CHAPTER-III. Pakistan Resolution-1940

Transcription

1 CHAPTER-III Pakistan Resolution-1940

2 CHAPTER-III PAKISTAN RESOLUTION-1940 Jinnah was provided with substantial propaganda material by certain circumstances between 1939 and 1940 for the consolidation of Muslim League which led to the passing of Pakistan Resolution by the All India Muslim League at its Lahore annual session. The changing attitude of the Muslim League towards the constitutional issues between 1938 and 1940 provides interesting study, the League's policy underwent a radical change regarding the provinces as well as the centre in the light of Muslim experience of the provincial autonomy-particularly in the Congress ruled provinces. Moreover, the exigencies of the British policy to have an ally to counter the Congress Movement during the War period become encouraging and morale-boosting factor for the Muslim League which was exploited by Jinnah in a masterly manner. Thus, Muslim politics in India had decidedly taken a new and significant turn by the beginning of The departure from the pre-1937 policy was clear. The Muslims no longer wanted an Indian federation. Federation would not do at all. The greater the Congress laid emphasis on a strong centre the greater grew the 152

3 i 153 Muslim revulsion to any centre. The more the Congress emphasized the principle of majority rule, the more the Muslims talked of Muslim self-determination. As Congress travelled towards the idea of a united India so did the League turned towards "Muslim independence". The political unity of India, which had been taken for granted by the Muslim League before 1937, was no longer looked upon as an axiom. The Indian political situation had undergone a fundamental change. Never again was it to be the same. Nehru termed Jinnah's call for unity amongst Muslims and his plans to reorganize his community as a 'fascist development' and 'an attempt to consolidate vested interests by a group of privileged people'. However, the Madras Mail commented differently, 'To ignore the portent of Mr. Jinnah's call is a challenge to all, the Government, the majority community and all 2 thinking men who wish India well'. The installation of Congress ministries in various provinces and the exclusion of the Muslim League made the Muslims generally bitter as we have already discussed in the previous chapter. It 'marked the beginning of a reaction among i 1. Leader, October 20, Madras Mail, quoted in Star of India, October 20,1937.

4 154 the bulk of politically minded Muslims against the idea of a "Congress Majority" which was presently to make the League a more powerful force throughout Muslim India than 3 it had ever been before'. The exposition by the Muslim League of the weaknesses of the Congress rule through such reports as the 'Pirpur Report' and the 'Shareef Report' further strengthened the League's hold on the Muslims. These reports, though by no means objective and neutral, left a lasting impression on the Muslim mind of the'injustices' of the Congress. According to Humayun Kabir, 'The ground may have been imaginery but the 4 discontent was real'. Even the Jamiat-ul-ulema-i-Hind, in view of this general dissatisfaction, asked the Congress to appoint a committee to investigate the complaints. It particularly objected to certain features of the Wardha Scheme. The Jamiat warned the Congress that a civil disobedience movement would be 5 started if the entire scheme were enforced. The fear that the Muslims would remain a permanent minority subject to a majority rule was confirmed. The 'Pirpur Report' explained this with added emphasis. The parliamentary system said the 'Shareef 3. R.Coupland, Report on the Constitutional Problem in India, Part ii, Indian Politics, (1943), p.ll2. 4. Humayun Kabir, Muslim Politics , p The Times of India, March 7, 1939.

5 155 Report' as practiced in the provinces had proved to be worse than the system already in vogue before the introduction of provincial autonomy. In coming years, the League's approach to the constitutional issue underwent a change. Weightages in the legislatures and the safeguards provided by the constitution were no longer regarded as meaningful or adequate. In reply to the above 'Reports' the Congress suggested an inquiry into the charges by a federal judge, which Jinnah refused. An impartial inquiry perhaps would have deprived the allegations of their propaganda value for the League. Instead he asked for a Royal Commission to investigate the charges, knowing that the Congress would not agree, as it would have implied acquiescence in British interventions in Indian affairs.^ The Viceroy saw little substance in Jinnah's charges, but, as he has commented earlier, 'the existence of the atmosphere is the thing that matters and the thing to which we have to give weight in formulating our policy and reaching our Q conclusions'. British officials maintained a deliberate silence about their opinion of the League's exaggerated 6. Pioneer, March 28, Bombay Chronicle, 16 December, Linlithgow to Zetland, 28 November, 1939, Linlithgow Collection.

6 156 charges against Congress ministries. By repeating his demand for an inquiry, Jinnah, with some help from the British, kept alive 'Muslim sufferings' under Congress rule. Moreover, Jinnah did not want a settlement with Congress. When Linlithgow asked him if he would be able to settle with Congress if the British assured him that the constitutional departure would be made without the approval of the League, he replied, "But what have you to lose if no agreement is 9 reached". And so the political impasse continued. So long as the Congress and League remained divided, the Viceroy could mark time and wait until the pieces on the political 10 chess-board had taken their place. The political stalemate was also worrying. His platform of blank negation was wearing out. In Bengal, Huq was engaged in one of his intermittent flirtations with the 11 Congress; and in the NWFP, the possibility of an 12 intercommunal ministry appeared imminent. Muslim Leaguers 13 themselves were urging Jinnah to define the party's goals; 14 some.. even suggested a Congress-League pact. There was, 9. Linlithgow to Zetland, 16 January 1940; Ibid. 10. R.J.Moore, Churchill Cripps and India, (0xford, 1979), p Herbert to Linlithgow, 2/3 January and 6 February 1940, Linlithgow Collection!. 12. Entry for 13 February,1940, Cunninham Diaries,Cunningham Collections, Quoted in Singh A.I. Origins of the Partition of India National Herald,20, February, Ibid., 26 February, 1940.

