Cognitive Deductive R
|
|
|
- Marvin Goodman
- 6 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Cognitive Deductive R Are Humans Rational RPI Selmer Bringsjord
2 Floridi s Continuum, and Claims ( Consciousness, Agents, and the Knowledge Game Minds & Machines) False Belief Task Wise Man Test (n) Deafening Test Torture Boots Test Ultimate Sifter Cutting-Edge AI Yes Yes No No No Zombies Yes Yes Yes Yes No Human Persons (s-conscious! p-conscious!) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3 Cracking False-Belief Tasks...
4 In SL, w/ real-time comm w/ ATP
5 In SL, w/ real-time comm w/ ATP
6 SNARK-USER 14 > (in-immature-scenario (prove '(t-retrieve subject teddybear c) :answer '(looks-in c))) (Refutation (Row 1 (or (not (person x)) (not (object y)) (not (container z)) (not (in y z)) (bel-in x y z)) assertion) (Row 2 (or (not (person x)) (not (container y)) (not (object z)) (not (w-retrieve x z)) (not (bel-in x z y)) (t-retrieve x z y)) assertion) (Row 4 (person subject) assertion) (Row 6 (container c2) assertion) (Row 7 (object teddybear) assertion) (Row 8 (in teddybear c2) assertion) (Row 9 (w-retrieve subject teddybear) assertion) (Row 10 (not (t-retrieve subject teddybear x)) negated_conjecture Answer (looks-in x)) (Row 11 (or (not (person x)) (bel-in x teddybear c2)) (rewrite (resolve 1 8) 6 7)) (Row 25 (bel-in subject teddybear c2) (resolve 11 4)) (Row 28 (t-retrieve subject teddybear c2) (rewrite (resolve 2 25) )) (Row 30 false (resolve 10 28) Answer (looks-in c2))) :PROOF-FOUND SNARK-USER 15 > (answer t) (LOOKS-IN C2)
7 SNARK-USER 12 > (in-mature-scenario (prove '(t-retrieve subject teddybear c) :answer '(looks-in c))) (Refutation (Row 1 (or (not (person x)) (not (container y)) (not (object z)) (not (w-retrieve x z)) (not (bel-in x z y)) (t-retrieve x z y)) assertion) (Row 2 (or (not (person x)) (not (object y)) (not (container z)) (not (p-in x y z)) (bel-in x y z)) assertion) (Row 4 (person subject) assertion) (Row 5 (container c1) assertion) (Row 7 (object teddybear) assertion) (Row 8 (p-in subject teddybear c1) assertion) (Row 9 (w-retrieve subject teddybear) assertion) (Row 10 (not (t-retrieve subject teddybear x)) negated_conjecture Answer (looks-in x)) (Row 11 (bel-in subject teddybear c1) (rewrite (resolve 2 8) 5 7 4)) (Row 25 (t-retrieve subject teddybear c1) (rewrite (resolve 1 11) )) (Row 26 false (resolve 10 25) Answer (looks-in c1)) ) :PROOF-FOUND SNARK-USER 13 > (answer t) (LOOKS-IN C1)
8 The present account of the false belief transition is incomplete in important ways. After all, our agent had only to choose the best of two known models. This begs an understanding of the dynamics of rational revision near threshold and when the space of possible models is far larger. Further, a single formal model ought ultimately to be applicable to many false belief tasks, and to reasoning about mental states more generally. Several components seem necessary to extend a particular theory of mind into such a framework theory: a richer representation for the propositional content and attitudes in these tasks, extension of the implicit quantifier over trials to one over situations and people, and a broader view of the probability distributions relating mental state variables. Each of these is an important direction for future research. Intuitive Theories of Mind: A Rational Approach to False Belief Goodman et al.
9 The present account of the false belief transition is incomplete in important ways. After all, our agent had only to choose the best of two known models. This begs an understanding of the dynamics of rational revision near threshold and when the space of possible models is far larger. Further, a single formal model ought ultimately to be applicable to many false belief tasks, and to reasoning about mental states more generally. Several components seem necessary to extend a particular theory of mind into such a framework theory: a richer representation for the propositional content and attitudes in these tasks, extension of the implicit quantifier over trials to one over situations and people, and a broader view of the probability distributions relating mental state variables. Each of these is an important direction for future research. Intuitive Theories of Mind: A Rational Approach to False Belief Goodman et al.
