What Is Spirituality?

Transcription

1 What Is Spirituality? Word Count (excluding footnotes, abstract, and works cited page): 3,999 Abstract Word Count: 197 1

2 Abstract Some traditional accounts of the good life include a place for what would today be called spirituality. For Aristotle, for example, at least part of the good life consists in theoria (intellectual contemplation), which connects humans to the Unmoved Mover, the divine and eternal first principle of being. Some contemporary moral philosophers have developed accounts of spirituality (and related concepts, such as transcendence), often with a mind to defend a particular conception of spirituality that is compatible with rationality, naturalism, or other currently widespread philosophical commitments. These accounts offer genuine insights, but are defective, in part because they introduce substantive philosophical positions that make the definition of spirituality too narrow, and in part because they introduce evaluative criteria which should be separated from the definition of spirituality proper. I propose defining spirituality as the disposition to seek transcendence, for the sake of attaining meaning, and which is realized through contemplation or other spiritual activity. This definition incorporates the genuine insights of previous accounts of spirituality, while avoiding their defects, and serves as a useful basis for addressing such issues as whether spirituality is compatible with rationality and whether it is a part of the good life. 2

3 1. Why Define Spirituality? Contemporary accounts of the good life have ignored or downplayed the role of spirituality. Following Aristotle, many contemporary accounts have conceived of the good life as rational activity in accordance with moral virtue, with sufficient external goods. 1 Non- Aristotelians, too, generally assume that rationality, at least, is an important part of the good life. The emphasis on rationality tends to drive out spirituality, on the common assumption that spirituality is inherently irrational. However, it is instructive to consider that Aristotle himself regards intellectual contemplation (theoria) as at least partially constitutive of the good life, and, prima facie, such contemplation is a form of spirituality, since it connects humans to that which is eternal and divine. 2 To determine whether spirituality is in fact compatible with rationality, and to determine whether spirituality is part of the good life, a clearer definition of spirituality is needed. Spirituality is difficult to define, for at least two reasons. First, the term is multiply ambiguous; second, the various senses of the term seem to be family resemblance concepts, which escape analysis in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. To deal with the first difficulty, philosophers should simply select a sense of spirituality which is especially relevant to the discipline. 3 Another sense of spirituality might, at least in principle, be more relevant to other fields, such as psychology or comparative religion. To deal with the second difficulty, there are at least two options. One is to adopt an account of spirituality which is not a traditional analysis in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, but rather a set of representative criteria which are generally characteristic of spirituality. Another is to simply adopt an analysis in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, even though there is bound to be a gap between this analysis and the actual meaning one is after. The latter option seems preferable, despite the inevitable semantic slippage, for the sake of the increased clarity and precision which a philosophical analysis so often provides. In addition to difficulties facing a definition of spirituality because of the nature of the concept, there are two additional pitfalls which such a definition should avoid. First, the 1 Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1097b a20. 2 For Aristotle on contemplation and its role in the good life, see Book X of Nicomachean Ethics. 3 My interest in developing a definition of spirituality is rooted, in particular, in moral philosophers attempts to offer an account of the good life; as such, it may be of greater interest to moral philosophers than to philosophers of religion (for example), but I have tried to make the account sufficiently broad so as to be of use at least to other philosophers, as well as (hopefully) to scholars in other disciplines. 3