7 157 then, not much sign of a solid Muslim political front in the early months of Even Linlithgow was.tired of Jinnah's tactics and had advised him to formulate and forward "Constructive proposals"'*''* for a political settlement which on the other, hand helped to counteract the Congress's demand for independence and a constituent assembly to frame a constitution for India. Against this background, on 23 March, 1940, the Muslim League passed its historic 'Pakistan' resolution at Lahore. Before we discuss the essence of the 'Pakistan' resolution and its analysis, it will be useful to trace the genesis of idea of Pakistan at length. From the foundation of All India Muslim League in 1906 to the passage of the "Pakistan" Resolution at its annual session at Lahore in 1940 there does not appear to be anything inevitable about the partition of India. Prior to 1939 the demand for the partition of the country on a communal basis had never been seriously considered. The Muslim delegation to the Joint Select-Committee in 1934 said that 'Pakistan' was a 'students' Chimera which 16 no responsible person or organization had put forward. 15. Linlithgow to Zetland, 16 January 1940 telegram quoted in Rizvi, G. Linlithgow and India, p See Joint Select Committee on Indian Constitutional Reforms, Minutes of Evidence (1934), TT] 1496 cited in Ibid, p.89.

8 158 Sir Samuel Hoare also testified to the same effect; 'The idea of Pakistan had not yet passed beyond the romantic mind of a Muslim poet, and the very name, Pakistan was 17 practically unknown'. It has been erroneously claimed that the idea of 'Pakistan' was put forward for the first time by Sir Muhammad Iqbal, though his contemplations inspired the future generation to think about the idea. He did not contemplate a separate sovereign Muslim state but merely the consolidation of the Muslim majority provinces in northwest India in one political unit of an all-india federation. His proposal distinctly contemplated a common 1 ft centre for the whole of India. Iqbal personally denied 19 that he was the originator of the idea of Pakistan. Even Jinnah as late as May 1939 had not' committed himself to 20 'Pakistan'. One more thing, Linlithgow strove to implement the federal section of the 1935 Act: the establishment of all-india federation might have placed Indian unity on a secure foundation. Yet it is ironical that it was during the viceroyalty of Linlithgow that the demand for Pakistan 17. Viscount Templewood, Nine Troubled Years (London 1954), p See M.Gwyer and A.Appadorai, Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution (London, 1957),ii, pp Edward Thompson, Enlist India for Freedom (London, 1940), p C.Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan (Lahore 1961), p.211.

9 had its start and early development. In order to offset Congress hostility during the war, Linlithgow encouraged the Muslim League to adopt an intransigent attitude towards the Congress. Such an attitude was natural enough in the circumstances. But Linlithgow's war-time policy at times went beyond a mere encouragement of opposition to the Congress: caught in the web of his anti-congress manoeuverings, Linlithgow at crucial junctures provided certain amount of direct support to those within the Muslim League who were pressing for a separate Muslim 22 state. The idea of Pakistan or any sort of partition, was far from its imagination when the All-India Muslim League was founded in Yet it was a coincidence of history that All India Muslim League was founded at a time when the agitation against the partition of Bengal province was at its peak. The partition was enforced on 16 October 1905 and the Muslims of the province welcomed it. In September 1908, the Muslim League, which had been formed in 1906 to safeguard the interests of the Muslims, passed a resolution which viewed the anti-partition agitation with great anxiety and hoped that the Government 21. C.H.Philips and M.D.Wainwright (eds.), The Partition of India: Politics and Perspectives (London, 1970), p7i G.Rizvi, Linlithgow and India, p.89.

10 160 would adhere to this "settled fact" which had"relieved the Muslims of Eastern Bengal from the disabilities which they 23 suffered". Though Muslims and Muslim League supported the partition of Bengal but it did not mean that they were thinking of the creation of separate independent Muslim state at that time. The politics of separation lay in the very logic of British colonial rule. The establishment of British rule in India brought the end of medieval system of administration and politics in India in which Muslims had a upper hand. In 1858 the Crown took over the Indian affairs under its direct rule. After this began the introduction of representative bodies or institutions in Indian administration and politics which meant the majority rule. It was here for the first time the Muslims afraid of their minority position in India, began to demand for safeguards of Muslim interests emerged. This was the reason that the demand for "safeguard" of minorities dominated the every constitutional reforms right from the Morley-Minto Reforms to the partition of India in In search of a suitable scheme for the protection and safeguards of interests of minorities (Muslims)the idea of Pakistan or partition of the country originated. During this process various schemes were suggested and forwarded by number of Muslim leaders, scholars and students. 23. The Times, 7 September 1908.

