- Do young adults (defined here as 18 to 29 years old) differ significantly from older respondents with regard to selected religious variables?

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1 Religiosity and Spirituality among Young Adults Anton A. Bucher, Salzburg University A widespread notion about youths and young adults holds that in this phase of their lives, their attachment to religious communities becomes looser, their agreement with religious beliefs more tentative, and religiosity overall less relevant to their lives. Nearly every era has joined in an elegy lamenting the rising generation s failure to sufficiently internalize the corpus of handed-down religious convictions, resulting in the abandonment of religious traditions and the spread of secularization. Young people no longer believe in the gods so went the complaint of a scribe who was still writing on clay tablets in Sumerian cuneiform writing. However, Ziebertz s analysis (2007) of Religion Monitor data for Germany shows that one cannot simply speak of a rupture of religious tradition in the young adult years. It is true that younger people attend religious services less often; but just like their older counterparts, a third of young adults agree with the central tenet of Christianity: that a personal God exists. Do Ziebertz s observations also apply to countries with other cultural backgrounds, such as Latin American or Islamic ones? Particularly in the latter, the public presence of religion is disproportionately stronger than in Western/American cultures shaped by individualism and pluralism. The Religion Monitor data is imposing, and it cannot be completely incorporated into the present interpretive analysis. This analysis focuses mainly on two questions: - Do young adults (defined here as 18 to 29 years old) differ significantly from older respondents with regard to selected religious variables? - Are there striking differences here among different countries or cultures? My analysis is limited to the five indicators that measure the centrality of religiosity: frequency of reflection on religious issues (intellect), strength of belief in God or the divine and an afterlife (ideology), private and public religious practice, religious experience, and the effects of religiosity on (moral) conduct. Two religious emotions are also scrutinized. There are good reasons to pay closer attention to them not only because such a renowned theologian as Schleiermacher classified religiosity primarily as an emotion but also because 1

2 recent brain research has identified its importance for cognitive processes, attitudes, attachment behavior, etc. My analysis subsequently explores religious and spiritual self-concepts. A topos of recent work in the psychology of religion is that young people increasingly characterize themselves as more spiritual than religious (Fuller 2001). I further ask whether young adults are more open to pluralism or instead tend toward fundamentalism, and whether they see life merely as one part of natural evolution which can be interpreted as an indicator of a primarily scientific understanding of existence. Do young adults think about religious issues less often than older people? The more frequently religiosity is reflected upon, the more relevant it becomes. The first indicator for measuring the centrality of religiosity is intellect. One of the questions that operationalizes it is: How often do you think about religious issues? The responses vary tremendously. Young people in Nigeria grapple with such issues most frequently, with 74 percent responding often or very often. (In the following, percentages refer consistently to these two responses combined.) They are followed by the United States (52%), Israel and Brazil (each with 48%), and Turkey (46%). Young Russians are the least likely to wrestle with religious issues (8%), followed by the Austrians (12%) even though Austria is considered traditionally Catholic, and as of 1999, according to the European Value Study [Europäischer Wertestudie] 75 percent of the total population regarded itself as religious (Denz et al. 2000: 102). They are followed by the young adults in South Korea (15%), Thailand and France (each with 19%), Spain (22%), and Poland (24%). In eleven countries, young adults think about religious questions significantly less often than the general population. This is most striking in Austria but also true for Switzerland, South Korea, Poland, Russia, Great Britain, Italy, the United States, Thailand, Australia, and Spain that is, mainly the industrialized nations. By contrast, the younger generation does not grapple with religious issues any less frequently in the especially religious countries of Latin America and Africa. Only in one country do young people reflect on religion more often than older people: Israel, where religiosity is evidently increasing among the younger generation. Thus, in most of the countries studied, the younger generation thinks about religious issues less often than older people. This is true primarily in the more secularized nations but also in a handful of developing countries, such as Thailand. The infrequency of religious reflection is 2

