The Uniqueness of Persons in the Life and Thought of Karol Wojtyła/Pope John Paul II, with Emphasis on His Indebtedness to Max Scheler

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1 Chapter 3 The Uniqueness of Persons in the Life and Thought of Karol Wojtyła/Pope John Paul II, with Emphasis on His Indebtedness to Max Scheler Peter J. Colosi In a way, his [Pope John Paul II s] undisputed contribution to Christian thought can be understood as a profound meditation on the person. He enriched and expanded the concept in his encyclicals and other writings. These texts represent a patrimony to be received, collected and assimilated with care. 1 - Pope Benedict XVI INTRODUCTION Throughout the writings of Karol Wojtyła, both before and after he became Pope John Paul II, one finds expressions of gratitude and indebtedness to the philosopher Max Scheler. It is also well known that in his Habilitationsschrift, 2 Wojtyła concluded that Max Scheler s ethical system cannot cohere with Christian ethics. This state of affairs gives rise to the question: which of the ideas of Scheler did Wojtyła embrace and which did he reject? And also, what was Wojtyła s overall attitude towards and assessment of Scheler? A look through all the works of Wojtyła reveals numerous expressions of gratitude to Scheler for philosophical insights which Wojtyła embraced and built upon, among them this explanation of his sources for The Acting Person, Granted the author s acquaintance with traditional Aristotelian thought, it is however the work of Max Scheler that has been a major influence upon his reflection. In my overall conception of the person envisaged through the mechanisms of his operative systems and their variations, as presented here, may indeed be seen the Schelerian foundation studied in my previous work. 3 I have listed many further examples in the appendix to this paper. It must, however, also be clearly stated that there are ideas in Scheler which Wojtyła rejected as false, for example, Scheler s thesis that moral obligation dissolves when a person reaches the heights of love. 4 In general, after looking through the texts where Wojtyła mentions Scheler or has clearly absorbed and/or developed his thought, it becomes

2 62 Peter J. Colosi clear that his overall attitude is one of respect for a master from whom he learned much. And this fact is not contradicted by noting that he also rejected forcefully certain errors he perceived in Scheler s thought. A thorough cataloguing of the Schelerian theses embraced by Wojtyła would be a helpful addition to scholarship on both authors. I have indicated some directions in which that work could proceed in my appendix, and some readers may wish to look there first. My main goal here, however, will be to focus on one single theme in Scheler that Wojtyła embraced. That theme is the uniqueness of persons. I will begin by first pointing to a distinction between two dimensions of the being of persons which are the sources of their worth: their rational nature and their uniqueness. Then I will cite some texts of Wojtyła in which it becomes clear that he embraced the idea of the uniqueness of persons. My idea is not that Wojtyła wrote an explicit philosophical development of Scheler s individual value essence. Rather, I mean to show that Scheler s development of individual persons and love between persons so impressed itself on Wojtyła that it is expressed in striking ways in many of his writings and also when he describes his encounters with people. 5 I base this conclusion on two premises. The first is the idea that personal uniqueness is a real dimension of personal being and a deep source of the dignity of persons, and thus a dimension of which a man whose life was spent meeting and serving people would have been keenly aware. Though often neglected in philosophy, two authors have developed this dimension in philosophically original ways: Max Scheler and John F. Crosby. One of my goals will be to express this aspect of persons. I will then point out that Wojtyła reveals a profound awareness of personal uniqueness in his pastoral and theological writings and in some metaphysical assertions in his philosophical texts, even if it was not a primary theme. My second premise is that if one author deeply absorbs another, this influence is lasting and can be detected in many ways. In Scheler s thought the uniqueness of persons is a primary theme (though, as I shall show, he uses different terminology for uniqueness ), and Wojtyła did deeply absorb Scheler s thought. George Weigel has provided insightful and thorough historical evidence of the lasting influence of Scheler on Wojtyła. 6 After discussing these premises, I will proceed to confront a Thomistic-based objection that was raised when I presented this paper. To conclude I will present an application to foundational ethical questions in the sphere of current debates in health care and bio-ethics. This last section will entail a consideration of the role of the affective sphere in gaining ethical knowledge, and suggest a Schelerian/Wojtyłian contribution to this field of contemporary ethical debate. RATIONAL NATURE AS A SOURCE OF THE WORTH OF PERSONS Much of Western philosophy elevates human beings above all other entities that inhabit the earth. This lofty worth is presented as the foundation

