CHAPTER 3 MUSLIM POLITICS OF SEPARATION DURING BRITISH RULE

Transcription

1 CHAPTER 3 MUSLIM POLITICS OF SEPARATION DURING BRITISH RULE Mohammed Ali Jinnah once opposed the demand of separate electorate out forward by Aga Khan, the founder of Muslim league. 1 He helped in materializing the Lucknow pact which was a significant development in the history of Indian freedom struggle because it helped in bringing an approachment between the Indian National Congress and all Indian Muslim League. 2 But very soon Jinnah became disappointed with policies of Congress. He undertook on entirely different course of Action and his communal ideas began to fall into place. He began to advocate that the Muslim representation to various legislatures should be secured by means of separate electorates and thus began his separatist politics. 3 If we go through the history before partition or history during British Rule, we find lots of evidences of Muslims Politics which always opposed many movements had politics of separation. Mohammad Ali Jinnah after having left the Muslim League, once again assumed the leadership of the Muslim Community in India. 4 The Muslim League under his leadership welcomed the congress decision to boycott the Simon Commission. But in 1928 the Muslim politics took altogether a different turn when Mohammed Ali Jinnah refused to accept the Nehru Report in an 'All parties' Conference. Mr. Jinnah rejected the Nehru Report as he considered nonacceptance of his proposal by the conference an insult to the Entire Muslim Community of the Country. So, Jinnah by the leadership of 'Muslim League' raised some points that were demands of the Muslim Community in India. 5 so, such evidences in the history show us the Muslim parties of separation during British Rule. 3.1 How, Jinnah Opposed to Gandhi in the Quit India Movement Gandhi decided to launch Quit India movement, Jinnah wrote an article in the Time and Tide expressing his strong views on Two Nation Theory, He says that constitution should be drawn to permit two nations to exist in India and he added further as support a piece from the Report of the Joint select Committee on Indian 81

2 Constitutional Reforms , Vol. I, Part I. 6 Though two nations could not be formed since then, yet when elections were held in Bengal, Punjab, Sindh, NWEF, Assam provinces on the basis of the report, where Muslims were densely populated, to his contentment the Congress was defeated. Inspired by this, he went on provoking more and more communal feelings saying that the Congress had no claim to be called national party in those areas and that Gandhi could not be called the national leader. Thus he became an arch rival to both the Congress and Gandhi and gave no scope to them for compromise in the settlement of national affairs but worked solely for the formation of separate nation for Muslims. 7 But an insight into his early personal life reveals that he was a strange person, who in 1910s strove for national unity but later, within a span of just three decades became a totally changed person. By 1937 he was a staunch anti Hindu and this is evident in his address to the All India Muslim League at Lucknow conference in October in that year when he openly demanded a separate nation to be carved for Muslims: Hindustan is for Hindus; only the Congress masquerades under the name of nationalism. The result of the present Congress party will be calm bitterness, communal war, and strengthening of the imperialistic hold. 8 But he did not realise that under Gandhi s leadership in the Congress there was fairly a good number of Muslims like Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Muhammad Ali brothers, Ghaffar Khan who did not reveal at any time his type of peace of mind for a separate nation. So his opposition reflected some personal bias but not the views of the majority of Muslims. He was quite open and used to say that he was dedicated for the creation of a separate nation for Muslims, and the Congress under no circumstances should succeed the British in case the latter withdrew from India. 9 Not contented, he intensified his tirade against Gandhi with his writings and speeches most of which were apathetic and splenetic a year before Quit India movement broke out. His main forte was that Muslims were in danger and that democracy was not workable because they constituted a minority community. Sometimes he twisted Gandhi s words in a way that the latter took to heart and aguishly said once, Not a week passes but these weeklies contain what to me appear to be distortion of truth and vilification of the Congress and Congressmen and Hindus. Thus he tried to draw public s attention to his viewpoint that the Indian leader s aim was to poison the Hindu mind against Muslims and himself and thereby 82

