Exploring the Implications of the Existential Phenomenon. Maurice Uchegbu

Transcription

1 Exploring the Implications of the Existential Phenomenon Maurice Uchegbu Existentialism in and of itself seems to be concerned with the question of life, the nature of our lives, and the existence of transcendental values. Almost without fail, we find that value itself is contained only within ourselves. From Nietzsche to Dostoevsky to Sartre, all the philosophers have said this same conclusion. Yet, what does this give us? We are left with a world in which we create value for ourselves, but our values stem from our experiences and our relation to our experiences so much so that no two people can have purely identical value sets. If I create value for Justice, there is no person who will fully understand my construct and will, in all cases, fully agree. As we move outwards, we find groups of people who can cluster around similar ideas, but cannot readily say My conception of the world is and always will be right. Indeed, for the very attempt to establish Right and Wrong leads to a cry for transcendent values and Absolutes. Here, then, the question arises: can we enact any sort of ethics? Ethics are necessary to function in a society of people yet what the Existentialist Philosophers have done, at least prima facie, have completely undermined the validity or justifiability of ethical structures. This being the case, if a person takes the conclusions to their full extent, they find themselves in a world of relativism. Perhaps there is a middle ground that has not been mentioned as of yet. Though Sartre has attempted some forms of ethical considerations from an existentialist point of view, he did not formulate a concrete ethical theory. Perhaps because of the apparent tension between the two realms of thought: one seems highly individualistic, while the other seems wholly communal.

2 Maurice Uchegbu 2 The primary goal to consider here is whether or not existentialism can have a considerable reconciliation with ethics through examining existentialism in society; secondarily, we will explore a case in which existentialist ideas seem to be carried out. Ethics In Society As stated before, existentialism seems to very readily do away with most justification of ethical theories by submitting the creation of value in morals to the individual. However, this may not be so readily understandable, especially as so curtly presented; so, to further explain this statement, and support the argument, let us consider a thought experiment. Suppose that Absolutes existed just as the laws of physics do from our understanding of them today. While the laws can be manipulated and used to our advantage, they cannot be violated; so much like Kant s Universalizability, we will consider all ethical and moral concepts as undeniable concepts that all things must follow. If we take, for example, the ideas of Good and Bad, this world will exist in a pure dichotomy where all actions must either be a good, or a bad. Almost immediately, we see that this world cares not for intentionality, i.e. whether a person intends to do good or intends to do bad does not matter what matters is, in fact, the action itself. The consequences as well will be irrelevant, thus this escapes the issue of intending bad and causing good, or vice versa. We can examine even the sentence of a case to see how this can be problematic. If a poor mother steals food in order to feed her starving children, she has, regardless of her good intentions, done wrong. The adjectives and prepositional phrases of the statement hold no meaning mother steals food to feed her children so too does the object of

3 Maurice Uchegbu 3 the sentence, such that we are only left with one evaluative claim: mother steals food. Stealing is deemed as Bad, therefore, she has done wrong. While this in itself is problematic for an ethicist, it is problematic for another reason. In having Good and Bad (absolutes that are not affected by time or outer influence) we require of them to be irreverent of time, technology, or change; however, as things do change, what falls under Good and what falls under Bad must constantly, and exhaustively, be evaluated and updated. A fully enumerated list must be kept but is this not in itself change? Therefore, we end with a paradox as what cannot change must change in order to remain true. We must, then, begin again. Inversely, let us consider taking the conclusion before and accepting a world of subjective truth. Here, good and bad are relative to how the individual sees the world; yet this is an unfavorable viewpoint entirely. If I agree that the world is subjective and no two people are necessarily wrong, how can I make any value judgments on the world? If a person or culture believes that killing babies is morally permissible, though it may disturb me to my core, I cannot impose my views and say that their concept is truly Wrong. Individual relativism, cultural relativism, historical relativism...they all become an almost necessary intrinsic ideal under which we would operate. Yet, it is difficult to imagine living under such a society while expecting a level of civility. If we view this under the perspective of Nietzsche s master and slave morality, living under such a mode, the dichotomy of master morality would inevitably subjugate the herd causing the inevitable formation of resentment and devolving into a power struggle of morality (i.e. what is good comes from the qualities of the slave morality: meekness, kindness, long-suffering, etc and is precisely that which the noble class does not exhibit). It is not hard to

