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2 Quilliam is the world s first counter-extremism think tank. Located in London, our founders are former leading ideologues of UK-based extremist Islamist organizations. Quilliam aims to generate new thinking through informed and inclusive discussion to counter the Islamist ideology behind terrorism, whilst simultaneously providing evidence-based recommendations to governments for related policy measures. Our strategic communications work involves research projects, public events, specialist roundtables and media campaigns to empower civil society to work towards improved community cohesion, Muslim integration through respect for scriptural diversity, and encouragement of political pluralism. For further information contact: Quilliam information@quilliamfoundation.org Tel: +44 (0) Unlocking al-qaeda: Islamist extremism in British prisons Quilliam, November 2009 Quilliam 2009 All rights reserved ISBN number: Disclaimer: The views of individuals and organizations used in this report do not necessarily reflect those of Quilliam.

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7 Unlocking al-qaeda We see the great signs of Allah within these prisons, as I have seen... how young men enter into Islam and then they turn into students of knowledge and they learn Arabic and the Sharia in a short number of months along with an understanding of the reality of Tawhid Verily, the greatest favour, which your brothers here are living in, is their conviction in Allah and their conviction regarding this religion and in the methodology of Jihad. Abu Qatada, HMP Long Lartin 2009 I have not seen even a tree for four years. I cannot even see the sky due to the mesh wires. Even our Windows computer version has bars on it. Nonetheless, no one and nothing can crack you or terrify you, if your heart is full of Allah and fear of Allah. There is no room left for anything else. Abu Hamza, HMP Belmarsh 2008 There is no time to rest; that will come later. Prison is not a place of rest. Babar Ahmed, HMP Long Lartin 2007 Abû Qatâdah, An Address to the Muslims, At-Tiby n Publications, 23rd March < umar-ibn-mahmudabu- umar/>. Interview with Abu Hamza, Cageprisoners, 6 June < Babar Ahmed, Three Years in Captivity, Cageprisoners, 17 August < 1

8 Contents Unlocking al-qaeda Contents Foreword by Baroness Pauline Neville-Jones 1. Introduction 2. Methodology 3. History of Islamist radicalisation in prisons Part 1: Radicalisation in prisons 4. Pull factors: Extremist outreach Extremists seek leadership of Muslim prisoners Gangs Prison conversions Deepening radicalisation Radicalisation through friendship groups Radicalisation through literature 5. Push factors Violence by non-muslim prisoners Perceived hostility from staff Perceived discrimination Halal food Strip searches Islamic prayers Searches with dogs Imprisonment without trial

9 Unlocking al-qaeda Contents Part 2 Radicalisation outside prisons: 6. Supporting al-qaeda s narrative Imprisonment as evidence of war on Islam Theological defences of al-qaeda Adel Abdel-Majid Abdel Bary Abu Qatada How has this happened? 7. Conclusion 8. Recommendations: Part 1: For all prisons Part 2: A de-radicalisation centre Appendix 1: The psychological effects of imprisonment without trial Appendix 2: Suggested books for Muslim prisoners

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11 Unlocking al-qaeda Foreword by Baroness Pauline Neville-Jones Foreword by Baroness Pauline Neville-Jones Mosques and educational establishments have traditionally attracted attention as vulnerable locations that extremists can exploit to propagate their ideas and draw vulnerable individuals down the path of willingness to condone or even participate in violence for political ends. It is increasingly recognised that the internet is a potentially significant mechanism for radicalisation. And it has been known for some time that prisons could also be incubators of extremism, but this study is one of the first published reports of its kind. This report illustrates how extremists are able to exploit for their own ends the psychological and emotional shock that individuals experience on entering the prison system, as well as the difficulties individuals experience in coming to terms with daily life and the confined social interaction possible within the prison environment. The challenge this poses increases with the number of terrorist-related convictions being secured by the police and security services. The Government and its agencies are certainly aware of this. The Prison Service has set up an Extremism Unit and, within the Counter Terrorism Strategy, the Government has sought to improve the intelligence infrastructure across the prison estate, develop intervention approaches for extremists in prisons and put in place post-prison supervision procedures. In so doing, it has experience to draw on from dealing with the IRA and also an understanding of the ways in which organised criminal and gangs operate within and from prisons. From this it is clear that the Prison Service will not be successful in isolation. The police have a role as does the Probation Service. The Islamist threat does, however, pose some unique challenges. The value of this report lies in part in the way in which it is based on the direct testimonies and accounts of prisoners themselves, which bring out some of the differentiating features. Such evidence has its own limits since statements of this kind can have been deliberately exaggerated for propaganda purposes. But it does help highlight the fact that there are some issues, such as the religious needs of the prisoners concerned, where some fairly simple practical solutions would, as the report recommends, alleviate a source of complaint. The Prison Service recognises this and is producing guidance as a result. So far, roll out and implementation has not been even, which is partly to be explained by the sheer diversity of the prison system. There is considerable learning on the job going on which means that a contribution to the knowledge base and advice from the research community should be welcome. The other primary recommendation of this report relates to the ideological management of Islamist extremists in the prison system: how to contain them and how to de-radicalise them. Here it draws on the experience of countries that have already developed innovative and ostensibly successful programmes for the de-radicalisation and rehabilitation of extremists. 5

