PARTICIPATION, RATIONAL INQUIRY, AND THE JUSTIFICATION OF DEMOCRACY

Transcription

1 PARTICIPATION, RATIONAL INQUIRY, AND THE JUSTIFICATION OF DEMOCRACY Polycarp Ikuenobe DEMOCRACY IS A FORM OF government whereby people are allowed to participate equally in the affairs of government. People are allowed to make their views known, and public policy decisions are made to reflect the views and interests of the people. The notion of democracy is linked to the ideal of equality, participation, fairness, and freedom. One important freedom essential to a democracy is freedom of speech or freedom of expression. The contemporary Nigerian philosopher Polycarp Ikuenobe explores the idea of providing free speech and expression in relation to participation as a way to justify a democracy. By drawing from Mill s arguments, Ikuenobe argues that freedom of expression is instrumental to the justification of a democracy in the sense that it allows people to engage in inquiry. Such freedom of inquiry provides a basis for people to engage in the process of uninhibited deliberations, discussions, debates, and arguments. This process involves critically evaluating the appropriateness of evidence for one s views and the adequacy of public policies. An important aspect of democracy is not just the opportunity for people to participate in government but the opportunity to make informed and enlightened choices or contributions to policy debates in order to arrive at the best political decision. It is not enough just to make a contribution; it is more important that people make an informed contribution. This is a plausible way to understand the idea of adequate participation. So, people s ability to participate is contingent on the opportunity to engage in the kind of rigorous inquiry which will lead them to the best decision. The idea of having an appropriate environment for inquiry may be justified by the idea that knowledge that one gets from inquiry can be used to make life better in society. The most arcane information derived from what may appear to be a form of esoteric inquiry may sooner or later become relevant to how we organize our lives. In this respect, the idea of allowing free inquiry in a democracy seems to give credence to the idea that no knowledge or inquiry is useless. Knowledge is essential for people to ensure their own well-being and welfare in society, which is one of the fundamental aims of a government. A justifiable government must provide the appropriate environ-

2 ment in which people can mutually attain their rational life plan, well-being, or welfare. The need for people to engage in rigorous inquiry has to do with the idea that people ought to pursue what is in their true interest and not simply their desires. They are likely to know their best interest and how to achieve it only if they engage in rigorous inquiry. It will be difficult for people to know what is in their best interest and how to achieve it if they do not have the opportunity to engage in uninhibited inquiry to find out. Without adequate inquiry, people cannot make meaningful and informed contributions to issues of public policy, and there cannot be adequate participation. It is sometimes not clear what the nature of human welfare is and how to achieve it. As such, people may disagree regarding the best means to achieve well-being in the appropriate circumstance. Such disagreements about the best means and true interest are the issues of debate in public policy and can be resolved only by rigorous inquiry and discussion. An environment such as liberal democracy in which people can engage in this kind of inquiry is the best system for finding information about the best means to achieve the true interest. Democracy is justified in terms of outcomes and processes that are not mutually exclusive. The social and political ideal of equality can be achieved as an outcome only if people are provided the requisite procedures to know about their true interest and the best means to achieve them. As you read Ikuenobe, consider and reflect on the following questions: In what way does freedom of speech and expression encourage rational inquiry? How is the opportunity or ability to engage in rational inquiry relevant to the justification of democracy? What is the proper way to understand the notion of democratic participation? In what way is adequate participation an essential element of democracy? Acommonplace understanding of democracy is that it is a government by the people. A democratic system allows people to participate in the affairs of government in terms of making their views known such that public policies may reflect their interests. The outcomes and procedures of democratic government reflect the ideals of equality, participation, fairness, and freedom. Thus, democracy is usually justified in terms of simply having procedures to achieve these ideals or the fact that these ideals are indeed outcomes of democratic procedures. One essential procedure of democracy is freedom of speech or expression. The thrust of this essay is to show that a