11 161 The most important and classical of such schemes was the theory of "two nations" for asserting that Muslims were a nation. As a community, they were consigned to being a perpetual minority in an united India. No juggling of the political arithmetic could prevent safe provincial Muslim majorities from being turned into an inefficient minority at the strong centre. As a nation they were entitled to equal status, irrespective of their numbers, since the family of nations contains the big and the small. This was a large step and a bold assertion. There had been talk along similar lines for at least half a century. Syed Ahmad Khan spoke of 'two nations' in the eighteen-eightees, when he urged the Muslims to dissociate themselves from the Indian National Congress, and asked the British to give them recognition in terms of their political importance, not their numbers. Of course this early hint of Muslim 'separatism' needs to be set into the context of north India in the late-nineteenth century: the particular interests of its Muslim elite, their response to the categories the Raj employed, and the opportunities of exploiting its patronage and favour. Later developments robbed this notion of its political utility Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman, (Cambridge), p.52.

12 162 Though Syed Ahmad Khan spoke of 'two nations' in the eighteen eightees, the "two nation" theory gained popularity in 1930s. The leaders of Muslim League adopted this theory as their principal aim. It had been voiced as early as 1930 by Sir Muhammad Iqbal in his presidential address at the Lucknow session of the Muslim Leage. "I would like" said he, "to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a / single state. Self Government within the British Empire, or without the British Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim State appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims of at least of 25 North-West India". Iqbal, however, did not altogether contemplate the cessation of Muslim provinces from Indian polity. Perhaps the credit of being the first person to propagate a scheme of partition of India goes to Rehmat Ali. He wanted the establishment of an "independent and separate" state composed of five Muslim Provinces in the North, namely, Punjab, North West Frontier Province, Kashmir, Sind and Baluchistan. To this contempleted state he gave the name of Pakistan and started "the Pakistan National Movement" in 1933.^ 25. Cited in Lai Bahadur, The Muslim League, p Refer B.R.Ambedkar, Pakistan or the Partition of India, p.5.

13 163 The idea of "two nations", however, was not popular in League circles in In 1937 Iqbal began to support Partition. "To my mind", he wrote to Jinrtah on June 21, 1937, "the new constitution with its idea of a single federation is completely hopeless. A separate Federation of Muslim Provinces... is the only course by which we can secure a peaceful India and save Muslims from the domination of non-muslims". Within less than three years Jinnah became an enthusiastic supporter of the"two Nation Theory" and under his dynamic leadership Pakistan became the cherished goal of Muslim League. Jinnah spoke of the "two Nation Theory"1 for the first time in January 1940 through an English Journal. On March 6, 1940, addressing the Aligarh Muslim University Union, be categorically declared that: "One thing is now obvious that we are by no means a minority but a soild and distinct nation 29 by ourselves with a destiny of our own" In his presidential speech at the annual session of League held at Lahore, he further eleborated the Two Nations Theory. He said: "Islam and Hinduism... are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact, different and distinct social orders, and it is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common 27. Cited in Lai Bahadur, Op.cit., p Time and Tide, London, Jan. 19, 1940 referred in P.D. Kaushik, The Congress Ideology and Programme , Delhi TT9F4TT Jamala-ud-din Ahmed (Ed.) Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, Vol.l, p.138.

14 164 nationality... The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, literatures. They neither intermarry nor interdine together and indeed, they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their aspects on' life and of life are different. It is quiet clear that Hindus and Mussalmans derive their inspiration from different source of history. They have different epics different heroes, and different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a foe of the other and, likewise, their victories and defeat overlap. To yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a state".^ Thus Jinnah maintained that the Hindus and Muslims were two different nations - the Hindus being the majority nation and the Muslims being the minority nation. The majority nation, namely Hindus, were out to establish a Hindu Raj in India and destroy the separate Muslim culture. The western parliamentary democracy was unsuited to India because being based on the majority principle, it would have inevitably meant the rule of the major nation. 30. Pirzada, S.S.(ed.) Foundations of Pakistan, Documents A.I.M.L.pp.337,338.

15 165 Therefore, in order to protect the interests of the Muslim Nation, it was necessary that India be partitioned and a 31 separate state of Muslim majority provinces be created. Inspired by Jinnah's rhetoric, the League adopted the famous 'Pakistan Resolution'. In claiming separate nationhood for Muslims the League leaders emphasised those characteristics which marked off the Muslims from the Hindus and at the same time united the Muslims. Indian Muslims, wrote Professors Hassan and Qadri, "have a distinct national entity wholly different from the Hindus and other non-muslim groups. Indeed they are more different from the Hindus than the 32 Sudetan Germans from the Czechs" Dr. KaziSaid-ud-din Ahmad maintained that, "there is no such thing as an 33 Indian Nation just as there is no European Nation". He emphasised the differences between Hindus and Muslims further, "they possess different faiths...while idol worship is prohibited in the one, it is the basis of prayer in the other; while the Mussalmans worship only one God, the Hindu have many of them. With the division of divinity, the whole social and moral structure is clearly demarcated. The forms of prayers and rituals and the o / places of pilgrimage are different". He not only 31. Jamil-ud-din Ahmad, (ed.) op.cit., pp , Cited in Rajendra Prasad, India Divided, p Cited in Lai Bahadur, The Muslim League, p Cited in ibid, p.278.

