CAN SYRIA AND ISRAEL BE SERIOUS ABOUT PEACE? AND WHAT SHOULD THE U.S. DO ABOUT IT?

Transcription

1 CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE CAN SYRIA AND ISRAEL BE SERIOUS ABOUT PEACE? AND WHAT SHOULD THE U.S. DO ABOUT IT? WELCOME AND MODERATOR: MARINA OTTAWAY, DIRECTOR, MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT SPEAKERS: PAUL SALEM, DIRECTOR, CARNEGIE MIDDLE EAST CENTER DANIEL LEVY, SENIOR FELLOW, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 2008 Transcript by Federal News Service Washington, D.C.

2 MARINA OTTAWAY: Okay good morning and welcome. Looking around the room, I can see this is a group of die-hard Middle Eastern (inaudible, background noise) it seems to be like a gathering of all the friends essentially. We are really happy to have this discussion of a topic which is becoming increasingly important; that is what are the prospects for a happy outcome of the negotiations that are going on between Syria and Israel? At a time of growing pessimism about possible outcome of the Israeli-Palestinian Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, there are many who hold out that as a glimmer of hope, essentially, a positive outcome on the Syria front. We are very lucky to have with us to discuss the issue, Paul Salem and Daniel Levy. Paul Salem is the director of the Carnegie Middle Eastern Center in Beirut. He had, before joining Carnegie two years ago, he has had the distinguished career with the Fares Foundation, with the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, with the American University in Beirut, and he has been a member of the Lebanese National Commission for Electoral Law Reform, just to touch up on the most important points of his career. Daniel Levy is the director of the Middle East Initiative at the New American Foundation and the director of the Prospects for Peace Initiative at the Century Foundation. He has been he has worked in the past during the Barak government in the Israeli Prime Minister s Office. So he is a practitioner, if you want, as well as an analyst. You have the bios so I will not going to any more detail. So given the fact that we don t have a lot more time, let me just pass the floor to Paul. PAUL SALEM: Thank you, Marina, and good morning everyone for showing up on this early morning. My remarks will focus as the title of the talk says, Can Israel and Syria be Serious About Peace, meaning trying to analyze the thinking that might be behind what Israel what Syria, sorry is doing in these negotiations, how it views them, where it wants to get at the end of them and a little about what Israel might get out of them but Daniel is with us to tell us much more with more depth and detail about that. And then moving on to the U.S. position, mainly, in the next administration, what could a next administration do about this issue? The Golan issue is essentially the last remaining Arab-Israeli major issue outside of the complicated Palestinian process. The Sinai was resolved in the 70s, occupation of southern Lebanon was essentially largely ended in 2000, although conflict remains largely backed Syria and others. But the Golan issue, since 1967, has been a very serious pressure point and has been behind ongoing structural Syrian-Israeli conflict. The fallout from the occupation of the Golan and this is 41 years, essentially since that took place has been a concentrated, mainly, in Syria and Lebanon but the fallout has been large and intense. Lebanon, essentially, collapsed about a year or two after the Golan was occupied. Syria, since 67 had, as one of its objectives, a focus to try to get the Golan back either through proxy war, largely through Lebanon or through direct war in 1973, or peace negotiations, mainly in 96 and So the fallout has been large, continues to be large. It continues to be behind the ongoing proxy conflicts backed by Syria against Israel and to some degree, against Israel s backer, the United States in the region. So it s a very key issue, although one has gotten has used to it. It seems to be part of the landscape but it is ongoing driver of very major conflict.

3 A resolution, a land-for-peace deal between Syria and Israel no doubt would have enormous consequences, largely very, very positive consequences. It would it would lead to peace between Syria and Israel, normalization, to some degree, of relations, which would necessarily impact Syria s regional and foreign policy to a considerable degree. It would push Lebanon into peace talks with Israel as well, would put Hezbollah and Hamas in a very, very different and difficult situation. It would open the door to peace negotiations and perhaps treaties between Israel and the other Arab countries based on the Arab initiative. So potentially, it could have very enormous and positive consequences. It could, however, have risks and there are elements of it the details of such a thing, which also need to be guarded against and I ll talk about that a bit more at the end of my comments. So can the two parties be serious? Can they be serious? The answer is yes. Both have a serious interest in land-for-peace. Syria has expressed that interest through war and peace its interest in getting back the Golan is real. It can live without it but it has a real interest in getting back the Golan Heights. It was on the brink of signing peace treaties in 96 and 2000 so it was part of Hafez al-assad s policy. It has also been very much part of Bashar al-assad s policy and he began talking about it in 2002 but it gained steam after the Summer War of 2006 and is now in these indirect talks between Syria and Israel. So yes, Syria can be serious about this. Israel, of course, can be serious as well. Five Israeli prime ministers have recognized the potential value potential importance of a serious peace between Syria and Israel. Negotiations, as we said, almost bore fruit in 96 and Most of the Israel prime ministers much of the Israeli leadership recognizes that if it s a thorough going peace, it would certainly garner benefits for Israel as well although the issue of giving up the Golan Heights very complex and trust in Syria is quite low. So yes, they can be serious. This could be a very serious very serious process. Are they actually serious now? In other words, what are they doing? What are the possible strategies that they could be pursuing? On the Syrian side well, I would just start by saying that both Israel and Syria do benefit from talks for talks sake as well. We must keep that in mind. There s no doubt that Syria benefits simply from having talks with Israel and encouraging the U.S. to join those talks. Certainly, that breaks Syria s isolation. That s good from the Syrian perspective, even if they don t end up in an actual treaty. So Syria has an interest in talks for talks sake. Israel, too, probably has an interest at this point in talks for talks sake. The options that Syria has before it and it could be keeping all these coals in the fire to see which one work, I would say it has three options. One is a hard-line option of riding out the storm of the Bush administration, which has been the roughest storm for the Baath Assad regime in recent times, to try to ride out the Bush storm, ride out the Hariri Tribunal, ride out its isolation and try to use the negotiations simply as a mechanism, as a tactic to break that isolation, to ride out the storm and to wait for a next U.S. administration or to wait simply for the pressure to calm, for the Hariri Tribunal to pass and so on. So that hard-line option is there for Syria. It maintains the dynamics it maintains strong relations with Iran, with Hezbollah, with Hamas and pursuing negotiations, it could be, in other words, an option that Syria has in mind. In that option, it could wait for the U.S. to weaken. It could then regain its dominance over Lebanon much more than it has in the last year. The events of Lebanon in May, where the March 8 Coalition weakened to a large degree, the March 14 Coalition, could be a prelude to something much stronger

