Moral Education or Social Institution?

Transcription

1 Moral Education or Social Institution? (Kent State Graduate Conference, 2013) Abstract: On a plausible account of moral education the purpose of teaching ethics is to inculcate genuine moral virtues within persons. Moral education is for the sake of truly moral people, truly moral people have moral characters, and moral characters require genuine virtues; hence the need for a robust virtue ethics. This conception is under harsh attack, however, by a social psychological tradition and by many philosophers as well. Situationists recommend in place of moral education a program emphasizing the production of certain forms of socialization. Behaviors are all that are of concern. I suggest, however, that this taken as a sufficient account of morality is seriously lacking when moral education is at stake. A plausible apriori defense of the coherency of virtue ethics, and thus the proper conception of virtue, can be given such that genuine moral education is unaffected by situationist criticism. (word count: 3732) 1. Introduction By moral education I mean to promote the creation of genuinely moral people; anything less is to fall short of the ideal of a moral life. This plausibly implies that the most straightforward approach to moral education involves a form of robust virtue theory. Moral education is for the sake of truly moral people, truly moral people have moral characters, and moral characters require genuine virtues; hence the need for a robust virtue ethics. This conception is under attack by a social psychological tradition. The "situationist" approach, championed by Gilbert Harman, John Doris, and others, purports to demonstrate that genuine moral character is a fiction. 1 Behavior, it is claimed, results from situations not from persons and, as a result, any robust form of virtue theory is impossible. If this is the case then moral education is misguided or impossible. Situationists recommend in place of moral education a program emphasizing the production of certain forms of socialization. They propose to put in place a system of social institutions where persons can be coaxed into "moral behavior"; to focus on social institutions that bring about "social harmony" and "socialized" people. Importantly, moral behavior on this account has no place, or need, for genuine moral character. Behaviors are all that are of concern. Herein I am not concerned with the specific details of moral education, or of a program of socialization however that may go; rather, I am concerned with the possibility of moral education as opposed to socialization and shall keep the discussion at this level. I suggest that the situationist approach taken as sufficient is seriously lacking when moral education is at stake. An empirical approach is not enough. 2 This can be seen by presenting 1 As Julia Annas points out, Although it is never brought out into the open and discussed, some of the relevant literature here seems to be assuming that the scientific attitude of interpreting the behaviour of others has a kind of obvious and unquestionable authority, such that it does not matter that it fails to take into account sources of information such as the agent s own account of her actions. Annas, Virtue Ethics and Social Psychology. Apriori 2 (2003): 20-34, (23). 2 If for no better reason than that genuine moral education seems to be desperately needed and, truly, only possible if something like moral character is real. What is truly maddening about deflationisms, of all sorts but especially in this discussion, is that the philosophers who buy into deflated concepts take themselves as thereby excused from discussing facts about character and practical reasoning (facts demonstrated by 1 Page

2 several initial responses as to the mistaken characterization of virtue presented by situationists. These concerns give credence to and depend upon a further: that a plausible apriori defense of the coherency of virtue ethics, and thus the proper conception of virtue, can be given. I am defending a plausible account of virtue ethics from social psychology, so that a plausible account of moral education is found possible. If this is correct, then we can have robust virtue ethics and moral education rather than mere socialization. 2. Situationism Characterized Situationism arrives at a key claim concerning human behavior and character traits, since seemingly incidental or trivial features of situations disrupt allegedly stable character traits. As John Sabini and Maury Silver describe it, situationism holds that morally significant behavior is affected by the immediate situational features which: 1. are not in themselves of moral significance; 2. are not, prima facie, of great motivational significance; 3. are not well known either to laypeople or to the philosophical literature; 4, are numerous; and 5. do not form a coherent class from the point of view of folk psychology. 3 This suggests that, as Doris states,...behavior is contra the old saw about character and destiny extraordinarily sensitive to variation in circumstance. 4 Relatively minor situation manipulation can have a significant influence on a person s moral behavior and, contrary to expectations, a person will behave differently across contexts where the behavior should be consistent. 