16 166 emphasized the differences between Hindus and Muslims but also denied the geographical unity of India. He argued that India could be divided into four clearly demarcated geographical areas, namely, Western region consisting of the Indus Basin. Eastern region consisting of the Gangetic Delta, Northern region of the upper Gangetic Basin and the Deccan. He pleaded for the partition of India on the ground of the absence of geographical 35 unity. The protagonists of Pakistan found a powerful ally in Dr.B.R.Ambedkar, the leader of the depressed classes 3 6 who described Muslims as "A nation calling for a home". He confessed that there were numerous bonds between Hindus and Muslims but was of opinion that these bonds had failed to create that feeling of 'oneness' among them which is the essence of nationalism. "As a matter of historical experience", he maintained, "neither race, nor language, nor country has sufficed to mould a people into a 37 nation". Approvingly quoting Renan's definition of nation, i.e. "A nation is a living soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which in truth are but one, constitute this soul, this spiritual principle. One is the past, the other is the present. One is the common possession of a rich heritage of memories; the other is 35. Refer in Ibid, pp B.R.Ambedkar, Pakistan, p.ll. 37. Refer, Ibid, pp

17 167 the actual consent, the desire to live together, the will to preserve worthily the undivided inheritance which has been handed down", he maintained that Hindus and Muslims had no common historical antecedents and no will to have a common life in the present. Both in religious and political fields, he thinks, the past of Hindus and Muslims had been a past of mutual destruction and the political and religious antagonisms divide the Hindus and Muslims for more deeply than the so-called common things are able bind them together. "In the absence of common historical antecedants", he maintains, "the Hindu view that Hindus and Musalmans form one nation falls to ground. To maintain it is to keep up a hallucination. There is no such longing between the Hindus and the Mussalmans to belong together as there is among the Mussalmans of India".39 Ambedkar not only refuted the assertion that India was one nation, he also supported the counter assertion that Muslims were a nation. He acknowledged that till 1937 Muslims were quite content to call themselves a community, but maintained that it did not prejudice their case of separate nationhoodhe 38. Refer in Ibid, p Ibid., p Refer, Ibid, pp.14-20,

18 168 differentiated between nationality and nationalism. "Nationality", he wrote, "means Consciousness of kind, awareness of the existence of that tie of kinship'. Nationalism means 'the desire for a separate national existence for those who are bound by this tie of kinship". He observed that there could be no nationalism without the feeling of nationality being in existence, but the feeling of nationality could be present without feeling of nationalism being in existence. The feeling of nationality could flame into nationalism only when two conditions were present: first, a will to live as a nation and second, a territory which nationalism could occupy and make it a state, as well as a cultural home of the nation. "The Muslims", he concluded, "have developed a 'will to live as a nation'. For them nature has found a territory which they can occupy and make it a state as well as 41 cultural home for the new-born Muslim nation". like a good Vakil he pleads: "...if the Mussalmans are bent on having Pakistan, then it must be conceded to them". A- 2 The wo Nation theory also received support from an unexpected quarter, namely, the Hindu Communalists. They laid stress on the historical antagonism between Hindus and Muslims and exhorted the Hindus to take revenge 41. Ibid., p Ibid., p.360.

19 169 upon Muslims. Indeed in a way they were the first to give allegiance to the Two Nation theory in twentieth century. Jinnah, the President of the Muslim League, enunciated the theory in 1940, but V.D.Savarkar, the then President of Hindu Mahasabha had voiced it as early as "India", said he in his Presidential Address at Ahmedabad session of Hindu Mahasabha, "cannot be assured today to be a Unitarian and homogeneous nation, but on the contrary there are two nations in the main, the Hindus and the Muslims in India".^ The Two Nation theory was strongly contested by almost whole of the Nationalist India. Not only the nationalist Hindus and non-hindus but also many a foreign observers as well as a number of Muslims rejected the theory. Mahatma Gandhi, the father of Indian nation, believed that India was one nation because all the Indians, Hindus, as well as Muslims belonged to the same race. "Change of religion", he opined 'could never change 44 nationality'. Dr.Rajender Prasad, in his monumental work "India Divided", has shown that the factors of unity between Hindus and Muslims were much more potential that the factors of disunity. In the religious field Muslim mysticism derived its inspiration from Hindu sources. Many 43. Cited in K.R.Bombwall, Indian Politics and Government p Harijan, June 22, 1947.

20 170 Muslims, e.g., Rahim, Raskhan etc. workshipped Hindu gods. Many Hindus have great reverence for Muslim Pirs and many 45 Muslims pay homage to Hindu saints. In the social field, there are many customs regarding birth, marriage etc. which are common to both Hindus and Muslims. Hindus, have been greatly influenced by Muslim custom of 'purdah' while Muslims have borrowed caste system from Hindus.^ Besides "certain attributes'^ remarks Rajendra Prasad, "which are generally supposed to attach to a nation do not apply to Muslims alone as such and are shared in common by Muslims and non-muslims, of particular areas of India. Thus, in the matter of langauge the Punjabi Hindu, the Punjabi Muslim and the Punjabi Sikh speak the same language irrespective of their religions. So do all the Pathans, whether Muslims or Hindus, of the North Western Frontier Province speak Pushto. alike. And so do all Bengalis, whether Hindu or Muslim, speak same language, Bengali. In all these areas they occupy the same land. In all these places they have lived under the same Government with the rest of British India during the British period for over one hundred years at least - even if we leave out / 7 the long period of Muslim rule". Geographically India 45. Refer, Rajendra Prasad, India Divided, pp _ Ibid., p Ibid., p.215.