3 plausible justification of liberal democracy is its provision of arrangements which guarantee freedom of speech and expression. This freedom is instrumental to the ability to engage in inquiry, deliberate, make informed decisions, and adequately participate in government. Freedom of expression provides the adequate environment for people to express their views and for such views to be adequately and critically examined in debates and discussions. It engenders rational thinking about people s true interest and the best means to achieve such interest in order to ensure their well-being and welfare. The fundamental aim of a justifiable government has to do with ensuring the appropriate environment in which people can mutually attain their rational life plan, well-being, or welfare. So, a proper view of democratic participation must involve the ability for people to make rational and informed decisions about their true interest and well-being, based on rational inquiry and examination of ideas. The point here is not to establish the commonplace view that inquiry and liberal education (which involve the ability to engage in rational inquiry) are necessary for a liberal democracy. This point has been made by Dewey (1996) and his view has been widely discussed. I assume this position as a basis for my point, which is that freedom of expression provides a basis for justifying liberal democracy, in terms of its ability to engender discussions; it is a necessary procedure for the development of the ability to engage in rational inquiry, which helps people to make informed decisions about issues of public policy. The corollary is that the ability to engage in critical inquiry and deliberation about public policies will be difficult if not impossible to develop in an illiberal, totalitarian, and repressive state. I offer a justification for why the opportunity to engage in critical inquiry and develop rational deliberative skills is necessary to adequately understand the notion of democratic participation. The notion of participation in relation to rational inquiry and deliberation involves a fallibilistic epistemic method of finding out the true interest of people and how best to achieve them. This implies that we must leave any inquiry open and we must always consider and be willing to examine new evidence, ideas, views, or opinions because we may be mistaken. Any knowledge claim, idea, view, or opinion must be considered tentative and deserving of critical examination. J. S. Mill (1987) makes this point in his fallibilistic argument for freedom of expression. This aspect of Mill s view has not been widely appreciated and discussed by democratic theorists. While Mill s views on representative democracy and proportional representation have been well appreciated, the connections among his falli-

4 bilistic argument for freedom of expression, adequate representation, participation, deliberation, and rational inquiry have not been appreciated. But what is the nature of this connection as a basis justifying liberal democracy? LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND MILL S ARGUMENT FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION Freedom of expression may be conceptualized in terms of values such as equality, human rights, liberal education, fairness, and openness. It involves a set of procedures and outcomes that provide a basis for justifying process of democratic participation. Thus democracy has been justified from two theoretical perspectives: outcomes and procedures. Procedural theories justify democracy by considering whether a political system has certain procedures that will guarantee openness, opportunities for liberal education, rational thinking, discussion, individual rights, and the freedom to participate in governance. Freedom of participation involves the opportunity to debate and critically examine ideas enunciated in laws and policies. Such theories consider whether there are procedures to allow for equal participation by and recognition of people, their ideas and concerns (Singer, 1973; Cohen, 1971; Jones, 1983). Outcome theories focus on whether features such as participation, freedom, openness, and discussions, considered as good outcomes, are necessarily engendered by a political system (Pateman 1970; Nelson, 1980). If a democratic political system has good procedures or good outcomes, then it is considered justifiable. Freedom of speech involves one such procedure which can be justified by virtue of engendering the epistemic virtue of critical inquiry and informed participation. Charles Beitz (1992) argues that democratic procedures provide the best chance for achieving just laws in terms of giving equal recognition to people, opinions, and interests, and allowing opinions to be critically examined. Although many theories justify democracy from one perspective, some also think that procedures and outcome are not mutually exclusive (Beitz, 1992). A system can consistently produce the requisite outcomes of a liberal democracy only if it has the requisite procedures which are particularly geared toward achieving the desired outcomes. If certain procedures do not exist, according to Beitz, we will have to rely on pious hope for such system to produce good outcomes. There will be no basis for the stability of democratic systems. Freedom of speech (as a material condition) determines whether a system can consistently achieve some desired outcomes or values such as participation, debates, discussion, critical inquiry, openness in atti-

5 tude, and the making of issues public. The procedures ensure fair and just laws and policies. Ensuring these also depends on whether people engage in robust inquiry and discussion to critically examine policies. Openness and commitment to educate people so that they can engage in critical inquiry are features of freedom of expression. In order for one to be adequately educated with the ability and opportunity to engage in critical inquiry, it is important that this is done in the context of a liberal democracy. The procedures that justify a liberal democracy and distinguish it from a repressive and totalitarian context or system are connected to human fallibilism. It will be difficult for a repressive system to have laws and policies that are consistently fair and just. In such system, there are no procedures to consistently ensure fair policies. So, when they happen, they happen by accident. People have to be able to critically consider the advantages and disadvantages, implications, and the available evidence, and should also make efforts to bring all these information to public notice. Just policies seem to reflect the general will in terms of what people critically evaluate and determine to be everything considered acceptable, and such can only derive from open discussions, critical examination, and debates. Some have argued that freedom of expression in terms of its ability to engender discussions and rational inquiry is the foundation for all other freedoms and rights. Education, rational inquiry, and knowledge tend to create a sense of checks and balances on governmental officials. They are aware that their activities are public and subject to critical examination. As such, they tend to do things that they can justify, that they think the public will accept and withstand public scrutiny. People are more likely to be reasonable and less likely to subscribe to a view they cannot justify and that cannot withstand public critical examination. The view they accept would be a view they will expect others to accept from a reasonable and critical viewpoint. Beitz (1992) makes this point as follows: Citizens conceived as participants in public decisions... will wish to regard their judgment as the most reasonable ones possible under the circumstances; such judgment should be formed in light of the relevant facts and should be defensible in the face of the conflicting views held by others in the community (p. 244). Freedom of speech as a context and set of procedures for critical discussion and debates ensures a sense of accountability, which will also bring about fair and just policies. It empowers people to inquire about ideas and elicit others views, and it provides the means and context for expressing their own views. Beitz defines democratic political procedures as the terms on which citizens recognize