4 Maurice Uchegbu 4 see, then, that it devolves such that the slave morality will call for the creation of Transcendence and Absolute in order to reign in the overflowing freedom of pure relativism. Herein lies the problem, for Ethics operates and finds justification in appealing to the idea of absolutes in order to reign in the freedom of the individual; but Existentialism wishes to reject the constraints of Absolutes, and instead, appeals to the subjective realm in order to free the individual. This is, to be honest, a more cursory understanding of the two ideas; still, the question remains as to whether or not these two constructs can have some sort of middle ground? Whether, on a whole, we can apply the terms of Ethics while maintaining the aspects of the Existentialist Individual. This question is not entirely an unfamiliar one. In fact, for many writers such as Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky, this very question and the anxiety it provokes is necessary; yet the seemingly unready solution to this tends to lead people to a state of total rejection and nihilism. From Dostoevsky s point of view in The Brothers Karamazov, the nihilist appeals strongly to the absolute, yet desires freedom from this oppressive, deterministic state. The nihilist seems to straddle a line between the two states but is unable to reconcile the two save for appealing to a total rejection of everything (and, for one of Dostoevsky s characters, death is the ultimate form of retaliation and rejection). However, the full reduction of existence is a completely unfavorable view, one that no existentialist or most lay persons wish to readily hold; also, it may be a false escape from the difficulty of trying to find the stable line between the Ethical and the Existential.

5 Maurice Uchegbu 5 So how, then, do we solve the problem of reconciling the Existential and the Ethical? In some of Sartre s later works, he explores what could be seen as a first attempt. Though several sources expound that these works do not present a concrete and consistent form of Existential Ethics, they still present a basic foundation from which we can begin. According to T. Storm Heter s Analysis of Sartre, Sartre develops the idea that ethical relations must be based on intersubjective recognition this is basically the idea that, as a free individual, one must recognize the inherent freedom of others around them. Using this, we can develop an ethical theory akin to that of the Libertarian doctrines. At base, the ethical theory could be construed as thus: that which is morally reprehensible is that which impedes on the freedom of others. So in this way, murder and thievery are still morally reprehensible, and thus an ethical structure can be put forth without worry of mitigating the ability of the free existential individual. Before getting too far into what this could entail, perhaps it would be best to understand just what it would mean to be a free existential individual in (especially a modern) society. To be sure, we must understand the character of the existential individual and how they would or would not be able to interact with society. The first aspect to consider is their connection to themselves. As Nietzsche would probably assert, the existential individual exhibits primarily the master morality in that they define value for themselves. They do not follow the herd blindly, nor do they appeal to the ascetic ideals put forth by those that follow slave morality. This also means that the existential individual critically examines their environment: their culture, social constructs, their own morals and beliefs, etc. Much like the main protagonist in Nietzsche s Zarathustra, his interactions with the common person seem somewhat estranged.

6 Maurice Uchegbu 6 While he operates under his own system of morality and mentality, as with the scene in the town, he seems weird, strange, or absurd by doing so. The next thing to consider is the existential individual and their view of social roles. Sartre will assert that one can only play the role of their social constructs. One can only play at being a father, mother, son, daughter, sister, brother, waiter, waitress, engineer, doctor, etc. however, one can never truly Be the Daughter or the Brother because these things are material and set where the human existence is immaterial and changing. The existential individual recognizes this and thus realizes that their social roles are always construed by masks. When one goes to work, they must wear the mask of employee with a set of tasks, rules of conduct, time frames and mannerisms that they must adhere to. Though we get into the issue of Bad Faith, insincerity, and inauthentic living, one can say that this is almost necessary to cope in society. Suppose I am to play the role of a college student. There are certain rules and customs I am expected to follow: I must go to class, do homework, study, sometimes I am expected to go to parties, drink alcohol, perhaps endorse promiscuity as well as several other things. If I wear the mask of a college student even if the mask is incomplete (in that I do only some of the roles as opposed to others) how can another judge if I am being sincere? How can I be held responsible if I am merely playing the role of college student in hopes of obtaining some secondary motive? Aside from some truth serum or telepathy, there is no way to tell. However, by virtue of the fact that I must play these roles in order to function, my sincerity seems, at least ultimately, to become a lesser point.