21 171 is impressively demarcated as one unit by mountains and 48 sea. Thus according to Dr.Rajendra Prasad Hindus and Muslims have many common religious ideas, common social customs, common languages and common economic interests. They live in a common land and 49 Hence India is one and a single nation. have a common history. Sir Setalwad, a liberal leader, refuted the argument that Hindus and Muslims were different nations because they did not intermarry and interdine. "Why, among the Hindus", he said, "there are numerous different castes and they do not dine together and intermarry". M.N.Dalai, a Parsi scholar, maintained that, "there is everything in common between the people of India calling themselves followers of different religions, and nothing but an artificial canker of jealousy and distrust 51 to divide them". H.N.Brailsford, an English observer, was of opinion that, "the immense mass of Muslims was originally Hindu by blood and culture. In the villages it retains much of its traditional outlook, its folklore and even traces of castes. This old world rural population had 48. Ibid., pp Ibid., p Cited in A.R.Desai, Social Background of India Nationism, p M.N.Dalai, Whither Minorities? p.51.

22 172 long age reached a fairly happy modus vivendi between the two creeds". Among the non-congress Muslims, Khan Bahadur Allah Bux, the then President of Azad Muslim Conference and Prime Minister of Sind, criticized Jinnah's cry for Pakistan as "grotesque" and maintained that it was "about the most indiscre t approach to a serious problem and as such has torpedoed the very basis of reasonable 53 settlement". Gulam Hussain criticized the partition scheme on financial and other grounds and emphasised the indissoluble attachment, to one's birth place.afzal Haq the Ahrar leader, maintained that India was one nation though because of Hindu Muslim antagonism it had become, 55 "a nation at war with itself". Among other authorities on the issue Prof. A.R. Desai has maintained that Muslims were a socio-religious group and not a nation because "they did not speak the same language, occupied no definite territory, and lived no common economic life".'^ Similarly Mrs. Amiya Chatterji is of opinion that "the differences between the Hindus and Muslims were not much more glaring than the 52. H.N.Brailsford, Subject India, p The Indian review, May 1940, p Ibid., p J.F.Kotewal, The Indian Charter, pp A.R.Desai, Social Background of Indian Natioalism,p.360.

23 173 differences among the Muslims themselves"she maintained that no other generally accepted criteria of nationalism, except religion, distinguished the Muslim Indians from non-muslim Indians. But religion could not be the real basis of nationalism, because if it was so then all the Muslims of the world should constitute a single nation and live in a single state. But it is not the case, "Indeed", she concludes, "the Muslims could not logically demand a separate state solely because they belonged to the same religion. There were other far stronger ties of union with the Hindus like common habitation, common manners and customs, common language, 58 common government, etc". Thus much has been said both for and against the Two Nation Theory. The fact is that the points of both unity as well as disunity between the Hindus and Muslims are numerous. Emphasise the points of difference as Muslim League did and Hindus and Muslims will be two separate nations. Before the All India Muslim League passed its historic "Pakistan" Resolution in March, 1940, the establishment of a separate Muslim state or states in this 57. Amiya Chaterji Constitutional Development of India, , p Ibid., p.54.

24 174 subcontinent had been advocated by some public figures. What follows in this section is rapid survey of the contributions or these harbingers of Pakistan. The concentration of Muslim majorities in the north-west and north-east of the subcontinent could not remain unnoticed by Muslim political thinkers. Saiyid Jamaluddin A1-Afghani, the famous worker in the cause of world Islamic unity, first thought of the possibility of a Muslim Republic embracing the present Central Asian Socialist Republics, Afghanistan and the Muslim majority 59 areas in the north-west of the sub-continent. It is claimed by Chaudhary Rahmat Ali that as early as 1915 he said in an address to Bazm-i-Shibli that "North of India is Muslim and we shall keep it Muslim. Not only that. We will make it a Muslim state. But this we can do only if and when we and our North cease to be Indian. For that is a pre-requisite to it. So sooner we shed "Indianism", the better for us and for Islam". Soon after in 1917 Dr.Abdul Jabbar Kheiri and Professor Abdus Sattar Kheiri, popularly known as Kheiri Brothers, suggested a plan of the partition of India in the Stockholm Conference of the Socialist International Cited in K.K.Aziz., The Partition of India and Emergenence of Pakistan, p Cited in Ibid., pp S.S.Pirzada, Evolution of Pakistan (Lahore 1963),pp

25 175 In 1928 Aga Khan III advocated independence for each province at the Calcutta meeting of the All Parties 62 Convention. Sir Muhammad Iqbal' is generally credited with initiating the idea of separation. As has been mentioned, there were people before him who advocated partition, but Iqbal was the first important public figure to propound the idea from the platform of the Muslim League. In his presidential address to the League's annual session at Allahabad in 1930, he discussed the problem of India at length. Some writers have taken Iqbal to mean that he wanted only a consolidated Muslim unit within the Confederation of India, but "this is incorrect" according to Dr.K.K.AziX He argued, "If that were so, he would not have mentioned 'self-government within the British empire or without it'. A resolution of the All Parties Muslim Conference was, in his view, a demand for the autonomy of Islam within a free India. That is the reason why he prefaced his remark by saying that 'personally he would like to go even further' which could mean only 6 2 independence". In the Third Round Table Conference 62. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, The History of the Indian National Congress, Vol.l, p K.K.Aziz, The Partition of India and the Emergence of Pakistan, p~