6 each other as participants in public deliberation and choice (p. 241). The notion of public deliberation presupposes the opportunity and context where people can engage in rational inquiry and critical examination of ideas. Mill understands freedom of speech or expression to involve the following: freedom of thought, feeling, press, conscience, opinion, sentiments, association, and freedom to publish and express opinions. The basic argument by Mill is that we as human beings are fallible; all rational human beings realize this, and as such, we cannot suppress or discount any opinion or view because we do not know which will turn out to be true or false. He says, The one opinion which it is attempted to suppress by authority may possibly be true. Those who desire to suppress it, of course, deny its truth; but they are not infallible.... To refuse a hearing to an opinion because they are sure that it is false is to assume that their certainty is the same thing as absolute certainty. All silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility (Mill, 1987, p. 77). Mill suggests that there is a connection between epistemic fallibilism and discussion, via freedom of expression, in that the realization of our fallibility may engender open discussion as a process of critical inquiry. It is in this sense that discussion as an epistemic aspect of rational inquiry and thinking is parasitic on the fact of human fallibilism and our efforts to avoid or correct errors. Fallibilism implies that we examine all views to arrive at the most plausible view given the available evidence. Mill argues that an opinion which someone is initially convinced about prior to critical examination may be an example of an error to which humans being are susceptible. As such, it is necessary to provide for freedom of speech because it is a procedure which assures people in the given context that they may engage in discussions, debates, and the critical examination of ideas. People are told that they are not going to be inhibited or prevented from doing so. This allows issues to be considered so that the view which has been evaluated and deemed to be the most reasonable is then adopted. The epistemic virtue of openness in a liberal democracy may be instantiated by how the views and interests of minorities are dealt with. With democratic procedures, such as free speech, the views of minorities are not ignored because the context allows them to make their views available for critical examination. So, if a person can adequately articulate a minority view and present it for critical examination, then, if it is considered reasonable, it may be adopted. The fact that the views of minorities are not completely shut out in a liberal democracy derives from the fact that its procedures allow for discussion, debates, and critical evaluation of all ideas. Thus, it engenders the

7 method of acquiring knowledge in that it allows all plausible ideas to be presented and evaluated, and accepted when deemed reasonable. This method, which assumes the freedom of speech, assumes that we are fallible and could be mistaken. Mill argues that people usually do not think it necessary to take reasonable precautions against their own fallibility. He thinks that allowing for freedom of expression may be one way to guide against such fallibility, to the extent that it ensures open discussion of issues where every opinion is given due recognition and critically examined. He argues that a plausible argument against his fallibilistic basis for freedom of expression would be to insist that a public authority has the responsibility to make a judgment to forbid the propagation of error. Doing this is an assumption of fallibility, in that allowing for the propagation of such errors exploits the fact of human fallibility. Although the judgment that public authorities make is not exempt from error, it is made on the basis of conviction. If we were never to act on opinions that we are convinced about because they could be fallible, then many interests will go unattended. However, Mill argues that there is a difference between assuming that an opinion is true because every opportunity to refute or falsify it has been provided and explored but all such efforts have failed to refute or falsify it, and assuming that it is true because we want to prevent the possibility of exploring the opportunities to refute it. By engendering discussion and critical examination of ideas, we may say that freedom of speech is a process of providing and exploring the opportunity to refute or falsify ideas. Mill s argument has two parts. The first is that the fact of human fallibilism and our awareness of such fact are enough for us to make the necessary efforts to engage in rational deliberation and critical inquiry that will yield the most plausible view. This effort is a means to avoid and correct errors. The second is that we should as a matter of norm accept views only tentatively. Such tentativeness implies open-endedness of inquiry and that we must always be open and willing to consider new evidence or ideas and to engage in discussion as a stringent method to arrive at the most reasonable view. The second argument is parasitic on the first in that our awareness of our fallibility motivates us to accept and use a standard that requires stringent method of rational inquiry. This view about discussion and democratic participation captures an epistemic view of critically evaluating evidence and views as a process or method of arriving at adequate knowledge. A fallibilistic attitude, Mill argues, involves having a stringent process of inquiry, which helps to estab-