3 suppress the latter. 10 As he thus began rebelling against Gandhi openly, indirectly he got some benefit of personal popularity and leadership over Muslims. But why he thus was changed and reacted indifferently, it is difficult to say. At one time as everybody knows, he was amicable with the Congress and Gandhi. But from 1930 onwards he began to change. Perhaps the reason was that new leaders like Nehru, Patel, Azad, Raja Goplachari with high potential began to emerge in Congress and they even threatened to capture leadership from Gandhi, in as much as they commanded much respect over millions of people all over the country. Hence it seems he wished to capture all India leadership from Gandhi to himself with constant criticism and opposition to Gandhi. 11 But many wondered how he, who at one time, was a staunch nationalist and worked for Hindu Muslim unity in the Bombay Congress of 1915 became suddenly so irascible, anti-hindu, and even went to the extent of dictating terms to Gandhi for a separate nation at least in Muslim majority areas. 12 How this drastic change came from such a person a staunch nationalist to obstinate anti-hindu and what made him to pursue the Muslim because thus only on communal grounds-all these are difficult questions to answer. But in trying to capture all India leadership he tried to provoke the elite and the masses with deep religious sentiments. But Jinnah did not understand C. R. s logic and diplomacy in asking the British to go out of India and seeking to set up national government. Internally he was a better integrationist than the Muslim leader expected. 13 So Jinnah couldn t understand him. The former developed only animosity towards Gandhi. When the politician saint moved his draft on Quit India in the Allahabad and Wardha sessions, the Muslim leader too parallely convened All India Muslim League s meetings at Allahabad in April 1942 and took support from Liaqut Ali Khan. 14 But he provoked the Muslim masses with sharp racial and religious sentiments and in his speeches he used to say that India could never be one nation because of the obvious differences in race, language and religion which could never be concealed and Muslim self-determination was the only thing that was required in the existing circumstances

4 Thus while at Allahabad and Wardha sessions the CWC gave Gandhi full powers to launch Quit India movement, similarly the Muslim League s Working Committee also endorsed Jinnah to pursue for the cause of Pakistan s creation or for formation of two nations in all negotiations with the Congress or the Congress or the Government, Hence the Muslim League under Jinnah s influence and imposing personality took parallel decisions that the Muslims should have equal share either in mobilizing military support to the country or in the control over Central and provincial Governments or in the expansion of the Viceroy s, Executive Council. 16 It is queer that he, who was fighting for separate nation thus, was not in fact an original Muslim but hailed from a converted Muslim stock and most of his fellow members of the Muslim League too were sons of the soil and got egotistic under religious sentiments provoked by him. 17 Thus he gained some superiority over Sikandar, his senior leader, who had just died before the Quit India movement started. So to attract the Muslim masses some more, the former rejected Cripps negotiations for the simple reason that the British statesman did not come out with a clear cut plan for the creation of Pakistan. But the truth is that the British leader showed some favor to the Muslims to opt out of the union so that Muslim provinces could be formed in course of time into a separate dominion. Under the existing circumstances this was the best solution to the Muslims but the Muslim leader was not satisfied. 18 He wanted to capture all India leadership from Gandhi and for this he demanded equal parity with Congress on every political issue so that the Congress would be bound to recognize the Muslims right to form Pakistan in any future settlement. But this was not feasible as nobody appreciated his demand and so he took the other way round misinterpreting Gandhi s writings just before the AICC Bombay Congress session that the latter could not achieve Swaraj all these years though with Hindu Muslim unity and that he was a total failure. 19 But the Indian leader had no time to refute Jinnah s such specious arguments. By that time the AICC had passed the Quit India resolution at Bombay and he was arrested soon after and this created a vacuum of political leadership in the country. Not only Gandhi but others like Nehru and Patel were also arrested and so there was none to represent Indian cause properly and effectively before the Government. Jinnah seized this opportunity and harangued more and more with his verbal attacks on Gandhi unscrupulously. 20 He went on blaming him that the latter launched Quit 84

5 India movement without Muslim League s support at his own risk. Not contented, he criticized him further that the latter built up a conspiracy to establish Hindu hegemony over the Muslims and thus tried to strike a blow to the evolving awakening in the country. 21 Even the Muslim League s working Committee members too lost their objectivity and fell under Jinnah s influence. Instead of showing sympathy over Gandhi s arrest, they criticized him in their meeting held on 11th August and Gandhi for having resolved to launch the Quit India movement and the Congress for having passed Quit India resolution. 22 The Committee members said that the Congress resolution was ill motivated and thus they encouraged everything that could be done to weaken Gandhi s movement and to assist the British in their war effort., hence they in a resolution said, The Congress policy is to cajole or coerce the British Government into surrendering power to Congress-a Hindu body with microscopic following of other communities in utter suppression of one hundred millions of Mussalmans. 23 This they indirectly blamed the AICC and Gandhi that it was they who closed the doors for negotiations with the Government and themselves. But the fact is such internal squabbles between Hindus and Muslims helped the British to stay in India. 24 But in making those allegations through the Working Committee members, Jinnah tried to enlist British sympathy and to create an impression that it was the Muslims who refrained the Axis powers from entering into India and getting internal help. So they should get due recognition and be enabled to form Pakistan in future. 25 So while Gandhi said Quit India, Jinnah Divide and Quit. Further, he also used to show some paper cuttings from Gandhi s Harijan, misinterpret them in a way: that the latter advocated Hindu Muslim separation and it was difficult to attain independence till the communal problem was solved. He went further and blamed Gandhi s movement as one to coarse the British to hand over power to the Congress party that was dominated by the Hindus and to place the Muslims at a subordinate level and get them dominated by the traditional tyrannical Hindu majority. 26 But in these circumstances the only Hindu leader who shared with Jinnah s feelings and dared to differ with Gandhi was C. Rajagopalachari. But his approach was too shrewd to be understood by Jinnah. C. R. said that the Muslim leader spoke 85