4 definition should be specific enough that it differentiates spirituality from other human capacities and dispositions (such as the capacity for rationality, or moral and intellectual states of character), but it should be broad enough that it finds exemplars in a sufficiently wide range of religious and philosophical traditions. Narrower conceptions of spirituality are of course possible, but these would seem to constitute particular theories of spirituality, rather than general definitions of the concept. For example, a definition of spirituality should be broad enough that it neither presupposes nor precludes the following possibilities: (1) spirituality is compatible with rationality; (2) spirituality is compatible with naturalism; (3) spirituality is compatible with physicalism; and (4) spirituality plays a role in the good life. Whether these possibilities are actualities is a substantive philosophical question, which should be resolved through argumentation, and not through definition alone. 4 Second, a definition of spirituality should not be front-loaded with excessive evaluative criteria. Insofar as a distinction can be made between spirituality as such and correct or right spirituality, it should be possible for something to count as an instance of spirituality even it is defective in some way. On the one hand, it makes sense, at least from an Aristotelian perspective, that the evaluative criteria for spirituality be reflected in its definition, since the more a thing realizes the nature spelled out in the definition of its kind, the more it counts as a good instance of its kind. On the other hand, if the definition of spirituality is encumbered with excessively thick evaluative criteria, there is a risk in conflating the definition of spirituality with the evaluation of it. In the following discussion, I will briefly discuss two moral philosophers accounts of spirituality, and one moral philosopher s account of the related concept of transcendence, before pointing out both the insights and the limitations of these previous accounts (section 2). I will then present an alternative definition of spirituality which attempts to avoid the difficulties while incorporating the insights (section 3). 4 As an example of a definition of spirituality by a moral philosopher which precludes the possibility that there are forms of spirituality compatible with naturalism, consider the following by Kwame Gyekye: I define spirituality as a heightened form of religiosity reached by certain individuals in the community who have, or claim to have, mystical contacts with the supernatural, the divine ( African Ethics, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, This does not imply that, in other intellectual or conversational contexts, it is not rationally justified to adopt a definition of spirituality which rules out one or more of these possibilities. For example, in the formal study of religion it might make sense to define spirituality in such a way that it rules out naturalism. 4

5 2. Some Previous Accounts of Spirituality Despite the relative neglect of spirituality, it has not been completely ignored. John Haldane advocates a conception of spirituality in terms of appropriate demeanor, where demeanor is a person s fundamental orientation to the world, and where the demeanor is appropriate just in case it is based on correct contemplation of the world and its objects. 5 Robert C. Solomon, in his Spirituality for the Skeptic: The Thoughtful Love of Life, advocates a conception of spirituality which is compatible with naturalism, rationality, and passionate commitment, and which emphasizes the way a person experiences the world in this life. 6 Owen Flanagan, in his The Really Hard Problem, discusses, from a purely naturalistic perspective, the natural human disposition to transcendence, and its relation to creating a meaningful life. 7 As mentioned above, each of these accounts has at least some insights which are worth retaining in a definition of spirituality, but also runs afoul of some of the desiderata for such a definition. Haldane has provided a thought-provoking account of spirituality which seems tailored to appeal to contemporary philosophers committed to rationality and naturalism. Haldane introduces the notion of spirituality as demeanor, in part in order to differentiate spirituality from ethical and aesthetic considerations: My suggestion, however, has been that there is a further area of human existence, the spiritual, which is not essentially concerned with action in relation to the rights and interests of others and which has something to do with how one experiences the world and what one makes of that experience. It is, I suggest, primarily a matter of what personal demeanour or mode of being one develops in the face of reality as one understands it in some more or less philosophical way Notwithstanding its welcome breadth, contemporary virtue ethics remains a version of moral theory and as such is concerned principally with action. Likewise, aesthetics is concerned principally with disinterested contemplation of objects of experience. Spirituality involves intellect, will and emotion and is essentially contemplative, but the process of discovering the nature of reality, evaluating its implications for the human condition and cultivating an appropriate demeanour in the face of these is not reducible to ethics, nor to aesthetics. 9 5 De Consolatione Philosophiae, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 32 (1992): 31-45; On the very idea of spiritual values, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 47 (2000): New York: Oxford University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, On the very idea of spiritual values, p Ibid., p