7 Maurice Uchegbu 7 This leads the discussion to an interesting point. It sounds rather Contractarian to assert that we, being free individuals, must concede certain freedoms to the Other in order to function or obtain personal goals. Though we may recognize the finitude of moral structures and the historicity that affects our world, we nevertheless must consider moral and ethical standpoints from the view of a Social Contract. Though, at first, it is easy to say, I will agree to give up my right to carry weapons if I am assured the right to live without being killed. we get back to an extensive and exhaustive list that enumerates all the tenants under which we bind ourselves. The positive side to taking this ethical structure is that it implies an appeal to the individual before limiting their freedom; however, who says what should be included in the contract, and when does the individual sign this contract? These two fundamental questions along with other critiques question the validity of social contractarianism. Of the most important is the worry that there is no actual appeal to the individual, but rather to the masses, the herd, or the They. The values and moral judgments of the individual, in fact, the entire subjectivity of the situation, are ignored in favor of mutually beneficial rules that come from it though even these rules may not benefit the many in truth. So far, there has been a lot of seemingly circular examination of ethical theories and how they relate to the free individual as described by existentialist philosophers. We have seen that Kantian appeals to universilizability incur many problematic maxims that end in a paradox. It seems unfavorable to think of Social Contractarianism as an effective bridge between the two extremes. The more libertarian view perhaps would be more in lines with a proper ethical philosophy. If we consider, for a moment, the tentative theory that only by infringing on the

8 Maurice Uchegbu 8 freedom of another have we done wrong what does it give? On one hand, we are left with a highly subjective world where freedom must be so stringently defined. What counts as infringing on one s freedom depends heavily on what they value and the morals they hold. Where one person sees an infringement of freedom, the other could see an expression of such freedom. Taking, for instance, freedom of speech and political correctness, a ready case of this problem becomes apparent. One party may feel that it is an expression of their freedom to say and think what they want by giving racist or homophobic remarks aloud in public; however, another party may feel that this is an infringement on their freedom to go in public without having to hear racist or homophobic remarks. Which party deserves the preservation of their right to freedom? In truth, this simply brings the discussion back to a highly subjective world in which relativism still trumps ethical theory. As dissatisfying as this is, even this ethical theory must be rejected. It would be somewhat egregious to talk of ethical theories and not include Utilitarianism or Virtue Ethics in the discussion. Unfortunately, Virtue Ethics, at least in how they were presented based on Aristotle s Ethics, depend heavily on the Transcendent. If we reject the concept of Virtue, as the existential philosophers would have us do, then we cannot appeal to this idea to form any concrete theory of ethics. Utilitarianism is a bit more difficult to disperse. It presents the least offense to the individual freedom of the existential; but rather requires them to consider the consequences of their own actions: whether in Act or Rule Utilitarianism, the considerations ultimately exist in the consequences. The issue is more pragmatic. While hindsight is always 20/20, foresight is never anywhere near so. No one person can effectively

9 Maurice Uchegbu 9 map out all the consequences a given action will have, and to do so would require a total removal of action entirely. Furthermore, there are strong limitations to consider actions where there are multiple effects or the effects are unknown. This leaves utilitarianism as more effective in hindsight or in cases that are similar to past experiences, readily available outcomes, or simple cases. At this point, the dominant ethical theories do not seem to compute readily with the ideals of existentialism. However, what if a synthesis was attempted? An ethical structure that does take into account each person s individual freedom, embraces the subjective, enacts virtues, and takes heed of consequences? At this stage and with only elementary understanding of ethical theory, this synthesis may seem grotesque at best, still it may provide a catalyst for the much desired end proposed. If we focus on intentions and say that an individual should never intend to bring harm to anyone or to their sense of freedom. If we say that all persons should recognize in others the potential for freedom and not impede on this freedom. If we say that those acts which logically and fundamentally produce negative results are egregious. If we say that each person is encouraged to develop their own set of virtues and morals codes and keep the former stipulations in mind, do we thus solve the problem? I establish my moral codes recognizing that they are only mine, and the aim of these self-contained moral codes is to exist freely and help others exist freely so that I can explore the world authentically and yet I do not have to worry about impeding on others authenticity.