10 Done. The present account of the false belief transition is incomplete in important ways. After all, our agent had only to choose the best of two known models. This begs an understanding of the dynamics of rational revision near threshold and when the space of possible models is far larger. Further, a single formal model ought ultimately to be applicable to many false belief tasks, and to reasoning about mental states more generally. Several components seem necessary to extend a particular theory of mind into such a framework theory: a richer representation for the propositional content and attitudes in these tasks, extension of the implicit quantifier over trials to one over situations and people, and a broader view of the probability distributions relating mental state variables. Each of these is an important direction for future research. Intuitive Theories of Mind: A Rational Approach to False Belief Goodman et al. Done.
11 Cracking Wise Man Tests...
12 Wise Men Puzzle
13 Wise Men Puzzle Wise man A Wise man B Wise man C
14 Wise Men Puzzle I don t know Wise man A Wise man B Wise man C
15 Wise Men Puzzle I don t know I don t know Wise man A Wise man B Wise man C
16 Wise Men Puzzle I don t know I don t know I DO know Wise man A Wise man B Wise man C
17 Wise Men Puzzle I don t know I don t know I DO know Wise man A Wise man B Wise man C
18 Wise Men Puzzle I don t know I don t know I DO know Wise man A Wise man B Wise man C
19 Proof from WM3 Proposition: I have a white fez. Proof: Remember as a first fact that we all know that at least one of us has a white fez. When the first wise man says that he doesn't know, I immediately know that either WM2 has a white fez, or I do, or both of us does. I know this because if neither of us has a whilte fez, WM1 would have said immediately that in light of our first fact, he has a white fez. My next piece of info comes from what WM2 says; he says that he is also ignorant. Now, if he had seen no white fez on my head, he would have immediately said "I have a white fez!" (He would have said this because after WM1 spoke, he carried out the same reasoning I did, and hence ruled out the (WM2-bf & WM3-bf) permutation.) But this isn't what he said. Hence, I do have a white fez on my head. QED
20 Diagrammatic Version of Reasoning in WMP3 (pov of truly wise man; easy for rational humans)
21 All our humanauthored proofs machinechecked. Arkoudas-Proved-Sound Algorithm for Generating Proof-Theoretic Solution to WMPn
22 Life and Death Wise Man Test (3) * Again: Object-level reasoning, reasoning that produces object-level reasoning (e.g., methods), and direct, dirty, purely computational procedures.
23 Life and Death Wise Man Test (3) * Again: Object-level reasoning, reasoning that produces object-level reasoning (e.g., methods), and direct, dirty, purely computational procedures.
24 Now harder...
25 Floridi s Continuum, and Claims False Belief Task Wise Man Test (n) Deafening Test Torture Boots Test Ultimate Sifter Cutting-Edge AI Yes Yes No No No Zombies Yes Yes Yes Yes No Human Persons (s-conscious! p-conscious!) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
26 Floridi s Continuum, and Claims False Belief Task Wise Man Test (n) Deafening Test Torture Boots Test Ultimate Sifter Cutting-Edge AI Yes Yes No No No Zombies Yes Yes Yes Yes No Human Persons (s-conscious! p-conscious!) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
27 Floridi s Ultimate (s- and p- consciousness) Sifter Wise man A Wise man B Wise man C
28 poison innocuous Wise man A Wise man B Wise man C Poison pill strikes the taker dumb.
29 Wise man A Wise man B Wise man C
30 Have you been struck dumb Wise man A Wise man B Wise man C
31 Have you been struck dumb Heaven knows! Wise man A Wise man B Wise man C
32 Two possibilities: Subsequent silence: failure/death. Or...
33 NO!! Wise man A Wise man B Wise man C
34 Had I taken the dumbing tablet I would not have been able to report orally my state of ignorance about my dumb/non-dumb state, but I have been, and I know that I have been, as I have heard myself speaking and saw the guard reacting to my speaking, but this (my oral report) is possible only if I did not take the dumbing tablet, so I know I know I am in the non-dumb state, hence I know that... Luciano Floridi
35 h, i h, argument/proof i h Contrarian view on animal minds in Nat. Geo.:
36 h, i h, argument/proof i h Contrarian view on animal minds in Nat. Geo.:
37
38
39 Wise man A Wise man B Wise man C
40 So, there s work to be done... but despite the fact we can t build rational persons, we can build AIs that pass any short test. That s why Blade Runner (& Ex Machina) is our future. Wise man A Wise man B Wise man C
41 So, there s work to be done... but despite the fact we can t build rational persons, we can build AIs that pass any short test. That s why Blade Runner (& Ex Machina) is our future. Wise man A Wise man B Wise man C
Can machines think? Machines, who think. Are we machines? If so, then machines can think too. We compute since 1651.