12 Foreword by Baroness Pauline Neville-Jones Unlocking al-qaeda These programmes are themselves still relatively new, so it is difficult to judge their overall success and effectiveness over time. Do individuals who have been through such programmes remain genuinely de-radicalised? Quilliam suggests a potential model of a single de-radicalisation centre adapted to conditions in the UK. Though it will pose practical challenges for the Prison Service, the suggestion deserves serious consideration and much further investigation of best practice and experience elsewhere. At present the value of the idea lies more in my view in provoking a necessary debate than in claiming to be the definitive answer. Keeping extremists among the wider prison population gives them access to a larger number of vulnerable people. But concentrating extremists in one centre could unwittingly lead to the creation of the incubator and consolidator of radicalism rather than its intended opposite. Whatever the format for de-radicalisation, the careful selection of imams and other partners involved in such programmes is crucial and great care greater care based on greater knowledge than has always been the case is needed here. A point well made in the report. The report contains its own pointers for further worthwhile research. One of the aims of the Government s Prevent strand is to foster resilient communities. This should also be reflected in the approach to tackling extremism in prisons. Do mainstream Muslim prisoners themselves counter the activities of extremists in prison? If so, what motivates them? If not, why not? We need to know. Through this report, Quilliam has made some practical recommendations and launched a constructive and thought provoking contribution to the policy debate about tackling radicalisation in the closed environment of the prison system. It does not provide complete answers, but it points to areas that policy makers should be looking at closely and puts forward ideas they should be considering. Baroness Pauline Neville-Jones DCMG, Shadow Security Minister and National Security Adviser to the Leader of the Opposition, the Rt. Hon. David Cameron, M.P. 6

13 Unlocking al-qaeda Introduction Introduction For over half a century, extreme Islamist movements have been nurtured in prisons around the world. From the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in the 1950s to al-qaeda in Jordan in the 1990s, Islamist individuals have used their time in prisons to radicalise and recruit followers and to refine and revise their ideologies. Indeed, it is impossible to imagine the evolution of modern jihadist thought without reference to the prison writings of Sayyid Qutb in Egypt or Abu Mohammed al-maqdisi in Jordan. It is likewise impossible to conceive of modern jihadist movements without al-qaeda s Ayman al- Zawahiri and Abu Musab al-zarqawi, both of whom were radicalised during their imprisonment. In the UK too, no narrative of Islamist terrorism is completed without the stories of Richard Reid, the shoe-bomber, or Muktar Said Ibrahim, the leader of the failed 21/7 bombings of 2005, both of whom adopted extreme Islamist beliefs as a direct result of their time in prison. In light of the role that prisons have historically played in incubating modern Islamist extremism, it should be a matter of urgent concern for the British government that there are currently record numbers of Muslims in British prisons at a time when the UK is under sustained threat from Islamist terrorism both at home and abroad. Recent estimates put the total number of Muslim prisoners in England and Wales at around 10,000 or 12 per cent of the total prison population. 1 While this disproportionately high number is a major concern in its own right, the large number of Muslims in prison raises additional concerns given that it occurs alongside three other important national trends related to Islamist extremism: Growth in number of prisoners jailed for terrorism. There are now around 100 Muslims held in British prisons on charges relating to Islamist terrorism the majority imprisoned since Some of these individuals, who are mostly held in a small number of Category A prisons, are serving their sentences after being convicted in British courts. Others are held awaiting trial or while appealing against deportation or extradition to face trial abroad. Many of these individuals are in prison for their role in inciting, inspiring and organising terrorist violence. Continuing terrorist threat to UK Despite recent successes by the British security services, a significant number of terrorist and pro-terrorist Islamist groups, both domestic and foreign, remain 1 For example, in December 2008, the Ministry of Justice estimated that there were 9,975 Muslims in prisons in England and Wales out of a total prison population of 81,636 (12.2 per cent). It is worth noting, as shall be seen later in this report, that non-muslim prisoners are also vulnerable to Islamist recruitment and radicalisation. Source: Ministry of Justice internal report ref. AHAPris

14 Introduction Unlocking al-qaeda active in the UK. These groups are actively seeking to recruit British citizens willing to conduct and facilitate terrorist attacks at home and abroad. al-qaeda and other groups have made clear that they continue to regard the UK as a legitimate target for jihadist operations. The large numbers of convicted extremists in British prisons is direct evidence of this continuing threat. Growing appeal of Islamist groups nationally Throughout many British Muslim communities, Islamist movements and extremely socially conservative Muslim organisations are becoming more popular particularly among young people. The growing number of Muslims joining such groups or adopting their ideologies, even if they are presently non-violent, poses substantial long-term challenges to building and maintaining national cohesion in the UK. These converging trends make tackling prison radicalisation a priority for the British government as part of its broader effort to combat Islamist terrorism and build greater national cohesion. The government has already acknowledged the dangers of prison radicalisation as evidenced by the creation of the Prison Service s Extremism Unit as well as a range of other initiatives. 2 However, the challenges remain considerable and it is therefore vital that any measures to tackle prison radicalisation are firmly grounded upon a solid knowledge of how radicalisation occurs actually within British prisons as well as on a robust understanding of Islamist ideology. This report therefore aims to examine how radicalisation is presently occurring in British prisons with a particular focus on studying how large numbers of convicted and suspected Islamist terrorists in British prisons have sought to influence other inmates and incite them towards hatred and, ultimately, violence as well as suggesting ways in which this radicalisation can be halted and ultimately reversed. 2 Some of these measures, such as improving the intelligence infrastructure across the prison estate to aid the management of prisoners suspected, or convicted of terrorist-related offences, refining post-prison supervision procedures and developing intervention approaches for extremist offenders are outlined in the Home Office s March 2009 Contest 2 strategy document. The United Kingdom s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism (Home Office, March 2009, < 8