3. The Challenge It is important to understand what situationists understand by character. Doris gives the most helpful and complete criterion: globalism. Globalism is the claim that as traditionally understood character is an evaluatively integrated association of robust traits. By this Doris means that character must meet three criteria: (1) Consistency. Character and personality traits are reliably manifested in traitrelevant behavior across a diversity of trait-relevant eliciting conditions that may vary widely in their conduciveness to the manifestation of the trait in question. (2) Stability. Character and personality traits are reliably manifested in trait-relevant behaviors over iterated trials of similar trait-relevant eliciting conditions. (3) Evaluative integration. In a given character or personality the occurrence of a our perceived moral experience). This is particularly clear in the dialogue between Harman and Athanassoulis, where the latter gives demonstrable evidence that we have very good theories (namely, Aristotelian) of character and moral development. Harman simply responds by denying that there are character traits, simpliciter, with no discussion of Aristotelian theoretical points. Annas discusses this at Virtue Ethics and Social Psychology, 23. As she is apt to point out, this entire knee-jerk deference to science is simply begging the question. 3 John Sabini and Maury Silver, Lack of Character? Situationism Critiqued. Ethics 115 (2005) (545). 4 Doris, Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior, 2. 2 Page

3 trait with a particular evaluative valence is probabilistically related to the occurrence of other traits with similar evaluative valences. 5 Notice that the key here is trait-relevant behavior, elicited by trait-relevant conditions. If there is character as traditionally understood, and needed by any strong theory of virtue, then we should expect empirical confirmation of intra-trait consistency, e.g. consistently cheating, or not, on tests, and inter-trait consistency, e.g. the honest person will also not steal and will keep their promises, be courageous, etc. The argument that Doris proposes can be summed up, then, as the following. 6 Robust-global character traits, commonly known as the virtues or vices, are taken to be an adequate normative account of human action; as such moral agents should demonstrate trait-relevant behavior in a wide variety of trait-relevant and eliciting situations. The empirical evidence demonstrates that for the most part agents do not display trait-relevant behavior across a wide variety of situations; rather, it shows highly local consistency. People simply do not seem to have globalist-like character. Thus, virtues robust character traits cannot give an adequate normative foundation for a theory of ethics Initial Responses Rather than directly attack the credibility of each experiment, or the interpretations given of their, as many already have done, I will offer several general responses intended to cut-across the research Aristotle, whom it is natural to think of in this connection, was well aware that situations could affect people s actions. Virtue ends up being a rare phenomenon, but that is 5 Ibid, 22. Doris claims that, Taken together, these theses construe personality as more or less coherent and integrated with reliable, relatively situation-resistant, behavioral implications. Ibid. 6 I borrow this formulation from Michael Winter and John Tauer, Virtue Theory and Social Psychology. The Journal of Value Inquiry 40 (2006): The situationists reject a globalist view of character traits. Human nature is not such that people can withstand situational pressures and behave consistently across situations. But, according to virtue ethics, morality is concerned with the cultivation of character traits with certain properties, i.e. virtues. The implication for virtue ethics is that such theories are empirically inadequate, given that they require global character traits. Virtues, according the situationists, just are global character traits indicating certain activity and, given the empirical evidence to the contrary, the theories are either false or lacking appropriate evidence. Since we are unable to consistently predict behavior, character traits are local, not global: they lack consistency and stability. That is, we can no longer talk of character as such or virtue as such (e.g. honest, truthful, etc.) but only local, specific traits and virtues (e.g. honest in his business dealings, truthful in her examination practices, etc.). Character is fragmented among highly specific and situation sensitive local traits, and hence Doris third criterion for globalism is not met. What is more, people are supposed to act from character; it is taken to be efficacious. Situations, though, not character, seem to be driving behavior. Hence, the explanatory role of character is taken away and character does not appear to be efficacious. If character is merely of the local variety, however, then a theory of ethics that focuses on robust character development and the normative dimension of character, such as classic virtue ethics, is defeated. But, if this last is true then the plausible case for moral education in terms of genuine character development within moral persons is lost. 8 For direct criticisms of the interpretation of the experiments, see the articles by Sreenivasan, Miller, Kamtekar, Sabini and Silver, and Athanassoulis. 3 Page