Machines, who think. Can machines think? Comp 2920 Professional Issues & Ethics in Computer Science S2-2004 Cognitive Science (the science of how the mind works) assumes that the mind is computation. At
On Breaking the Spell of Irrationality (with treatment of Pascal s Wager) Selmer Bringsjord Are Humans Rational? 11/27/17 version 2 RPI
On Breaking the Spell of Irrationality (with treatment of Pascal s Wager) Selmer Bringsjord Are Humans Rational? 11/27/17 version 2 RPI Some Logistics Some Logistics Recall schedule: Next three classes
Logic and Artificial Intelligence Lecture 26
Logic and Artificial Intelligence Lecture 26 Eric Pacuit Currently Visiting the Center for Formal Epistemology, CMU Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science Tilburg University ai.stanford.edu/ epacuit
Rationalism. A. He, like others at the time, was obsessed with questions of truth and doubt
Rationalism I. Descartes (1596-1650) A. He, like others at the time, was obsessed with questions of truth and doubt 1. How could one be certain in the absence of religious guidance and trustworthy senses
A Model of Decidable Introspective Reasoning with Quantifying-In
A Model of Decidable Introspective Reasoning with Quantifying-In Gerhard Lakemeyer* Institut fur Informatik III Universitat Bonn Romerstr. 164 W-5300 Bonn 1, Germany e-mail: gerhard@uran.informatik.uni-bonn,de
On the hard problem of consciousness: Why is physics not enough?
On the hard problem of consciousness: Why is physics not enough? Hrvoje Nikolić Theoretical Physics Division, Rudjer Bošković Institute, P.O.B. 180, HR-10002 Zagreb, Croatia e-mail: hnikolic@irb.hr Abstract
15 Does God have a Nature?
15 Does God have a Nature? 15.1 Plantinga s Question So far I have argued for a theory of creation and the use of mathematical ways of thinking that help us to locate God. The question becomes how can
General Introduction
General Introduction T HE SUBJECT OF THIS BOOK IS A NEW FIELD OF RESEARCH: DEVELOPING ethics for machines, in contrast to developing ethics for human beings who use machines. The distinction is of practical
Contra Darwin, Humans are Rational Animals, But Mere Animals are Not; and Darwin is Irrational in Thinking Otherwise
Contra Darwin, Humans are Rational Animals, But Mere Animals are Not; and Darwin is Irrational in Thinking Otherwise Selmer Bringsjord Are Humans Rational? 11/6/17 RPI Logistics Logistics Logistics Again:
LTJ 27 2 [Start of recorded material] Interviewer: From the University of Leicester in the United Kingdom. This is Glenn Fulcher with the very first
![LTJ 27 2 [Start of recorded material] Interviewer: From the University of Leicester in the United Kingdom. This is Glenn Fulcher with the very first](/thumbs/86/93351903.jpg "LTJ 27 2 [Start of recorded material] Interviewer: From the University of Leicester in the United Kingdom. This is Glenn Fulcher with the very first")
LTJ 27 2 [Start of recorded material] Interviewer: From the University of Leicester in the United Kingdom. This is Glenn Fulcher with the very first issue of Language Testing Bytes. In this first Language
Here s a very dumbed down way to understand why Gödel is no threat at all to A.I..
Comments on Godel by Faustus from the Philosophy Forum Here s a very dumbed down way to understand why Gödel is no threat at all to A.I.. All Gödel shows is that try as you might, you can t create any
From Transcendental Logic to Transcendental Deduction
From Transcendental Logic to Transcendental Deduction Let me see if I can say a few things to re-cap our first discussion of the Transcendental Logic, and help you get a foothold for what follows. Kant
OSSA Conference Archive OSSA 8
University of Windsor Scholarship at UWindsor OSSA Conference Archive OSSA 8 Jun 3rd, 9:00 AM - Jun 6th, 5:00 PM Commentary on Goddu James B. Freeman Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive
2.1 Review. 2.2 Inference and justifications
Applied Logic Lecture 2: Evidence Semantics for Intuitionistic Propositional Logic Formal logic and evidence CS 4860 Fall 2012 Tuesday, August 28, 2012 2.1 Review The purpose of logic is to make reasoning
Causation and Free Will
Causation and Free Will T L Hurst Revised: 17th August 2011 Abstract This paper looks at the main philosophic positions on free will. It suggests that the arguments for causal determinism being compatible
Chapter 8 - Sentential Truth Tables and Argument Forms
Logic: A Brief Introduction Ronald L. Hall Stetson University Chapter 8 - Sentential ruth ables and Argument orms 8.1 Introduction he truth-value of a given truth-functional compound proposition depends
ON CAUSAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE MODELLING OF BELIEF CHANGE
ON CAUSAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE MODELLING OF BELIEF CHANGE A. V. RAVISHANKAR SARMA Our life in various phases can be construed as involving continuous belief revision activity with a bundle of accepted beliefs,