15 Unlocking al-qaeda Methodology Methodology This report focuses primarily on the role and influence of the large number of convicted and suspected extremists presently held in British prisons. Due to the obvious difficulties of accessing prisons, and of interviewing convicted Islamist extremists there, this report relies largely on prisoners own testimonies and accounts that have been smuggled out of prisons and distributed through supportive organisations and individuals. This has several advantages, the greatest of which is that in these accounts extremists are often talking or writing candidly to people whom they already know and trust, many of whom are sympathetic to their causes, which provides a substantial guarantee of their honesty. Another significant advantage is that many of these accounts by individuals range across several years, providing important insights into how these individuals have been changed (or not) by their time in prison. Of course, this method is as fallible as any other research methodology: the more loquacious and self-aggrandising prisoners who have sought to pro-actively publicise their experiences and ideas are inevitably quoted more often in this report than less gregarious or egocentric individuals. In other cases, prisoners, through their writings and interviews, have either sought to exaggerate either their own importance in prison or, alternatively, to exaggerate the trials they have faced at the hands of the Prison Service. In addition, many of the organisations distributing such statements, particularly Cageprisoners have a clear political agenda and overtly aims to inspire sympathy for imprisoned extremists and suspected extremists. While this report has generally excluded many of the most transparently self-serving and exaggerated accounts, it occasionally includes some self-important and propagandistic statements made by prisoners in order to show how these individuals have sought to speak to Muslims outside prison or to convey insights into their own states of mind. Where possible this report has corroborated these numerous first-person accounts with official reports and surveys conducted by the Prison Service and other branches of government. Many of the accounts from imprisoned extremists cited in this report come from English- and Arabic-language websites which aim to draw attention to the condition of Muslims imprisoned in relation to terrorism. The most useful of these has been the website run by the Cageprisoners organisation, a registered company which was established in 2003, to raise awareness of the plight of the prisoners at Guantanamo Bay and other detainees held as part of the War on Terror. 3 Its most prominent member is Moazzam Begg, a former Guantanamo detainee, who has personally interviewed many terror detainees held in British prisons. Although Cageprisoners is clearly a campaigning organisation, the website s vast archive of interviews with former and current prisoners, as well as the large numbers of their letters and communiqués from them, appear of unquestionable provenance. The website s content has additionally 3 Cageprisoners website, About us., < 9

16 Methodology Unlocking al-qaeda been endorsed by a number of prominent human rights lawyers who have represented a number of terror-related detainees, suspects and convicts in the UK and the US including Clive Stafford Smith and Louise Christian. The website s content has been also endorsed by many families of extremist prisoners and detainees. 4 4 What others have to say about cageprisoners.com, Cageprisoners website, < 10

17 Unlocking al-qaeda History of Islamist radicalisation in prisons 3. History of Islamist radicalisation in prisons During the last 50 years, many modern Islamist and jihadist movements around the world have been dominated and led by individuals who have been radicalised while in prison (See Factbox: Definitions of Islamism and Jihadism ). An examination of the most prominent of these cases reveals that these individuals were usually radicalised through a combination of push factors such as routine mistreatment from the prison authorities, unfair trials and harsh prison sentences, and by pull factors such as the deliberate recruitment and radicalisation of prisoners by other extremists whether inside or outside prison. A brief overview of some of the most prominent such cases reveal substantial similarities, even when the cases are seemingly separated by considerable gulfs of time and space. Case Studies: Sayyid Qutb ( ), Egypt Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian, is today seen as being one of the most important ideologues of the global Islamist-jihadist movement. His prison writings from the 1950s and 60s directly inspired al-qaeda and other similar movements. Sayyid Qutb spent much of his life as a literary critic, writer and civil servant. However, from the late 1940s he became increasingly radical, partly as a result of his deeper involvement with the Muslim Brotherhood, a revolutionary Islamist group, and partly as a result of his experiences in prison between when he was jailed, along with hundreds of other Brotherhood members, after the group attempted to overthrow Egypt s government. During his time in prison, Qutb was tortured and witnessed the murder of several other Muslim Brotherhood members by prison guards. 5 This experience, together with his enforced proximity to many other radical Islamists, quickly led to the radicalisation of his views, which became increasingly focused around the idea that life is a violent struggle between a minority of true Muslims on one hand, and the forces of unbelief dedicated to the destruction of Islam on the other. While in prison he wrote Milestones, a short work that has since provided the core theo-political ideology for many jihadist movements, which his followers smuggled out of prison in instalments and secretly published. 6 In 1966 Qutb was executed in prison. His death made him a martyr in the eyes of his followers, both in and outside prison, and greatly strengthened the impact of his prison writings on future generations. Ayman al-zawahiri (1951- ), Egypt Ayman al-zawahiri is presently the second-in-command of al-qaeda after Osama bin Laden. He was imprisoned and tortured in Egyptian prisons in the early 1980s. 5 A key incident occurred after Qutb was moved to the prison hospital in May Here he saw wounded Islamist prisoners being brought in after being shot by guards for taking part in a strike. Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower (London: Penguin, 2006), p Paul Berman, The Philosopher of Islamic Terror, The New York Times, 23 March