8 lish the reasonableness of an opinion. This is important for Mill s view of liberal democracy. Rational inquiry as a basis for deliberation depends on informed participation by people and open discussion with people who have the requisite information in a context. Discussion and participation involve placing evidential strictures on beliefs to yield adequate knowledge. Mill s argument indicates that participation involves discussions and debates, which also involve a process of rigorous inquiry, the examination of views, and the evaluation of reasons for accepting a belief. Participation, rational inquiry, and discussions involve the attempt to find the true interest of people and the best means to achieve these interests. The need for people to engage in rational inquiry derives from the fact that people ought to pursue what is in their best interest and not what they desire. They are likely to know their best interest and how to achieve it only if they engage in rigorous inquiry. If they do not, it is unlikely that they will be able to make informed choices and meaningfully participate in the discussion of issues of public policy. The notion of participation which is grounded in rational deliberation involves the epistemic effort by everyone to engage and participate in the process of avoiding and correcting errors, to approximate the truth. Thus, participation may be understood in terms of epistemic abilities that include: analyzing ideas and issues; evaluating and questioning the adequacy of opinions and beliefs in terms of the relevance of evidence; identifying problems and finding creative approaches to solving them; articulating, organizing, and expressing ideas clearly; arriving at informed beliefs and reasoned judgments about issues and ideas; and reasoning on the basis of evidence to arrive at informed and acceptable decisions. DEMOCRATIC STRUCTURES, PARTICIPATION, AND RATIONAL THINKING Discussion and the epistemic abilities to engage in rational inquiry require a concerted effort to avoid and correct errors about people s true interests and the best means to achieve general well-being because we are fallible and aware of such fact. People may disagree regarding the best means to achieve their well being. Such disagreements about the best means and true interest are the issues of debate in public policy and can only be resolved by rigorous inquiry and discussion. We therefore need to create a context that will engender such discussion and inquiry, which is what a liberal democracy does. The effort to find true interest and the means to ensure people s well-being and welfare will fail if we do not create the requisite liberal context that will

9 engender inquiry. Such effort can succeed only in a social context that allows for the examination of available evidence. Such context of inquiry seems to socially circumscribe the relevant alternatives, information, available evidence, and counter-evidence regarding interest that others have which may be relevant to an issue of public policy. An illiberal context may prevent us from getting requisite information that other people have in a relevant context. So, in order to fully appreciate Mill s argument, we need to explore the nature, procedures, context, and structure of a liberal democracy as a system provides for freedom of expression, rational inquiry, and participation. This may help us to further appreciate the significance of freedom of expression in allowing for the development and application of the method, abilities, and process of rational inquiry, discussion, justification, and reasonable evaluation of beliefs. The following features, which are representative of various views of democracy may help to capture the procedures and outcomes that people usually refer to when they talk of a liberal democracy: (i) that the right to human life, well-being, dignity, and property should not only be respected, but that there should also be concerted efforts to guarantee these rights and foster such respect; (ii) that human beings should be fairly, justly, and equally treated to the effect that an individual is given her due without a particular preference for group or individuals; (iii) that individuals be given a reasonable amount of freedom and privacy to make choices and pursue their rational life plans within the context of the community in which they live (precluding the excessive and extreme use of force and violence); (iv) that there is the provision for free speech, association, critical debate, and discussion, to highlight all viewpoints with the purpose of sifting out the bad ones, and hence making deliberate efforts to avoid probable bad consequences (conflicts and disagreements are to be resolved via rational means of discussions and negotiations); (v) that there should be the right to vote and have representation, and that adequate and informed participation is not only encouraged, but also not frustrated to the extent that single individuals or a group can impose their will on others without justification;

10 (vi) that extreme coercion, brute force, threat, blackmail, and bribery or other clandestine or fraudulent means not be used in the process of making and applying laws; (vii) that there is concern for public welfare, common good, and constraints on purely selfish interests in the public realm; (viii) that there is openness and tolerance towards various views and public debate of issues, that people are educated and informed about the issues, and there is honesty and lack of secrecy in the process of making laws and formulating public policies; and (ix) that there are ways, procedures, and means of checking and reviewing policies and laws (in terms of a semblance of checks and balances) such that the possibility of shortcomings and unintended bad outcome of laws and policies is avoided or reduced to a minimum or can at least be rectified. We may understand Mill to be arguing that freedom of speech is a way to provide stringent strictures on the process and method of rational deliberation and critical inquiry, to determine whether a belief is justifiable or acceptable. One such stricture involves openness or tolerance towards any process or method of inquiry that provides the opportunity for ideas or beliefs to be critically examined, falsified, or refuted. Mill supports this view by alluding to history to indicate that many eminent people held opinions they were convinced about but that we now know to be false. He argues that a feature of human rationality, rational deliberation, and inquiry involves the ability to evaluate evidence and correct errors: He is capable of rectifying his mistakes by discussion and experience (Mill, 1987, p. 80). We would not be able to correct our opinions if we did not provide the opportunity to allow for discussion that involves critical examination of all the plausible alternatives. In this sense, the fact of human fallibilism and the realization of such fact are necessary to engender open discussion and critical examination of ideas. This means that we may accept an opinion only tentatively, given the evidence or reasons we have in its favor, and only after a critical examination of all the plausible alternatives. Mill s fallibilistic epistemological argument for freedom of speech suggests that we accept an opinion as reasonable if and only if it is strongly supported by evidence and meets an adequacy test of critical examination. The idea of fallibilism as a basis for understanding rational deliberation and adequate democratic participation implies the following attitudes: peo-