26 176 Iqbal pleaded that there should be no central government in the subcontinent and that the provinces should be autonomous and independent dominions. 64 Iqbal did not give a name to his projected Muslim state. That was the work of Rahmat Ali, to whom we now turn again. In January 1933, Chaudhary Rahmat Ali and his three colleagues at Cambridge, issued a pamphlet entitled Now or Never, in which the idea of Partition was reiterated. They wanted a separate Muslim State in India i.e. Pakistan, comprising the Panjab, the North Western Frontier Province, Kashmir, Sind and Baluchistan. They opposed the federal constitution then on the anvil and said that Muslim delegates to the -Round Table Conference could not speak for their community. "India is not the name of one single country, nor the home of one single nation. It is, in fact, the designation of a state created for the first time in history by the British". Regarding Hindu-Muslim differences, they stated, "we do not interdine, we do not inter-marry. Our national customs and calenders, even our diet and dress are different". The Muslims "demand the recognition of a seperate national status... There can be no peace, and tranquility in this land if we, the Muslims, are duped into a Hindu-dominated Federation where we cannot be the masters of our own destiny and captains of our souls". 64. B.R.Ambedkar, Thoughts on Pakistan (Bombay 1941), p C.Rahmat Ali, Now or Never, (Cambridge: January 1933), cited in K.K.Aziz, op.cit., p.119.

27 177 Simultaneously Rahmat Ali founded the Pakistan National Movement aimed at translating his ideas into achievement. A good elaboration of his ideas is to be found in his statement in the Supreme Council of the Pakistan National Movement in In it he underlined the menace of what he called 'Indianism'. It had corrupted Islam spiritually and morally. It had depressed the Muslims, politically and economically. It had deprived the Muslims of national sovereignty and reduced them to "minority community". The 'Millat' of the Muslims should have nothing to do with India. North-west of India should make up the nation-state of Pakistan. But that was not enough. Muslims living in other parts of India should also be set free. Bengal and Assam should form another Muslim State of Bang-i-Islam. The Nizam's dominion in Hyderabad must be another state named,tsmanistan. These three states should that form a triple ii- 66 alliance. Dr. Sayyid Abdul Latif of Hyderabad also believed that India was not a nation, but he thought, unlike others, that partition was not a desirable solution. In two books he expressed his own ideas on the political future of India. He divided India into four cultural zones for the Muslims, eleven for the Hindus. The 66. C.Rahmat Ali, cited in Ibid, p.120.

28 178 Muslim zones were: North Wrest Block, consisting of Sind, Baluchistan, the Panjab, N.W.F.P. and the states of Khairpur and Bahawalpur; North East Block, comprising Eastern Bengal and Assam; Delhi-Lucknow Block; and the Deccan Block. The Indian states scattered all over India were to be distributed among the diffe.rent zones in accordance with their natural affinities. Each zone "will form a homogeneous state with a highly decentralized form of government within... but fitting along with similar fi 7 states into an all India federation". Sir Abdullah Haroon, a Muslim League leader of Sind, presented his own proposals in the autumn of In a foreword that he wrote for Latif The Muslim Problem in India, he suggested the division of India into two separate federations, "each reflecting the strength of one of the two major communities". The Muslim federation would consist of North-West Indian provinces and Kashmir. He was silent on the future of Bengal and Assam. Q In 1939, Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan proposed a scheme to end the political impasse. According to his scheme, which was in the form of a pamphlet entitled 'The Outlines of a Scheme of Indian Federation*, an Indian 67. Sayyid Abdul Latif, The Cultural Freedom of India (Bombay:1938), The Muslim Problem in India, (Bombay 1939), refer in Ibid, p.!2qt 68. Sayyid Abdul Lalif, The Muslim Problem in India, pp.v-vii.

29 179 Federation was to be divided into seven zones with separate legislatures. These would then constitute the Federal Assembly of 375 members, one-third of whom would 69 be Muslims. Sikandar Hayat's Scheme enjoyed wide publicity; but received more criticism than applause. It was not appreciated by the Congress because it did not advocate any clear plan for independence. The Hindus did not like it because, to them, it seemed a round about way of securing Pakistan. The Muslim League did not welcome it, because it did not offer a feasible solution of the communal problem.^ All such schemes, despite their differences, testified to the growth of Muslim separatism in the subcontinent. The antagonistic attitude of the Congress Ministries towards the League and their efforts to monopolize Indian politics further strengthened the cause of Muslim League. Thus, when the Lahore Session of the League took place in March 1940, it was felt that Muslim Political ideas had matured into a dynamic movement to be reckoned with. 69. Iftikhar Haider Political Biography, l ';.. Malik, Sikandar Hayat Khas-A (Islamabad, 1985 f, pp.96, 70. Ibid, p.96.