6 plainly what he wanted and he would have succeeded, had Cripps entertained the idea of setting up national government with Vice Regal Rule at the Centre. But the British representative recommended dominion government at the end of war and it created all deadlock., So C, R. suggested intelligently why not the national government be set up in a way that it should be answerable to the Viceroy. Hindus would lose nothing by this but Muslim cooperation would be obtained. 27 Then Hindu Muslim unity would prevail and the Congress would join with the Muslim League and one day the British would grant freedom. In the meanwhile every Muslim would forget the concept of Pakistan and it would be shelved. So his theory was, Let us give to the Musalmans what they are asking. They will themselves say that they do not want if you do not keep it in your pocket but throw it on the table. 28 So to move the country in this direction he raised the issue at the Wardha CWC meeting. But he was not properly understood. He was heckled with cries Rajaji Moradabad and somebody even hit a missile at him. 29 Nehru also said that the Tamil leader was trying to break to pieces Gandhi s weapon of Satyagraha which had been fashioned for the last 22 years with many sacrifices. As the tension thus increased, inside the Congress Gandhi advised C. R. to resign from the Congress, which the latter dutifully did. But the Tamil leader wrote to Gandhi that in case the whole civil and military power was to be withdrawn according to the latter s wish the British Government would certainly be in a worse form. But Gandhi did not mind his advice. He took it lightly and said that better he should go the other side of Jinnah and Muslim League friends. 30 Taking advantage of the ideological differences existing in the Congress, Jinnah tried to hit Gandhi s popularity as much as he could. When the latter was arrested, he did not worry about the consequences or the fate of the country. He felt that let the British play their own game; This is one of those cases where neutrality is the most effective policy on our part. He further added that if he was allowed a free hand, he would set up the Muslim League Committee, keep it in touch with the Muslims of the affected areas, and explain the programme of civil defense. 31 But he could not go ahead or was successful in this divisive activity except getting some sympathy from C. R. Further he could not yet understand the latter s deep lime of thinking which was diplomatic, meant to appease him or sidetrack the whole idea of the formation of Pakistan into cold storage

7 But Jinnah blurted over Gandhi often. When the latter did fast, the former did not care but tried to incite Bengali Muslims not to press any resolution in the latter s favor to release him. But his protests did not carry any weight. On the other hand, waves of unrest mounted against the Government throughout the country over Gandhi s health. At one stage Sapru, a Moderate, to cut down the size of Jinnah, insisted the latter to come to Delhi and settle the matters amicably so that Gandhi s life could be saved. But the Muslim leader refused and showed extreme indifference. 33 Yet Gandhi from the jail hoped that a day will certainly dawn when Jinnah will realize that I have never wronged him or the Muslims. He knew Jinnah s fixed notion of Pakistan, which was at one time considered philosophical but became a living voice in the throats of Muslims. Whether it was done provokingly or not, it became communal issue and Jinnah s critical expression, single mindedness, and fusillade against the Hindus were evident. But it goes to Jinnah s credit that it was due to this propaganda the membership of the Muslim League rose from 1330 in 1925 to two millions in 1942 and this increase was achieved in a span of seventeen years though at the cost of national unity. 34 So Jinnah s two nation theory became a strong political issue in 1940s but it was still premature because differences between Hindus and Muslims had been existing for the last several centuries, but Jinnah made an issue out of them only from religious viewpoint. His angle of assessment was only from one side. Unlike Gandhi, he did not take into account the interests of the nation or teeming millions of Hindus on the other side. Religion cannot be said to be the only one factor but more than one for the creation of a nation. 35 Yet he strove for it as a camouflage to cover up the humiliation he and his admirers felt in the political field. He forgot that at one time in 1915 he was a fervent nationalist but then was turned into an anti-hindu due to the ramifications of circumstances which he faced or over which he had no control. He was not really an original Muslim to hailing from Muslim countries to put up such lofty claim but a son of the soil. But yet his claim for Pakistan created problems and complexities not only to the nation and Gandhi but also to himself and fellow Muslim