6 Haldane also maintains that the demeanor of spirituality must be appropriate to the nature of things: I have spoken at various points of spirituality as involving an appropriate demeanour. It may now be asked appropriate to what?.... It seems unintelligible to suppose that nothing follows for the enquirer from arriving at a fundamental view of reality be it physicalist or theist. Not only does the question arise of how to compose one s spirit in the face of this, but the content of the metaphysical belief must condition the character of the resulting demeanour. 10 While Haldane does not expiclty spell out the nature of this appropriateness relation, a plausible suggestion is that a demeanor is appropriate just in case it is fitting given the nature of the world, perhaps in conjunction with relevant facts about human nature. The second of Haldane s passages quoted above makes reference to the contemplative nature of spirituality. Haldane is here drawing upon the traditional Aristotelian notion of theoria or intellectual contemplation, even if he is perhaps conceiving of it in a new way. In an earlier work which also discusses spirituality, Haldane clarifies the specific type of contemplation which he has in mind. Unlike Boethius and other Platonists, who advocate contemplation of immaterial forms, Haldane, with his more Aristotelian conception of contemplation, advocates contemplation of the forms embodied in particular objects: In conclusion, then, the thought which I wish to propose for further consideration is that there is a mode of thinking of the nature of things which is contemplative but which does not seek to transcend the realm of numerically distinct empirical forms. When it comprehends those forms for what they are, and ipso facto comprehends the immanent principles of being of individual objects, it is satisfied at having engaged with reality and thereby having realized itself. This is the consolation Boethius believed he had found, that of uniting oneself with the real, of coming to be at one with things not, as mystics have often claimed, at one with everything, the totality itself being conceived of, in Parmenidean style as a unity, but united with each thing as one contemplates it for what it is. 11 Even compared with Aristotle s notion of theoria, Haldane s conception of contemplation is metaphysically spare and epistemically modest. Haldane does not argue here for a First Cause or Unmoved Mover as the ultimate object of contemplation, and the only knowledge which the contemplator must possess is of the actual natures of the empirical objects which he contemplates. In addition to demeanor and contemplation, Haldane s account of spirituality includes the notion of consolation, in that intellectual contemplation causes or brings with it the sense that in 10 Ibid., pp De Consolatione Philosophiae, p

7 some sense, all is well. 12 Haldane does not say much about the nature of or the grounds for this consolation, apart from his aforementioned statement that it is a consolation of uniting oneself with the real, of coming to be at one with things ; 13 perhaps this consolation is grounded in, or at least related to, realizing one s nature as a rational being, by intellectually grasping the fundamental nature of things. Like Haldane s account, Solomon s account of spirituality is multi-faceted, and contains numerous substantive philosophical commitments. Solomon begins his discussion, however, with a minimalist conception of spirituality, which is of quite broad application: At the very minimum, spirituality is the subtle and not easily specifiable awareness that surrounds virtually everything and anything that transcends our petty self-interest. Thus there is spirituality in nature, in art, in the bonds of love and fellow-feeling that hold a community together, in the reverence for life (and not only human life) that is the key to a great many philosophies as well as religions. This does not mean that spirituality is a form of selflessness (or egolessness). Spirituality, I want to argue, is an expanded form of the self, which is emphatically not to say that it is an expanded form of selfishness. Rather, as many Buddhists have long argued and Hegel more recently, it is that passionate sense of self-awareness in which the very distinction between selfishness and selflessness disappears. 14 Solomon is keen on developing a conception of spirituality which is compatible with naturalism, materialism, rationality, and a passionate life. Despite these commitments, his characterization of spirituality in terms of transcending mere selfishness or petty self-interest on the one hand, and of developing an expanded sense of the self on the other, harmonizes with many traditional religious and philosophical conceptions of spirituality. Solomon further characterizes spirituality as a way of experiencing the world (rather than mainly being about beliefs or belonging), and by emphasizing the social and practical aspects of spirituality: But spirituality, at least, is not primarily a matter of beliefs (although it certainly involves beliefs). It is rather a way (or a great many ways) of experiencing the world, of living, of interacting with other people and with the world. It involves a set of practices and rituals, not necessarily prayer, or church services, or meditation, or prescribed rituals of purification but any number of ways, whether individual or collective, of thinking, looking, talking, feeling, moving, and acting Ibid., p Ibid., p Spirituality for the Skeptic, p Ibid. 7