4 hardly surprising. 9 Rather than disconfirming virtue much of the social psychology experimentation confirms what virtue ethicists actually say: it takes effort, difficulty, and a lifetime for some traits to gain the right character. 10 Now, this can be seen as a retreat from the situationist s claim, and indeed it is; the situationist is simply too strong in her claims. This is hardly detrimental, despite the strong suggestion by Doris and Jesse Prinz that it is. 11 In effect, they charge that returning to a strongly Aristotelian virtue ethic, virtue that is hard to attain, is a theory that loses much of its interest. If the morality is out of reach for many then it is not a good guide to the moral life. However, they would have us ascertain beforehand what the good and moral life is and that is a mistaken methodology. It is no criticism of virtue theory that it is difficult for some people to be moral. We should not therefore complain that the theory is not attractive or of no interest. If the educational system of a nation is failing its students, such that every generation becomes increasingly less intelligent than the last, it is no criticism of a good teacher that she has higher standards so as to actually produce intelligent students. Indeed, we would think such a teacher virtuous. There are three ready responses to this reply. 12 The first is that this underestimates the challenge: what evidence is there for thinking that we are the sort of creatures capable of virtue, or acting from virtue? I shall return to this criticism later. Second, if virtue is rare and hard to achieve then the bar for morality is raised too high. Average persons will be held to the standard of some ideal actor. Such a criticism forgets the role of practical reasoning in virtue ethics. Once one realizes that virtue requires us to think about our actions, unify our behavior and judgments, and have good justifications, then an ideal naturally follows and ideals are difficult to attain. 13 Finally, the situationist can respond that the virtue theorist attains immunity from empirical critique by making their theory too modest. In so doing, however, the virtue theorist gives up empirical applicability, and thereby loses the power of an explanatory and predictive theory since the preponderance of subjects are not covered. This criticism misses the point. It would be absurd to say that the preponderance of subjects are virtuous. Rather the theory has an explanation why many or even most persons lack complete virtue while some may have more than others. Possessing virtue comes in degrees, being on the road as it were, and it simply turns out that many are vicious or incontinent. 9 Nafsika Athanassoulis makes the same point as I do when he says that, Virtue ethics presumably requires that moral behaviour, in the form of possessing virtuous character traits, is a possibility, rather than an actuality for the majority of people. Indeed the virtuous agent is often discussed as an ideal which we aim towards, but do not necessarily ever achieve. Athanassoulis, A Response to Harman: Virtue Ethics and Character Traits. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (2000): , (217). 10 Miller, Social Psychology and Virtue Ethics, makes this point clearly. 11 Doris, Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics, 520. Prinz, The Normativity Challenge: Cultural Psychology Provides the Real Threat to Virtue Ethics, See Prinz, The Normativity Challenge: Cultural Psychology Provides the Real Threat to Virtue Ethics, , and Doris, Replies: Evidence and Sensibility, Just as one might think any student of physics compares her development in scientific knowledge against that of Einstein or Bohr. 4 Page

5 4.2 Virtue ethicists recognize that persons can and do act intentionally. Whether virtue is guiding behavior depends on two cognitive factors. First, the person must recognize or construe the situation in question as in some way germane or relevant to the virtue in question. Second, if the first holds, there may be other factors that weigh against or induce behavior contrary to the action generally in accordance with that virtue. 14 Testing for virtue takes more than merely observing external behavior, since the agent may have acted intentionally due to some overriding factor perceived in the situation. Situationists, in contrast, merely observe and encourage the outward behavior thinking mere behavior enough for moral action. This, however, misunderstands both virtue and the ability to act intentionally within various situations and entirely misconstrues the purpose of moral education. If moral education is merely the attempt to make behaviour-following automatons, then virtue is not needed fine; but it s most plausibly not. 4.3 This demonstrates that the notion of virtue that the situationists are critiquing is not the type of virtue defended by virtue ethicists. 