30 180 The substance of the constitutional reforms, announced by the British Government was one of the most important and crucial factor which led to the passing of Pakistan Resolution at Lahore in The First World War ( ) had shaken the belief in the stability and permanence of the British Raj, and vague expectations of impending changes had encouraged the latent forces of disorder. The demand for constitutional reform was voiced not only by the Indians. Many British, too, were sympathetic to the aspirations of Indian nationalists. The Loyal support which marry Indians had given during the war demanded some friendly response, and a war in defence of freedom and democracy could hardly be reconciled with Britains autocratic rule in India. Already in 1909, despite the protestations of their sponsors, the introduction of the Morley-Minto reforms had sown the seeds of parliamentary institutions in India. Further advance towards self-government was called for. Accordingly in August 1917 it was declared that the aim of British Policy in India was 'the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to progressive realization of responsible government in India as an 71 integral part of the British Empire'. 71. Cmd (1918). Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms. cited in G.Rizvi, Linlithgow and India, pp.5-6.

31 181 In contrast to the earlier practice in the case of the older dominions, the British Government had decided to make an explicit declaration of its intentions in India, in order to allay the nationalist misgivings about the ultimate objective of British rule in India. It was the beginning of a policy which Britain may claim to have followed (despite the 'Rowlatt' back-sliding) upto the eventual transfer of power.' Prior to the declaration of August 1917, it had not entered into the calculations of many British officials that the creation of a self-governing India would necessarily mean the cessation of British sovereignty in India. The position, however, was altered with Montagu's declaration in which for the first time official recognition was given to responsible government in India as the goal of British policy. With recognition thus given to the impermanence of British rule, it gradually became clear that Britain would have nothing to gain, at least in the long run, if she attempted to prevent those nationalistic aspirations from being adopted by the whole population. In order to make the task of withdrawal easier, the natural policy for the British would seem to sustain unity and not encourage disunity. Two years after Montagu's declaration the Government of India Act of 1919 remodelled the central

32 182 legislature, giving greater weight to the principles of election and representation. The 1919 Act provided that its working would be reviewed after ten years. The appointment of a statutory commission was therefore not due until But the conservative government advanced the date to forestall the possible appointment of a comission by a Labour 72 Government after the 1929 election. The announcement of the commissions exclusively British membership evoked protests from almost all the political parties in India. Since the commission was to be drawn from the British Parliament, Indians could technically not be included. Nevertheless, as a protest, all the major Indian parties agreed to draft their own constitution for India. A committee was appointed under the Chairmanship of Motilal Nehru which submitted its report in August It was a genuine attempt to reach the greatest measure of agrerment on the political issues and at the same time face the Hindu-Muslim problem squarely. The appointment of an all-british commission proved to be a tactical error. Lord Irwin, the Viceroy, realized the necessity of making some gesture to dispel 72. S. Gopal, The Viceroyalty of Lord Irwin, (Oxford, 1957), p. 19.

33 183 the distrust of British intentions and secure Congress's cooperation. The Labour Government which came to office at this juncture approved Irwin's scheme, which was two fold: first, he proposed that members of the British Parliament and representatives: of British India and the Indian states should meet in a conference to discuss the Simon report and consider proposals for constitutional advance before those were placed before Parliament; second he announced that the natural issue' of India's constitutional progress was the attainment of dominion status.^ In March 1933, the British Government's proposals, resulting from the three sessions of the Round Table Conference, were published in a White Paper; and in April a Joint Select Committee of Parliament was appointed to consider the future constitution of India. The committee was authorised to call into consultation delegates from British India and the States. The Congress did not participate in the discussion. The Select Committee submitted its report in October On 12 December, a motion that a bill based on the report be submitted to Parliament was carried in the commons; and on 19 December, the Government of India Bill was introduced. 73. Sir Maurice Gwyer and A. Appadorai, Speeches and Cocuments on the Indian Constitution (Oxford, 1957), i, pp

34 184 After a stormy debate, lasting in the commons for forty three and in the Lords for thirteen days, the Bill was 74 passed, and received the royal assent on 4 August The 1935 Act sought to maintain the unity of India by federating the multitude of princely states together with the eleven British Indian provinces and by gran ting responsible self-government to the latter. The analysis of Muslim attitude towards these reforms upto the Act of 1935 shows the trend of Muslim politics, Muslim fears, suspicions and growing separatism among them during this period.. For the Muslims the most important change brought about by the Morley-Minto Reforms, was the establishment of separate electorates. The Simla Deputation demand was met and a system of separate Muslim representation was introduced. Muslim politics between 1906 and 1911 constitute a period of contentment and calm in the history of Modern Muslim India. On the whole Muslim community was satisfied with its constitutional and political status. They had no cause to be disloyal to Britain. They enjoyed separate representation in all elected bodies. They had been given more seats than their 74. G. Rizvi, Linlithgow and India, p. 11

35 185 population warranted. The Partition of Bengal stood intact. But this peaceful and placid state of affairs was not destined to last long. In June 1911 Sir John Jenkins, a member of the Viceroys council, made proposal for the reversal of the partition of Bengal and for the transfer of the British Indian capital from Calcutta to New Delhi, and suggested that these changes should be announced by the King on the occasion of the forthcoming coronation Durbar at Delhi. These decisions were kept strictly secret and were not revealed to the world till 12 December 1911, when the King announced them as his "boons" at his coronation Durbar held at Delhi?** The Muslim reaction to these decisions was naturally bitter. For years the Government of India and the Home Government had been telling the Muslims that the decision regarding the partition of Bengal was final and would not be re-opened. Such a flagrant disregard for solemn promises created a feeling of distrust amongst the Muslims. They lost all faith in British pledges. They were convinced that the Government listened only to 75. K.K.Aziz, The Partition of India and the Emergence of Pakistan, p K.K.Aziz, Ibid., p.35.