11 ple are trying or willing to explore or put forward more than one perspective on an issue; they are prepared to evaluate, examine, and be responsive to the different perspectives, in order to determine which is more plausible, given the reasons provided in support of each view; and they have the intention and willingness to seek information, develop their knowledge, allow their opinions to be affected by the reasonable ideas of others, and get a better understanding on the issue being explored. These epistemic attitudes can be adequately used and fostered only if there are no restrictions on inquiry and discussion. It is in this regard that Bridges (1979) argues that in order to engage in discussion, which is necessary for adequate participation, the following features that may be captured by freedom of expression and liberal democracy must exist: curiosity, reasonableness, receptivity, open-mindedness, orderliness, freedom, equality, and respect (pp ). These features of liberal democracy reflect the elements that Hill (1979) argues are necessary for effective discussion: the climate is warm, non-threatening, and accepting; learning is approached by participants as a cooperative enterprise; people interact and participate in discussion; learning or inquiry is the main objective of the discussion; and people evaluate their progress in the discussion (pp ). Mill s argument is that freedom of expression has epistemological significance to the extent that it engenders the method of rational deliberation and active participation in rational inquiry. Epistemology is a normative view, method, or process regarding how we ought to reason, know, and engage in inquiry. Such process or method presupposes certain (cognitive) abilities by which people engage in inquiry. Using these abilities, processes, and methods properly also presupposes some relevant context. In order for these abilities to be developed one needs to practice how they are to be used appropriately in the relevant contexts. This view indicates that the abilities and processes of rational deliberation and inquiry are parasitic on the existence of certain material conditions. One such condition is the existence of a context, process, or method that allows people to freely and openly engage in discussion, and encourages them to contribute their best views to the discussion. This is a context where all ideas, views, beliefs, opinions, evidence, and counter-evidence are made available and critically examined. This context, Mill suggests, is captured by freedom of speech in a liberal democracy. The need for such condition or method is theoretically motivated by the fundamental human condition: the factual condition of human fallibilism; that is, the condition of the human knower, which involves the ability to be in

12 error, the awareness of such condition, and efforts to avoid or correct errors. These conditions are necessary not only for acquiring the proper abilities associated with the process of rational deliberation, rigorous inquiry, open and critical discussion, and evaluation of reasons, but also the context in which these processes can be actually used. From Mill s argument, it is reasonable to say that openness and freedom are necessary features of the rational deliberative process or method of inquiry such as discussion. Thus, the notion of discussion or open and rigorous inquiry is an epistemic property of rational deliberation, fallibilism, and freedom of expression. The process of inquiry depends on an open and free context that allows for critical examination of ideas and evaluation of the reasons for accepting an idea or belief. This process is parasitic on the fact about human fallibilism, our realization about such fact, and the motivation to use every reasonable effort and precaution to avoid or correct our errors. The idea of rational deliberation and inquiry, which is captured by Mill s notion of discussion, involves developing an appropriate context where one is able to develop and use one s abilities to analyze issues, solve problems, reason, organize and express ideas, and make reasoned judgments because human beings are fallible. This implies that no opinions or views are excluded from consideration and examination, and that people have the abilities and are willing to examine issues in a situation where there are no inhibitions. Thus, rational deliberation and democratic participation may be said to involve the idea that: issues are open for discussion; participants are openminded; people or issues are open to all perspectives and arguments; discussion is done in the open; and the outcome in terms of what people want in terms of decision is open (Bridges, 1979, pp ). So, liberal democracy has significant fallibilistic epistemic and educational implications that justify it as political and social procedures or arrangements. In other words, liberal democracy must be seen in terms of how it affects people. Mill argues that a liberal democracy is justifiable because it develops a person s character; in some sense, it makes a person liberal-minded in her process of rational deliberation and inquiry. We can reasonably suggest that part of that character involves the ability to independently and critically inquire, deliberate, and make informed choices, which affect a representative s political choices or a government s policies. Thus, there is an obvious connection between representation, participation, education, and the development of character as a basis for justifying a liberal democracy. I assume a connection between education and epistemology, in relation to freedom of