18 History of Islamist radicalisation in prisons Unlocking al-qaeda An Egyptian doctor, Zawahiri was formerly a leader of Islamic Jihad, an Egyptian revolutionary Islamist movement founded in the 1970s in order to overthrow the Egyptian government and establish an Islamic state. Following Islamic Jihad s role in the assassination of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in 1981, Zawahiri was arrested along with many other members of his group. During the next three years in prison, Zawahiri and his associates were repeatedly tortured while also witnessing the mistreatment of other prisoners. 7 This brutal and deliberate mistreatment allegedly led him to betray his colleagues, one of whom was arrested and executed. 8 In 1984 Zawahiri was released, following which he travelled abroad. Although he had entered prison as an already intolerant and violent jihadist, his views now became even more extreme leading some to view his jihadist career as an elaborate attempt to take revenge on the West and the Egyptian government for the treatment that he endured in prison. 9 After leaving Egypt, Zawahiri travelled extensively in the Middle East, seeking allies in his attempts to unseat the Egyptian government and becoming involved in pan-islamic causes, most notably the Afghan jihad against the USSR. In the early 1990s, he began working closely with Osama bin Laden, helping him to establish al-qaeda, into which he gradually merged his own Islamic Jihad organisation. Abu Musab al-zarqawi ( ), Jordan Abu Musab al-zarqawi, a Jordanian who eventually became the leader of al-qaeda in Iraq, was largely radicalised during his two long periods in Jordanian prisons in the 1980s and 1990s. A drug-dealer and petty-criminal, Abu Musab al-zarqawi was first imprisoned in Jordan for petty crime in the 1980s. In prison he adopted a Wahhabi form of Islam which he learnt from other prisoners. On his release, al-zarqawi was recruited by militant Islamists to fight in Afghanistan against the USSR and their Afghan Communist allies. After returning to Jordan from Afghanistan, he was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment in 1993 after planning to attack Western targets in Jordan. In prison for a second time, he fell under the influence of Abu Muhammad al- Maqdisi, a leading jihadist ideologue. 10 Together the two men formed a prison gang which sought to intimidate guards and other prisoners with the aim of spreading al- Maqdisi s jihadist ideology throughout the Jordanian prison system. Abdullah Abu Rumman, a Jordanian journalist who was imprisoned with him in 1996, later recalled 7 During his trial, Zawahiri described the abuse, saying we suffered the most inhumane treatment. There they kicked us, they beat us with electric cables, they shocked us with electricity. And they used wild dogs... Where is freedom? Where is human rights? Where is justice? Where is justice? We will never forget! We will never forget! Wright, The Looming Tower, p Ibid. p For example, see Chris Zambelis, 'Is There a Nexus between Torture and Radicalization?' Jamestown Terrorism Monitor, volume 6, Issue 13, 26 June Gary Gambill, 'Abu Musab al-zarqawi: A biographical sketch', Jamestown Terrorism Monitor, volume 2, issue 24, 15 December