3 striking in Guatemala (33%), although 96 percent of respondents there believe in God quite a bit or very much. In those countries where young adults think about religious issues as often as older ones, religiosity is extremely present and influential in public life. Do young adults believe in God and an afterlife? In his classic work, The Varieties of Religious Experience (original 1902), William James defined religiosity as a relationship to a deity, which presupposes belief in its existence. Do young adults still share such a belief? For the most part, yes, though with major national differences. God is unquestionable for young Moroccans, 99 percent of whom are quite a bit or very much sure of His existence. They are followed by the young people in Guatemala, Nigeria, Turkey and Brazil (all over 90%), and Israel (83%), Indonesia (81%) and Italy (79%). At the bottom of the spectrum are the Russians with 20 percent, followed by Austria (31%) and France (32%). Especially in developing countries and in those where Islam is influential, young people believe in God as strongly as do their older compatriots. It is mainly the industrial nations where belief in God is weaker in the rising generation especially in Spain, where 50 percent of the general population is quite a bit or very much sure of God s existence (young adults: 34%) and where it was further determined that more people believe in God with advancing age. Findings were similar for Austria and (to a lesser extent) for Switzerland, France and Russia. In Great Britain, by contrast, young adults are somewhat more likely to believe in God than are those in midlife. Israel is an outlier insofar as 83 percent of its young adults believe in God, against only 59 percent of the oldest cohort. This is difficult to explain, but it can be seen that especially in those countries where secularization is comparatively advanced, young adults are less likely to describe themselves as believing in God. One cannot speak here of similar trends worldwide. Belief in God can mean regarding God as some sort of higher being that has its own realm and is complete and content in itself like the Epicurean gods who dwell self-sufficiently in the spaces where no atoms exist. But belief can also mean counting on God s concrete intervention in the affairs of the world helpfully, in the best case, but also to sanction and punish. A study on the acceptance of religion classes in Germany s public schools found that more students have a basic belief in God than believe He intervenes in the immanent world. 3

4 Those who find it plausible that God intervenes concretely in world affairs also agree significantly more strongly with Christian beliefs, regard themselves as more religious, and conduct their lives with greater regard for religious commandments (Bucher 2001). Do Religion Monitor respondents similarly count on God intervening in their lives? If so, in terms of developmental psychology this may indicate that they have not yet achieved the third stage of religious judgment according to Oser and Gmünder (1996): deism. In our study, too, more respondents overall believe in God than in His intervention in their lives. And once again, national differences are enormous in the younger generation. Three quarters of young Indonesians agree that God intervenes in their lives often or very often, followed by Brazil (71%), Nigeria (70%), Guatemala (57%) and Morocco (54%). Once again, in developing countries and those influenced by Islam, more young people than average profess that God intervenes directly in their lives. The situation looks different in the highly industrialized countries. In Austria, 5 percent stated that God intervenes in their lives often or very often, followed by Russia (9%), France and Spain (12%), Great Britain (15%) and Switzerland (16%). One exception is Thailand, where just 4 percent reported divine intervention. But this is most easily explained by the fact that 93 percent of Thai respondents are adherents of Buddhism, which is not a theistic religion. Do young adults experience God s intervention in their lives less often than older respondents? Only partly. The age-related differences are greater in industrialized countries than in developing ones. In Nigeria, 73 percent of the population believes in an actively intervening God; this figure is only three percent lower for the young generation. In Indonesia, there is no generational difference at all, while young adults in Austria are three times less likely to believe in divine intervention than is the general population (5% versus 14%). Spain is similar: The oldest group (60 and older) concurs with divine intervention three times as often (35%) as the youngest. Older Italians, too, more often experience an intervening God, as is also true for older individuals in Switzerland, Russia and Australia. Age-related differences are less marked in the United States, where 44 percent of young people experience an active God often or very often, compared to 48 percent of the general population. Again, Israel represents a striking exception. Half of its youngest generation believes in divine intervention, against 42 percent of the general population. A particularly striking finding here is that only 26 percent of the oldest Israeli respondents count on an actively intervening God. 4

5 Figure 1: According to the neuropsychologists Newberg et al. (2004), religiosity evolved to allow the brain and the individual consciousness the illusion of not being destroyed by death. One essential function of religion has been to help people deal with the great transcendence. Do young adults believe less strongly in a life after death, be it in the form of an immortal soul, resurrection, or reincarnation? Belief in life after death is particularly strong in countries influenced by Islam, especially Morocco and Turkey, where 92 percent of young adults are quite or very much sure of it, trailed by Nigeria (76%) and Guatemala (72%). In the 5