INF5020 Philosophy of Information: Ontology
WEEK 3, LECTURE a INF5020 Philosophy of Information: Ontology M. Naci Akkøk, Fall 2004 Page 1 THIS SESSION The goal History: We first talked about computation, complexity and looked at several definitions
ILLOCUTIONARY ORIGINS OF FAMILIAR LOGICAL OPERATORS
ILLOCUTIONARY ORIGINS OF FAMILIAR LOGICAL OPERATORS 1. ACTS OF USING LANGUAGE Illocutionary logic is the logic of speech acts, or language acts. Systems of illocutionary logic have both an ontological,
Understanding irrational numbers by means of their representation as non-repeating decimals
Understanding irrational numbers by means of their representation as non-repeating decimals Ivy Kidron To cite this version: Ivy Kidron. Understanding irrational numbers by means of their representation
Introduction: Belief vs Degrees of Belief
Introduction: Belief vs Degrees of Belief Hannes Leitgeb LMU Munich October 2014 My three lectures will be devoted to answering this question: How does rational (all-or-nothing) belief relate to degrees
Lecture 9. A summary of scientific methods Realism and Anti-realism
Lecture 9 A summary of scientific methods Realism and Anti-realism A summary of scientific methods and attitudes What is a scientific approach? This question can be answered in a lot of different ways.
Circularity in ethotic structures
Synthese (2013) 190:3185 3207 DOI 10.1007/s11229-012-0135-6 Circularity in ethotic structures Katarzyna Budzynska Received: 28 August 2011 / Accepted: 6 June 2012 / Published online: 24 June 2012 The Author(s)
Defining Ontological Naturalism
Marcin Miłkowski, Polish Academy of Science Institute of Philosophy & Defining Ontological Naturalism Sociology 07/08/08 Overview Naturalism vs. physicalism Hempel's dilemma for physicalism Physicalism
Realism and instrumentalism
Published in H. Pashler (Ed.) The Encyclopedia of the Mind (2013), Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, pp. 633 636 doi:10.4135/9781452257044 mark.sprevak@ed.ac.uk Realism and instrumentalism Mark Sprevak
PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC AND LANGUAGE OVERVIEW LOGICAL CONSTANTS WEEK 5: MODEL-THEORETIC CONSEQUENCE JONNY MCINTOSH
PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC AND LANGUAGE WEEK 5: MODEL-THEORETIC CONSEQUENCE JONNY MCINTOSH OVERVIEW Last week, I discussed various strands of thought about the concept of LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE, introducing Tarski's
A Scientific Model Explains Spirituality and Nonduality
A Scientific Model Explains Spirituality and Nonduality Frank Heile, Ph.D. Physics degrees from Stanford and MIT frank@spiritualityexplained.com www.spiritualityexplained.com Science and Nonduality Conference
Masters in Logic and Metaphysics
Masters in Logic and Metaphysics Programme Requirements The Department of Philosophy, in collaboration with the Department of Philosophy at the University of Stirling, offer the following postgraduate
Negative Introspection Is Mysterious
Negative Introspection Is Mysterious Abstract. The paper provides a short argument that negative introspection cannot be algorithmic. This result with respect to a principle of belief fits to what we know
Logic I or Moving in on the Monkey & Bananas Problem
Logic I or Moving in on the Monkey & Bananas Problem We said that an agent receives percepts from its environment, and performs actions on that environment; and that the action sequence can be based on
Contradictory Information Can Be Better than Nothing The Example of the Two Firemen
Contradictory Information Can Be Better than Nothing The Example of the Two Firemen J. Michael Dunn School of Informatics and Computing, and Department of Philosophy Indiana University-Bloomington Workshop
ASPECTS OF PROOF IN MATHEMATICS RESEARCH
ASPECTS OF PROOF IN MATHEMATICS RESEARCH Juan Pablo Mejía-Ramos University of Warwick Without having a clear definition of what proof is, mathematicians distinguish proofs from other types of argument.
A New Parameter for Maintaining Consistency in an Agent's Knowledge Base Using Truth Maintenance System
A New Parameter for Maintaining Consistency in an Agent's Knowledge Base Using Truth Maintenance System Qutaibah Althebyan, Henry Hexmoor Department of Computer Science and Computer Engineering University
1 Logical dynamics, agency, and intelligent interaction
1 Logical dynamics, agency, and intelligent interaction 1.1 Logical dynamics of information-driven agency Human life is a history of millions of actions flowing along with a stream of information. We plan
6.080 / Great Ideas in Theoretical Computer Science Spring 2008
MIT OpenCourseWare http://ocw.mit.edu 6.080 / 6.089 Great Ideas in Theoretical Computer Science Spring 2008 For information about citing these materials or our Terms of Use, visit: http://ocw.mit.edu/terms.