4 is Syria goes ahead and pursues the hard-line option of regaining what it lost, to some degree, perhaps in different ways in Lebanon and pushing back American, March 14, and Israeli influence and so on and so forth. The medium-line option which Syria might be pursuing might be a kind of no-war-no-peace option in other words, a stabilization of the current status quo. This option would involve not actually achieving peace with Israel. However, Syria regaining its legitimacy in the Arab and international community, surviving or riding out the Hariri Tribunal, not regaining not going back into Lebanon, but having its proxies in Lebanon and mainly Hezbollah control the situation there and move on to other things and other issues. So Syria could be aiming at a middle-of-the-road position. The third option, the long option of regaining the Golan and gaining long-term regime security and economic benefits is the one in which the eggs are placed in the negotiation basket. Now, these three options are not exclusive in time. In other words, I think Syria prepares itself for using all three and whichever one ends up working, it would pursue it. That may explain a bit of contradictions as it were in Syrian policy, talking negotiating peace with Israel while signing defense deals with Iran, while arming Hezbollah, doing all these things at once. From the Israeli perspective, but of course, Daniel would know more about this but I would say there are also three options. There s a hard-line Israel option which might be to entangle Syria in talks and to keep it sort of moderated, to keep it on hooks, as it were, while possibly preparing something more dire a strike against Iran or some action against Hezbollah. In other words, it could be tactical in that sense. It could also be tactical in the sense of talking with the Syrians to signal to the Palestinians, sort of an old game that used to be played between the Palestinian and Syrian tracks. Now, there could be a what I would call sort of a medium option for the Israelis, which is to talk with the Syrians to stabilize the current status quo, to calm and stabilize the northern border. After Israel withdrew in 2000, the border was not calm and this ended up leading to events that led to the 2006 war Israel trying to manage Hezbollah itself and failing to do so. Israel might have an interest in talking to Syria to find a way to manage this status quo without overall peace. This would possibly look like what things look like before. In other words, Syria Israel might encourage Syria to take more of a role in Lebanon to get a handle on Hezbollah as definitely, Israel trusts Syria more than it trusts Iran. And that would that would also be, you know, bring us back to Syrian influence in Lebanon and so on. The long option, again, is a land-for-peace deal with Syria. I think that is a serious option for the Israelis. Definitely right now, the leadership crisis in Israel, everything is in suspension. And also with the, you know, U.S. elections, there s no progress expected before the spring or perhaps the early summer. But taking a longer view, Israel certainly has a potential serious interest in a serious land-for-peace deal with Syria. So the two parties are very serious but they have other options. They might be playing other games as well. But the possibility of a peace between the two which is in the calculations of both parties is a serious part of the thinking and hence, it s something that deserves focus. There s no doubt that both parties could live without a land-for-peace deal over the Golan and that s been clear for the last 41 years. But why might the two sides be interested in peace now,