19 Unlocking al-qaeda History of Islamist radicalisation in prisons that Zarqawi basically controlled the prison ward: He decided who would cook, who would do the laundry, who would lead the readings of the Koran. He was extremely protective of his followers, and extremely tough with prisoners outside his group. He didn t trust them. He considered them infidels. 11 After his early release from prison in 1999, al-zarqawi travelled to Afghanistan and then Iraq, where he led al-qaeda s Iraqi wing for three years before being killed in a US airstrike in The experiences of these men in prison not only helped radicalise them as individuals, and allowed them to radicalise other prisoners, but also provided a motif of martyrdom and suffering which has in turn helped to inspire and motivate future recruits to Islamist and jihadist movements alike. Islamist organizations active in the UK have frequently sought to eulogise high-profile Islamist prisoners from the Arab world and to promote them to British Muslims. For example, in 1994 the Islamic Foundation, an Islamist organisation based in Leicester that works closely with a number of British government departments, 12 translated and published a book called Return of the Pharaoh: Memoirs in Nasir s Prison by Zainab al-ghazali, a prominent female Muslim Brotherhood activist who was frequently imprisoned in Egypt in the 1950s and 60s on charges of seeking to overthrow the government. Muhammad Manazir Ahsan, the long-serving director of the Islamic Foundation, wrote the book s foreword in which he presented al-ghazali as a model Muslim and portrayed her steadfastness in prison as proof of the validity of her beliefs. He wrote that one of the outstanding leaders of the Islamic movement in Egypt and the pace-setter of courage, piety and dedication to Islam, Zainab al-ghazali was a victim of this savagery and inhuman persecution... her courage in the face of unimaginable odds and her many qualities of head and heart remind us of the life and time of many of the Companions of the Prophet and virtuous people in the earlier generations of Muslim history. He further referred to her book as a source of inspiration and guidance for millions of people who want to see Islam thrive and flourish as a world religion, as a viable new world order and as a source of peace and happiness for all mankind. 13 The book remains in print and is offered for sale on the Islamic Foundation s website Mary Anne Weaver, The short, violent life of Abu Musab al-zarqawi, Atlantic, 8 June For example, in 2007, the Islamic Foundation s educational wing, the Markfield Institute for Higher Education, produced a report commissioned by the government entitled Islam at universities in England: Meeting the needs and investing in the future. In July 2009, David Lammy, Minister of State for Higher Education, said that the Higher Education Funding Council for England was commissioning research into Islamic Studies in higher education, building on Dr. Siddiqui's report on Islam at universities in England. See; Dr Ataullah Siddiqui, Islam at universities in England: Meeting the needs and investing in the future (London, DFES, 2007); House of Commons Written answers and statements, Islam: Higher Education: Business, Innovation and Skills, 15 July 2009, < 13 Zainab al-ghazali, Return of the Pharoah: Memoirs in Nasir s Prison, (Leicester: 2006), p. viii 14 Text available for purchase online at the Islamic Foundation bookstore < =DETAIL&Product_Id=1206&W_ID=1&P_ID=3>. 13

20 History of Islamist radicalisation in prisons Unlocking al-qaeda In the UK, there are four main cases of individuals being radicalised as a direct result of their experiences in British prisons and subsequently being imprisoned (in one instance without trial) for terrorism-related reasons: Richard Reid Richard Reid, a black, London-born convert to Islam who in 2001 attempted to blow up a trans-atlantic airliner using a bomb concealed in his shoe, converted to Islam in prison and was subsequently radicalised soon after his release. Born in South London, Reid was jailed several times in the 1990s for petty crime. While serving his sentence in Feltham Young Offenders Institution, he converted to Islam after his father, a Christian who had had positive experiences with Muslims, had advised him to look into the religion. 15 It is not known which individuals in prison inspired him to convert, however during this period there was a considerable radical presence at FYOI. 16 On his release in 1995, Reid began spending large amounts of time at Brixton Mosque, a conservative Wahhabi establishment. Abdul Haqq Baker, the imam of the mosque, told the BBC that Reid was subsequently tempted away from the mosque by even more extreme individuals who set up a few years ago away from the mosque. 17 Baker also observed that Reid was very, very impressionable. Three years after leaving prison, he stopped attending the mosque in Baker said that it was likely that by then Reid had met Zacarias Moussaoui, a Moroccan who was later convicted for his role in the 9/11 attacks, as well as a number of other extremists. Baker said that at the end of Zacarias Moussaoui being in the community and spouting off his views, it was true that Mr Reid was attending at the same time I'm pretty confident they were attending the extreme scholarship classes being held by some of the extremists who could not attend our centre. 18 Not long after he stopped attending the Brixton Mosque altogether, Reid travelled to Pakistan and Afghanistan where he received training from al-qaeda, before returning to the UK to attempt to carry out his attack on a trans-atlantic airliner. Muktar Said Ibrahim Muktar Said Ibrahim led and organized the attempted bombings which took place in London on 21 July He was initially radicalized through his time in the British prison system. 15 Alan Cowell, A nation challenged: jailed Briton; the shadowy trail and shift to Islam of a bomb suspect, The New York Times, 29 December 2001, < 16 Ibid. 17 Who is Richard Reid?, BBC News, December , < 18 Chris Gray, Richard Reid: How eager convert was turned into a suspected terrorist, The Independent, 27 December 2001, < 14