8 3.2 Constitutional Struggle In subsequent years, however, he felt dismayed at the injection of violence into politics. Since Jinnah stood for "ordered progress", moderation, gradualism and constitutionalism, he felt that political violence was not the pathway to national liberation but, the dark alley to disaster and destruction. In the ever-growing frustration among the masses caused by colonial rule, there was ample cause for extremism. But, Gandhi's doctrine of non-cooperation, Jinnah felt, even as Rabindranath Tagore( ) did also feel, was at best one of negation and despair: it might lead to the building up of resentment, but nothing constructive. Hence, he opposed tooth and nail the tactics adopted by Gandhi to exploit the Khilafat and wrongful tactics in the Punjab in the early twenties. On the eve of its adoption of the Gandhian programmed, Jinnah warned the Nagpur Congress Session (1920). He felt that there was no short-cut to independence and that any extra-constitutional methods could only lead to political violence, lawlessness and chaos, without bringing India nearer to the threshold of freedom. The future course of events was not only to confirm Jinnah's worst fears, but also to prove him right. Although Jinnah left the Congress soon thereafter, he continued his efforts towards bringing about a Hindu-Muslim entente, which he rightly considered "the most vital condition of Swaraj". However, because of the deep distrust between the two communities as evidenced by the country-wide communal riots, and because the Hindus failed to meet the genuine demands of the Muslims, his efforts came to naught. In order to bridge Hindu-Muslim differences on the constitutional plan, these proposals even waived the Muslim right to separate electorate, the most basic Muslim demand since 1906, which though recognized by the Congress in the Luckhnow Pact, had again become a source of friction between the two communities. surprisingly though, the Nehru Report (1928), which represented the Congress-sponsored proposals for the future constitution of India, negated the minimum Muslim demands embodied in the Delhi Muslim Proposals. In vain Jinnah argued at the National Convention of Congress in 1928 that "What we want is that Hindus and Mussalmans should march together until our objective is achieved...these two communities have got to be reconciled and united 88

9 and made to feel that their interests are common". The Convention's blank refusal to accept Muslim demands represented the most devastating setback to Jinnah's life-long efforts to bring about Hindu-Muslim unity, it meant "the last straw" for the Muslims, and "the parting of the ways" for him, as he confessed to a Parsee friend at that time. Jinnah's disillusionment at the course of politics in the subcontinent prompted him to migrate and settle down in London in the early thirties. He was, however, to return to India in 1934, at the pleadings of his co-religionists, and assume their leadership. But, the Muslims presented a sad spectacle at that time. They were a mass of disgruntled and demoralized men and women, politically disorganized and destitute of a clear-cut political program. 3.3 Muslim League Reorganized Thus, the task that awaited Jinnah was anything but easy. The Muslim League was dormant: even its provincial organizations were, for the most part, ineffective and only nominally under the control of the central organization. Nor did the central body have any coherent policy of its own till the Bombay session (1936), which Jinnah organized. To make matters worse, the provincial scene presented a sort of a jigsaw puzzle: in the Punjab, Bengal, Sindh, the North West Frontier, Assam, Bihar and the United Provinces, various Muslim leaders had set up their own provincial parties to serve their personal ends. Extremely frustrating as the situation was, the only consolation Jinnah had at this juncture was in Allama Iqbal ( ), the poetphilosopher, who stood steadfast by him and helped to chart the course of Indian politics from behind the scene. Undismayed by this bleak situation, Jinnah devoted himself to the sole purpose of organizing the Muslims on one platform. He embarked upon country-wide tours. He pleaded with provincial Muslim leaders to sink their differences and make common cause with the League. He exhorted the Muslim masses to organize themselves and join the League. He gave coherence and direction to Muslim sentiments on the Government of India Act, He advocated that the Federal Scheme should be scrapped as it was subversive of India's cherished goal of complete responsible Government, while the provincial scheme, which conceded provincial autonomy for the first time, should be worked for what it was worth, despite its 89

10 certain objectionable features. He also formulated a viable League manifesto for the election scheduled for early He was, it seemed, struggling against time to make Muslim India a power to be reckoned with. Despite all the manifold odds stacked against it, the Muslim League won some 108 (about 23 per cent) seats out of a total of 485 Muslim seats in the various legislatures. Though not very impressive in itself, the League's partial success assumed added significance in view of the fact that the League won the largest number of Muslim seats and that it was the only all-india party of the Muslims in the country. Thus, the elections represented the first milestone on the long road to putting Muslim India on the map of the subcontinent. Congress in power with the year 1937 opened the most momentous decade in modern Indian history. In that year came into force the provincial part of the Government of India Act, 1935, granting autonomy to Indians for the first time, in the provinces. The Congress, having become the dominant party in Indian politics, came to power in seven provinces exclusively, spurning the League's offer of cooperation, turning its back finally on the coalition idea and excluding Muslims as a political entity from the portals of power. In that year, also, the Muslim League, under Jinnah's dynamic leadership, was reorganized de novo, transformed into a mass organization, and made the spokesman of Indian Muslims as never before. Above all, in that momentous year were initiated certain trends in Indian politics, the crystallization of which in subsequent years made the partition of the subcontinent inevitable. The practical manifestation of the policy of the Congress which took office in July, 1937, in seven out of eleven provinces, convinced Muslims that, in the Congress scheme of things, they could live only on sufferance of Hindus and as "first class" citizens. The Congress provincial governments, it may be remembered, had embarked upon a policy and launched a programme in which Muslims felt that their religion, language and culture were not safe. This blatantly aggressive Congress policy was seized upon by Jinnah to awaken the Muslims to a new consciousness, organize them on all-india platform, and make them a power to be reckoned with. He also gave coherence, direction and articulation to their innermost, yet vague, urges and aspirations. Above all, he filled them with his indomitable will, his own unflinching faith in their destiny. 90