6 traditionally Catholic countries of Poland and Italy, too, an above-average number of young men and women believe that death is not final (each with 61%). Belief in an afterlife is weakest among young Russians (16%), South Koreans (23%), Indians (28%), and Thais (29%), although belief in reincarnation has a thousand-year-old tradition in Thailand. In Brazil, whose respondents scored above average on the variables discussed thus far, 53 percent believe in a hereafter. In central European countries, the proportion of those who are at least quite certain of it fluctuates around approximately one-third. Only in a few countries are young adults less likely than the older population to believe in an afterlife as in Austria (with 38 percent of young people versus 43 percent of the general population), South Korea (23% versus 30%), Russia (16% versus 20%), Spain (30% versus 34%), and the United States (52% versus 60%). In a number of industrialized nations, young adults are actually more convinced of an afterlife, as in France (33% versus 29%), Great Britain (34% versus 31%), Italy (61% versus 55%), and unsurprisingly Israel, where 54 percent of young adults are sure of our continued existence while only 21 percent of adults over age 60 believe in it. These inconsistent age-related trends are again difficult to interpret, quite apart from the fact that closed-ended survey questions cannot reveal a differentiated picture of how exactly respondents imagine existence after death. In any event, the data clearly argue against the possible thesis that young adults in the more secularized countries are abandoning belief in an afterlife to the same extent as religious practice in both private (prayer) and public (worship services) forms. How often do young adults pray? Prayer is the central phenomenon of religion thus began Friedrich Heiler s classic study on prayer (1919). How often do young adults pray in different cultures, and do they pray less often than the older population? Young men and women pray much more often in developing countries and those influenced by Islam. Nigeria leads with 93 percent praying once a day or several times a day, followed by Guatemala (88%), India (75%), Turkey and Brazil (74%), Morocco (72%), and Indonesia. Young adults pray least often in Russia (8%) and in the highly industrialized nations: Austria (7%), France (9%), Spain (12%) and Switzerland (14%). The exception is the United States, where more than half (57%) report praying at least 6

7 once a day a striking indication that the socioreligious situation there is not comparable with Europe s (Hoge 2003). Figure 2: The more frequently people pray in individual countries, the more often young people pray and the less pronounced are the age-related trends. In Nigeria, the percentage of young people who pray is almost identical with the percentage in the general population; the same is true for Brazil, Indonesia and Guatemala. In the highly industrialized countries, by contrast, young 7

8 people pray much less often than the general population. This is the case in Austria (7% versus 21%), as well as Switzerland, Spain and France. Even in Poland, a traditionally Catholic country, young people pray less often (34% versus 51%). Only in Israel do young people pray slightly more often than the average (36% versus 32%). In most countries, women pray more often than men in Italy, for example, 59 versus 34 percent. The findings for the public practice of religion specifically, worship services or (in Islamic contexts) congregational prayer are comparable to those for private prayer. Worship services are attended at least weekly by 91 percent of the young Nigerian population, 84 percent in Guatemala, 69 percent in Indonesia (congregational prayer), 58 percent in Morocco, and just over half of young Brazilians. Young people in France and Russia attend worship services least frequently with just one percent going at least once per week, followed by 5 percent in Austria, 7 percent in Switzerland, and 13 percent in Great Britain. What was already true for prayer is also evident here: Age effects are scarcely visible in highly religious countries (developing countries and those with Islamic influence). In India, 53 percent of the general population attends a religious event at least once per week; for young people this is 50 percent. In Brazil, these figures are 55 versus 52 percent. The situation looks different in Austria, where the percentage of young people who regularly attend worship services (5%) is a quarter of that for the general population (20%). Similarly, in secular France 8 percent of the general population attends mass weekly, but only one percent of young adults. Young Italians also go to church significantly less often (29% versus 39%), as do Spaniards (10% versus 19%). One might surmise that more collectivistic cultures (Africa, the Far East) value the public practice of religion, in particular, more highly than do more individualistic cultures. Arguing against this, however, is the fact that in one of the most highly individualized cultures the United States considerably more people attend church regularly (40%) than in Europe. Most likely, the more a society values religiosity, the stronger the religious socialization of each rising generation will be. Willingness to live according to religious commandments All religions expect their adherents to live according to their commandments or a particular ethos, be it the Ten Commandments, the Sunnah, etc. Due to changes in childrearing practices that have occurred mainly in the highly industrialized countries over the past decades from a 8