21 Unlocking al-qaeda History of Islamist radicalisation in prisons Ibrahim arrived in the UK from Eritrea in 1990 aged 12. In June 1993 he was convicted of indecent assault against a 15-year old schoolgirl. Two years later he was involved in two robberies, one of which involved robbing a 77-year old woman in a tube station. 19 After taking part in a gang-related attack in Hertford, Ibrahim was sentenced to five years imprisonments in Young Offenders Institutes in He spent the next two and a half years at a variety of such institutions including Feltham, Aylesbury and Huntercombe (Henley-on-Thames) as well as Woodhill prison. 20 Ibrahim was released in 1998, having reportedly become interested in radical Islamism during his time there. 21 Soon after his release, Ibrahim began attending Finsbury Park mosque and listening to pro-al-qaeda sermons by Abu Hamza and Abdullah al-faisal (whose tapes were later found at his flat) while also working in restaurants and as a market trader. 22 Further radicalized by exposure to individuals like Abu Hamza and al-faisal, Ibrahim subsequently travelled to Sudan in 2003 where he claimed to have received weapons training and also to Pakistan. 23 On a trip to Pakistan in 2005 (which coincided with a trip there by the two leading 7/7 bombers) he is believed to have received instruction in bomb-making military training from Islamist militants possibly including members of al-qaeda. Mohammad al-figari Mohammad al-figari, a convert to Islam who was convicted in 2008 for attending terrorist training camps organised by followers of Abu Hamza, was initially radicalised during his time in prison for drugs-related offences in the late 1990s. Mohammed Al-Figari was born in Trinidad as Roger Michael Figari to mixed Catholic and Hindu parents. He arrived in the UK in 1989 and initially studied in London. Within a few years however he had become involved in drugs and crime, leading to him being convicted of deception, assault and cocaine smuggling in 1997 and sentenced to eight years in prison. Ten days before he was sent to prison, he converted to Islam, having been previously influenced by the Nation of Islam, a predominantly African-American US-based sect. Shortly before going to prison, he also met Mohammed Hamid, a charismatic salafi preacher and former drug addict, alongside whom he would later be convicted. 24 Once in prison, al-figari seems to have abandoned his interest in the Nation of Islam in favour of more mainstream 19 Sandra Laville, Refugee children who turned against Britain, The Guardian, 9 July 2007, < 20 Sandra Laville, Key events in the July 21 bomb plot, The Guardian, 9 July 2007, < 21 Do prisons radicalize inmates?, BBC News, 29 July 2005, < 22 Profile: Muktar Ibrahim, BBC News, 11 July 2007,< 23 Ibid. 24 Owen Bowcott, Profile: Mohammed Hamid and his followers, The Guardian, 25 February 2006, < 15

22 History of Islamist radicalisation in prisons Unlocking al-qaeda forms of Sunni Islam. Unfortunately, however, he soon gravitated towards the most extreme forms of Sunni Islam salafi-jihadism. Part of the blame for this lies directly with the Prison Service. For example, during his trial the prosecution produced a booklet found in al-figari s possession entitled How Can I Train Myself for Jihad? 25 Inside, the book had a stamp from the Wandsworth prison s library. At the same time, indicative of further oversights by the Prison Service, al-figari was receiving hard-line Islamist literature sent to him in prison by Mohammed Hamid who meanwhile was becoming a keen follower of Abu Hamza and was regularly attending Abu Hamza s Finsbury Park mosque. 26 The Prison Service is therefore doubly at fault firstly for allowing hardline Islamist literature to be mailed into prison by Hamid and secondly for stocking pro-jihadist books in the prison library. On his release from prison in December 2002, Figari swiftly re-joined Hamid and began regularly attending Finsbury Park Mosque with him. In February 2008, Figari was convicted of attending terrorist training camps at locations around the UK which had been organised by Hamid. Martin Mubanga Martin Mubanga, the son of Zambian immigrants, is a Black-British man who converted to Islam while in prison. Although Mubanga has never been convicted in relation to terrorism, the US has previously accused him of being involved in extremist - and possibly terrorist-related activities - during his time in Afghanistan in Martin Mubanga, who was born in Zambia but was brought up in London, left school with five GCSEs and an NVQ in construction. At around the same time, when Mubanga was 16, his mother died (his father had already died while he was young). 27 After leaving school, he failed to find a job and was arrested in 1992 and convicted for trying to steal a car. Imprisoned in Feltham Young Offenders Institute, aged 19, he became interested in Islam and soon converted while still in prison. 28 Soon after his release, in 1995, he travelled to Bosnia, where the US government later said that he had received military training (Mubanga, however, has denied this and said that he went to Bosnia to work for a charity). 29 In October 2000, he travelled to Pakistan to attend a hard-line madrassa. After spending time in Peshawar, he travelled to Afghanistan where he attended two further madrassas in Kabul and Kandahar, the spiritual home of the Taliban, leaving Afghanistan soon after the US invasion but 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 Declaration of James R Crisfield, Judge Advocate, United States Navy, in 'Martin Mubanga et al. v. George W. Bush, (Civil Action No. 04-CV-1144)'. Transcript available online at: > 28 David Rose, How I entered the hellish world of Guantanamo Bay, The Observer, 6 February 2005, < 29 U.S Department of State, The United States response to questions asked by the committee against torture, 8 May 2006,< 16