5 perhaps even more than before? What are the dynamics in Syria and some degree Israel that are pushing this option? But on the Syrian side, I would say there s a number things. Hafez al-assad, as defense minister, lost the Golan Heights in 1967 and the Assad regime has been trying to get it back ever since by proxy war, direct war, or negotiations. So there is almost a personal particular element that links the loss of the Golan to the legitimacy and strength of the regime. Additionally, the Golan itself is a serious security threat. Anybody who s been to Damascus, Israeli artillery looks down on Damascus and the occupation of the Golan very seriously impacted Syrian defense calculations, partly pushed Syria to move into Lebanon and other places to try to bolster its security. It s also a main failure of the Assad regime, not to be able to get the Golan back. Egypt got the Sinai back. Even Lebanon, a small, divided, very weak country got its occupied territory back. And Syria, as an Arab state, is and the Arab nationalist perhaps, it s a very weak point that they have not been able to get their occupied territories back. Bashar al-assad has been in office eight years and has really almost nothing or very little to show for his eight years in office and as a young leader who needs 20 or 30 years perspective towards the future, this is fairly serious. He was pushed out of Lebanon ignominiously. He s an Arab in international isolation under potential investigation the regime and so on for the assassination of Hariri. He lost the foreign policy alliance structure that Hafez al-assad had built painstakingly over many years, which included alliance with Iran but was balanced with very good, strong relations with Saudi Arabia and Egypt and Europe and the U.S. and an understanding with Israel. All of that was lost very quickly by Bashar al-assad and he s left leaning on one leg, which is an alliance with Iran. And the 2006 war ended Hezbollah s ability to function as a day-to-day, week-to-week proxy army against Israel in a war of attrition against Israel, which was Hezbollah s main function vis-à-vis Syria from the mid- 80s up till It was, to some degree, the PLO s function, from Syria s perspective in the 70s up till the 1982 war. 2006, although it was a war that was not won by Israel claimed to have been won by Hezbollah, a very mixed bag. But essentially, since 2006, Hezbollah can no longer launch, essentially, you know day-to-day, week-to-week war of attrition type activity against Israel. Hezbollah, now, can only be used in an all out war between either Israel and Iran or Israel and Syria or Israel and Hezbollah itself. It s sort of a doomsday weapon now. MR. LEVY: Since 2000 or 2006? MR. SALEM: I think 2006, I m sorry, yeah since the war, yeah, since This has weakened Syria s pressure point on Israel. It s one of the reasons why it might be, from Syrian perspective, this is the last chance to get the Golan back. The overdependence on Iran, while perhaps necessary from the Syrian perspective during the period of the invasion of Iraq, when Syria felt that it was next and for a number of reasons, that lost its alliances with Saudi Arabia and so on and so forth. But Iran cannot assure the regime s security long-term nor can Iran get the Golan back. And Syria cannot follow the extreme positions of Iran as sort of an international rogue state which an oil state can do. I mean, Ahmedinejad or Hugo Chavez have the resources to do that. Syria is unable to sustain that international rogue position for long. It pays a very, very heavy price and it has very little to compensate for it. It s a population of 20 million, very, very rapid growth rates, very rapid population growth rates, very sluggish economic growth rates, declining public services, the rise in food and energy prices has hit

6 Syria hard. So Syria s a country with very, very serious social and economic problems with dwindling resources. The regime itself is strong in the sense that it doesn t have any organized serious opposition this point as the firm and harsh control of society but it has troubles at the top. There have been assassinations, defections, seeming in-fighting. The Kurdish issue in the Kurdish regions of Syria is an unsettled issue, particularly as the Kurds of Iraq are autonomous. Sunni-Shiite tensions in Iraq and in Lebanon affect Syria potentially very negatively along the Sunni-Alawite split. And the rise of religious politics in general in Iraq and to a large degree, in Lebanon obviously, it s happening in other parts of the Arab world also destabilizes what is basically a secular regime and causes concern. A return what would a return of the Golan bring Bashar? What positive things could it bring? Well, I think it would be projected by the regime as a great achievement of Bashar that something Hafez could not achieve over many, many years. Public opinion in Syria since the 90s has been prepared been increasingly prepared for this. And I think large cross sections of the Syrian population, whether it s the minorities, the Alawites, the Christians, the Jews, as well as much of the Sunni bourgeoisie and so on would welcome such a move. And there isn t major organized opposition at this point to use it very negatively. The absence of Saddam Hussein from the scene facilitates things for Hafez al-assad, definitely for Bashar al-assad in the sense that were Saddam still around, main enemy of the regime, Saddam could have used it very much if Bashar would go for peace, he could use it as an Arab nationalist Baathist regime to organize opposition and to threaten the regime. So in this situation, I think there is more of a possibility. Peace with Israel would actually buy the regime regime security from Israel and the U.S. much more than the security it can buy by maintaining the current position. Arab states that signed peace with Israel and the experience has been sort of no matter what else they do in the future and how undemocratic and how they sort of have an insurance policy because they have signed peace with Israel and I think the Assad regime has seen, you know, Mubarak or the Hashemites and so on and realize that this is a very good card for regime security in a regime that s long-term not terrible stable. It would also certainly bring very large economic dividends. This is very, very serious in Syria where the economic and social issues might be one of the dynamics that break the back of the system at some point. It s also important at a time when there s so much money flushing around the region but not a terribly large amount coming into Syria. And when Turkey has essentially found a way for rapid and sustained economic growth foreign direct investment and through certain economic policies without without oil resources and that s one of the reasons, you know, for the Syrian-Turkish close relationship is to figure out how Turkey is moving forward economically without oil. For Israel, definitely, peace with Syria would be if it s a thorough-going peace, would neutralize the last major Arab state opponent, a very important issue would lead to a push for Lebanon to sign a peace treaty as well, would very much narrow the options of Hezbollah and Hamas, would open the door to peace with the other Arab states, and would weaken Iran s political and proxy army reach in the Levant region at least. Of course, the Iranian nuclear issue is separate.