3 The Uniqueness of Persons in the Life and Thought of Karol Wojtyła 63 of moral laws that forbid the violation of human beings, such as using them in various ways as if they were mere means to some end. Western philosophy has maintained that the metaphysical basis for this superior worth which grounds those laws is the rational nature of human beings: any being possessing a rational nature is deemed to be worthy of absolute respect. The exact nature of the rationality possessed by humans differs somewhat among the philosophers who have defended it, but perhaps a few key features could be identified. A rational nature includes the ability to transcend oneself in such a way as to relate meaningfully to the whole world; we perform these acts of selftranscendence through our intellect, will, and affections. Thus, of the beings on earth, only fellow humans can follow a lecture, make judgments about it and ask questions after it. Only humans participate in the moral life by bringing into being actions and states of soul that can be called morally good or evil, 7 and only human beings can be moved and then respond with the deepest of emotions to, for example, beautiful works of art and nature. Animals cannot engage in discussion, they cannot be said to be morally virtuous or vicious and they do not have an aesthetic perception of the beauty of a sunset. Any being with these capabilities reveals itself to possess a rational nature, and is thus deemed to hold a higher rank than beings which lack these capabilities. 8 Another dimension of this account of the worth of persons that runs through the Western tradition is based on the Aristotelian distinctions of substance/accident and potency/act. Based on these distinctions is the view that a human being in a state of dreamless sleep retains in actual being its immaterial soul, along with its intellectual, volitional and affective faculties, while retaining consciousness in potency only. Not only does this line of thought maintain that humans in dreamless sleep still have their souls, but so do other living humans in various states of diminished/non-consciousness. 9 I think that Western philosophy is correct in its assertion that such a rational nature raises the worth of a being to a level that grounds exceptionless moral norms to respect that being, 10 and that Western philosophy has produced an accurate philosophical account of many features of that rational nature. WOJTYŁA S INDEBTEDNESS TO SCHELER S PERSONALISM ABOVE ALL OTHER FORMS OF PERSONALISM In the texts in the appendix, and in ones that will follow shortly, when Wojtyła speaks of his indebtedness to personalism, he either mentions only Scheler by name, or gives a list of names and always puts Scheler s first. One might then be led to think that Wojtyła was drawn to some philosophical insights in Scheler which were not present in the other personalists. Indeed, there is more than one such idea, and the individuality of persons (what I am calling their uniqueness ) is certainly a significant one. John Crosby has recently shown that none of the personalists who write about individuality mean by it what Scheler meant: Scheler does not posit the antithesis of person and

4 64 Peter J. Colosi individual that is found in many personalist authors, such as Maritain, Mournier, and (even if he is not usually reckoned to the personalists) Hans Urs von Balthasar. Maritain lets individual express the material extensive aspect of man, with the result that person expresses the spiritual aspect of man. 11 Mounier lets individual express a meaning more distinctly moral, namely the grasping, acquisitive, self-assertive side of man, with the result that person expresses the generous self-giving side of man. 12 Von Balthasar lets individual express man as an instance of human nature, with the result that person expresses man as incommunicable, unrepeatable. 13 But in each case individual forms some kind of antithesis to person and it expresses something lower in human beings, something in contrast to what is highest and best in them, which receives the designation person. Now, as usual as this antithesis is among personalist authors, Scheler knows nothing of it: individuality for him is nothing but an aspect of personhood. When he entitles a section of his Formalismus Person und Individuum, he means to suggest no least antithesis; on the contrary, Individuum expresses for him the very heart of Person. 14 Three questions arise from this reading. What exactly does it mean to assert that individuum is the very heart of person? Exactly how does one express the meaning of this view as distinct from all other personalists? Can it be seen from his writings that Wojtyła picked up on and embraced exactly this Schelerian understanding of personal individuality? THE UNIQUENESS OF PERSONS 15 I devote my very rare free moments to a work that is close to my heart and devoted to the metaphysical sense and mystery of the person. It seems to me that the debate today is being played on that level. The evil of our times consists in the first place in a kind of degradation, indeed a pulverization, of the fundamental uniqueness of each human person. This evil is even much more of the metaphysical order than of the moral order. To this disintegration, planned at times by atheistic ideologies, we must oppose, rather than sterile polemics, a kind of recapitulation of the inviolable mystery of the person. I firmly believe that the truths attacked compel with more urgency the recognition of those who are often the involuntary victims of it 16 This text of Wojtyła reveals his absorption of the idea of individual