9 household based on authoritative obedience toward one based on socially integrative negotiation one can assume that young people in these countries display less willingness to adjust their behavior to a religious code. In fact, 9 percent of young Austrians live quite a bit or very much according to religious commandments. In Russia, it is 8 percent, followed by South Korea (11%), Switzerland and France (each with 15%), Spain (16%), and Great Britain (21%). Leading the pack is Nigeria (84%), followed by Indonesia (55%), Israel (53%), Italy (52%), and Poland (51%). The last two are two traditionally Catholic countries where scores for other variables (especially frequency of prayer) tend to be low. It is striking that young Indians score relatively low with 43 percent, as do Moroccans (40%), and especially Brazilians (35%) although 74 percent of Brazilians report praying at least once a day. Thus, especially in industrialized countries, the younger respondents focus less on religious commandments in everyday life than do their elders. The age-related trend is enormous in Austria, where 43 percent of respondents over 60 reported living quite a bit or very much according to the commandments (younger respondents: 9%). Similarly, in Australia 64 percent of the oldest respondents follow the commandments at least quite a bit against 25 percent of young adults, followed by Spain (54% versus 16%). The same trend was ascertained for Switzerland, though in a less pronounced form: 31 versus 15 percent, followed by Great Britain (31% versus 21%), Italy (69% versus 52%), Poland (62% versus 51%), South Korea (35% versus 11%), and the United States (64% versus 49%). This trend does not diverge all that strongly from trends in developing countries and countries influenced by Islam. To be sure, young adults in Nigeria are just as willing as their elders to orient their behavior toward a religious code. In Turkey, though, young people do this significantly less (41%) than the oldest group (70%). In Thailand, this willingness is just over half as prevalent among young people (24%) as among those over 60 (45%), and Brazil is similar (35% versus 59%). The same trend exists albeit in weaker form in Morocco, India, and Indonesia. 9

10 Figure 3: Why are these trends present not just in more individualistic (Western) cultures but also in those that are more collectivistic? One possible explanation is that values based on individual freedom the negative correlate of a life conforming to religious commandments have gained credibility in non-western countries, too, due to globalization (especially through the media), and that this is more pronounced among young people than among older ones. At the same time, religious convictions and practices whose high status is solidly embedded in those cultures have not lost their relevance. 10

11 Young adults: Less fear and more joy in religion? Whether a person joins or leaves a religious community is rarely the result solely of sober and rational deliberation; the gut is involved in religious decisions, too. The discussion below singles out two emotions from the Religion Monitor s inventory, joy and fear. The first was selected because many religious expressly promise joy, as in the Gospels; the latter, because it is an especially intense emotion that more than others compels people to take action. The young people most like to experience joy very often or often in relation to God or the divine are those in Morocco at 88 percent, followed by Brazil and Indonesia (each with 85%), India (84%), Guatemala (83%), Nigeria (80%), and Turkey (74%) that is, young people in developing countries and those influenced by Islam. In the Western industrialized nations, the degree of divine joy among young adults varies considerably. It is highest in Italy (70%) and the United States (59%), and lowest in Austria (16%), Russia (21%), Spain (23%), and France (25%). Are young adults more likely to experience joy in their relationship to God or the divine? In highly religious countries there are at most slight age effects; in Morocco, India and Brazil there is none whatsoever. In Nigeria, older people derive more joy from God, while young people do so in Guatemala. This variable is relatively weak among young adults in Austria, where respondents over 60 were three times more likely to report joy in relation to God (48%). The trend is parallel though less prominent in Switzerland, where those over 60 feel joy due to their relationship with God (56%) nearly twice as often as young adults (31%), followed by Spain, France, South Korea, Australia, Italy and the United States. The converse holds true in Israel, where 61 percent of young adults profess frequent joy thanks to God, with the over-60-year-olds at 40 percent. A positive psychohygienic function of religiosity is to reduce fears, even though historically, religions have in fact endlessly produced real epidemics of fear of hell, of demons, of a stern God (Delumeau 1985). How often do people in different countries experience fear very often or often in respect to God? Remarkably, in exactly those countries where people more often feel joy regarding God, they are also more likely than average to report fearing God, as in Guatemala (67%), Nigeria (57%), Brazil and Indonesia (each with 56%), India (50%), Turkey (46%) and Morocco (42%). Fear of God is least common in Spain (4%), Austria (7%), Russia (8%), France (10%) and Switzerland (11%). 11