15 Rather, Doris et alia have set up a radically unintellectual straw-man. Classical virtue, in the Aristotelian tradition, has always recognized that virtue is not merely a disposition to behave in certain ways, as if it were cloddish habit following, as Julia Annas so aptly puts it. 16 The possession of a virtue is to possess a certain disposition or state built up by and exercised by an agent s practical reasoning. Genuine dispositions of agents involve choice or decision, what Aristotle called a hexis proairetike. 17 They are intelligent. Acting virtuously is itself a choice and not a mere reflexive behavior, like a plant turning towards the stimulus of the sun. That the situationists have a faulty understanding of virtue, and hence of what good character brings about, is demonstrated rather vividly by Doris prosaic example of infidelity: Imagine that a colleague with whom you have had a long flirtation invites you to dinner... with the excuse that you are temporarily orphaned while your spouse is out of town... [Y]ou regard the infidelity that may result as a morally undesirable outcome... [Y]ou might think there is little cause for concern; you are, after all, a morally upright person... On the other hand, if you take the lessons of situationism to heart, you avoid dinner like the plague, because you know that you will not be able to predict your behavior in a problematic situation on the basis of your antecedent values... Relying on character once in the situation is a mistake, you agree; the way to achieve the ethically desirable result is to recognize that situational pressures may all too easily overwhelm character and avoid the dangerous situation See for a discussion of this Prinz, The Normativity Challenge: Cultural Psychology Provides the Real Threat to Virtue Ethics, Hence Annas, Situationists, then, have so misunderstood the classical or Aristotelian kind of virtue ethics that they are attacking, that they have been attacking the wrong target. Moreover, the alternative they recommend is already part of classical virtue ethics itself. Virtue Ethics and Social Psychology, Julia Annas, Comments on John Doris s Lack of Character. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LXXI, no. 3 (2005): (737). 17 Annas, Virtue Ethics and Social Psychology, Doris, Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics, In a footnote (n 50, 526) Doris claims that situationism does not deny that people may consistently avow their values, only that there is doubt to the 5 Page

6 Only the situationist, he thinks, is intelligent enough to avoid dinner. Clearly this mistakes the purpose and function of virtue. The genuinely virtuous person has precisely the correct understanding of the situation and, as such, follows Doris recommendation to avoid the dinner. No one should rely on the force of habit alone, least of all a classical virtue theorist. Hence, when Nafsika Athanassoulis responds to Harman that in the classical tradition there is an understanding of moral growth, and degrees of good character, he makes a vital point. 19 Aristotle made the distinction between six types of character such that we may observe the same outward behavior by different people who nevertheless possess different characters. The virtuous and continent look the same but affectively, and perhaps also intellectually, they differ. Likewise for the vicious and the incontinent. And so when experiments give descriptions of outward behavior they do not thereby also give descriptions of interior character or lack thereof. This explains why the same person, further, can act one way and contrariwise to expectations in another situation: virtue involves struggle, and for the incontinent struggle is their middle name. Even the continent character, which knows what is right and generally has many of the right affections, can fail if the situation brings temptation or difficulty. Contrary to Doris claims, virtue ethicists in the Aristotelian tradition have never assumed that one can read a virtuous character off of another s outward behavior or even patterns of action. That was why Aristotle famously suggests that we call no man happy until dead. 20 One must take into considerations their reasons for action, as they describe them and as they can be inferred from action. 21 This will naturally lead to an understanding of moral expertise 22 where expertise is by definition and in practice highly sensitive to situational conditions, because the expert has understanding and practical effect that even consistent values bring about consistent behavioral patterns. Once again, however, this is only so if one antecedently presupposes a Humean understanding of practical rationality; that is, to beg the question against the Aristotelian. 19 Athanassoulis, A Response to Harman: Virtue Ethics and Character Traits, Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, pp [1100a a22]. 21 See Rachana Kamtekar s discussion of traits and virtues at Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of Our Character. Ethics 114 (2004): ( ). Kamtekar discusses Doris example of Oskar Schindler, whom Doris holds as an example of fragmented virtue (not evaluatively integrated, see Doris, Lack of Character, 59, 115). Oskar Schindler had guts, but so did many other womanizers and war profiteers; this is not surprising. What is surprising is the claim that this demonstrates fragmented character other than a merely incontinent one. Schindler very much lacked the virtue of temperance, although he exhibited great acts of courage (and so could reasonably be considered continent in that regard). 