11 3.4 His Majesty s Government (H.M.G) Besieged on all fronts and running fast towards bankruptcy, the British position in India was further complicated by growing resentment among the native population. Lord Wavell, the viceroy in India, in a letter to the Secretary of State for India, summarized the British position in this way With a lost and hostile India, we are likely to be reduced in the east to the position of commercial bagman. 37 He went on to write The Congress and the League are the dominant parties in Hindu and Muslim India, and will remain so We cannot bypass them, and shall be compelled in the end to negotiate with them along with representatives of the less important parties All-India Muslim League (A.I.M.L) The All-India Muslim League (AIML) struggled through a varietyof circumstances to protect the rights of Indian Muslims. 39 Throughout its history it had to face many challenges and passed through many crises. 40 However, for the AIML the most crucial juncture was the year 1927when it was divided into two groups: one led by Jinnah ( ) and the other by Sir Muhammad Shafi ( ). The AIML was reunited at Lahore but soon another serious challenge threatened its unity. Before going into details of split and reunification of the AIML its seems appropriate to analyze the political scenario of that time. The year 1926 saw bitter communal riots in various parts of India most of these riots took place in towns and cities where the Muslims were in a minority and therefore they suffered much more than the Hindus. It is reported that there were 40 riots between April 1926 to 1927 which resulted in 197 deaths and 1598 injured. 41 These communal riots in 1926 culminated in Swami Shurdhanund s murder on 23 December 1926, at the hand of a Muslim in Delhi which led to another round of communal disturbances. 42 The gravity of the situation can be understood from the fact that Muhammad Yaqub ( ) wrote a long letter to secretary AIML stating:all India Muslim league is responsible for the protection and promotion of their. 43 political rights and interests. It is not fear to keep them in the darkness. Let us tell them that the league has ceased to exercise its functions so that they may organize and form another political body if they choose to do so. 44 At the same time, the Hindus 91

12 raised their voices against the separate electorates and blamed the AIML for the prevailing communal tension. The All-India Hindu Mahasbha (f. 1906) opposed the separate electorates and condemned the Lucknow pact of This was the communal situation in India when party meetings of assembly members at Delhi were held on 17 March 1927, to exchange views on the direction in which modification of the system of communal representation was desirable. The Hindu members of the assembly decided in favour of joint electorates with reservation of seats to Muslims either on the basis of Lucknow Pact or the Muslim population in each province. 45 Many Muslim leaders like Dr. Mukhtar Ahmad Ansari ( ), Abul Kalam Azad and Ali Imam ( ) were willing to give up separate electorates. 46 In 1927, Jinnah was in Delhi to attend the budget session of the Central Legislative Assembly. During discussion on political matters, Motilal Nehru interpreted separate electorates as the bone of contention between the Hindus and the Muslims. He offered that if Muslim gave up separate electorates he could persuade the Indian National Congress (INC) to accept other Muslims demands. Under the circumstances, Jinnah was anxious to form a Muslim consensus on future constitution. 47 The Delhi Muslim Conference under Jinnah on 20 March 1927 took a bold initiative to give up separate electorates if their four proposals were accepted; such as, Separation of Sind form Bombay; reforms in the N.W.F.P and Baluchistan; representation on the basis of population in the Punjab and Bengal; and thirty three percent seats for the Muslims in the Central Legislature. 48 The All-India Congress Working Committee (AICC) at its meeting in New Delhi on 21 March 1927, recorded itssatisfaction on the Muslim proposals. 49 Hindu members of the Central Legislature also approved the joint electorates with reservation of seats on population basis in all the Legislatures but left open the vital question of redistribution of provinces. Lord Irwin, the viceroy of India, was appreciative of the stance of M.A. Jinnah at Delhi Muslim Proposals because the Government thought that the Muslim politicians in general were not ready to give up separate electorates. 50 The Central Sikh League, termed the Muslim proposals as a step in the right direction. 51 However, the Hindu Mahasabha challenged the representative character of the 92