5 The Uniqueness of Persons in the Life and Thought of Karol Wojtyła 65 persons from Scheler, and I will draw on it throughout the discussion which follows. I would like to begin to answer the questions posed at the end of the last section by presenting a simple two-part definition of philosophy. The first part of philosophy consists in getting a good look at reality, a clear perception of some dimension of reality. Once that is achieved, the second part of philosophy consists in formulating assertions that accurately express that dimension of reality which one has clearly seen. This is what philosophers are supposed to do. Following this schema, our first approach to the uniqueness of persons will be to notice, as Scheler does, that while this quality can be seen clearly, it is impossible to perform the second part of philosophy on it. That is to say, while one can see and know the uniqueness of another person, there are no words that can be spoken which would capture or express that uniqueness. 17 Since I have just asserted that no words can express the uniqueness which is the main topic of my paper, you may be wondering how I will be able to continue; I am writing words, yet I just said that words cannot express that about which I intend to write. I will begin, then, by pointing out exactly what this uniqueness is not. I can express using words that outline what the uniqueness is not, and then, by negating the definition thus outlined, lead the reader to see what uniqueness actually is. The uniqueness of persons is often designated by referring to it as their incommunicability. For the purposes of this paper the terms uniqueness and incommunicability may be considered interchangeable. Notice that in-communicable is itself a word that points to something by negating its opposite. 18 It functions in the same way that im-mortal does. For whatever reason, we have taken to pointing to that intensity of life which is so strong that it can never be extinguished by using a term that literally means not-dead, or not able to be dead. Incommunicability points to a certain profound dimension of being, uniqueness, with a word that simply means not-common. And indeed, Scheler s definition of the individual value essence of a person is expressly set by him against the notion of a universal essence which is common in the sense that it can be instantiated in more than one exemplar: it is necessary to give a more precise definition of what we understand by individual-personal value essence. Essence, as we mentioned earlier, has nothing to do with universality there are essences that are given only in one particular individual. And for this very reason it makes good sense to speak of an individual essence and also the individual value-essence of a person. 19 It must be noted that the word incommunicable looks as though it could mean unable to be communicated, however, the incommunicable in persons is that in them which actually makes possible the deepest and most

6 66 Peter J. Colosi meaningful forms of communication. 20 For this reason, the choice of the term incommunicable could be seen as an unfortunate choice, since it leads so easily to such confusion. Therefore, I would like to give three possible meanings of the term and assert that two of the meanings of incommunicable are helpful in bringing us to an awareness of the uniqueness of persons, while the third leads to error: Meaning 1: The incommunicable is that within a person which is not common, in the sense that other persons could not have this within their being also. I have a will and an intellect, and so do you, therefore those features are common. But you are unique in your person, and unrepeatable, in a way that no one else can ever be you. This meaning of incommunicable is helpful in understanding personal uniqueness because it gets at the idea of not-common. Meaning 2: The incommunicable in persons cannot be expressed in words and sentences. While someone who loves you is able to grasp, know and love you in your very uniqueness, they could never utter a sentence which would capture or express that uniqueness. This meaning of incommunicable is also helpful in understanding personal uniqueness, because it gets at a narrow sense of not able to be communicated, namely, with words. Meaning 3: The incommunicable is that which is unable to be known by anyone else or communicated to anyone else. This meaning leads straight to error. The mere fact that no words can express the uniqueness of a person whom you love in no way implies that you do not know and love their very uniqueness it only means that that which you know and love in them is ineffable or unutterable. It would be absurd to conclude that just because words cannot be found to express something you know, that you therefore do not know it. This meaning leads to error because it takes the full and broadest meaning of communication and negates its possibility at all in interpersonal relating with respect to personal uniqueness. 21 As I have already suggested, love is the epistemological vehicle through which we know the uniqueness of others. In the realist phenomenology of Scheler and others, it was thematized that depending on the object known, a different faculty was needed. Thus, for colors, one needed the faculty of sight; for sounds, hearing; for mathematical principles, the intellect; and for values, Scheler would say, feelings. 22 This means that Scheler holds the view that love has a cognitive dimension. Normally one conceives of love as a fullness of feeling welling up in the soul of a lover which is then expressed outwardly as a response to the beloved. While this is a correct characterization, love seems also to have a receptive dimension, in which knowledge comes to a person and deepens because of love. One normally thinks of the intellect as the faculty whose primary function it is to cognize reality. 23 Not only the intellect,

7 The Uniqueness of Persons in the Life and Thought of Karol Wojtyła 67 however, but also the heart, or the feelings, have a cognitive dimension. 24 And it is only through loving another person that his or her uniqueness is known or encountered by us. Joshua Miller describes this particular form of affective cognition in the following way: In the first place, coming to know the unique person is at the same time a gaining of insight into her individual value essence. This essence comes to us as a distinct feeling in the heart; the person impresses herself on our heart in a way that no one else does. It also often comes to us in our imagination; we literally picture the person, especially her face, as a kind of incarnation of this individual value essence. 25 THE DIFFICULTY OF GRASPING PERSONAL UNIQUENESS AS A SOURCE OF A PERSON S WORTH In an insightful essay 26 offered shortly after the death of John Paul II, George Weigel cites the line in the letter to de Lubac about the pulverization of the fundamental uniqueness of each human person, and lists the horrors of the 20 th century, many of which Wojtyła himself experienced or witnessed, as the grim realization of this pulverization. Yet, in the next paragraph Weigel misses the point of the line he quoted by passing right over the notion of fundamental uniqueness : Wojtyła s counter-proposal was built on the conviction that God had made the human creature in His image and likeness, with intelligence and freewill, a creature capable of knowing the good and freely choosing it. That, John Paul insisted in a vast number of variations on one great theme, was the true measure of man the human capacity, in cooperation with God s grace, for heroic virtue. I would first of all whole-heartedly agree that all of these features raise the worth of human persons to the level which grounds absolute respect. But none of the items named by Weigel seem to capture Wojtyła s meaning with the term fundamental uniqueness. It is as if Weigel thinks that Wojtyła intends unique to refer to our entire species as unique over all other species of created things, because everyone in our unique species can do these acts, while animals, plants and rocks cannot. But Wojtyła referred to the fundamental uniqueness of each person, i.e., from every other person within our species. And the features as such listed by Weigel are not the person, nor exactly that which we love in another. When a loved one dies, we do not mourn that an intellect or a free will is gone, which all other people have too, but that this unrepeatable person is gone. Crosby expresses it thus:

8 68 Peter J. Colosi The loss of any person would not be a negligible loss on the grounds that so many persons remain, but would be an almost infinitely great loss, as if the only person in existence had been lost. 27 This is why people who have lost a loved one are in a sense inconsolable for the rest of their lives. Of course we miss the intellect, will and laugh of this very person, and the reason for that is because these common features (intellect, will, risibility) of persons appear in their full individuality on the basis of being rooted in the person. We can say that it is this person who in a certain sense communicates full individuality to the qualities. 28 A laugh is unique because it is informed by the unique person who is laughing. And Scheler says that [t]he love which has moral value is not that which pays loving regard to a person for having such and such qualities, pursuing such and such activities, or for possessing talents, beauty, or virtue; it is that love which incorporates these qualities, activities and gifts into its object, because they belong to that individual person. 29 Wojtyła, it seems to me, has in mind this dimension of persons in his letter to Henri de Lubac, not the common features of our human personal nature. 30 UNDERSTANDING PERSONAL UNIQUENESS BY EXAMINING A THOMISTIC-BASED OBJECTION 31 After this paper was presented, two conference participants expressed an objection which I understood in the following way. They approved of the discussion of the uniqueness of persons, even in the way I presented it, but they insisted that I refer to that dimension of personal being as the esse of persons, and that I not refer to it as the essence of a person (Scheler, as already noted, calls it the individual value essence ). They seemed to maintain the view that essence is always common and that existence is the sole source of uniqueness and individuality. Introducing a collection of texts of St. Thomas on metaphysics, W. Norris Clark, S.J. encapsulates what I take to be the core Thomistic metaphysical assertion concerning esse represented in their objection: A being, (used without qualification) means for him that which is, in the real order. The that which signifies what a thing is, its essence or nature, responding to the question, What is it? The is signifies the act of existing, or active presence, which posits the what in the real order responding to the question, Is it?, or Does it exist? This inner act

9 The Uniqueness of Persons in the Life and Thought of Karol Wojtyła 69 of existence which St. Thomas calls the esse or to-be of a being, that which makes a being precisely to be a be-ing is not a what, an essence or nature, making a being to be this kind of being. It is, rather, an active presence which posits the entire essence, with all its properties, in the real order of actual existence, making it actually to be what it is. 32 I do not disagree with this account of esse, and if one considers the case of multiple objects of the same type that seem identical in every way, then I would agree with the assertion that the esse of such beings also fully accounts for the uniqueness of those beings. Consider multiple schoolroom desk chairs, for example, all lined up next to each other in rows. They share everything in common besides their own instantiation; that is, all the chairs are stamped with the same general essence of chairness (simply put, each is stamped with the blueprint for that model of chair), but each chair actualizes that essence separately. Each chair has its own unique existence (esse). In this case it is true to say that the source of uniqueness is the esse of each chair which is making it be this real chair and not any of the other chairs. 33 And while the essence or plan/blueprint for the chairs which is really present in each of them is unique in the sense that it is in that one there as concretely instantiated and in this other one here, 34 ultimately we would not rightly insist on unique essences in the full sense, since they all look identical. 35 But notice that the bearer of the worth 36 of a chair is not its uniqueness, but rather that about it which makes it the same as all the other chairs, namely its essence. Of course I mean the really existing essence of the chair which has an active presence which posits the entire essence, as Fr. Clark put it. However,the focal point of our interest is primarily those essential features of the real chair, and this can be shown by asking what we do with a broken chair? Toss it in the garbage and take one that works, despite its uniqueness as being this chair and no other. Why? Because the focal point of the worth of the chair is not what is unique about that chair, but rather what is common, its chairness. Consider another question about a schoolroom chair. 37 If I want to sit and can see only one chair in the room, then that chair has a great deal of importance for me. If, however, upon entering the room I see 700 such chairs, then suddenly the particular one diminishes greatly from the point of view of worth. Beings whose worth comes primarily from their common traits are relativized in that worth when placed next to many more exemplars of the same type. While having esse is necessary if a person wants actually to sit in a chair, that is as far as it goes, and any existing chair will have the same worth in fulfilling that function. But consider a person, and it is best to consider one whom you love dearly. If you place that person next to 700 or seven million other people, their worth does not drop to an insignificant level, like a chair next to 700 other chairs. It does not drop at all. Now someone may object in the following way, ah, but the reason it does not drop is because you asked me to think of