Computational Metaphysics
Computational Metaphysics John Rushby Computer Science Laboratory SRI International Menlo Park CA USA John Rushby, SR I Computational Metaphysics 1 Metaphysics The word comes from Andronicus of Rhodes,
On David Chalmers's The Conscious Mind
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LIX, No.2, June 1999 On David Chalmers's The Conscious Mind SYDNEY SHOEMAKER Cornell University One does not have to agree with the main conclusions of David
1/10. The Fourth Paralogism and the Refutation of Idealism
1/10 The Fourth Paralogism and the Refutation of Idealism The Fourth Paralogism is quite different from the three that preceded it because, although it is treated as a part of rational psychology, it main
INTERMEDIATE LOGIC Glossary of key terms
1 GLOSSARY INTERMEDIATE LOGIC BY JAMES B. NANCE INTERMEDIATE LOGIC Glossary of key terms This glossary includes terms that are defined in the text in the lesson and on the page noted. It does not include
Chapter 1. Introduction. 1.1 Deductive and Plausible Reasoning Strong Syllogism
Contents 1 Introduction 3 1.1 Deductive and Plausible Reasoning................... 3 1.1.1 Strong Syllogism......................... 3 1.1.2 Weak Syllogism.......................... 4 1.1.3 Transitivity
PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC AND LANGUAGE OVERVIEW FREGE JONNY MCINTOSH 1. FREGE'S CONCEPTION OF LOGIC
PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC AND LANGUAGE JONNY MCINTOSH 1. FREGE'S CONCEPTION OF LOGIC OVERVIEW These lectures cover material for paper 108, Philosophy of Logic and Language. They will focus on issues in philosophy
Reasoning and Decision-Making under Uncertainty
Reasoning and Decision-Making under Uncertainty 3. Termin: Uncertainty, Degrees of Belief and Probabilities Prof. Dr.-Ing. Stefan Kopp Center of Excellence Cognitive Interaction Technology AG A Intelligent
High Power Manifesting by Richard Lee McKim Jr.
High Power Manifesting by Richard Lee McKim Jr. Received via email from OWK... High Power Manifesting This is the VERY ADVANCED course on Manifesting. Frankly, this is how Manifesting is done in Higher
Why the Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever Cannot Be Solved in Less than Three Questions
J Philos Logic (2012) 41:493 503 DOI 10.1007/s10992-011-9181-7 Why the Hardest Logic Puzzle Ever Cannot Be Solved in Less than Three Questions Gregory Wheeler & Pedro Barahona Received: 11 August 2010
Logic Appendix: More detailed instruction in deductive logic
Logic Appendix: More detailed instruction in deductive logic Standardizing and Diagramming In Reason and the Balance we have taken the approach of using a simple outline to standardize short arguments,
Review of Philosophical Logic: An Introduction to Advanced Topics *
Teaching Philosophy 36 (4):420-423 (2013). Review of Philosophical Logic: An Introduction to Advanced Topics * CHAD CARMICHAEL Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis This book serves as a concise
What is a counterexample?
Lorentz Center 4 March 2013 What is a counterexample? Jan-Willem Romeijn, University of Groningen Joint work with Eric Pacuit, University of Maryland Paul Pedersen, Max Plank Institute Berlin Co-authors
Formalizing a Deductively Open Belief Space
Formalizing a Deductively Open Belief Space CSE Technical Report 2000-02 Frances L. Johnson and Stuart C. Shapiro Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Center for Multisource Information Fusion,
ELEMENTS OF LOGIC. 1.1 What is Logic? Arguments and Propositions
Handout 1 ELEMENTS OF LOGIC 1.1 What is Logic? Arguments and Propositions In our day to day lives, we find ourselves arguing with other people. Sometimes we want someone to do or accept something as true
The Theoretical Model of GOD: Proof of the Existence and of the Uniqueness of GOD
March 2010 Vol. 1 Issue 2 Page 85-97 85 Article The Theoretical Model of GOD: Proof of the Existence and of the Uniqueness of GOD Temur Z. Kalanov ABSTRACT The work is devoted to the 21st century s most
The Extended Mind. But, what if the mind is like that? That is, what if the mind extends beyond the brain?