22 Annas has a very good analogy for ethical expertise (virtue) compared to a skill or technical expertise. As she says, We are all familiar with the point that there are expert mechanics, plumbers and so on. What makes them experts, rather than learners, is that they understand what they do. They do not mechanically follow the rule-book, but approach each new challenge in a way informed by long practice, but sensitive to the particular demands of the situation, and ready to respond in creative ways to unfamiliar challenges. We want our practical experts to have learned from experience and practice, but we do not expect them to have developed a routinized habit that produces predictable outcomes whatever the nature of the individual challenges; if we find that our plumber of mechanic does have such a routinized habit, we realize that she is not an expert, since she lacks understanding of what she is doing. (and so we go to another.) Annas, Virtue Ethics and Social Psychology, Page

7 rationality. 23 I shall have more to say on the topic of character types below. 4.4 One way to arrive at the requisite global character traits has been suggested by Christian Miller and is rather intuitive. 24 Essentially, one gets global character traits from local character traits. Given that no one denies our having local character traits, which are predictable and consistent given a limited range of specific situations, all we need is good moral education. That is, teach people to take what they already recognize as the right manifestation of a character trait in specific local situations and apply that to other situations, using their moral imagination. If situational factors seem to lead to dramatic differences in behavior, chalk it up to an inadequate moral education. If accomplished, then indeed there will be global character traits with consistency and predictability as much predictability as one can sensibly expect from rational agents acting for reasons. 25 This is why proper habituation from an early age is required, and that means proper moral education rather than socialization It is clear that there are two general problems with the situationist view of morality and the attack on virtue ethics. These were highlighted by the two general responses given: they have misconstrued character traits and they have misconstrued virtue. The first general response 23 This is why Aristotle says at 1107a1 that, Virtue, then, is a state that decides, consisting in a mean, the mean relative to us, which is defined by reference to reason, that is to say, to the reason by reference to which the prudent person would define it. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 25. Emphasis added. 24 Miller, Social Psychology and Virtue Ethics, One can see here a meeting of the Situationist halfway: giving them their cross-situational consistency and predictability (mitigated predictability) while retaining efficacious global traits in a way similar enough to how they understand them. Thus, Miller gives us a formulation (at 387) of what by all accounts seems to be a (modest) necessary condition for global trait acquisition (and, further, attribution). This he calls a minimal subset of a character trait, such that: (MS) For any dispositional global character trait T and agent A, a set is the minimal subset of T just in case it is the least membered set of T-counterfactuals of the form: If A were in the relevant T-eliciting circumstances C n, then A would attempt to perform the appropriate T-sortal act. Such that, other things being equal, A has T only if each member of the set is true of A. Sreenivasan points in the same direction with his two lessons that a theory of virtue can learn from situationsim (Sreenivasan, Errors about Errors: Virtue Theory and Trait Attribution, 66). Now, it is absolutely crucial to remember that, given virtuous agents are not machines and, hence, act for reasons taken to be appropriate for the circumstance at hand, it is not merely a matter of mechanical disposition that an agent A being in some T-eliciting circumstance will act in the relevant T-sortal way (as Miller puts it). Rather, it is highly probable, or expected that they will act in that way (especially if the eliciting circumstance is part of the minimal subset). It remains the case that the agent may choose to not perform the relevant T-sortal act due to special considerations of the situation C (especially if the eliciting circumstance is not in the minimal subset). One can see, then, that many people may not be able to live up to the special considerations of some difficult circumstances (such as being in a Milgram study or a Good Samaritan experiment). If such is the case, however, it is no reason to deny them a global trait of the appropriate sort; rather, recognize that their moral education lacked the ability to discriminate such situations properly (or some such explanation). 26 Thus Aristotle was quite correct when at 1095b5-10 of the Nicomachean Ethics he says, That is why we need to have been brought up in fine habits if we are to be adequate students of fine and just things... For we begin from the belief that something is true; if this is apparent enough to us, we can begin without also knowing why it is true. Someone who is well brought up has the beginnings, or can easily acquire them. Someone who neither has them nor can acquire them should listen to Hesiod: He who grasps everything himself is best of all; he is noble also who listens to one who has spoken well; but he who neither grasps it himself nor takes to heart what he hears from another is a useless man. 7 Page