10 70 Peter J. Colosi a person I love, and their worth doesn t seem to drop to me because I love them. I would agree in one sense and strongly disagree in another. If it is meant that your love for that person is the complete source of their worth such that if you did not love them, then they would be worthless, then I would strongly disagree. 38 If, on the other hand, it is only meant that since you love this person you have a better insight into their worth than people who do not love them, but that their worth is inside them regardless of your love, then I would agree. Your love makes you see that their worth is not relativized by numerous instantiations of human nature put next to them. The reason for this is that the focal point of another person s worth, unlike the chairs, is their uniqueness. Love is inspired by catching a glimpse of the uniqueness of another person, and once so inspired, in turn allows for a deeper and clearer vision of that person s uniqueness, which in turn inspires more love, and so on. But your love for them is not the foundational metaphysical cause of their uniqueness, it just gives you a clear vision of their uniqueness. Once you see it, then you also see that it is not diminished in its worth and preciousness when that person is standing next to seven million other people. Chairs, on the other hand, are so diminished. The deepest source of the worth of a chair is precisely what it has exactly in common with all the other chairs, while the deepest source of worth in a person is precisely what he or she does not have in common with anyone else. For this reason all statements such as what is so important about uniqueness, every stone is unique? utterly miss the mark. 39 The difference between unique persons and unique stones is so radical that I would almost hesitate to use the term analogy to describe the similarity. 40 Another way to get the same idea across is to ask why it is that you love this person. The answer is not a common trait. You do not love a person because they have the faculty of intellect, or will, or because they have five senses. After making a new friend or falling in love, no one exclaims: Guess what?! I met another functioning intellect today! I met another being with a free will! Rather, one says, I met a new person today! Of course, a person expresses himself or herself to you through an intellect and a free will, but the person is not reducible to those faculties, 41 nor to those faculties actualized through esse. There is something utterly unique about each person, which is indeed expressed through traits that are common to all persons and intimately united with those traits, but which is not accounted for by listing those traits. This dimension of the person is individual in its very content, and therefore cannot be duplicated in another person. It is in the strictest sense unique. It is this unrepeatable, utterly unique, essential content of a person that Crosby refers to with the term incommunicable, and Scheler refers to as the individual value essence. Pope John Paul II was also clearly referring to this uniqueness when he made the following statement wherein he credited his awareness of uniqueness to his study of personalism (and we know that the personalist he studied above all others is Max Scheler):

11 The Uniqueness of Persons in the Life and Thought of Karol Wojtyła 71 It is difficult to formulate a systematic theory on how to relate to people, yet I was greatly helped in this by the study of personalism during the years I devoted to philosophy. Every human being is an individual person and therefore I cannot program a priori a certain type of relationship that could be applied to everyone, but I must, so to speak, learn it anew in every case It is very important for a bishop to have a rapport with his people and to know how to relate to them well. In my own case, significantly, I never felt that I was meeting an excessive number of people. Nonetheless, I was always concerned to safeguard the personal quality of each relationship. Every person is a chapter to himself. I always acted with this conviction, but I realize that it is something you can t learn. It is simply there, because it comes from within. 42 The Pope did not say here that we need to focus on the rational nature of each person we meet, nor did he say we ought to look with awe to their act of being which gives that nature reality - of course, we should do these things too - but that is not the import of this quote. Notice that he even utilizes the Schelerian language of individual person. And the last line reminds one of the ineffable uniqueness of each person: why couldn t you learn about a will, or a will actualized through esse? The point is, you can learn about those, and even form a systematic theory about them, which has been done. But he says here that you cannot do that with persons. We see that Scheler s phrase individual person (noted in the text of Scheler quoted above 43 ) was taken over here by John Paul. In both texts there is the idea that love is not properly directed at what is common, but at what is unique, which is the individual person. This idea is exactly that which makes Scheler so very different from all other personalists: individuum, as Crosby rightly pointed out, is the very heart of personhood, and John Paul II uses language which reveals his absorption of this Schelerian insight here. The quote above indicates that this was the guiding focus in his meetings with people. 44 There are more texts which confirm this very same Schelerian influence on Wojtyła s approach to persons. Consider the following quote, especially its last two sentences: after my priestly ordination I was sent to Rome to complete my studies These studies resulted in my doctorate on Saint John of the Cross and then the dissertation on Max Scheler which qualified me for University teaching: specifically I wrote on the contribution which Scheler s phenomenological type of ethical system can make to the development of moral theology. This research benefited me greatly. My previous Aristotelian-Thomistic formation was enriched by the