The Extended Mind 1. The Extended Body: We often have no problem accepting that the body can be augmented or extended in certain ways. For instance, it is not so far-fetched to think of someone s prosthetic
Artificial Intelligence: Valid Arguments and Proof Systems. Prof. Deepak Khemani. Department of Computer Science and Engineering
Artificial Intelligence: Valid Arguments and Proof Systems Prof. Deepak Khemani Department of Computer Science and Engineering Indian Institute of Technology, Madras Module 02 Lecture - 03 So in the last
Study. In Wooldridge, M., and Jennings, N. R., eds., 890 in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 71{85. Springer Verlag. appear.
we have shown how the modularity of belief contexts provides elaboration tolerance. First, we have shown how reasoning about mutual and nested beliefs, common belief, ignorance and ignorance ascription,
1/12. The A Paralogisms
1/12 The A Paralogisms The character of the Paralogisms is described early in the chapter. Kant describes them as being syllogisms which contain no empirical premises and states that in them we conclude
Intuitive evidence and formal evidence in proof-formation
Intuitive evidence and formal evidence in proof-formation Okada Mitsuhiro Section I. Introduction. I would like to discuss proof formation 1 as a general methodology of sciences and philosophy, with a
subject are complex and somewhat conflicting. For details see Wang (1993).
Yesterday s Algorithm: Penrose and the Gödel Argument 1. The Gödel Argument. Roger Penrose is justly famous for his work in physics and mathematics but he is notorious for his endorsement of the Gödel
P=NP Proved, Disproved, Varies Based on Problem or issue, and Indeterminate Based on Similarity between Checked and Find
From the SelectedWorks of James T Struck Winter March 2, 2018 P=NP Proved, Disproved, Varies Based on Problem or issue, and Indeterminate Based on Similarity between Checked and Find James T Struck Available
spring 05 topics in philosophy of mind session 7
24.500 spring 05 topics in philosophy of mind session 7 teatime self-knowledge 24.500 S05 1 plan self-blindness, one more time Peacocke & Co. immunity to error through misidentification: Shoemaker s self-reference
MISSOURI S FRAMEWORK FOR CURRICULAR DEVELOPMENT IN MATH TOPIC I: PROBLEM SOLVING
Prentice Hall Mathematics:,, 2004 Missouri s Framework for Curricular Development in Mathematics (Grades 9-12) TOPIC I: PROBLEM SOLVING 1. Problem-solving strategies such as organizing data, drawing a
Rethinking Knowledge: The Heuristic View
http://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783319532363 Carlo Cellucci Rethinking Knowledge: The Heuristic View 1 Preface From its very beginning, philosophy has been viewed as aimed at knowledge and methods to
An Alternative View of Schizophrenic Cognition
of Schizophrenic Cognition DOUGLAS M. SNYDER ABSTRACT An alternative view to the traditionally held view that schizophrenia is characterised by severely disordered cognition is presented. It is possible
Richard L. W. Clarke, Notes REASONING
1 REASONING Reasoning is, broadly speaking, the cognitive process of establishing reasons to justify beliefs, conclusions, actions or feelings. It also refers, more specifically, to the act or process
Lecture 4. Before beginning the present lecture, I should give the solution to the homework problem
1 Lecture 4 Before beginning the present lecture, I should give the solution to the homework problem posed in the last lecture: how, within the framework of coordinated content, might we define the notion
Pronominal, temporal and descriptive anaphora
Pronominal, temporal and descriptive anaphora Dept. of Philosophy Radboud University, Nijmegen Overview Overview Temporal and presuppositional anaphora Kripke s and Kamp s puzzles Some additional data
REVIEW. Hilary Putnam, Representation and Reality. Cambridge, Nass.: NIT Press, 1988.