13 INC and stressed that only the Hindu Mahasabha was the proper body to negotiate a settlement on behalf of the Hindu community with any Muslim organization. 52 The Hindu Mahasabha held its meeting in April 1927, with Dr. Moonje ( ) in the chair, opposed new provinces where Muslims would get majority. It stressed mixed electorates with reservation of seats only for a definite period of time on a uniform basis of representation. 53 This attitude of the Hindu Mahasabha forced some of the Muslim leaders to revise their Delhi decision. A general meeting of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League was held at Lahore on 1 May 1927 under the Presidency of Sir Shafi. He maintained that until the mentality of the Hindu Mahasabha underwent a change there was no option for the Muslims but to continue to insist on the retention of separate communal electorates as an integral part of the Indian constitution. 54 Allama Muhammad Iqbal ( ) also expressed his conviction that in the existing political conditions in India separate communal electorates provided the only means of making the legislatures truly representative of Indian peoples. 55 The first Muslim opposition to the Delhi Muslim Proposals came from the members of the Madras Legislative Council who held the view that joint electorates for Muslims in Madras Presidency particularly will jeopardise the interests of the Muslims. 56 Muslim representatives of Bihar and Orissa held a meeting on 8 May 1927, at Patna to consider the Delhi scheme of joint electorate. Sir Ali Imam ( ), Maulana Shafi Daudi ( ) and Syed Abdul Aziz (d. 1946) supported the Delhi proposals, but Nawab Muhammad Ismail ( ), Sir Fakhruddin ( ), Ather Hussain and Nawab Sarfraz Khan (d.1933) led the opposition to the joint electorates. 58 The Bengal Muslim Conference held under presidentship of Sir Abdur Rahim ( ) at Barisal on 8 May 1927 and maintained that Muslim opinion was decidedly against the joint electorates. 59 In reply to an AIML circular letter of 5 May 1927, many prominent Muslim leaders expressed themselves in favour of the separate electorates. 60 M.A. Azim, M.L.A. from Chittagong expressed the same view in his letter to the Secretary of the AIML. 61 By the middle of May 1927, the Muslims of Madras, U.P., the Punjab, Bengal and Bihar had condemned joint electorates. Under the circumstances, Jinnah visited Lahore in June 1927 and advocated the acceptance of the proposals but met with little success. Hence, implicitly, the AIML stood divided into two camps: those 93

14 who supported the joint electorates were led by Jinnah (known as Jinnah League) and those who opposed were led by Sir Muhammad Shafi (Shafi League). The Council Members of the AIML from the Punjab met at Lahore under Malik Firoz Khan Noon ( ). A joint manifesto was issued on 23 July 1927 thoroughly disapproving the joint-electorates scheme. 62 On the meanwhile, the question before the AIML Council (Jinnah group) was to consider them venue for the 1927 annual session, and to elect the party president. 63 On 8 September 1927, Malik Barkat Ali ( ), and Malik Firoz Khan Noon invited the AIML to hold its 1927 annual session at Lahore. 64 Mirza Ijaz Husain, Joint secretary of the AIML wrote to Jinnah on 30 September 1927, that there were four invitations to consider for the League session i.e., from Madras, the Punjab, U. P and Calcutta. 65 In this situation, the Viceroy in a statement announced the appointment of the Statutory Commission on Reforms on 8 November It was to be headed by Sir John Simon ( ) and assisted by six other Members of Parliament. On 13 November 1927, only five days after the commission was announced, the Punjab Muslim League met officially and voted for co-operation with the commission. The only opponents of the resolution were Dr. Kitchlew ( ), Maulana Zafar Ali Khan ( ), Malik Barkat Ali and Ghulam Mohiuddin. 66 This had been done before Jinnah sent his protest telegram to then Secretary of State. Thus both the groups stood divided on the issues of Simon Commission as well as the electorates. It seemed that the British government wanted to use it as a bargaining counter so as to disintegrate the Swaragist party. Furthermore through the Muslims discarding separate electorate in Delhi, the Government had got the chance to divide the Muslim on this issue and deprived Jinnah of some Muslim backing. Now Malik Barket Ali changed his position and wrote to the Joint Secretary, AIML, on 19 November 1927 that the Lahore invitation may be treated as withdrawn. However, this move was neutralized in time by Firoz Khan Noon with the support of Allama Muhammad Iqbal. On the same date Noon wrote a letter to the Secretary of the AIML on 19 November 1927 that he considers the Punjab invitation as still standing and not withdrawn. 67 Thus Punjab Muslim League was divided into two groups. One group was in favour of cooperation with the Simon Commission and the other opposed it. 94