7 Iranian influence in Iraq is separate but at least vis-à-vis Syria and Lebanon and possibly the Palestinian territories, it would have an impact. What should the U.S. do about this? This is sort of the second part of the title. Well, the possibility of a peace treaty between Syria and Israel is real. It s not it s not, perhaps, easy or likely, or whatnot, but it s real. It s a real possibility and should be taken seriously. And both sides are clear that it s only the U.S. in the end, can take the talks to the next level and could potentially come out with a peace treaty in 2009 or So both are signaling that it s the U.S. that needs to, at some point, engage if this is to be taken further. A peace treaty between Israel and Syria and what might follow we were mentioning Lebanon and so on, is certainly desirable from the U.S. perspective and its interests in the region. And I would say the U.S. should have and has more of an interest today after its involvement in Iraq and the Middle East. It has much more a national interest in Syrian-Israeli peace and in the peace process and other elements of the long-standing situation than it did in 96 or 2000, when these issues were sort of, somewhat remote, not as urgent as they are today. The U.S., today, is the largest Middle Eastern country in the sense it has the largest army there, the most it is the biggest player in the Middle East. It is no longer an outside player. Hence, its interest in addressing conflicts in the region are American interests as well as interests of other players in the region. The policies of the Bush administration, in some elements and aspects, might have been helpful to bring about this particular situation with Syria about. The policy of pushing Syria out of Lebanon, of isolating and pressuring Syria and the tribunal and all of that have helped, I think, push Syria more vigorously towards the peace option as one of its options, as I keep in mind that it has several options. But this pushing of Syria is has been, in a sense, helpful in that sense. It is also, I would say, strengthen the hand of certain groups in Syria or wouldn t exactly say factions, but factions with a small F of the regime who argue that this policy of constant, you know, obstructionism and so on really, Syria s paying too heavy a price. And part of that price is the pressure itself that the U.S. has brought to bear. So in a sense, that has been possibly useful. A new administration, in brief, I believe should develop a well thought out and integrated policy involving clear stick, carrot, and diplomacy. And each one is very important in its own right. I think this outgoing administration has had the stick, but not the carrot, and not the diplomacy. And they are three different things. The stick to maintain pressure and sanctions on Syria as long as Syria violates the things that might be violating Lebanese sovereignty, cross border arms smuggling, Iraqi sovereignty and so on and so forth. In other words, mediation need not affect and should not affect and should not be a bargaining process between Syria and the U.S. over other violations or other issues. And that is very important to keep that stick, keep those sanctions in place because they are part of the dynamic and calculation in Syria and for Syria as to why peace might be useful. So the stick would involve maintaining a strong position vis-à-vis Lebanon, of course, support for 1701, opposition to smuggling of arms, support for the Hariri Tribunal and moving forward with what has turned out to be a very sluggish tribunal and so on with regard to Iraq, maintain the position against insurgents crossing the border and so on. So the stick, which has been developed by the Bush administration, in many elements of it, needs to be kept in place for the immediate future and could be useful.

8 A carrot, however, has to be has to be produced. It s important to note what should not be part of the carrot and this is in the fears of many people. Lebanon should not be part of the carrot as it was to some degree in 1990 over the Kuwait War and so on. And that should be I think both candidates are quite clear about that but that should be maintained very clear in the tribunal and so all of that should not be part of any bargaining process. What should be part of the carrot the biggest part of the carrot is the Golan Heights themselves, which is the heart of this land-for-peace deal. So the Golan itself is the biggest part, eventually ending the political and economic isolation of Syria, tribunal aside whatever the tribunal produces should be respected and moved forward on. But that aside or that pending, if the peace process goes forward and if there s a peace treaty, one of the big parts of the carrot for Syria is ending the political and economic isolation. Politically, that means assurances or sense of the regime that its it has regime security for a considerable period of time. Economic isolation touches the Syrian social and economic problems that Syria is facing and will face. Things that are part of this carrot in terms of economics would be the EU association agreement, which has been on hold, WTO accession, foreign direct investment, which is washing around the region and so on. Sticks and carrots, however, don t function on their own of course. And the third element of this tripod is very intelligent, effective diplomacy, to try to get this very complex conflict dismantled gradually over the land-for-peace deal in a process that s going to take a lot of time, a lot of effort, a lot of intelligence and influence and proper management. This administration has not had a very strong diplomatic element or diplomatic arm. Diplomacy, definitely, is completely separate from weakness or strength. I think this administration s tried to equate diplomacy with weakness or diplomacy with appeasement or diplomacy with, you know, if you talk that means you re not hitting. That means you re weak. This is, historically, obviously not the case, should not be the case. Diplomacy simply means talking, sitting down with opponents, enemies, friends, and so on and trying to work out in a very complex conflict, elements that could lead to a resolution of that conflict. In practical terms, this means that there would need to be a very capable and very empowered envoy at a fairly high level with direct access to the next president and so on with the capacity to deal with, in the end, an extremely complex but an extremely potentially valuable and positive possibility. What would a deal look like? The outlines of a deal are fairly clear. They were pretty much negotiated and again in They relate to issues of security zones, land, water, the normalization process, and a timetable for doing that in terms of the bilateral issues. The sticking point in the past has been really, details of land borders, Lake Tiberius and the Jordan River, but I would say in the current situation, where major threats loom in Iran for the U.S. and Iraq and elsewhere, issue of 100 meters here, 100 meters there should not end a potentially very positive outcome. So the outlines of a deal in terms of bilateral issues over the Golan are not much of a guessing game but some details would still need to be worked out. What can be built on such a deal if the process if one, you have success in the Syria-Israeli track, obviously that, as I mentioned in the beginning, is a very important key to moving forward on the Lebanon track, which then impacts Hezbollah which then has other impact. It would change the environment of the Israeli-Palestinian talks and the Arab-Israeli relations and so on. So what