REVIEW Hilary Putnam, Representation and Reality. Cambridge, Nass.: NIT Press, 1988. In his new book, 'Representation and Reality', Hilary Putnam argues against the view that intentional idioms (with as
Rosen, Discrete Mathematics and Its Applications, 6th edition Extra Examples
Rosen, Discrete Mathematics and Its Applications, 6th edition Extra Examples Section 1.1 Propositional Logic Page references correspond to locations of Extra Examples icons in the textbook. p.2, icon at
A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC FOR METAPHYSICIANS
A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC FOR METAPHYSICIANS 0. Logic, Probability, and Formal Structure Logic is often divided into two distinct areas, inductive logic and deductive logic. Inductive logic is concerned
INQUIRY AS INQUIRY: A LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY
INQUIRY AS INQUIRY: A LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY JAAKKO HINTIKKA SELECTED PAPERS VOLUME 5 1. Ludwig Wittgenstein. Half-Truths and One-and-a-Half-Truths. 1996 ISBN 0-7923-4091-4 2. Lingua Universalis
Logic and Pragmatics: linear logic for inferential practice
Logic and Pragmatics: linear logic for inferential practice Daniele Porello danieleporello@gmail.com Institute for Logic, Language & Computation (ILLC) University of Amsterdam, Plantage Muidergracht 24
Craig on the Experience of Tense
Craig on the Experience of Tense In his recent book, The Tensed Theory of Time: A Critical Examination, 1 William Lane Craig offers several criticisms of my views on our experience of time. The purpose
THE STUDY OF UNKNOWN AND UNKNOWABILITY IN KANT S PHILOSOPHY
THE STUDY OF UNKNOWN AND UNKNOWABILITY IN KANT S PHILOSOPHY Subhankari Pati Research Scholar Pondicherry University, Pondicherry The present aim of this paper is to highlights the shortcomings in Kant
DOWNLOAD OR READ : THEO LOGIC VOL 3 THE SPIRIT OF TRUTH PDF EBOOK EPUB MOBI
DOWNLOAD OR READ : THEO LOGIC VOL 3 THE SPIRIT OF TRUTH PDF EBOOK EPUB MOBI Page 1 Page 2 theo logic vol 3 the spirit of truth theo logic vol 3 pdf theo logic vol 3 the spirit of truth THEO LOGIC VOL 3
By submitting this essay, I attest that it is my own work, completed in accordance with University regulations. Minh Alexander Nguyen
DRST 004: Directed Studies Philosophy Professor Matthew Noah Smith By submitting this essay, I attest that it is my own work, completed in accordance with University regulations. Minh Alexander Nguyen
A s a contracts professional, from
18 Contract Management June 2015 Contract Management June 2015 19 A s a contracts professional, from time to time you must answer a question, resolve an issue, explain something, or make a decision based
Positive Philosophy, Freedom and Democracy. Roger Bishop Jones
Positive Philosophy, Freedom and Democracy Roger Bishop Jones Started: 3rd December 2011 Last Change Date: 2011/12/04 19:50:45 http://www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/www/books/ppfd/ppfdpam.pdf Id: pamtop.tex,v
1/9. The First Analogy
1/9 The First Analogy So far we have looked at the mathematical principles but now we are going to turn to the dynamical principles, of which there are two sorts, the Analogies of Experience and the Postulates
Positive Philosophy, Freedom and Democracy. Roger Bishop Jones
Positive Philosophy, Freedom and Democracy Roger Bishop Jones June 5, 2012 www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/www/books/ppfd/ppfdbook.pdf c Roger Bishop Jones; Contents 1 Introduction 1 2 Metaphysical Positivism 3
Ethical System Formalization using Non-Monotonic Logics
Ethical System Formalization using Non-Monotonic Logics Jean-Gabriel Ganascia (Jean-Gabriel.Ganascia@lip6.fr) LIP6, University Paris VI, 104 avenue du Président Kennedy 75016, Paris, FRANCE Abstract Ethics
Final grades will be determined by 6 components: Midterm 20% Final 20% Problem Sets 20% Papers 20% Quizzes 10% Section 10%
course phil 610: Philosophy & Science, Spring 2018 instructors J. Dmitri Gallow ( : jdmitrigallow@pitt.edu) Adam Marushak ( : adshak@gmail.com) lecture times Tuesdays and Thursdays, 14:00 14:50 Room 324,
Chapter 3: Basic Propositional Logic. Based on Harry Gensler s book For CS2209A/B By Dr. Charles Ling;
Chapter 3: Basic Propositional Logic Based on Harry Gensler s book For CS2209A/B By Dr. Charles Ling; cling@csd.uwo.ca The Ultimate Goals Accepting premises (as true), is the conclusion (always) true?