12 Are young adults less likely to fear God? This is not the case in most countries. Only in two countries did those over 60 more often report feeling fear toward God: Spain (11% versus 4%) and India (62% versus 50%). Emotions both positive and negative are evidently more relevant to religious bonds than is assumed by cognitively accentuated psychology of religion (Azari and Birnbacher 2004). More spiritual than religious? Are young adults more spiritual and less religious, as the popular discourse on spirituality often asserts (Fuller 2001)? Our findings on this are equivocal. In 11 countries we found that the proportion of respondents aged 18 to 29 who were very or quite spiritual exceeded those who were religious to the same degree. This is most pronounced in Spain, with 26 percent spiritual versus 6 percent religious. In the United States, where the sociology of religion first articulated the thesis that spirituality is replacing spirituality, the figures are 54 versus 29 percent. This is similar in Great Britain, where spiritual education has become highly popular in recent years: 27 versus 14 percent. In traditionally Catholic Poland, too, more young adults are spiritual (49%) than religious (36%), and a similar gap exists in Australia (23% versus 13%) and Russia (16% versus 6%). Spirituality s head start is minimal in Switzerland, France and Brazil. In nine countries, religious young adults outnumber those calling themselves spiritual. This is most pronounced in India, with 56 percent religious versus 34 percent spiritual, then in Nigeria (82% versus 68%), and Turkey (39% versus 34%). The differences are minimal in the rest of these countries (Thailand, South Korea and Indonesia). This also includes Austria, where 8 percent of young adults characterize themselves as very or quite spiritual, and 10 percent as religious to the same degree. This raises more questions, since according to the European Value Study [Europäischer Wertestudie], 75 percent of Austrians said they are religious (Denz et al. 2000: 102). 12

13 Figure 4: The thesis that the rising generation is more spiritual than religious can also be tested by comparing the percentage of young spiritual respondents with their percentage in each country s overall sample. In only three countries are young adults somewhat more spiritual than the general population. This is most pronounced in Great Britain (27% versus 22%), then in the United States (54% versus 53%) and Turkey (34% versus 33%), where the difference in each country is only a single percentage point. More often, however, there are more spiritual 13

14 respondents in the general population than in the group of young adults; this is true for Switzerland (22% versus 14%), Russia (23% versus 16%), and Poland (57% versus 49%). Stronger age-related differences exist for respondents religious self-concept. Only in two countries do more young adults declare themselves to be religious, compared to the general population: Israel (35% versus 30% in the general population) and France (16% versus 13%). Especially in highly industrialized countries, fewer young adults call themselves religious: Austria with 10 versus 23 percent of the general population, Switzerland (13% versus 20%), traditionally Catholic Poland (36% versus 44%), South Korea (13% versus 19%), Morocco (17% versus 26%), and Italy (47% versus 56%). Age-related differences are comparatively small in developing countries for example, in Guatemala (40% versus 41%) and Brazil (37% versus 40%). Thus, one cannot generalize the thesis that young adults increasingly call themselves spiritual and fewer declare themselves to be religious. While it does apply to more than half the countries studied, the surplus of spiritual respondents is generally small. Age-related effects are rather slight for self-declared spirituality; this is not true, however, for religiosity, which especially in highly developed nations is less present in the subjective self-concept of young adults than in the general population. An assertion sometimes made in the discourse on spirituality that spirituality makes gains to the extent that religiosity loses relevance (Elkins 1998) is not supported by the Religion Monitor. Although the definition of spirituality is multifaceted and far from achieving a consensus, numerous authors agree that connectedness is one of its main components, both horizontally with a higher power and vertically with nature or one s social environment (Burkhardt and Nagai-Jacobson 2002; Bucher 2007). The Religion Monitor also inquired about the prevalence of this spiritual experience of being at-one. Is it more frequent in countries where more people declare themselves to be spiritual? And is it also more common among young adults in those eleven countries that position themselves more as spiritual than as religious? The feeling of being at-one with all is most frequently experienced by young people in Nigeria, who also regard themselves as more spiritual than average (68%). Among young Nigerians, 67 percent reported feeling at-one often or very often, followed by Brazil (64%), where young people are significantly less likely to characterize themselves as spiritual (38%). Experiences of being at-one are also comparatively common among young people in India (44%), Indonesia (42%), Morocco (39%) and Turkey (38%). Young adults least commonly feel at-one in South Korea (6%), Austria (7%), Russia (8%), France (9%) and Italy 14