15 However, in the Council meeting under the presidentship of Sir Shafi, on 20 November 1927 passed resolution in favour of the Lahore faction. 68 An interesting thing is that Malik Barkat Ali was among those members who voted in favour of Sir Shafi. 69 In connection with this meeting Syed Shamsul Hassan, Assistant Secretary of the AIML, narrates an interesting story that followers of Sir Shafi created a situation in which the League would have followed a course different from that laid down by the Jinnah. Jinnah could not attend the meeting. Nawab Sir Zulfiqar Ali Khan, who was one of the Vice-Presidents, presided. The group which did not want to boycott the Commission, proposed to hold the Session at Lahore under the presidentship of Sir Shafi. While the matter was still under discussion, a message was received from Hakim Ajmal Khan that as he was seriously ill, his name should not be proposed for presidentship. Nawab Sir Zulfiqar Ali Khan did not allow Maulana Mohammad Ali to propose any other name, and announced that in view of the withdrawal of Hakim Ajmal Khan s name, the resolution moved by Sir Firoz Khan Noon, proposing the name of Sir Shafi as president and suggesting Lahore as venue for the Session, being the only resolution before the house, was carried through. This resulted in uproarious protests and the president immediately adjourned the meeting. 70 Dr. Kitchlew considered the Council decision of 20 November regrettable and highly detrimental to national and communal interests and bound to create division in the Muslim camp. On 23 November 1927 seven members of the AIML Council requested Dr. Kitchlew to hold another meeting to revise Council decision about venue and presidentship. 71 Mujibur Rahman ( ), Secretary, Bengal Presidency Muslim League, also sent a telegram on 24 November 1927 to AIML office, Delhi, demanding revision of the Council decision. Jinnah telegraphically asked Shamsul Hasan, on 28 November 1927, from Bombay to call a Council meeting. Consequently an agenda (making as urgent) was issued from the AIML office Delhi on 28 November 1927, for a Council meeting to be held on 11 December at the AIML headquarter Ballimaran street. 72 Jinnah urged Dr. Asnari to use his influence to secure a majority for Calcutta, with the Aga Khan ( ) as President. 73 He urged Dr. Kitchlew to do his bit. In his letter to Kitchlew he hoped that the League would not fall prey to the reactionary forces of the Punjab. He also sent a letter to Mirza Ijaz Hussain, Joint 95

16 secretary of the AIML, in early December 1927 to do his best to give to the members of the AIML Council proper information about the situation. Jinnah got in touch with Aga Khan who replied to his communication strongly urging the next meeting be held at Calcutta. 74 Under the circumstances, Sir Shafi sent a telegram to Dr. Kitchlew requesting him to postpone the Council meeting to promote Muslim solidarity. However, the Council meeting took place as scheduled on 11 December Some of the members questioned the Legality of this meeting and regarded it unconstitutional. Among them were S.M Abdullah, of Aligarh, Gul Muhamad Khan of Ferozpur, Abdul Latif Faruqi M.L.A. and Zafarullah Khan from Lahore. Only 23 members attended the Council meeting in person, a large number of absentee votes polled in which swung the decision in Calcutta Favour. 76 It is to be noted that Sir Shafi declined to preside over Calcutta meeting due to fear of some unpleasant treatment and agreed to change the venue. But Jinnah insisted on Calcutta. The split in the League ranks had finally become absolutely clear. The decision of the Council meeting opened a new debate on the question of venue. Syed Abdul Jabbar, Vice-President Rajputana Provincial Muslim League, Sir Abdur Rahim, Raja Ghazanfar Ali khan ( ) and many others wanted the annual session of the AIML to be postponed to a later date to save the split in the AIML. Mushir Hussain Kidwai ( ), Aga Khan and Hasrat Mohani tried to hold another meeting of the AIML Council to change the venue. 77 Some of the important UP Muslims leaders asked the Secretary to convene a Council meeting to change venue of the AIML session from Calcutta to Delhi. Though the Reception Committee was formed at Lahore with Nawab Sir Zulfiqar Ali Khan ( ) as its chairman, decided to hold the AIML meeting at Lahore but last bid effort was made by Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana ( ) to save the situation. He wired to Jinnah at Calcutta: We are extremely gratified that majority of Muslims favour separate electorates. If settlement with Hindus possible its detail and boycott question may be discussed by both communities otherwise only by Muslims of India at full joint meeting on last Saturday and Sunday in January. Pray do not hold regular session of League but as members must have arrived discuss matters only informally. If you agree same course may be followed here. Kindly save situation as true statesman wire considered reply immediately