23 Unlocking al-qaeda History of Islamist radicalisation in prisons before the Northern Alliance s capture of Kabul. 30 He was arrested by local police in Zambia in 2002, while en route to the UK, after the US discovered that he had spent time in Afghanistan (US forces had by then discovered Mubanga s British passport, which he had reported as being stolen, in an al-qaeda cave complex in Afghanistan). The US accused him of receiving training from al-qaeda and of being an al-qaeda member. 31 These charges were never proven and Mubanga was released from Guantanamo in 2005 without ever having been put on trial. He is now believed to live in the UK. In addition to these four main cases, there are many examples of other, lesser-known Islamist extremists who may have been radicalised at least in part through their experiences in UK prisons. One of these is Mohammed Hamid (mentioned above for his role in radicalizing Mohammed al-figari) who was convicted in 2008 of training would-be terrorists. 32 Hamid, a former drug addict, had previously served as least two jail sentences for robbery, one of them in a Young Offenders Institution. 33 Omar Khyam, who dressed as a suicide bomber at extremist protests against the Danish cartoons of Mohammed in February 2006, had likewise recently spent several years in prison on drugs-related charges. 34 Another individual who possibly adopted extremist beliefs as a result of his time in prison is Sulayman Keeler (aka Simon Keeler), a white convert and a former member of al-muhajiroun jailed in 2008 for supporting terrorism. 35 Keeler had previously served a short sentence for assaulting a police officer, converting to Islam not long after his release. 36 Another extremist whose prison experiences pushed him towards radical Islamism is David Myatt, formerly a prominent neo-nazi who is now known as Abdul-Aziz ibn Myatt. He converted to an extremist form of Wahhabi-influenced Islam soon after leaving prison David Rose, How I entered the hellish world of Guantanamo Bay, The Observer, 6 February 2005, < 31 The Guantanamo Docket, Summary of evidence for combatant status review tribunal: Martin John Dubanga, The New York Times, 25 January 2005, < 32 Top extremist recruiter is jailed, BBC News, 26 February 2008, < 33 Duncan Gardham, Mohammed Hamid is evil personified, The Telegraph, 26 February 2008, < 34 Protestor is returned to prison, BBC News, 7 February Six guilty of terrorism support, BBC News, 17 April 2008, < 36 Hate-filled Muslim heckler faces life in jail, The Scotsman, 18 April Al-Muhajiroun, BBC News, 29 April 2004, < 37 David Myatt, David Myatt: From Neo-Nazi to Muslim, < 17

24 History of Islamist radicalisation in prisons Unlocking al-qaeda The most significant recent case of prison radicalisation, however, is that of Kevin Gardner, a paranoid schizophrenic in his early twenties who converted to an extreme form of Islam in Stoke Heath Young Offenders' Institution and HMP Featherstone in In 2009, Gardner was jailed indefinitely on mental health grounds for, while in prison, having planned to carry out bomb attacks on a Territorial Army base in Chesterfield, carrying out primitive bomb-making experiments in prison and writing statements such as the deaths of British soldiers on home soil will encourage the believers. Gardner s case is important because, even though his bombing plans were not at an advanced stage (and would perhaps never even have come to fruition), this is one of the first occasions when Islamist terrorist attacks are known to have been planned by individuals while in British prisons. In most previous cases, individuals adopted extreme Islamist beliefs in prison but only took concrete steps towards terrorism after being released. Despite considerable differences between the individuals radicalized in prisons in the Arab world and in the UK (for instance, many prominent Arabic radicals, such as Zawahiri, have been well-educated individuals from prominent and well-connected families), and despite wide differences in their conditions in prison (torture is widespread in prisons in the Arab world), there are some themes that are common to many of those who have adopted extreme Islamist ideologies as a result of their time in prison. Extremism seen as a logical solution to other problems In many cases, the adoption of extremist ideologies by prisoners appears not to have been an irrational, involuntary or unconscious act. Instead, for individuals like Richard Reid or Martin Mubanga and perhaps even Zarqawi, it seems to have been consciously perceived as a drastic but necessary solution to a variety of other problems, ranging from criminality to drug abuse to personal identity crises. Extremism as a new start Similarly, conversion either to extremist Islamism or, in the case of converts, initially to Islam in general, is seen by many prisoners as allowing them a new start both spiritually and in relation to their own identity, friendship circles and way of life as a way of breaking with a past that was often associated with crime, drugs and failure that is comparable with born again Christianity. Prison deepens radicalisation While some individuals first adopt extremist ideologies only while in prison, in other cases individuals who entered prison as extremists become more radical as a result of their experiences there. Sayyid Qutb is a classic example of this phenomenon; severe mistreatment in prison transformed him from a relatively progressive political dissident into the creator of modern jihadist ideology who saw the world as divided exclusively into good and evil. Prison mistreatment is a key factor In both the Arab world and the UK it seems likely that individuals perceptions of 38 Sick bomb planner is locked up, BBC News, 28 July 2008, 18

25 Unlocking al-qaeda History of Islamist radicalisation in prisons their treatment in prison is a hugely important causal factor in their radicalisation. Individuals with anti-state ideologies who feel mistreated or victimised in prison on account of their religious or political beliefs often conclude that their mistreatment only validates the truth of their beliefs - strengthening a person s radical beliefs and provoking greater feelings of anger towards the state and towards wider society. Extremism as an extension of earlier behaviour The adoption of a confrontational Islamist ideology in prison can sometimes be seen as an extension of earlier anti-social behaviour which, in the case of Muktar Ibrahim included sexual assault and robbing an elderly woman or, in the case of Simon Keeler, assaulting a policeman. Signing up to Islamist beliefs can therefore potentially act as a systemisation and vindication of an earlier antipathy and resentment towards mainstream society and towards symbols of the state. Extremism causes dramatic behavioural changes Radicalisation (i.e. the adoption of an extremist ideology and worldview) can dramatically transform a person s behaviour. Many extremists such as Muktar Said Ibrahim and Richard Reid arrived in prison after leading somewhat aimless lives. On becoming radicals they become highly-motivated and disciplined - saving money, travelling abroad, learning languages and undertaking physical training. Such transformations may become more likely if a person deliberately adopted extreme Islamism to break with a past that they were ashamed of or that they associated with failure or unhappiness. Post-release radicalisation Not all the extremists listed above joined radical groups while actually in prison. Instead a number of them, such as Richard Reid, became consistently involved in such groups only after their release. This however strongly suggests that they had adopted radical ideologies while in prison or that their prison experiences made them susceptible to extremists messages. Alternatively they may have been recommended to such groups through their prison contacts and friendship circles. In regard to the UK specifically, an examination of high-profile cases of prison radicalisation reveals other trends: Converts more vulnerable to radicalisation The cases of Muslim converts like Richard Reid, Mohammad al-figari and Simon Keeler suggest that converts are significantly over-represented among those who adopted extremist or jihadist ideologies as a result of their prison time. Converts experiences in prison can be seen as heightened versions of the experiences of other prisoners: questions of identity and group loyalty are even more important to new converts than to those born and brought up as Muslims, for example. Absolutist Islamist ideologies meanwhile offer converts simple solutions to complex questions of identity and belonging. At the same time, most new converts are naturally less able to differentiate between rival interpretations of Islam than Muslim-born individuals and may thus be more likely to unquestioningly buy into extremists 19