13 speech and participation. The proper notion of education has certain epistemological assumptions, in terms of the nature of the rational method of acquiring knowledge which is usually articulated as the educational ideal of critical thinking. My reference to education presupposes a liberal and rational critical method of acquiring knowledge as opposed to indoctrination. Having the ability and attitude to engage in this kind of inquiry is regarded as the hallmark of an educated person and democratic citizenship. The principles, ability, attitude, and skills for independent inquiry and rational deliberation, which involve accepting a belief on the basis of a justifiable ascription of reasonableness, is what theorists want in democratic citizenship. Rational inquiry as an aspect of discussions and debates involves an inquiry into the contexts that support or encourage them [abilities]; and into the barriers that impede them (Burbules, 1991, p. 250). Democracy as a context may be justified by its ability to encourage and support deliberation, inquiry, and adequate participation with respect to people being able to make informed contributions to policy debates. The context of a liberal democracy and freedom of expression in some sense pressures people to be tentative about their opinion and to debate and deliberate in way that they otherwise would not. It does this by offering a number of views as plausible relevant alternatives and evidence or counterevidence. However, if one is indoctrinated in an illiberal social or political context where one cannot ask questions, debate, deliberate, inquire, hold independent views, or act contrary to what is specified, which is what a liberal democracy seeks to avoid, it will be difficult to question or critically examine ideas and rationally deliberate even when there are obvious reasons to do so. It is a common place view as many people have argued that the requisite ideals of liberal democracy are plausible and realizable only if people are educated. Moreover, enabling people to realize democratic ideals is an aim of education, and proper education requires the context of liberal democracy. In other words, education and democracy are coextensive. The pertinent point is that when people are liberally educated they would learn to be participatory, open, and tolerant towards different ideas, views, and interests of people (Dewey, 1996; Gutman, 1987; Fishkin, 1991; Putnam & Putnam, 1993; Rosenthal, 1993). Some have argued that one important value of a democracy is its commitment to the education of people as a way to encourage political participation and human development (Hostetler, 1995; Snautwaert, 1992). This is because human beings are fallible.

14 A core feature of rationality involves having the ability to examine ideas and evaluate their reasonableness, to identify errors and correct them, and to make reasonable efforts to avoid errors. To be rational involves being able to evaluate the adequacy of one s justification. This involves being able to place evidential strictures on one s doxastic attitudes and process of justification. To do this, one needs to understand the criteria for assessing reasons offered for the justification of one s beliefs. This may involve being able to apply these criteria that involve having a disposition and attitude to always evaluate the reasonableness of a belief by considering all available evidence. As such, one needs to be initially tentative and skeptical about any belief, in order to evaluate it before acceptance. This suggests a normative process of making beliefs reasonable in the attempt to approximate truth; it requires critical examination of evidence that points to the reasonableness of one s beliefs. These ideas indicate that rationality involves a kind of attitude, process, and criteria by which we may engage in inquiry. This conception of rational deliberation or critical inquiry is founded on the fact of human fallibilism, our realization of such fact, and the efforts to avoid and correct errors. In other words, because we are fallible and our reasons are subject to revision, we need to be rigorous and stringent in order to do a serious and diligent examination of the adequacy of the reasons we bring to bear on our beliefs. EPISTEMIC FALLIBILISM AND JUSTIFICATION OF DEMOCRACY If we were infallible and did not need to avoid or correct errors, then the liberal ideal of expressing ideas freely and engaging in discussion, inquiry, and critical examination of ideas and views will be superfluous. In other words, democracy will not have any epistemic significance. All that we will be freely discussing will be truisms in some sense, things that everyone would know which could not mistaken. Given that we are indeed fallible, we need the necessary conditions that will allow us to engage in robust inquiry and evaluate reasons in order to avoid or correct errors. If such conditions do not exist, it would be practically difficult if not impossible to practice, develop, and use the requisite abilities of rational inquiry. So, the notion of liberal education which is characterized by critical examination of ideas is parasitic on the context of freedom of expression. If this analysis is plausible, then I question, as La Brecque (1990) has, whether it is realistic to talk about developing rational deliberative abilities in a repressive context, where there