8 In particular, Solomon describes spirituality s way of experiencing the world as one of passionate caring, trust in the cosmos, and as rational, both in the sense that it is correctly informed by the way the world is, and in the sense that it best fits with actual human emotions. 16 Solomon s view of spirituality broadly resembles that of Haldane in two respects: spirituality has to do with a basic orientation to the world which displays itself in dispositions of passion and action; and this orientation is based on a correct understanding of the nature of the world. Solomon s talk of trust in the cosmos also resembles Haldane s notion that philosophy offers a consolation to human beings. Solomon s account puts more emphasis on the practical side of spirituality, and on the way in which human spirituality is relative to characteristic human emotions. Finally, Solomon emphasizes the transformation of self from petty selfishness to a larger, more expansive sense of the self. Flanagan, for his part, grounds his discussion of spirituality in psychologists Christopher Peterson and Martin Seligman s concept of transcendence. Peterson and Seligman include transcendence on their list of six universal virtues, and define it as the connection to something higher the belief that there is meaning or purpose larger than ourselves. 17 Flanagan agrees with Peterson and Seligman about the importance of transcendence in a human life, but disagrees with their classification of transcendence as a virtue. Instead, Flanagan regards transcendence as a complex (cognitive, affective, and conative), innate human disposition, which involves a sense of connection, and relates to the search for meaning: transcendence, it seems to me, is best conceived as a prepotent part of our basic cognitive-affectiveconative constitution as human animals that is easily activated across environments. It can then appear as beliefs, as belief-like things with feeling and motivational bearing, and across all these dimensions as weak or powerful I know not what thoughts or feelings of connection, merger/merging, awe, and the life. Transcendence so conceived has almost completely to do with such things as urges to make sense of things and live meaningfully. Both these urges involve, indeed require, situating myself in the world in some sort of expansive way, in a manner by which I become at once smaller and less significant that I am inclined to think, and more connected to and part of that which is large and great. Making sense of things and living meaningfully involve some sort of fulfillment of the urge to make sense of who I am, of the outside world, my place in it, and my prospects for living meaningfully as a wee part of everything that there is. Many 16 Ibid., p Character Strengths and Virtues: A Handbook and Classification (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 38. See also Katherine Dahlsgaard, Christopher Peterson, and Martin P. Seligman, Shared Virtue: The Convergence of Valued Human Strengths across Culture and History, Review of General Psychology 9 (2005):

9 people who say that they are spiritual but not religious are saying that they are seeking to understand and develop a sense of connection to that which is greater than and more comprehensive than their self. In this manner meaning is sought, possibly found and embodied in one s life. 18 Flanagan s account of transcendence resembles both Haldane s and Solomon s account of spirituality, in that it is a disposition with both cognitive and non-cognitive aspects. Flanagan s account further resembles Solomon s account of spirituality, in that it involves an alteration of the sense of self. However, Flanagan s account of transcendence places greater emphasis on the search for a meaningful life. The notion of meaning does seem implicitly related to Haldane s consolation and to Solomon s trust in the cosmos and passionate commitment, but meaning plays a greater, more explicit role in Flanagan s account. Haldane s account of spirituality correctly emphasizes both the deeply dispositional aspect of spirituality (demeanor) and its connection to characteristic forms of spiritual activity (contemplation). Connecting spirituality with consolation is also promising, though the nature of, and grounds for, the consolation need further clarification. In addition, Haldane s account of spirituality contains too many substantive philosophical commitments for a general definition of the concept, such as his quasi-aristotelian view that the proper objects of spiritual contemplation are the natures of empirical objects. Finally, by insisting that demeanor be appropriate to the nature of things in order to qualify as an instance of spirituality, Haldane s account does not permit the existence of defective forms of spirituality that should still count as spirituality. Solomon is correct to emphasize that spirituality involves commitment to something beyond the individual human self. His contention that spirituality involves both an absence of selfishness and an expanded sense of the self needs careful clarification to avoid incoherence, but the thought that spirituality involves both abandoning selfishness on the one hand and finding a true or authentic self on the other is historically quite common. Solomon s minimalist account of spirituality as an awareness of anything that transcends self-interest is far too broad, though; on this account, simple awareness of any non-self-interested moral principle would count as an instance of spirituality, for example. Solomon s more robust account of spirituality, meanwhile, involves too many commitments to particular views about the nature of the world (naturalism and physicalism, for example) and about the nature of (and proper relation between) reason and passion, at least for it to serve as a general definition of spirituality. 18 Flanagan, The Really Hard Problem,