26 History of Islamist radicalisation in prisons Unlocking al-qaeda arguments. This is partly because most hard-line Islamist theologies are straightforward, un-nuanced and highly literalistic in contrast to many syncretistic and often less explicitly articulated forms of traditional interpretations of Islam. Time lag between radicalisation and action The four most prominent British cases of prison radicalisation outlined above suggest that there is often a significant time lag between a person being radicalised in prison and either carrying out a terrorist attack or being prosecuted or arrested for terrorism-related offences. In the case of Reid, Mubanga, Ibrahim and Al-Figari this time-lag is around five to seven years. This lag makes it harder to measure the full extent of prison radicalisation or conversely to fully assess the impact of counterradicalisation initiatives. Such a lag may mean that individuals who are being radicalised in prisons today might not commit violent acts for another seven years (i.e. until around 2015). It should be noted, however, that, with the possible exception of Kevin Gardner, in no case did radicalisation occur exclusively as a result of these individuals experiences in the prison. In all cases, experiences both before and after imprisonment were key in making individuals adopt radical ideologies. Factbox Definitions of Islamism and Jihadism Islamism is a modern 20th century ideology that blends traditional Islamic teachings with twentieth century communist and fascist ideologies. Islamism is primarily problematic in the UK because it advocates a separatism between Muslims and non-muslims based on a concept of eternal military, moral and cultural conflict between these two groups. This confrontational us and them logic, augmented by a supremacist worldview, undermines national cohesion, creates social, mental and geographical ghettoisation and sows distrust and suspicion between different ethno-religious groups. Modern jihadists are Islamist who believe they are religiously obligated to carry out terrorist attacks in order to further Islamism s objectives. Key feature of Islamism: Islam is a political ideology Islamists believe that Islam is not just a religion but also a political ideology. They believe that Islam contains clear instructions not only on spiritual or ritualistic matters but also on all other issues such as the foreign policy, the banking system and governmental structures. Islamists typically aim to Islamise society; to make all aspects of society such as the government, courts, schools, the police, banks and restaurants follow these Islamic practices. 20

27 Unlocking al-qaeda History of Islamist radicalisation in prisons Factbox continued Sharia law as state law Islamists want secular law to be replaced by the Sharia, which they regard as being a single set of fixed laws which are purely divine in origin. Islamists generally interpret the sharia as instituting discriminatory laws for men and women, Muslims and non-muslims. In addition, sharia punishments advocated by Islamists often include stoning women for adultery, executing apostates and killing those who seek to overthrow or question Islamist political systems. Ummah as a political bloc Islamist think that the traditional concept of the Muslim ummah, the collective description of Muslims around the world, should be redefined to imply the creation of a political bloc. To Islamists, this means that Muslims should be loyal to other Muslims, whoever they are and wherever they are, ahead of being loyal to non-muslims. Creation of an expansionist caliphate Following from their re-interpretation of ummah, Islamists believe that all Muslim majority countries (and areas formerly ruled by Muslims)should be united in a single super-state called the Caliphate. This caliphate would, according to most Islamists, be a non-democratic state which would make the Islamist version of Sharia into state law, effectively making non-muslims and women second-class citizens. Most Islamists also believe that the Caliphate should also wage expansionist wars against surrounding non-muslim states. Jihadism and Wahhabism Jihadists are Islamists who believe firstly in using violence to advance Islamism s objectives and secondly that Muslim individuals anywhere in the world have the right to carry out violent attacks against any state, organisation or individual which they believe to be oppressing Muslims or to be actively hostile towards Islam. Most jihadists follow the Wahhabi school of thought which originates in 18th century Arabia. Such Wahhabi teachings, in addition, to usually promoting the above Islamist tenets, put a great emphasis on dressing and acting in imitation of Mohammed and his followers, for instance by growing beards of a certain shape and length, wearing traditional clothing etc. At the same time, however, not all those who similarly seek to imitate Mohammed and his followers are Wahhabists or Islamists. Similarly, not all Islamists are Wahhabists. 21