The Kripkenstein Paradox and the Private World. In his paper, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Languages, Kripke expands upon a conclusion
24.251: Philosophy of Language Paper 2: S.A. Kripke, On Rules and Private Language 21 December 2011 The Kripkenstein Paradox and the Private World In his paper, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Languages,
Coordination Problems
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LXXXI No. 2, September 2010 Ó 2010 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC Coordination Problems scott soames
Logic for Computer Science - Week 1 Introduction to Informal Logic
Logic for Computer Science - Week 1 Introduction to Informal Logic Ștefan Ciobâcă November 30, 2017 1 Propositions A proposition is a statement that can be true or false. Propositions are sometimes called
Illustrating Deduction. A Didactic Sequence for Secondary School
Illustrating Deduction. A Didactic Sequence for Secondary School Francisco Saurí Universitat de València. Dpt. de Lògica i Filosofia de la Ciència Cuerpo de Profesores de Secundaria. IES Vilamarxant (España)
On A New Cosmological Argument
On A New Cosmological Argument Richard Gale and Alexander Pruss A New Cosmological Argument, Religious Studies 35, 1999, pp.461 76 present a cosmological argument which they claim is an improvement over
Reason and Explanation: A Defense of Explanatory Coherentism. BY TED POSTON (Basingstoke,
Reason and Explanation: A Defense of Explanatory Coherentism. BY TED POSTON (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. Pp. 208. Price 60.) In this interesting book, Ted Poston delivers an original and
A Theory of Immediate Collective Liberation
A Theory of Immediate Collective Liberation A presentation for Plan C London January 19, 2016 Overview 1. Revolution as an immediate goal 2. How the 20th century outpaced radical theory 3. A political
Brief Remarks on Putnam and Realism in Mathematics * Charles Parsons. Hilary Putnam has through much of his philosophical life meditated on
Version 3.0, 10/26/11. Brief Remarks on Putnam and Realism in Mathematics * Charles Parsons Hilary Putnam has through much of his philosophical life meditated on the notion of realism, what it is, what
Is Truth the Primary Epistemic Goal? Joseph Barnes
Is Truth the Primary Epistemic Goal? Joseph Barnes I. Motivation: what hangs on this question? II. How Primary? III. Kvanvig's argument that truth isn't the primary epistemic goal IV. David's argument
(1) A phrase may be denoting, and yet not denote anything; e.g., 'the present King of France'.
On Denoting By Russell Based on the 1903 article By a 'denoting phrase' I mean a phrase such as any one of the following: a man, some man, any man, every man, all men, the present King of England, the
First Truths. G. W. Leibniz
Copyright Jonathan Bennett 2017. All rights reserved [Brackets] enclose editorial explanations. Small dots enclose material that has been added, but can be read as though it were part of the original text.
The Problem with Complete States: Freedom, Chance and the Luck Argument
The Problem with Complete States: Freedom, Chance and the Luck Argument Richard Johns Department of Philosophy University of British Columbia August 2006 Revised March 2009 The Luck Argument seems to show
A Riddle of Induction
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/learning-formal/ (On Goodman s New Riddle of Induction) This illustrates how means-ends analysis can evaluate methods: the bold method meets the goal of reliably arriving
Foundations of Non-Monotonic Reasoning
Foundations of Non-Monotonic Reasoning Notation S A - from a set of premisses S we can derive a conclusion A. Example S: All men are mortal Socrates is a man. A: Socrates is mortal. x.man(x) mortal(x)
Department of Philosophy TCD. Great Philosophers. Dennett. Tom Farrell. Department of Surgical Anatomy RCSI Department of Clinical Medicine RCSI
Department of Philosophy TCD Great Philosophers Dennett Tom Farrell Department of Philosophy TCD Department of Surgical Anatomy RCSI Department of Clinical Medicine RCSI 1. Socrates 2. Plotinus 3. Augustine
Artificial Intelligence Prof. Deepak Khemani Department of Computer Science and Engineering Indian Institute of Technology, Madras
(Refer Slide Time: 00:26) Artificial Intelligence Prof. Deepak Khemani Department of Computer Science and Engineering Indian Institute of Technology, Madras Lecture - 06 State Space Search Intro So, today
Deflationism and the Gödel Phenomena: Reply to Ketland Neil Tennant
Deflationism and the Gödel Phenomena: Reply to Ketland Neil Tennant I am not a deflationist. I believe that truth and falsity are substantial. The truth of a proposition consists in its having a constructive
Circumscribing Inconsistency
Circumscribing Inconsistency Philippe Besnard IRISA Campus de Beaulieu F-35042 Rennes Cedex Torsten H. Schaub* Institut fur Informatik Universitat Potsdam, Postfach 60 15 53 D-14415 Potsdam Abstract We
JELIA Justification Logic. Sergei Artemov. The City University of New York
JELIA 2008 Justification Logic Sergei Artemov The City University of New York Dresden, September 29, 2008 This lecture outlook 1. What is Justification Logic? 2. Why do we need Justification Logic? 3.
Lonergan on General Transcendent Knowledge. In General Transcendent Knowledge, Chapter 19 of Insight, Lonergan does several things:
Lonergan on General Transcendent Knowledge In General Transcendent Knowledge, Chapter 19 of Insight, Lonergan does several things: 1-3--He provides a radical reinterpretation of the meaning of transcendence