15 can be no open and free discussion. On the one hand, it will be difficult to teach such abilities because the necessary material conditions that will foster its development and practice do not exist. On the other hand, even when such abilities are learned, if indeed they can be learned, they cannot be practiced or applied, they cannot be developed, and they cannot endure. Such context will allow only for closed discussion or inquiry and indoctrination. This will not be a true inquiry or discussion in the epistemic or critical sense, because being closed suggests that the process, topic, and outcome are determined ahead of time. The availability of evidence and determination of the reasonableness of beliefs depend on how well a context allows for them. Fallibilism, according to Siegel, is the thesis that all our knowledgeclaims are open to revision and are possibly mistaken (1988, p. 145n). This statement is relevant to understanding the nature of rational deliberation and inquiry as a process for arriving at claims about knowledge and a basis for understanding democratic participation. However, it is ambiguous. It is not clear whether it is the fact of human fallibilism and our awareness of the fault which require that we critically examine ideas or whether it is the epistemic standard regarding how we ought to know, or both, in the sense that the standard is sensitive to the fact. Siegel s statement could be understood as a factual thesis about the nature of knowledge-claims. But such factual statement does not by itself motivate the process of rational deliberation and inquiry. It may also be understood as a normative statement regarding how we ought to determine the nature of a knowledge-claim and the process for arriving at knowledge. This is the view that is relevant to understanding the nature of rational thinking as a feature of adequate participation. What, if any, is the relation between the factual and normative statements? A normative epistemic principle of fallibilism states that S knows that q, if and only if there is a justification r for q, such that r being a confirmed and undefeated evidence for q only makes q highly probable. This principle allows one to know something on the condition that a plausible justification exists in support for what one claims to know. The evidence being confirmed and undefeated only makes what one claims to know reasonable and highly probable, as opposed to being absolutely true. This epistemic principle provides a basis or method for accepting and adopting a public policy. It states that a policy may be considered acceptable and ought to be adopted if and only if it is critically examined and evidence confirms it as the most reasonable. One needs to appreciate the distinction between the factual and epistemic claims about fallibilism in

16 order to understand the plausible connection between them as a way to illuminate the notion of rational. The factual claim about fallibilism is that human beings are indeed fallible given the nature of our cognitive abilities and the fact that we are aware of this. The epistemic claim as a prescription is about how we ought to acquire knowledge and the standard by which we determine whether one is justified or has knowledge. This epistemic claim implies that because we are aware of our fallibility we should make reasonable efforts to avoid or correct our errors. The connection between these two claims can be seen in terms of the ought implies can principle. What we ought to do implies what we indeed do. If we cannot do something, then it is unreasonable to expect that we ought to do it. So, considerations about how we ought to acquire knowledge or what ought to be considered knowledge (as an epistemic claim) have to be sensitive to or parasitic on considerations regarding how we can possibly acquire knowledge and what we can possibly know (as a factual claim). Since we can be in error, we should not immediately accept a belief without proper examination. The process of acquiring knowledge which involves evaluating evidence based on reasoning and perception is susceptible to error and the product of such processes may be conceived only in terms of verisimilitude to truth (Russell, 1959; Popper, 1985). As such, the process of rational inquiry and deliberation requires that we continuously subject our beliefs and evidence to critical analysis, to determine their reasonableness in terms of approximating truth. A justified belief or acceptable policy is a view arrived at by a method of rational inquiry, deliberation, and inter-subjective critical examination of ideas, evidence, and beliefs. This epistemic view precludes the condition of absolute truth, where truth is a logical or metaphysical condition regarding the objective nature of reality and its relation to our beliefs and justification. People may be humanly incapable of actually satisfying this logical condition because of their faulty cognitive abilities. What people know about reality and its relation to their beliefs may be mistaken. So, if the state of knowledge improves or changes, some hitherto warranted evidence may no longer adequately support our beliefs. Thus we are bound to change or modify our beliefs. The fact that human knowledge is only highly probable implies that there is a window of opportunity for one to be in error. Insofar as such a window exists, no matter how small, we should be committed to exploring it, since the more rigorous the exploration we engage in, the nearer to certainty our knowledge will be. Rational inquiry and deliberation as an aspect of ratio-

17 nality require that we be methodologically skeptical and tentative about beliefs and ideas (McPeck, 1981, p. 7). It requires that we tentatively accept a belief or suspend judgment until we have enough evidence. Issues about rational inquiry and deliberation involve the processes and methods that facilitate our ability to do inquiry so as to arrive at a justified belief. They also involve how we ought to evaluate evidence as a basis for believing, disbelieving, or suspending judgment. If we ought to acquire knowledge by the method of critical examination, then we must be capable of doing such critical examination, and the conditions and context which make such examination possible must exist. The composite notion of fallibilism, as the connection between the epistemic and factual claims, provides a basis to understand Burbules view that rational inquiry and deliberation have to do with the requirement of reasonableness. This, he argues, involves being willing to evaluate evidence and to admit that one is wrong (1991, p. 250). Reasonableness requires that we must make concerted efforts and be willing to evaluate evidence to provide adequate and relevant justifications. The prescription inherent in the notions of rational inquiry and deliberation is that we ought to use epistemic standards which give credence to the possibility that we could be wrong. A universal and intuitive appeal exists for a fallibilistic epistemological view of rational inquiry, deliberation, and democratic participation. Part of this appeal derives from the obvious truth that human beings by their very nature are susceptible to error. Our perception and reasoning and other cognitive facilities are faulty, and since knowledge is a product of these faulty cognitive processes of reasoning or perception or both, it will invariably be susceptible to error. People have a very strong intuition that we know many things. The epistemic view of fallibilism is an attempt to articulate a principle of inquiry which will square with our commonsense view that we do know many things, and that we are also susceptible to error. A fallibilistic epistemic conception of rational inquiry, deliberation, and participation may be justified in terms of the falsification method of inquiry in science. Scientific method is considered a paradigm case of rational thinking as a process of arriving at reasonable beliefs. This method involves the rigorous process of trying to falsify the reasons we bring to bear on our beliefs to test their relevance, adequacy, and reasonableness. Therefore, rational inquiry and deliberation imply that we have to adopt a moderately skeptical, tentative, or fallibilistic view, because there is always the