10 Flanagan is correct that transcendence involves both a diminishing of the self and an increase in the sense of connectedness to something which is outside of and greater than the self. Flanagan is also right to emphasize the connection between transcendence and the search for meaning. And Flanagan s description of transcendence as a complex cognitive, affective, and conative disposition is a helpful way of spelling out what Haldane refers to as demeanor. A limitation of Flanagan s account of transcendence is that it omits reference to contemplation or other forms of spiritual activity that are means to or ways of realizing transcendence. The relation between spirituality and transcendence also merits further clarification. 3. A New Definition of Spirituality With the aforementioned considerations in mind, and incorporating the insights about spirituality contained in Haldane s, Solomon s, and Flanagan s accounts, I propose the following definition of spirituality: Spirituality def = a cognitive, affective, and conative disposition (or set of dispositions) to seek transcendence of the individual human self, which is developed for the sake of attaining meaning, and which is realized through contemplation (or other forms of spiritual activity) that is putatively fitting to the fundamental nature of reality. At least two evaluative criteria emerge from this definition of spirituality: (1) the actual fittingness of the spiritual contemplation to the fundamental nature of reality; and (2) the extent to which the disposition or set of dispositions actually enable a person to attain meaning. 19 This proposed definition of spirituality contains several difficult terms which themselves require further clarification, including transcendence, contemplation, spiritual activity, and meaning. The terms transcendence and meaning, in particular, inherently defy easy characterization, so a certain amount of chasing one s semantic tail is inevitable here. Having said that, some clarification of these concepts is necessary, if the definition of spirituality is to be at all precise and clear. Let transcendence, then, be the experience of a sufficiently deep connection to a transcendent being, principle, or state of affairs where the transcendent is that which is metaphysically or normatively (morally, aesthetically, or epistemically) prior to the individual 19 The definition leaves open the possibility that no actual spirituality is correct, if for example fitting contemplation of the nature of reality rules out attaining meaning. 10