8 was to demonstrate that situationists directly misunderstand character traits, and thus indirectly virtue: they ascribe too much power to the situation given that they approach experiments with the false notion that character is merely an unreflective habit of stereotypical response to stimuli. 27 The second general response was to demonstrate that situationists directly misunderstand virtue, as it genuinely features in virtue ethics. For, the situationists seem to understand virtue as merely a habit, a disposition, to produce certain regular behaviors in certain situations. This, however, leaves out the fact that virtue ethicists claim that virtues are dispositions to act for reasons there must be reference to the agent s own reasons for acting. 28 This conception of virtue, the correct one, needs some defense. I shall now attempt to do so. 5. The Apriori Argument 5.1 Timothy and Lydia McGrew offer a response to naturalism in epistemology, and hence the attack on apriori epistemologists, by making a distinction between psychological data and psychological concepts. 29 I would like to extend that type of defense from epistemology to virtue ethics. Given this distinction an apriorist 30 can use psychological concepts without needing psychological data (i.e. experiments) to corroborate the theory. So, we distinguish virtue data from virtue concepts this allows for the right theory. In epistemology, the question asked is what sort of processes are beliefs based on, in ethics, on what sort of reasoning should behaviors be based on. If one considers Hilary Kornblith or Susan Haack, for example, the claim that epistemic matters are obviously empirical is taken as just that, obvious. But on close examination there is reason to worry about this characterization. Epistemologists make claims about basing beliefs off of others, or of perceptual experience ; but what are these claims? There are two options. On the one hand one might be referring to characteristics of general human cognition, and so empirical observation is needed to justify such a claim: it is referential. On the other hand, a concept can be used non-referentially: one takes as data the contents of one s own mind. In virtue ethics, we can see a correlation between, on the one hand, the claims of the situationist and on the other the claims of the classic Aristotelian. The former takes concepts to be referential and thus empirical, while the latter can take them to be non-referential concepts: virtue concepts rather than virtue data. The distinction between referential and non-referential is key for this distinction I am making between the empirical and the apriori. Consider Kripke s famous conclusion that water is H 2 O. In order to discover that water is related in a strong way to the chemical make-up H 2 O we already had to have some concepts about it, e.g. clear liquid stuff that fills lakes and ponds. In that case, however, it is conceivable that water is not H 2 O. The concept need not entail the 27 Annas, Virtue Ethics and Social Psychology, Julia Annas, Virtue Ethics. In The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, David Copp editor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, (519). 29 McGrew, Timothy and Lydia McGrew. Psychology For Armchair Philosophers. Idealistic Studies 10, no. 3 (1998): That is, armchair philosophers such as the McGrews and myself. 8 Page

9 empirical matter; we can conceive of water without conceiving of the underlying structure. H 2 O is referential; water is not necessarily referential and, hence, can be non-referential. In that case, then, we possess psychological concepts without psychological data. But in that case, we can make valid arguments, and have valid concepts, of subjects containing experiential concepts (e.g. wet, liquid, cold, etc.) without referring to anything in need of empirical verification. 31 If we can do this in epistemology with our concepts concerning beliefs and perception, we can do likewise with our moral concepts. 32 For the sake of the correct moral theory what matters is the concept of virtue. 5.2 As such we can see that Aristotle s characterization of the moral field, as divided between six character states, uses psychological concepts that do not require appeal to psychological data for corroboration, even though such corroboration is available. 