15 (9%), where half of young respondents nonetheless called themselves spiritual. There is thus no clear-cut correlation between the percentage of highly spiritual respondents and the prevalence of experiences of being at-one. This is surely in part because concepts of spirituality vary greatly among individuals. In most countries, young adults experience being at-one significantly less often than the older population. In Poland, for example, such experiences are twice as common at 20 percent in the general population as in the youngest age group; for those over 60, this figure rises to 30 percent. These experiences are also less common by half among young adults in Austria, Switzerland, Italy, Great Britain, Spain, Australia, South Korea and Russia. Experiences of being at-one become more prevalent with advancing age in Nigeria, as well, where 92 percent of those over 50 report them. Similarly in Israel, where young adults consistently score higher on other religious variables, 26 percent of young people but more than a third of older respondents affirm they often experience being at-one. Only in Brazil, Guatemala and Turkey is there no age effect in this regard. Spiritual experiences of being at-one are hindered by a dualistic view of subject (res cogitans) and object (res extensa). Indeed, these experiences are reported more often in countries with a more holistic worldview (the Far East) than in Europe and interestingly, very often in countries influenced by Islam. One possible explanation for the fact that young adults in most countries less often experience feeling connected to everything is that spiritual development toward the experience of being at-one often only comes to fruition in middle age and later (Gollnick 2005). It is often in the middle years that people seek spiritual reorientation in response to crises. How strongly do young adults tend toward bricolage religiosity? For myself I rely on teachings from several different religious traditions (Figure 5). This item was answered predominantly affirmatively in the overall sample; the differences among individual nations are greater than those between young adults and other age groups. The response was totally agree or tend to agree for 74 percent of young respondents in Italy, 73 percent in South Korea, 61 percent in the United States and similar in Switzerland but also 59 percent in Indonesia, 57 percent in Austria, and 56 percent in Spain. Openness to syncretism and bricolage is the lowest in India (18%) and Guatemala (30%). In the other 15

16 countries not mention here, it is well over 40 percent for young adults, even in Nigeria (45%), which is more religious than the average. Figure 5: Openness to syncretistic bricolage is thus by no means restricted to secularized countries. But is it more common among young adults? Only in part. In France, for instance, 47 percent of young adults but only 40 percent of the general population agree with this item (over 60 years 16

17 old: 32%). Young South Koreans also support syncretistic religious entities at a higher rate than average, as do young people in Spain, Italy and Poland. But in countries such as Austria, Brazil, Switzerland, Great Britain, Australia and Turkey, older respondents are just as open to bricolage as are young adults. Again, the findings are difficult to explain. For example, why is there more agreement with this item in traditionally Catholic Italy than in England, whose society is more multi-religious due to its colonial past? Religiously homogenous milieus in no way guarantee that syncretistic religious entities will not develop. Those who approve of syncretism should also be more ready to grant that every religion has a core of truth. The Religion Monitor also asked about this. Is multi-religiosity as van der Ven and Ziebertz (1994) term the view that all religions embody truth or religious pluralism (see the introduction to this volume by Stefan Huber) more widespread among young adults? First, it is striking how many persons in the youngest age group totally or tend to agree: 94 percent in Indonesia, followed by Thailand (88%), Poland (84% despite its strong Catholic influence), India (85%), Guatemala (77%) and Italy (74%). Agreement is weakest in Morocco (47%), then in Russia (53%) and France (56%). Even in countries that are religiously quite homogenous, religious pluralism enjoys tremendous popularity which is even greater in developing countries and those influenced by Islam than in some of the industrialized nations. Are young adults even more open to religious pluralism than the general population? Generally, no: French respondents over 60 agreed with the pluralism item more strongly than did young adults (71% versus 56%). The same trend was evident though less striking in Austria, Brazil, Switzerland, India, South Korea, Russia and Spain. Only in Nigeria, Great Britain and Poland are young adults more open-minded on this point than older respondents. Are young adults less inclined to religious fundamentalism? Fundamentalism is an enigmatic term. The item I am convinced that in questions of religion, my own religion is right while other religions tend to be wrong is an appropriate operationalization of religious exclusivism. Is this espoused less often by young adults? The first thing that stands out is the enormous differences among countries, including in this age group of 18 to 29. In Morocco, 81 percent tend to or totally agree with this item, as do 75 percent in Guatemala. This is all the more thought provoking since 75 percent of young 17

18 respondents in Guatemala grant that each religion has a core of truth, as do 47 percent of young Moroccans. Evidently, a large number of young Guatemalans (roughly half) and about 30 percent of young Moroccans experience no cognitive dissonance in combining pluralistic and exclusivistic religious ideas. Religious exclusivism is downright marginal in Switzerland (8%), Russia (10%), Great Britain and Spain (each with 14%), Italy (17%) and Poland and Austria (each with 20%). It is markedly stronger among young people in Israel (55%), Turkey (49%), India (47%) and the United States (44%). In Switzerland, those over 60 espouse this exclusivist position twice as often (16%) as younger respondents; findings are similar for Italy, India, Turkey and Spain. Other countries show an inverse trend, however, as in the United States, where 44 percent of young adults approved of exclusivism, significantly more than the 25 percent of respondents over 60; findings are similar for Nigeria, Guatemala and France. No appreciable age-related differences appeared in the other countries. All in all, it can be concluded that religious exclusivism is not especially pronounced among young adults, though there are major international differences. In a clear majority of countries, young respondents are (still) less frequently convinced of their religion s exclusive truth than are their older counterparts. But the inverse trend also exists in both developing countries and the United States. Are young adults more likely to favor a scientific interpretation of life? The Abrahamic religions attribute life to God s free and sovereign act of creation. Many scientists, by contrast, see it as a (contingent) part of natural evolution. Ziebertz (2007) examined whether young Germans agreed with this statement more strongly than older Germans; he found the opposite to be true. How does this look in other countries? The picture is varied. As expected, agreement with a scientific view is strong in the industrialized countries: 74 percent in Spain, followed by Austria (70%), Switzerland and Poland (each with 68%), Great Britain (66%), and France (65%). Agreement is even stronger in India (83%) but significantly weaker in countries influenced by Islam, especially Morocco (18%) and Turkey (31%). It is relatively low among young Americans (41%), South Koreans (42%), and the generally highly religious young Israelis (39%). 18