9 can be build on it is quite enormous, which would alter the landscape political landscape of the current Middle East in a major way. The issue of Hezbollah, which is a major sticking point is a complex one. And I won t maybe we can talk a bit more about it in the discussion because time is a bit running short but my quick reading of that is that Syria and it was pushed out of Lebanon in It, in a sense, accepted that pushing out. It withdrew fairly rapidly after the events of February. In 2005, there may have been some internal reasons for why the withdrawal was done so quickly. The events of May of this year quick reading of that, these events took place while Israeli-Syrian talks had been going on for about a year. I think they partly indicate a some distance between Syria and Iran and Lebanon some distance between Syria and Hezbollah. The dynamic there is I think Syria, as it approaches the possibility of serious talks with Israel, it knows that Israel and the United States would ask of Syria as one of the things, give us Hezbollah, deliver Hezbollah. Syria does not want to clash directly with Iran over Hezbollah. It does not maybe is not capable or doesn t want to pay that price of directly trying to dismantle or weaken Hezbollah and it knows that that is a very serious sticking point for Israel and the U.S. So I think it regards partially, its current situation of not physically being in Lebanon and the events of May in which Hezbollah took a lot of control in Lebanon itself as certain degrees of separation between it and Hezbollah so that if the peace talks advance the U.S. asks of Syria, deliver Hezbollah, the most Syria can say at that point is that well, we can close our border or we can stop delivering arms but sorry but we cannot deliver Hezbollah. You asked us to leave in 2005, you left, Hezbollah is very powerful in Lebanon. There s a president in Lebanon. Syria and Lebanon have diplomatic relations. That s what s being talked about now. I think that s a tactical move for Syria to distance itself from this very hard nut to crack, which is Hezbollah. However, I have little doubt that if there were peace between Syria and Israel and the very complex and serious conditions that would be placed on Syria to do that. And simply the dynamics of the Syria becoming a country with a peace treaty with Israel, with transformed relation with the U.S. would fundamentally change the strategic environment for Hezbollah. Hezbollah cannot sustain its current situation for many, many reasons if Syria shifts its policy. But Syria does not want to be in the position of having to deliver Hezbollah directly but a peace between Syria and Israel will fatally impact, in the medium term, Hezbollah and would force it to make difficult choices, either to negotiate itself with Lebanon peace with Israel or to embark on an adventure of maintaining its position without Syrian backing or support, which is not sustainable. Finally, relations with Iran, Syria will maintain relations with Iran. There s no doubt about that. I think it looks at Turkey as an example of a country with very strong relations with Iran, with Iraq, with Russia, with other countries, as well as with Europe, the United States, and Israel and that centrist position is something that I think is attractive to Syria. So Syria will definitely maintain its relations with Iran but that doesn t necessarily mean that it will maintain its backing of Hezbollah and other groups which in the end, it backed because it backs specifically, as proxy armies, to get something for itself. So I think by the nature of events, its relations with Iran will be impacted but will not be certainly suspended nor is that, I think, necessary. If the talks don t succeed, there are a couple of scenarios. The talks certainly shouldn t drag on forever but they will take considerable time 2009 or 2010 to be realistic if they re embarked upon