33 These concepts form a core of the theory and can be understood apriori. They may be informed by experience, but we can understand the theory and, hence, moral behavior, independent of empirical verification. This does not deny that they are unable to be corroborated. The virtuous person, through the process of living their life, and also in dialogue with the wise and the many, understands that the best life to live is of a certain sort and further understands why they acted the way they did in any given situation. This is what possessing practical rationality allows. Hence, it is no criticism or demonstration of virtue ethics to be false to point to empirical data demonstrating that many or most people fail to act in certain ways. Virtue ethics need not base its concepts off of the empirical data; they are apriori in the strong sense of being derived from theoretical deduction and then applied to practical affairs. We know what virtue is before we experiment, we know what the virtuous person is like before we experiment, and we know that virtue as truly described by virtue theorists is attainable at the very least because the situationists have not been finding data that is contradictory since they have been working with the wrong concepts. The apriori conception of virtue is what gives us the content of virtue theory, such that to leave aside its conclusions is to attack the wrong theory. Situationism has attacked the wrong understanding of virtue and thus has not threatened the possibility of genuine virtuous character. Where the empirical meets the apriori in ethics is not to set the boundary of the apriori, not to deduce our notions of virtue, but rather to demonstrate that there is a connection of the actual to the possible. This is why historical examples of virtuous character are pertinent: they connect the empirical to the apriori conception of virtue, vindicating but not determining it. Having the correct apriori account of virtue, then, sets the boundary of the empirical and this is paramount for proper 31 Timothy and Lydia McGrew. Psychology For Armchair Philosophers, One might wonder what the connection to the external world is at all. But, as the McGrew s state, From an a priorist point of view, the question of whether human beings, including the epistemologist, actually think or reason in a certain way is neither distinctively epistemological nor relevant to epistemic standards themselves. It is the knowing subject as conceived at a given time about whom the a priorist is asking epistemic questions, I do not hold that this is the only characterization of the moral field possible or even the correct one. I simply state it due to historical importance and plausibility. 9 Page

10 moral education: educators need to be making the correct assumptions about virtue, but that requires the correct theory. Only with the correct theory is correct practice intelligible, and hence only with the correct theory is moral education possible. 5.3 There is at least one lingering concern with the above. The question can still be asked whether the apriori argument actually fits the actual world. Consider two types of moral agents: Man A and Man S, where the first is man according to virtue theory and the latter is unable to have the right sort of character needed for real virtue. The apriori argument does not tell us which we have, Man A or Man S. I take it, in response, that the jury is out as to whether we really should believe we have Man S as opposed to Man A. Given that we have strong reason to think there are virtuous characters, from reflection but also from myriads of historical, cultural, and literary examples, the onus is on the demonstration of Man S. Given that any demonstration of Man S is going to need the use of certain psychological concepts I feel entirely free to simply doubt the correctness of those findings Conclusion Four points have been made throughout this paper. First, the situationist s behavioral approach to moral education leaves out the importance of practical reasoning, the cornerstone of moral inquiry, and hence is inadequate. They would have one merely possess automatic, and rigid, habits. Second, if one is to give up practical reasoning from moral education there had better be compelling reasons, such as the impossibility of practical reason; these are found lacking in situationist criticism. Third, this demonstrates that situationism lacks needed attention of the internal, rational, aspects of moral action; but this is needed for moral education. Finally, the evidence that virtue itself is impossible or unneeded is lacking, as historical examples can easily establish. The apriori argument for these points demonstrates what the proper relation between theory and practice can be, and hence what proper moral education can be. An emphasis on social situations in order to bring about moral behavior presupposes already a conception of virtue and of the ends of moral education. In that case, the apriori boundaries of a theory of virtue must be set, aided by reflection on the empirical data. This is to link the correct theory to evidence of possible practice. The latter, however, cannot be determined without presupposition of the former. Given this it is plausible to say that the most promising case for moral education, a robust form of virtue ethics, is safely immune from social psychology. 34 I realize that this is to put me squarely at the mercy of the empiricist-rationalist debate. I take it that the rationalist is the winner, and I take that as a theoretical primitive needed for my argument. 10 Page

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