11 human self. At first glance, this definition of transcendence may seem too broad, because it depends on an extremely broad notion of the transcendent. However, a key phrase is the experience of a sufficiently deep connection ; without this experience of connectedness, just any old awareness of a transcendent being, principle, or state of affairs is not enough to count as an instance of transcendence. Merely thinking about God or the categorical imperative, for example, is not enough for transcendence, if the experience of deep connectedness is lacking. A second key concept in the definition of transcendence is contemplation. I am following Haldane s use of the concept, which is rooted in Aristotelian theoria, the proper activity of nous or intellect, which consists in grasping the nature of the first principles of being. 20 However, the concept of contemplation used in the definition of spirituality must be broad enough that it can include similar forms of activity advocated by alternative religious and philosophical traditions. Also, to avoid excessive parochialism, in addition to contemplation (broadly conceived), other forms of spiritual activity should be permissible as means to or ways of realizing transcendence. Contemplation, then, is a kind of spiritual activity which involves intense focus on and absorption in an object relevant to realizing transcendence. This includes Platonist and Aristotelian theoria, Christian and other theistic contemplation, and at least some forms (perhaps all) of both Indian and Chinese meditation practices. Spiritual activity, meanwhile, is any activity engaged in for the sake of realizing transcendence Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics X; Metaphysics XII Spiritual activity as conceived herein should be carefully distinguished from Pierre Hadot s concept of spiritual exercises. Hadot introduced the term spiritual exercises to describe the techniques for moral self-transformation used by ancient Greek philosophers. See, for example, his What Is Ancient Philosophy? ( Michael Chase, trans., Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, 2004) and Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault (Arnold I. Davidson, ed., Michael Chase, trans., Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1995 (2003 printing)). An example of Hadot s concept of spiritual exercises is Stoic contemplation of the laws of physics as a method for quieting the irrational passions of the soul. See his The Inner Citadel: The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius (Harvard University Press, 2001). (For an extended discussion of the role of spiritual exercises in moral cultivation, see James Gould, Becoming Good: The Role of Spiritual Practice, Philosophical Practice 1 (2005): ) There is certainly overlap between Hadot s concept of spiritual exercises and spiritual activity as the latter is conceived of here; for example, Neoplatonist contemplation of the One involves an experience of connectedness with the One, a being which is metaphysically and normatively prior to the individual human self; and, arguably, Stoic epoptics also qualifies as spiritual activity, since in this contemplative practice the philosopher adopts the perspective of the logos, a rational principle governing the cosmos, which is likewise metaphysically and normatively prior to the individual human self. However, while all spiritual exercises have to do with moral cultivation or self-transformation training the soul so as to gradually acquire virtuous states of character not all count as instances of spiritual activity, since not all involve a sense of connectedness with a transcendent being, principle, or state of affairs. 11

12 This definition of spiritual activity has a couple of noteworthy characteristics which may not be immediately apparent. First, it does not restrict the kinds of activity which could count as spiritual; it is a substantive question which kinds of activity fall under the concept. In addition to obvious candidates such as contemplation, a wide variety of kinetic, imaginative, creative, cognitive, and other kinds of activity might fit the bill. 22 A second noteworthy characteristic of this definition of spiritual activity is that it permits such activity to function either as a means for attaining transcendence or as a way of constituting transcendence. In addition, spiritual activity can function as a means for attaining transcendence either synchronically or diachronically. Synchronically, spiritual activity can function as a means for transcendence while a person is actively practicing it. Diachronically, spiritual activity can function as a means for transcendence by transforming the dispositions of the person who practices it. Such transformation might be a necessary condition for realizing transcendence. For example, since transcendence involves an experience of connectedness with a being, principle, or state of affairs which is metaphysically or normatively prior to the individual self, such an experience might be disrupted by selfish thoughts, feelings, or actions. If a person is disposed to selfish forms of activity, then perhaps this disposition of character must be transformed, at least in part, in order to permit genuine transcendence, and it is commonly purported that spiritual activity is an effective means for such transformation. 23 A third key concept in the definition of spirituality is meaning, in the sense of the meaning of a human life. Giving a definition of meaning in this sense is challenging enough, let alone giving a theory of whether such meaning exists and, if so, what it consists in. However, as with transcendence, some clarification is necessary, at least for the sake of getting a handle on For Hadot s account of Neoplatonist contemplation of the One, see his Plotinus, or, the Simplicity of Vision (Michael Chase, trans., Arnold I. Davidson, intro., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); for Stoic epoptics, see his The Inner Citadel: The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius (Michael Chase, trans., Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2001). 22 This openness of the definition seems to fit actual human practice, when one considers the wide variety of practices that are customarily conceived of as linked to spirituality: Vodun dance circles, the whirling dance of Sufi dervishes, Tibetan throat singing, Gregorian chant, chanting the mantra Om in meditation, calling upon Amida Buddha, perpetual prayer as practiced by Orthodox contemplatives, contemplative reading as practiced by Confucians, and so on. In addition, the definition of spiritual activity should leave open the possibility that other kinds of activity may serve as vehicles for realizing transcendence, such as sport, creating works of art, performing live, and so on (even if it turns out they do not, in fact). 23 Writers on meditation, for example, commonly claim that practicing meditation is an effective way of making a person less selfish and more compassionate. See, for example, Tara Brach, Radical Acceptance: Embracing Your Life with the Heart of a Buddha (Bantam, 2004). For a clear account of the dearth of actual empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis, see Owen Flanagan, The Bodhisattva s Brain: Buddhism Naturalized (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2011). 12