12 72 Peter J. Colosi phenomenological method, and this made it possible for me to undertake a number of creative studies. I am thinking above all of my book The Acting Person. In this way I took part in the contemporary movement of philosophical personalism, and my studies were able to bear fruit in my pastoral work. I have often noticed how many of the ideas developed in these studies have helped me in my meetings with individuals and with great numbers of the faithful during my apostolic visits. My formation within the cultural horizon of personalism also gave me a deeper awareness of how each individual is a unique person. I think that this awareness is very important for every priest. 45 And consider this striking text as well: If we celebrate so solemnly the birth of Jesus, we do it so as to bear witness to the fact that each person is someone, unique and unrepeatable. If humanity s statistics and arrangement, its political, economic and social systems as well as its simple possibilities, do not come about to assure man that he can be born, exist and work as a unique and unrepeatable individual, then bid farewell to all assurances. For Christ and because of Him, the individual is always unique and unrepeatable; someone eternally conceived and eternally chosen; someone called and given a special name. 46 John Paul II speaks here of a unique and unrepeatable someone eternally conceived, chosen, called and named. He does not speak of a human nature given inner actuality and nothing more. He speaks of a unique individual given inner actuality. 47 THE UNIQUENESS OF PERSONS AS INTRINSIC THEOLOGICAL TEXTS OF JOHN PAUL II Considering together the Pope s Christmas reflections on the unique individuality of each person and his earlier letter to de Lubac stating that the evil of the pulverization of the fundamental uniqueness of each person is much more of the metaphysical than of the moral order, a call emerges to understand and to recapitulate the metaphysical status of this uniqueness. Let us, then, without discounting its mystery, attempt to probe it more deeply. An all-powerful God could make all the skin cells and body cells of two people to be identical, and could make all of their experiences the same. Even if God did that, Scheler would still say that these two people are in the core of their being different one from the other. He would say this because external factors are not the primary reason for the differences between, or

13 The Uniqueness of Persons in the Life and Thought of Karol Wojtyła 73 the uniqueness of, persons (although they do participate in our uniqueness in various ways). Scheler comments: Supposing we could get rid of all physical differences between human beings (including their essential here-and-nowness), and could further eliminate all qualitative differences in regard to their private objects of consciousness (including the formal aspect of these objects in short the whole of what they think, will, feel, etc.), the individual diversity of their central personalities would still remain, despite the fact that the idea of personality would be the same in each of them. 48 I would like to proceed by considering some theological texts of Pope John Paul II in which one detects the Schelerian understanding of the uniqueness of persons. It will be helpful first to consider the following formulation of personal uniqueness by Crosby, which expresses both that it is intrinsic to persons and that it is a really existing, one-time essential structure: it does not suffice to point to the unrepeatability of the genetic make up of a human being, that is, of those traits of race, temperament, intelligence, etc., which depend on the genetic make-up of an individual. These traits are indeed woven together in a given individual in a way that is not repeated by other individuals, but this is only a relative unrepeatability. There is after all no absurdity in exactly these traits being repeated in exactly these interconnections in a second and third individual indeed this repeating is exactly what happens in the case of identical twins. 49 But there is an absurdity in there being two copies of one and the same person. The incommunicability that we found above in a certain existential form, and into which we now inquire in asking about a possible essential form of it, lies at a deeper level in a human being. It lies in the depths of personal being; it is not a relative but an absolute incommunicability Each person has an essential something that only he or she can have, or rather can be, an essential something that would forever be lost to the world, leaving a kind of irreparable metaphysical hole in it, if the person embodying it would go out of existence altogether. 50 In theological terms, Crosby would seem to be implying here that in creating a new person, God is thinking of, and bringing into being, a specific someone, and not merely giving inner actuality to the form of human nature. Referring again to the Thomistic-based objection analyzed earlier, if someone

14 74 Peter J. Colosi held the view that the moment of coming into being of a new human person could be fully accounted for by saying that inner actuality was given to the form of human nature, then one would be committed to the position that the source of the uniqueness we encounter in people was entirely extrinsic to that person. This would mean that as experiences started happening to this new human, those experiences would begin to shape that person s personality, and since it is statistically practically impossible that the exact same experiences happen to two people, we end up with the uniqueness we encounter in others. Such a view would deny that at the moment of the creation of a new human person God also put the person s uniqueness there, making it intrinsic to that person. But Scheler, as was demonstrated, does not agree with the idea that the exclusive source of the uniqueness of persons is extrinsic to them. He thinks there is a divinely determined uniqueness within each of us, as Joshua Miller has shown. 51 In fact, Miller s analysis reveals that there are two sources of the uniqueness of persons for Scheler. While it is the divinely determined one that can be perceived in the texts of John Paul II that I will provide and analyze in a moment, I would like to give Miller s summary of both sources. A key part of Scheler s personalism is the idea that each person has an individual value essence, which he sometimes calls an ideal essence or ideal value image that permeates the person s being. This individual value essence is determined by God and indicates an abiding ontological structure of personal uniqueness. A second dimension of personal uniqueness emerges from the person s nature as self-determining. Because the person is spiritual, like God, he is spontaneous, creative, and above all free so that each of his acts is something new and distinct in the world. I will not argue that a person can change his essence or operate outside its parameters, but I do mean to say that uniqueness is, in part, something indeterminate and fluid. The person, who is essentially unique, is also free and therefore can authentically actualize his individual value essence in a number of ways. In doing so he does not simply concretize what Scheler calls an ideal value image that God has of him. Rather, he cocreates this image; he self-determinatively fills in the lines that have been established for him. 52 In The Gospel of Life, paragraphs 44 and 68, John Paul II lists numerous lyrical scripture passages which point to God s love for babies in the womb. He then asks a profound rhetorical question: How can anyone think that even a single moment of this marvelous process of the unfolding of life could be separated from the wise and loving work of the Creator, and left prey to human caprice? 53 But wouldn t it be the case that if the uniqueness of persons was constituted exclusively by events that happen to us, many of which are quite random, then this would be precisely that caprice which a