19 Are young adults more likely to favor a naturalistic view of life? This is only true in isolated cases, as in Nigeria, where 49 percent of young adults endorse this worldview (compared to 46% of the general population), as well as in Indonesia and (insignificantly) Morocco and Guatemala. In more countries, the reverse is seen: Among young South Koreans, 42 percent see life [as] just part of the natural evolution, while 51 percent of the general population and a full 61 percent of those over 60 agree with this. Of young Israelis, 39 percent agree with this item, compared to 65 percent for the oldest group (general population: 54%). In Brazil, France, Russia, Thailand and the United States the older adults tend even more strongly to view life mainly as part of nature. The age groups did not vary appreciably here in the other countries. International differences are again greater than those among age groups. The most striking point is the weaker agreement with this item in countries influenced by Islam. Is life more strongly appreciated there as something created by God s hand? It would also be worth studying whether a country s educational level produces an effect here. However, remarkable agreement with this worldview can be ascertained even in less developed countries and in the United States, which leads in the natural sciences, agreement was more than 20 percentage points lower than in Brazil. Of course, it should be qualitatively clarified which concepts of nature and life this item was assimilated to in different countries a point that can be generalized to all the other items. Religious upbringing The young generation s allegedly weaker religiosity is occasionally attributed to a slackingoff of religious upbringing, especially in the family. Religiosity in the adult years is much more strongly prefigured by one s parents than by peers, religion classes, or the media, as many studies show (for an overview, see Grom 2007: ). Is it actually the case that a firm religious upbringing is less often reported in countries where the centrality of religiosity is weaker among young adults? Only to some extent. Among young Austrians, 10 percent of whom regard themselves as quite or very religious, 57 percent reported being raised religiously. Compared to Austrians, fewer young Israelis 35 percent of whom are highly religious were exposed to religious socialization (44%), by their own account. The discrepancy between religious upbringing and religious self-definition is even more pronounced in Spain: 92 versus 6 percent. 19

20 As expected, young people in highly religious countries more frequently recall a religious upbringing: 99 percent in Indonesia, followed by India (98%), Nigeria (97%), Poland (96%), Morocco (89%), Italy (88%) and Guatemala (86%). Given such high figures, age-related differences can scarcely be identified, due to ceiling effects alone (when a variable has very high values, very little scatter is possible). Interestingly, in secular France a scant two out of three young adults recall being brought up religiously (61%); yet the centrality of religiosity is significantly weaker there than in other countries. Has religious upbringing declined in the industrialized countries? The trend is inconsistent. In the United States, 64 percent of young respondents stated that they were raised religiously; in the general population this figure is 85 percent, and for those over 60 it rises to 92 percent an enormous decline, though responses for other variables are nearly identical across the different age groups. South Korea, too, shows a clear decline, with 40 percent young adults but 52 percent of the general population a religious upbringing. Findings are similar for Austria (57% versus 73%), Switzerland (50% versus 67%), Great Britain (61% versus 76%) and Australia (60% versus 71%). 20

21 Figure 6: These findings are not easy to interpret. Brought up religiously, or not this is not very concrete and leaves open what parents have done or refrained from doing in this regard. At any rate, the frequency of religious upbringing recalled in each country does not consistently correlate with the values of the religious variables. In other words: High prevalence of a religious upbringing is no guarantee that religiosity will be correspondingly stronger. 21