10 Maurice Uchegbu 10 This presents itself as a solution to the question. Whether or not it is an effective or adequate solution is yet to be seen, and perhaps will not be fully expounded except on a serious discussion primarily in the field of ethics. At least as far as this exploration is concerned, careful consideration of the pros and cons of this hybrid theory is outside my scope; yet it seems that this type of thinking can be examined in a real world example. The Phenomenology of Parkour In almost any society, underground groups are bound to form; their formation is rather standard as they tend to form around some particular item such as a not-well-known sport or music genre; but what is particularly interesting is the case being considered here. Parkour, being a young and still relatively unknown sport carries with it very interesting characteristics that pertain directly to the question of applicable existentialism and their interactions with society. Just to begin, Parkour (also known by FreeRunning and L art du Deplacement) is defined as the physical discipline of training to overcome any obstacle within one s path by adapting one s movements to the environment. No practitioner, however, readily ascribes this meaning to themselves. Even among the creators of this underground discipline, the term has different meanings for different things. Each traceur (practitioner of parkour) has a subjective and slightly different conception of what they do and this is precisely how they prefer it. Through initial attempts to define Parkour and its aliases into well-defined boxes, many within the community have rejected this attempt to make a transcendent Thing and prefer Parkour to simply be parkour. Much like the existential appeal to redefinition of morals, the traceur is encouraged

11 Maurice Uchegbu 11 (almost required) to formulate their own concept of this discipline and to train with this concept in mind. The traceur does not just redefine their concept of what they do: they redefine their entire environment. The traceur actively and constantly learns to reevaluate their concepts of reality. They constantly redefine values and definitions. Where the common person sees a wall as a barrier keeping them from walking a certain way, the traceur sees an item, present-at-hand, that can be surpassed, conquered, and surmounted. They do not see a wall as just a wall, but as a tool by which they can interact with the environment differently. The traceur redefines what it means to interact with most physical objects: walls, poles, fences, railings, trees, etc and interacts with them based on this new definition. The traceur also allows this to define how they interact with the world. They tend to critically question their beliefs and values and synthesize their own concrete morals from their own historicity and the paradigm of parkour. Much like Kierkegaard s leap of faith, or Camus s absurdism, the traceur cannot relate what he does to the common person. They have no justification for doing what they want, and to attempt to do so ends only in confusion for both parties. If a traceur is asked, What are you doing? they answer with Parkour. To the questioner, this means nothing, and they must cling to a readily available notion of what they see they see a person acting like a child; the term Parkour means nothing to them. However, to the traceur, no other words are possible, the term holds within it everything. They recognize that the stranger (the member of the They as it were)

12 Maurice Uchegbu 12 does not understand them, and no amount of description will convince this stranger to change their opinion once formed. To this person, they can only appear to be absurd. At any rate, the traceur will make for an adequate form of the existential individual that we will examine for their ethical and moral behavior. Because the traceur trains using his body and whatever objects exist in the environment, they must be aware of their interactions with others. From an ethical standpoint, they do not operate on maxims that will limit their freedom and ability to train. Still, they do not move in a way that restricts others freedom. If they find that an area is private property, and the owner does not want them practicing at that particular place, the traceur thinks nothing of it and moves to a different location. Though they may have interactions with police officers and other authority, the hold no resentment, and instead embraces these occurances as a chance to better explain themselves. Because of the nature of training that a traceur endures, they must always be conscious of the consequences of taking a certain action. For them, in their particular paradigm, if they jump a certain way from a certain height, they must take certain actions to avoid or provide specific effects (say jumping from a 12 foot or taller height would require them to perform a roll or risk seriously injuring themselves). This, once again, extends to their moral interactions with others. Again referencing authority figures, the traceur must know that running from authority has negative consequences that could affect the whole community whereas facing up to authority (with respect) often garners good results.

13 Maurice Uchegbu 13 Through this example, we can more readily see an instance of the existential individual and how elements of their real-world application can be used to bridge the gap between the ethical and the existential. All in all, the problem of trying to reconcile the need for Ethics with the ideals of Existentialism is indeed a difficult one. At least with a basic understanding of the prominent ethical theories, attempts to apply them to the existential individual do not produce favorable results. Even though a hybrid of the ethical theories is possible, the question shifts to whether or not this solution is truly a solution or if it is an applicable case. Maybe this is something for later philosophers to ponder and postulate, so maybe this cursory exploration will be but the first of many attempts. At bottom, this was a good start for a non-philosopher but nonetheless the need for reconciliation exists and cries out for attention. My hope is that philosophers will focus more on this question.

14 Maurice Uchegbu 14 Works Cited Heter, T. S. (2006). Authenticy and Others, Sartre's Ethics of Recognition. Sartre Studies International, 28. Sartre, J. P. (1945). Existentialism is a Humanism. Visker, R. (2007). Was existentialism truly a humanism? Sartre Studies International: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Existentialism and Contemporary Culture, 13(1), 3-15.