10 vigorously in the spring. If they succeed, well and fine. If they don t, one can imagine two scenarios as sort of negotiations that are going well and so on but don t actually succeed in coming out with a peace treaty but yet, have established relations between Syria, Israel, the U.S., and there s been talk about other issues, even though the treaty has not been achieved. That could be an avenue to managing, without peace, a very complex and dangerous status quo that we re in now. And hence, talks might be useful if property approached, to manage a very dangerous status quo and prevent Lebanon from sliding further, prevent another war from breaking out, and so on and so forth. Or the talks could end very negatively with great, you know, disappointment, disagreement and so on and could then trigger a downward spiral and perhaps lead to risk of further war. Otherwise, you know, the option between a peace treaty or not is very stark. Without land-forpeace deal on the Golan, there s no doubt that the proxy war between Syria and Israel, mainly through Lebanon, but also through the Palestinian territories and Iraq and so on. Without the Golan, proxy war will continue indefinitely, years, decades, there s no exit strategy for that. So I think the two options are very clear. I would close by saying the possibility of a deal is 10 percent, 15, or 20. It s not very likely. It s very complex, but the possibility is there and it s real and it s worth the next U.S. administration taking a very serious look at it while at the same time maintaining a strong stick, a credible carrot, and very vigorous and strong and aware diplomacy. Thanks. MS. OTTAWAY: Thank you, Paul. Daniel? DANIEL LEVY: Sure. I (audio break) so many people here at such an early breakfast meeting except in one respect, which as I always tell them at New America, we can t do 8:30 meetings, people won t come so now I have to be honest about the reason I don t want us to do 8:30 meetings. (Laughter.) I want to keep my comments brief and I was asked to respond to Paul so I m going to jump around in terms of my responses. I haven t prepared which is why I ve got all these papers right in front of me. I haven t prepared comments. I really wanted to feed off what Paul gave us and he gave us an awful lot. And to be honest, I would ve happy to listen to him for a lot longer. I guess I would start on the Israeli side and picking up on something that you said. I think one of the key differences looking at the Syrian track compared to the Palestinian track is there is far more of a consensus amongst Israeli security establishment of the Israeli interest in having a negotiating track with Syria. Now, does that translate into actually closing a deal with all the terms that a deal would entail? Not necessarily, but I think a concept became locked in, in the last years in Israel, which is we benefit in terms of creating a greater degree, at least, of stability and predictability on Israel s northern border by having a track with Syria. Israel is also has a track record in cutting state-to-state peace treaties. Egypt, obviously, which required the significant withdrawal and dismantling, Jordan, and in that respect, Israel feels that Syria is a something of a proven quantity. It s a quiet border, at least Israeli-Syrian, obviously not the Israeli-Lebanese since There s no greater historical weight to the Golan, the number of Israeli settlers on the Golan is minimal certainly when compared with the West Bank.

11 So there s a sense that this is doable. And as you mentioned, it s five Israeli prime minister, Bibi Netanyahu, when he was prime minister, had an envoy in talks with then President Hafez al- Assad. The sense to me, at least, is that this would be something that would not be an anathema to Netanyahu to pursue were he to be elected again and become Israeli prime minister again, Uzi Arad, who is who was Netanyahu s policy advisor in the Prime Minister s Office when Netanyahu was in office has participated in some track, too, with Syria. The efforts Abe Suleiman (ph) and Jeff Arenson (ph) with the Swiss recently initially, Uzi Arad was a part of that it s very likely, or at least it s not unlikely, very likely maybe it stretching it a bit it s not unlikely that you would still see some kind of a move towards Syria. Livni has not been eager with regard to the Olmert track with Syria. What we re hearing at the moment in questions that she s answered and even in today s Israeli media, is a sense that she would continue the Syria track. She was excluded from that track, essentially. This was run through the PM s office without the involvement of the foreign minister, which if you re the foreign minister, you re never that (laughter) enamored with as a situation. So I think the betting would be on Tzipi continuing this. The flip side to that, which you ll all be very familiar with, is it appears at least to be a rather hard sell to the Israeli public. The deal on Syria, the actual withdrawal from the Golan consistently polls as way less popular than the two-state territorial dimension of the deal with the Palestinians. Israelis carry around the Golan in their spatial cognitive map of what Israel is, of what constitutes Israel. Israelis go to the Golan Heights. Unlike the West Bank, Israelis will cross the green line without knowing it all the time. But if you say to the Israelis, ah, have you spent time in the West Bank recently, they Israelis don t go to many parts of East Jerusalem, don t go to unless you ve got family in settlements or something like that. The Golan is different. People carry around a spatial cognitive map of Israel which includes the Golan. The status quo is bearable. At least it s perceived to be bearable. Okay? The Lebanese border can occasionally heat up and I think one of the by-products of the Summer 2006 Lebanon War was a was that Israelis re-linked the absence of any process with Syria back into the broader question of the security and stability on their northern border. And to that extent, there was perceived, again, to be a price to pay for the fact that nothing s going on with Syria. But it s perceived to be very bearable. I would also argue maybe I ll come back to this again afterwards and here I might be disagreeing with something you said. There is, perhaps, less risk in terms of the fallout from collapse of Israeli-Syrian talks. I would argue at least that when the talks under Rabin collapsed, nothing dramatic happened. And the specific and the same largely happened in 2000, when the effort under Barak and Clinton well, remember, that was in the context of Barak having made a commitment to get out of Lebanon by the summer of He tried and we ll come back to that in a moment to do that in the context of a deal involving with Syria. When the deal didn t come off, the unilateral withdrawal took place. So that was a very specific context. But I think there s not perceived to be such a risk of collapse of a process with Syria. I would be less confident talking about the Syrian interest and I really would I think agree with pretty much everything that Paul said on that. I ll come back to it in a minute, but let me jump to the what I call the almost question and when we ve almost been there, apparently, under Rabin in