22 Conclusion The Religion Monitor presents impressive data material on religious variables for twenty countries. This chapter s analysis has focused on young adults (aged 18 to 29) who are often said to ascribe little value to religion anymore. In no way do the data support the conclusion that young adults are less religious and spiritual or that traditions are being abandoned. Quite the opposite is occurring in Israel, where exactly the young generation is enormously religiously productive. Our most important findings can be summarized as follows: - The religiosity of young adults depends crucially on the value of religion in each individual country or culture. Where religion is highly valued, young adults too are more religious, more active, and more tightly integrated. - Age-related effects are greater in the industrialized nations, where many religious convictions and forms of behavior are in danger of becoming marginalized. - Intellectual interest in religion is weaker among young adults when they live in countries where this is already lower than average anyway. In countries where it is standard to believe in God, the same goes for most young adults as well. By contrast, in those countries where many people in the general population are no longer convinced of His existence, belief is even more rare among young adults. - The same applies to religious practice, as well both prayer and public worship services. - One exception is belief in an afterlife, which is stronger among young adults than among the older population in some industrialized nations. In other first world countries, age-related differences in this regard are significantly slighter than for religious practice or for the willingness to live according to religious commandments. On the latter point, our findings also show that in developing countries and in countries influenced by Islam, the youngest age group is less willing to live by commandments. - In over half of the countries studied, more people in the youngest age group regard themselves as spiritual than as religious. But this does not justify the conclusion that religiosity is increasingly being displaced by spirituality: In only three countries are young adults more likely to be spiritual than are members of the general population. One possible reason for this is that the stages of spiritual development leading toward experiences of being at-one first occur in midlife. 22

23 - Similarly, the thesis that young people are more syncretistic cannot be generalized. Nor can the assertion that young people are less approving of fundamentalist perspectives: In some countries, including the United States, the exact converse is the case. - An unexpected result because of its inconsistency is that young adults can be both pluralistic and religiously exclusivistic, especially in highly religious countries (such as Guatemala and Morocco). - The trend of young people being even less religious than their elders in the more secular countries which was shown for other variables also holds for the frequency of religious training. Religiosity is a highly multilayered yet still virulent phenomenon also and especially among young adults. It is greatly to the credit of the Religion Monitor that it has fundamentally refuted a number of stereotypes, especially that of the increasingly irreligious young adult. Bibliography Azari, Nina P., and Dieter Birnbacher. The Role of Cognition and Feeling in Religious Experience. Zygon 39 (2004): Baacke, Dieter. Die 13- bis 18-Jährige:. Einführung in die Probleme des Jugendalters. 8th ed. Weinheim, Bucher, Anton A. Religionsunterricht zwischen Lernfach und Lebenshilfe: Eine empirische Untersuchung zum katholischen Religionsunterricht in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 3rd ed. Stuttgart, Bucher, Anton A. Psychologie der Spiritualität: Handbuch. Weinheim Burkhardt, Margaret A., and Mary Gail Nagai-Jacobson. Spirituality: Living Our Connectedness. Albany, NY, Delumeau, Jean. Die Angst im Abendland: Die Geschichte kollektiver Ängste im Europa des 14. bis 18. Jahrhunderts. Reinbek,

24 Denz, Hermann, Christian Friesl, Regina Polak, Reinhard Zuba and Paul M. Zulehner. Die Konfliktgesellschaft: Wertewandel in Österreich Vienna, Elkins, David N. Beyond Religion. Wheaton, Fuller, Robert C. Spiritual, but Not Religious: Understanding Unchurched America. New York, Gollnick, James. Religion and Spirituality in the Life Cycle. New York, Grom, Bernhard. Religionspsychologie, 3rd ed. Munich, Heiler, Friedrich. Das Gebet: Eine religionsgeschichtliche und religionspsychologische Untersuchung. Munich, Hoge, Dean R. Religion in America: The Demographic of Belief and Affiliation. In Religion and the Clinical Practice of Psychology, edited by Edward P. Shafranske, 3rd ed., Washington, DC, James, William. The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature. New York: Penguin Classics, 1982 [original 1902]. Newberg, Andrew, Eugene D Aquili, Vince Rause and Judith Cummins. Der gedachte Gott: Wie Glaube im Gehirn entsteht. Munich, Oser, Fritz, and Paul Gmünder. Der Mensch Stufen seines religiösen Urteils: Ein strukturgenetischer Ansatz, 3rd ed. Gütersloh, Van der Ven, Johannes A., and Hans-Georg Ziebertz. Religionspädagogische Perspektiven in interreligiöser Bildung, In Bilanz der Religionspädagogik, edited by Hans-Georg Ziebertz and Werner Simon, Düsseldorf Ziebertz, Hans-Georg. Gibt es einen Tradierungsabbruch? Befunde zur Religiosität der jungen Generation. In Religionsmonitor 2008, edited by the Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gütersloh,