15 The Uniqueness of Persons in the Life and Thought of Karol Wojtyła 75 loving Creator would not choose as the ultimate source of our unique person? And he adds: Human life is sacred and inviolable at every moment of existence, including the initial phase which precedes birth. All human beings, from their mothers womb, belong to God who searches them and knows them, who forms them and knits them together with his own hands, who gazes on them when they are tiny shapeless embryos and already sees in them the adults of tomorrow whose days are numbered There too, when they are still in their mothers womb as many passages of the Bible bear witness they are the personal objects of God s loving and fatherly providence. 54 Do these texts not engender an image of a specific someone who, from the beginning, is present with an inner actuality not only of their human nature, but also of their very uniqueness in some way, and already loved by God as that person, as opposed to an instantiated human nature that will only later become unique due to external influences? As was seen above, Scheler expressly rejected the notion that external factors such as the unique space that I occupy, time and experiences that happen to me, or acts that I perform could exhaustively account for my uniqueness. He argues instead, as Crosby has shown, for a radically intrinsic principle of uniqueness, finding a particular strength of individuality in human persons, which he explains by saying that each person has an essence all his own, that is, an essence that could not be possibly repeated in a second person. 55 Crosby cites an interesting quote, where Richard Stith says, Even if God were to promise me that he would immediately substitute an identical person for my wife if I would let him take her away, I would refuse. I do not want someone like her, I want her. 56 Crosby uses this quote to criticize a remark that Stith makes a few pages later. He says that Stith is forced into referring to the dimension of his wife that he wants as her existence only because he has not yet conceived that some essences are not universal, such as the unique, ineffable, essential something of his wife that will never be again in any other person. I would like to extend the use of the Stith quote and ask: would not God, who also loves each of us, also have that same intensity of love expressed by Stith for his wife toward each of us from the first moment of our existence? It would be opposed to the principles of divine love and beauty for God not to be able to say from the very beginning to each one of us that we are not just repeatable instantiations of human rational nature; what kind of love would that be? This idea is contained within the core of the quotes from The Gospel of Life that I have given, and it was developed by Scheler in an unexpected way with unexpected clarity. Perhaps it impressed itself on the mind and heart of Wojtyła in the years he dedicated to poring over Scheler s work.

16 76 Peter J. Colosi It seems that Scheler s position could not countenance the view that in God s creation of a human person God only took some amount of raw esse and gave it human nature. 57 For Scheler maintains, as Miller has shown, that there are two sources of our uniqueness, and one of them is divinely determined. And so, according to this account it would follow that God brings into being a human nature and also an individual person by giving the unity of these two an inner actuality, or esse. And while human nature can be instantiated more than once in billions of human persons, your unique youness, i.e., that which your mother sees and loves in you, is not able to be instantiated like that, since it only comes once. Crosby provides one further helpful distinction for us here: the distinction between the existential incommunicability and the essential incommunicability of persons. 58 He suggests the possibility that the dignity of persons belongs more to existential incommunicability, while the personal lovableness, on the other hand, belongs more to essential (but, of course, really existing) incommunicability. 59 There is the dignity of each person in virtue of which we owe respect to persons; but then there is the goodness or lovableness of a person which, once seen and experienced, awakens something like friendship, or perhaps a spousal love, for that person. This lovableness is perhaps even more deeply rooted in the incommunicable selfhood of each person than the dignity of the person, because every person has this dignity, whereas the lovableness of a person is possessed only by that person and by no other. I am capable of recognizing the dignity of every person whom I meet and of showing him or her respect, but I am capable of recognizing the unique personal lovableness of only a very few persons and I am capable of loving only these few. There is, strange to say, a certain communicability that remains in the dignity of the person, even though it is grounded precisely in the incommunicable selfhood of each person. 60 The interesting idea contained in this text is that there is a distinction between the fact of incommunicability and the very content of some specific person s uniqueness. 61 Every person is unique, thus uniqueness is a common trait, yet the very inner, essential and unrepeatable content of a person s uniqueness is not found in any other. It is that very inner uniqueness of a specific person for which there are no words; it is that which once glimpsed inspires love and is then seen even more clearly because of the love. Yet this unique, unrepeatable lovableness of someone whom you love cannot be asserted in words, no matter how clearly your love lets you see it. 62