13 the proposed definition of spirituality. A necessary condition (and perhaps a sufficient one) for a person to have a meaningful life is for the person to have a purpose in two senses of the term. Objectively speaking, there must actually be a purpose for the person to have, regardless of whether she is aware of it or pursues it; subjectively speaking, the person must be aware of the purpose, and must deliberately pursue it, for the right reasons. While whether such a purpose exists (and if so, what its nature is) lies beyond the scope of the present discussion, a promising way forward is the familiar Aristotelian move of using human nature as a guide to determining the proper function of humans, and then giving an account of purpose which draws upon this account of proper function. This definition of spirituality immediately opens up further questions. Is there any form of contemplation which is genuinely fitting with respect to the fundamental nature of reality? Is it in fact possible to attain meaning through developing spirituality? Are there forms of spirituality which are compatible with rationality, a passionate nature, naturalism, or physicalism, or is spirituality by nature incompatible with any of these capacities, dispositions, or theoretical positions? What is the relationship between spirituality and mysticism or mystical experiences? And finally, what role, if any, does spirituality play in the good life? Is spirituality a necessary condition for, a sufficient condition for, neither necessary nor sufficient but related to, an optional part of, or completely unrelated to the good life? In order to answer these and other philosophical questions, a sufficiently clear, precise, and complete definition of spirituality is necessary. Defining spirituality in terms of a disposition to seek transcendence for the sake of meaning through engaging in putatively fitting contemplation of the nature of reality is a helpful way forward in developing such a definition, and thus in answering these important philosophical questions. 13

14 Works Cited Aristotle. The Complete Works of Aristotle. Edited by Jonathan Barnes. 2 volumes. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, (Sixth Printing, with Corrections, 1995.) Brach, Tara. Radical Acceptance: Embracing Your Life with the Heart of a Buddha. Bantam, Dahlsgaard, Katherine, Christopher Peterson, and Martin P. Seligman. Shared Virtue: The Convergence of Valued Human Strengths across Culture and History. Review of General Psychology 9 (2005): Flanagan, Owen. The Bodhisattva s Brain: Buddhism Naturalized. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, Flanagan, Owen. The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material World. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, Gould, James. Becoming Good: The Role of Spiritual Practice. Philosophical Practice 1 (2005): Gyekye, Kwame. African Ethics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed January 10, Hadot, Pierre. The Inner Citadel: The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius. Translated by Michael Chase. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, Hadot, Pierre. Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault. Edited by Arnold I. Davidson. Translated by Michael Chase. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell, (2003 printing.) Hadot, Pierre. Plotinus, or, the Simplicity of Vision. Translated by Michael Chase. Introduction by Arnold I. Davidson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Hadot, Pierre. What Is Ancient Philosophy? Translated by Michael Chase. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press, Haldane, John. De Consolatione Philosophiae. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 32 (1992): Haldane, John. On the very idea of spiritual values. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 47 (2000): Peterson, Christopher, and Martin Seligman. Character Strengths and Virtues: A Handbook and Classification. New York: Oxford University Press,

15 Russell, Daniel. Happiness for Humans. New York: Oxford University Press, Solomon, Robert C. Spirituality for the Skeptic: The Thoughtful Love of Life. New York: Oxford University Press,