12 93, 94 and in the Barak talks. And I think the almost question is very much related to the role of the U.S. And so let me begin to talk about the role of the U.S. And I ll start within a way, what are your medium options for both sides, Paul the medium option for the Syrian side, the medium option for the Israeli side. You re having talks. There s a degree of calm. There s a degree of stability. Both sides are getting something out of the talks. I think that s where we are today. In a way, I think the current talks, given that they re structured and predicated on the absence of U.S. involvement, it may be a bit unfair but you could almost call the current talks garbage time. I think both sides appreciate that there will not be a deal, absent U.S. involvement. But both sides felt that there was enough to be gained from having a process, even if there were no immediate hope of closure because there s no hope of closure, as I ve said, without the U.S. involvement. I think for the Israelis, as I ve argued, especially post-summer of 2006, a consensus takes hold in the security establishment that it would be useful to have something going on with the Syrians because it can in some way meliorate the likelihood of more flash points with Lebanon and given the sense of what Israel was dealing with in Gaza, given the focus on Iran, there was a strong feeling that there would be benefits to be had by Israel in having such a process. And likewise, I think Syria felt that and I think especially now, felt that it would be sending a good signal to the international community, that Syria had something to gain from being in a process with Israel and I think you ve seen that born out. Israel s a great kosher certification, if Israel s talking to us, then who is anyone else not to be talking to the Syrians? That was particularly useful with the Europeans. Interestingly enough, less so with the U.S., but I think it was also sending a signal to the next administration. I think it was very clearly sending a signal to the next U.S. administration. We re in a process with the Israelis, why don t you guys get on board? It seems strange that you re not getting on board. So I think for both sides, there were benefits to be had. Money time is when the U.S. gets involved. The move from garbage time to money time is whether there is American engagement but crucially, what kind of American engagement? I would argue as follows: number one, America is indispensable in getting a deal done but I would also suggest that there s less exclusivity to the American role in the Israeli-Syria track than perhaps there is in the Palestinian track. I mean, I do think that you can you can tease out and involve other third parties to a far greater degree of productive, constructive influence on the Israeli-Syria track, whether those third parties be Turkey, the Europeans, other Arab partners, than you can on the Israeli-Palestinian track. You can t do it without the U.S., but I think when you begin to construct what Paul talked about in terms of a very sophisticated, deftly put together diplomatic effort, I think the way that you deploy other third parties on the Israel-Syria track could be very, very significant again, not possible without having the U.S. on board. The second thing I d say about the U.S. involvement is don t repeat the Geneva meeting of the spring of And I just received a copy of it yesterday; I haven t had a chance to read it yet. There were excerpts already published in the Israeli press in Hebrew over the summer of Martin Indyk s new book, Innocence Abroad, where Martin is really rather forthcoming in terms of what happened, as to why a deal wasn t closed. I ve read some of the excerpts so I don t want to misquote Martin, but Clinton went to that meeting with nothing and America shouldn t place itself

13 in that position. Barak essentially reneged the historical analysis that was a lot to do with the polling that he had seen. If you read the histories of what happened under Rabin and Christopher, there s a sense there, again, that Rabin gave this deposit. There was a sense there again that the American side did not make use of the deposit. So I think, while I m saying that there s a role for other third parties, I think the administration needs to get this right and you don t if you have a chance to go for closure, go for it, which I think is the lesson of the mid- 90s. And if you don t have the Israelis there for closure, don t put yourself in a position where I think it was essentially embarrassing what happened in Geneva in the spring of The thing that I toy with as I m listening to you, Paul, is how sustainable over the medium term is what you define as as the medium option for both countries. I would argue as follows. There are extremely compelling regional reasons for the Americans to get involved on the Israeli- Syrian track. But I think that if you re not moving fast on the bilateral Israeli-Syrian thing, on the capacity to close on the Golan deal and I think that s a very possible outcome and it would take time. Some of the front-loaded deliverables for keeping that process in the absence of closure come from America. In other words, I think that there are things that can be done on the U.S.-Syrian bilateral track that could help assuage either slow movement or even getting relatively stuck on the Israeli- Syria peace of this. So I think there s something that s sustainable over, maybe even the medium term, is an exaggeration. But there s something that s sustainable for a period of time if you ve got an Israeli-Syria process going, you re unsure whether you can get closure on it, but you ve movement on the American-Syria track. And given that I think one needs to bring Syria in, I think that would be highly useful. I want to just touch on that regional component because I would argue that, you know, I don t think there are going to be, and I think we should disavow ourselves of this notion that that Syria will give up front-deliverables on its relations with Iran or Hezbollah or Hamas. I see the outcome as that you get the most to gain if you actually get a deal or even perhaps if you get serious movement on the American-Syrian bilateral track. You have the most to gain, obviously, on the Hezbollah side of things, as you outlined, especially in how it influences Hezbollah s strategic environment. But more kind of practically speaking and on the ground, the real options of what goes through Syria that would perhaps no longer go through Syria finds its way to Hezbollah. On the Hamas track, I think this is, you know the demand pretends to be Syria has to kick out the headquarters of the rejectionist groups and there was even rumors that I think was spread by Syrian opposition a couple of weeks ago that Mashal had left Damascus and that you shut down relations with Iran. That s not going to happen, certainly not up front, certainly not as a precondition, and certainly I don t think if negotiations are just moving relatively slowly. I think what could happen is that you also influence with Hamas Hamas strategic way of looking at the region. I think if Mashal sees that Syria is moving into a different orbit, it changes Hamas calculation and I think that s one of the reasons why an effective Syria track could help change the strategic calculation on the Palestinian track given that I am an advocate of the need to bring Hamas into that. On I think you get even less on the Iran track. It s a very talking point to say we have to