36 186 sedition and clamour, that constitutional approaches did not pay, that loyalty was rewarded with treachery. They looked upon the reversal as nothing less than an ignominious surrender to an unreasonable agition. They felt that they had been sacrificed to appease the Hindus. The decision encouraged sedition, betrayed the Muslims and 77 alienated them from the Government. The Delhi Durbar of 1911 heralded a significant shift in Muslim politics. The Muslim Community was thoroughly disillusioned and came to the decision that it could no longer put its trust in the British Government or look to it for the protection of its legitimate rights and interests. The immediate manifestation was that at the December, 1912-January, 1913 session the Muslim League changed its aim from loyalty to "a form of self-government 70 suitable to India. Then came the another important and historic event i.e. Khilafat Agitation. Though the Khilafat movement achieved no ostensible success, yet it was of considerable value as an instrument of creating political 77. For the Muslim feeling see. R. Craddock, The Dilemma in India. (London: 1929), p.147: M.F.0.DwyerIndia As I Know It; (London 1925), p.175; The Times, S March^ TWIT: J.D.Rees in Fortnightly Review,. Feb. 1912, pp ; and A. Carthill, The Lost Dominion (London 1,1924), pp , all referred in K.K. Aziz, Ibid, p See Civil and Military Gazette, 3 January 1913.

37 187 consciousness in the Muslim masses. It produced a broad based leadership and taught the techniques of organizing a mass movement to the Muslims. These proved great assets in their struggle for separate and independent home-land Pakistan. The Muslims had reacted favourably to the Montagu-Chelmsford Report and the 1919 Act at first instance. They were not completely satisfied, but they did not reject the constitution as the Congress did. But in 1919 the Muslim League went radical. It identified itself with the Congress and did not meet as a separate 79 body between 1919 and When at last it did meet in 1924, under Jinnah's presidentship, it insisted on an immediate and far-reaching constitutional advance. It resolution on Swaraj contained six "principles". The first four dealt with minority safeguards and separate electorates. But the last two introduced two new demands: India must be federal polity and any territorial redistribution shall in no way affect the Muslim majorities in the Punjab, Bengal and the North-West Frontier 80 Province. Prospects of parliamentary government were, thus, influencing Muslim policy. The Muslim League foresaw that, even in a federal India, the centre was 79. Indian Quarterly Register, Voll.l, No K.K.Aziz. The Partition of India and the Emergence of Pakistan, p.52.

38 188 bound to be Hindu-dominated. Therefore, it demanded full provincial autonomy. It also wanted assurance that its control over the Muslim-majority provinces would not be loosened through wittling down the Muslim Majorities of the Punjab, Bengal and the N.W.F.P. This fear of Hindu domination was ultimately lead to the idea of separate homeland-pakistan. The urge for provincial autonomy and weak federation or centre, clearly dominated the "Punjab Thesis" of Fazl-e-Husain, the leader of Panjab Unionist 'Party'a cross-communal alliance of Muslim, Hindu and Sikh agriculturist interests. He backed his claim to speak for Indian Muslims by organizing the All-India Muslim Conference. Fazl-i-Hussain's conditions for Muslim co-operation at the Round Table Conference in London were unequivocal. He wanted separate electorates to be retained, clear majorities for Punjabi and Bengali Muslims, the separation of sind from Bombay, provincial status for the N.W.F.P. and full autonomy for all the provinces. Until these were conceded, Fazl-i-Hussain was 81 against any advance towards a responsible centre. In 1928, the Nehru Report was published. It recommended the abandonment of separate representation and 81. Ayesha Jalal and Anil Seal, 'Alternative to partition: Muslim Politics between the Wars', Modern Asian Studies, 15, 3(1981)

39 189 and weightage. Further, the Report clearly rejected federation as a possible solution of the communal problem. The Nehru constitution was firmly based on the principles of a Unitary government. The Muslim League's resolution of 1924 was not even mentioned in the Report. The immediate result of the publication of the Report was that Muslims of all shades of opinion united in opposition to it. The All India Muslim Conference which met at Delhi in 1929 under Chairmanship of the Aga Khan had laid down the demands of Muslim India in the clearest possible terms. It passed a resolution which rejected the Nehru Report. The rejection of the "Congress inspired constitution" was "complete, unanimous and clear". On two points the Muslims were adamant. Separate electorates must continue and India must have a federal form of government. This postulated the irreducible conditions which would make a constitution for India acceptable to them. The Nehru Report was primarily repudiated because it denied these conditions. Regarding the appointment of Simon Commission the Muslim League was of two minds. One wing, led by Jinnah, sides with the Congress and boycotted Commission, while the other wing, led by Sir Mohammad Shafi, opted for co-operation. One of the Commissioners, Sir Edward Cadogen, later recorded that Muslims and Untouchables co-operated out of an intense suspiction of the Brahmin;