17 The Uniqueness of Persons in the Life and Thought of Karol Wojtyła 77 CONCLUSION: AN APPLICATION TO HEALTH-CARE AND BIO-ETHICS It may be possible here to make a modest step in responding to the call of Karol Wojtyła to recapitulate the metaphysical sense and mystery of the fundamental uniqueness of each human person as the only response to the disintegration planned at times by atheistic ideologies. Crosby claims that when we awaken to the uniqueness of a person whom we love and thereby become aware of the mysterious concreteness of human persons, our value consciousness becomes immeasurably enlarged. 63 One famous atheist who, as shown above, currently plans out the pulverization of the fundamental uniqueness of each person is Professor Peter Singer of Princeton University. In a recent article 64 I discussed the reasons for Singer s decision to hire a team of home health care professionals for his mother who at the time was suffering from severe dementia. 65 According to the theories that Singer has long espoused, Singer ought to have either let his mother die or have killed her. I pointed out that it was precisely when Singer got into the position of dealing with the suffering of a person whom he loved dearly that he reversed in his actions what he has insisted on for decades in his books. Many critics of Singer demanded an explanation for his behavior. Ultimately, he claimed that he committed a morally wrong act by caring for his mother. 66 But this answer, I pointed out, does not express the motive for his action, it only provides an excuse: moral weakness if he had been stronger he would, it seems, have killed her. But there must have been a positive reason/ motive for his actions. I suggested that he did not kill his mother because he loved her and that his love made him see the reasons within her being for which she should not have been killed. I found in Singer s own words the basis of my assertion, when he said to Michael Specter (who pressed him on the point), I think this has made me see how the issues of someone with these kinds of problems are really very difficult. Perhaps it is more difficult than I thought before, because it is different when it s your mother. 67 In other words, the difference when it is your mother is that you love her, and this expands your awareness of the worth of the person exponentially because in love you become aware of precisely the ineffable, unrepeatable preciousness of that person. In uttering these words Singer revealed that he had exactly this awareness in the case of his mother, and that this is the reason he behaved so differently in that case: his value knowledge expanded to large proportions in the case of his mother through his love of her. While it caused Singer to behave towards his own mother in a way that John Paul II would approve of, and while it perplexed him enough to make this admission to Michael Specter, it did not cause him to undergo a great awakening to the incommunicable selfhood and mysterious concreteness of every person. 68 Jonathan Sanford concludes his important study of Scheler s idea of cognition through feelings with the following point: Scheler s sensitivity to the emotional sphere of the human

18 78 Peter J. Colosi being leads him to explore facets of our contact with the world that philosophers have but rarely considered. One reason that philosophers have shied away from discussing the emotional sphere, and our intuitive experience of the world, is that intuitive evidence cannot be demonstratively verified Some things are simply given the inability to prove evidence gleaned through intuition is no reason to reject that evidence. If in fact reflection on our experience of reality suggests that affective insights do occur, then we ought to theorize about the nature of such insights and examine their content. 69 Singer perceived this in the case of his mother and acted in a manner that follows from such awareness in her case, but he could not extend that awareness to other persons whom he does not love. Peter Berkowitz, upon hearing about Singer s behavior towards his mother, wrote an excellent piece whose title aptly gets this point across: Other People s Mothers. 70 There is a raging debate in contemporary ethics which centers around the conflict between the intuition that killing innocents is wrong and the inability to demonstrably justify that intuition. 71 Many utilitarians are conflicted within themselves because of this paradox. For example, J.J.C. Smart, after drawing the conclusion that it is ethically right to kill an innocent person when that action results in the avoidance of large scale suffering, asserted, Even in my most utilitarian moods I am not happy about this consequence of utilitarianism. 72 Smart attempts but ultimately fails to find a satisfactory solution to his dilemma, 73 because he rejects evidence that is obtained through intuition simply because it is so obtained. Another way to put this would be to say that he decides to hold the view that he does not know any dimension of reality that cannot be expressed in formulaic assertions, even if he knows that he knows such a dimension of reality (which I think his unhappiness proves). Scheler and Wojtyła have an answer to this problem. Scheler describes the position manifested by thinkers like Smart as a philosophical prejudice. Until recent times philosophy was inclined to a prejudice that has its historical origin in antiquity. This prejudice consists in upholding the division between reason and sensibility, which is completely inadequate in terms of the structure of the spiritual. This division demands that we assign everything that is not rational that is not order, law, and the like to sensibility. Thus our whole emotional life and, for most modern philosophers, our conative life as well, even love and hate must be assigned to sensibility. According to this division, everything, in the mind which is alogical, e.g., intuition, feeling, striving, loving, hating, is dependent on man s psychophysical organization. 74