18 actual possibility for us to be in error. However, if we have a belief that is positively confirmed and there is no counter-evidence to vitiate our justification, we hold it as conditional knowledge in the context of relevant alternatives and available evidence. Yet we admit that new evidence may render our reasons inadequate and our beliefs false. Fallibilism provides a theoretical motivation to find and foster a context that allows for the development of rational deliberative skills and the participation of many people in the process of inquiry. It should be borne in mind that the process of making political decisions is a process of inquiry. Finding an appropriate social and political condition or process that will foster rational inquiry and deliberation is important. To the extent that democracy can engender rational deliberation and people s participation in inquiry, it may be considered a good system. So, an adequate process of inquiry must be contingent on a relevant social and cognitive context and the extent to which they engender inquiry to arrive at the best view. This stance, which is now commonplace in epistemology, suggests that a theory of justification has to consider natural or cognitive and social conditions of knowing and evidence (Cohen, 1987; Goldman, 1986; Kornblith, 1987; Harman, 1980). This social condition has to do with how well information is readily available in a society; this requires people to participate in the process of making information available. One cannot be adequately justified if one has not considered all the relevant information in terms of evidence or counter-evidence that other people in a community have, to which one has easy access. To rely on what other people know in community as a basis for one s justification presupposes a context that makes it possible for people to participate in sharing and examining ideas. If such context exists, then one cannot be adequately justified, i.e., if other people in the community have a counter-evidence which clearly falsifies one s belief. If available evidence falsifies one s belief, then one must be willing to modify one s beliefs accordingly. This epistemic principle of fallibilism may be couched in terms of rational inquiry and deliberation, which require that we be appropriately moved by reasons (pp ). This involves having the reflective skills for assessing and accepting statements, views, and beliefs on the basis of reasons. Thus the notion of rationality is usually expressed as appropriate judgment, correct assessment and reasonable evaluations ; it also makes implicit reference to human fallibilism and the effort to deliberate, inquire, debate, and evaluate evidence so as to avoid or correct errors. The idea of people deliberating and debating

19 issues about what is in people s best interest and how best to achieve such interest is the hallmark of participation essential to a democracy. CONCLUSION The virtue of democracy in terms of providing a free context for inquiry and participation may be illuminated by Aristotle s view of virtue, that the practical disposition to be virtuous would emerge only if someone learns to always do virtuous acts and thus forms the habit of doing virtuous acts a context which freely allows or encourages it. It is important for people to be able to articulate their views clearly, coherently, and properly as part of democratic citizenship. Democratic participation requires inquiry in terms of looking for appropriate ways and strategies to make their views known, and to convince others about them. The procedures of a liberal democracy are justifiable because they allow for a free, open, and uncontrolled discussion and examination of ideas. Freedom of expression guaranteed in a liberal democracy creates the context in which people are always open to evidence, ideas, and views. It also involves the opportunity for people to engage in discussion where issues could be raised, and evidence provided and critically examined. Adequate participation involves deliberation, debate, and inquiry, and participation depends on an appropriate context that allows for inquiry, debate, and discussion. Moreover, since participation involves attitudes, abilities, and skills that have to be acquired, applied and practiced in order for them to be developed, the context where such activities can go on uninhibited becomes absolutely necessary for their development. REFERENCES Beitz, Charles. Complex Proceduralism. Excerpted from Political Equality: Essays in Democratic Theory, in Democracy: Theory and Practice, ed. John Arthur. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., Bridges, D. Education, Democracy and Discussion. Windsor, England: NFER, Burbules, Nicholas. Rationality and Reasonableness: A Discussion of Harvey Siegel s Relativism Refuted and Educating Reason. Educational Theory 41, no. 2 (1991): Cohen, Carl. Justification of Democracy. The Monist 55 (1971) :1 19. Cohen, Stewart. Knowledge, Context, Social Standards. Synthese 73 (1987) :3 26. Dewey, John. Education and Democracy. London: Collier Macmillan, Ennis, R. H. A Concept of Critical Thinking. Harvard Educational Review 32, no. 1 (1962):