14 move forward with Syria because then you pull Syria out of the Iran track the Iranian orbit and at least you ve isolated the Iranians more. I think you have to go a significant way down the road with Syria for that to even begin to come into play. But there s another element that hasn t been mentioned and I ll draw to a close by talking about that, which is Egypt, which hasn t been mentioned yet. And I would say the following about Egypt and this, I think, should factor very high in Israel and America s strategic calculations and ways of looking at the region. As we (inaudible) the biological reasons face a transition in Egypt and the possibility of instability in the wake of that transition in Egypt. I think there s a hugely important logic in trying to logic down stability with Syria, especially for Israel, but I think also for the United States in the region. And I would be thinking long and hard, less even, about the Iranian part of the strategic regional equation and a little more about why in the context of what I, at least, would argue, is a fair chance of a not totally smooth transition. You would want Syria to be in a very, very different place in terms of its relations with the U.S., in terms of its relations with Europe, and in terms of the strategic role it could play in the region. Two final comments one is another lesson from Egypt. I worry, I guess is the way I would phrase it, that the equation that you introduced here, Paul, which is if you do peace with Syria sorry, if you re an Arab state and you do peace with Israel, you get an immediate insurance policy on security from the Americans and lots of goodies that flow with that. I think you re seeing right now, in Congress with Egypt, that that doesn t automatically follow so much and I think the Syrians will be looking at that will be saying well, maybe one of the automatic obvious benefits isn t so obviously there. And that worries me even more because it s not so much easy to walk Congress back. I mean, it might be true that some of the sanctions have given additional leverage and brought Syria around for certain of the positions it s come around to. But those aren t switched off quite so easily or automatically, just because the administration says so or just because even the Israeli government says so. So I would I would just pose as a little problem. And the last thing I d say is one can create a degree of leverage, not use it in a timely fashion, and then lose that leverage. And I wonder whether we re approaching a space like that on the Syria track. I think if early in the next administration, you didn t see a different approach, than the added value of trying to get additional leverage, I think would be more than made up for by the Syrians beginning to think differently and beginning to respond differently to their willingness to have that leverage. You mentioned sitting out the Bush regime. I remember, just over a year ago, and you would speak to people and they d say, look, Syria will sit out Chirac because at the time, sitting out Chirac was as important for the Syrians as sitting out Bush. They said, we ll sit out Chirac and then we ll sit out Bush. We re about 100 days, plus/minus, of getting to both of those. I think that doesn t mean oh god, what a terrible what a terrible thing, they succeeded. I think to a large degree, it means we got it wrong, not necessarily we, the panelists, but the definers of international policy and there s a relative urgency in in rethinking this early in the next administration is what I d end with. MS. OTTAWAY: Thank you to both speakers. This is a difficult dilemma for the moderator because as you realize, we don t have much time for discussion. There was so much in

15 both presentations that I really did not want to interrupt. So let s try let s try to do the best we can with the time we have, then. You want to start? Q: I m Nathaniel (inaudible). I m vice president of the U.S. Institute for Peace and while I count myself among Marina s friends, I can t be counted among the Middle East stance by virtue and spending at the moment to (inaudible) in Damascus, studying Arabic, as I m a student at the university and I gathered a few things while I was there. And one of them hasn t been mentioned so I thought I would bring it up. You both treated the regime in Syria as a given. In fact, I ve found things shifting very quickly. And the big shift in regime that we re aware of is associated not with the political opposition, but the shifting basis for government finance in Syria. I mean speaking to this very rapid decline (inaudible) revenue. The government can t just clean off the oil revenue anymore and hope they have enough money to sustain itself. What it needs is to (inaudible) well aware of that, a great a sign that the civilization has appeared in the streets in Damascus. The vote, they now vote, illegally parked cars (inaudible) but for revenue reasons. And it seems to me that we have to (inaudible) about the question of the Syrian regime and how to deal with it, it s foreign investment that s on everybody s mind that Syria (inaudible). Businessmen, people close to the government, everybody is thinking peace with Israel will being gigantic quantities of money, it ll bring real economic growth, the government will be able to collect taxes to sustain the regime. And this in part a question for you, Marina. What is our proper attitude towards the Syrian regime in this situation and should we regard it as a kind of given or should be one more variable in this situation? MS. OTTAWAY: Let me take another couple of questions and yes? Q: Melissa Mayley (ph) with CNO Resources. Following up on that question, I d like to go back to a point that you made, Paul, in which you articulated that you saw a peace agreement as strengthening, securing the regime as a form of a insurance, so to speak. But in talking about the Syrian people, when you one of the discourses that you hear a lot is the oppressive tactics of the regime and the whole structure that the regime controls the country and the national security laws, emergency laws and all of that. The justification for that type of government will presumably be lifted or at least questioned in a post-peace environment. And so drawing on the economics, would the economics be enough of a driver to fix that or would it indeed be something that will be pushing that government, very much what we saw with perestroika and all of that in Russia? Thank you. MS. OTTAWAY: Any more yes? Q: Hi (inaudible) just following up a little bit on this but focusing more on the tribunal issue. I wondered if you could elaborate on how that plays internally in Syria and how much of a need for the regime for internal and external reasons to have that as part of the deal or whether, as I think you suggested, the tribunal issue can be just allowed to go on and whatever ends up ends up