17 That reply never came. The Leaguers at Lahore waited till the evening of 30 December for decision of the Jinnah group. Having learnt that Jinnah group had decided not to postpone the meeting, it was decided to hold the Lahore session the next day i.e., 31 December So there were two AIML sessions in 1927, one at Lahore with Sir Shafi in the chair and the other at Calcutta presided over by Maulvi Muhammad Yakub ( ). 80 The Lahore session was supported by many Muslim leaders from various parts of India. In Calcutta session it was reiterated that the AIML was not prepared to give up separate electorates unless its conditions were fulfilled. The Punjab Muslim League was disaffiliated. Jinnah was elected the President of the AIML for the next three years. 81 The INC in its annual session at Madras, called for an All-Parties Conference to draft a Swaraj Constitution. 82 The All-Parties Conference which had started on 12 February 1928, at Delhi continued its day to day sittings till 22 February 1928 and formulated some proposals. The AIML, Jinnah group, appointed a 13 member committee 83 to confer with representatives of other organizations to press them to accept the Muslim proposals as embodied in the AIML resolution IV of Calcutta 1927 and to report the result to the council before proceeding with the framing of the constitution. The All Parties Conference was held on 8 March There was no agreement between Jinnah group and the Hindu Mahasabha on the separation of Sind and on reservation of seats. The Hindu Mahasabha rejected creation of a new province of Sind because it would increase the number of Muslim provinces and that would ultimately divide India into Hindu India and Muslim India. Jinnah group was left with no alternative but to withdraw. 84 In short all the agreements from Lucknow (1916) to Madras (1927) Pacts between the two communities were practically renounced. This indeed was the end of negotiations. The All-Parties Conference held at Lucknow from 28 to 31 August 1928, the resolution adopting the Nehru Report was moved by Lajpat Rai ( ) seconded by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad ( ) and supported among others by M. M. Malaviya, Maulana Shaukat Ali, Moulvi M. Yakub, Maulana Ahmad Shah, M. C. Chagla, Tufail Ahmad and Mrs. Sarojini Naidu ( ). However, both the Jinnah and Shafi groups, kept aloof from the Conference. The only prominent Muslim leader to oppose the Report at the Conference was Maulana Hasrat Mohani. 85 The Nehru Report discarded separate electorates and reservation of seats in 97

18 the Punjab and Bengal as desired by the AIML. The principle of weightage was also condemned. The separation of Sind and equal status as provinces to Baluchistan and NWFP though recommendation was made conditional i.e. subject to administrative and financial feasibility and implementation of the Nehru Report. One third Muslim seats in the central Legislature, already agreed to by Lucknow Pact of 1916 was dropped in spite of Shuaib Qureshi s ( ) note of dissent. In brief all the agreements reached on Hindu-Muslim unity were swept away and sacrificed at the altar of Hindu Mahasabha. The worst that the Nehru Committee could do was practically its recommendation for Unitary System of government instead of a truly federal one. 86 The UP All-Parties Muslim Conference and the Khilafat Conference condemned the Report. The Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Hind also broke away from the INC and joined the Muslim critics of the Report. 87 The Nehru Report led to the issuance of a manifesto at Simla signed by a large number of Muslim members of the central and provincial Legislatures on 10 September They made it clear that no constitution would be acceptable to the Muslim unless it provided effective and adequate protection of their interests. 88 This ultimately paved the way for the All Parties Muslim Conference (later on called All-India Muslim Conference, AIMC) held on 31 December 1928 and 1 January 1929 under the presidentship of the Aga Khan at Delhi. The Shafi Group of the AIML was very active in organizing this conference. Some Muslim leaders suggested postponement of the AIML session till after the AIMC at Delhi but Jinnah Group decided to hold the twentieth annual session on 26 to 28 December 1928 at Calcutta and the Raja Saheb of Mahmudabad was elected its President. 89 The Shafi Group proceeded with the AIMC at Delhi under the Aga Khan to provide the Muslims a common platform to formulate their united demands vis-à-vis, the Nehru Report. The Shafi Group did not hold any annual session after The AIML, Jinnah Group, held its twentieth annual session at Calcutta from 26 to 30 December 1928, under the presidentship of Raja Saheb of Mahmudabad. Resolution IV of the Jinnah Group regretted that it could not accept the invitation of the AIMC as that would be disastrous to Muslim interests if rival and ad hoc organizations were set up at every crisis in the history of the community. This resolution was opposed by 98

19 Fazlul Haq ( ). 90 Jinnah moved his amendments in the open session of the All Parties Convention on 28 December No progress was possible in the face of opposition by the Hindu Mahasabha. Mukund Ramrao Jayakar questioned the representative character of Jinnah and emphasized that Jinnah only represented a small minority of Muslims. If you do not settle this question today, we shall have to settle it tomorrow. The All Parties convention rejected Jinnah s amendments in the very presence of those INC leaders who had accepted the Delhi Muslim Proposals at Bombay and Madras claiming them to be in the forefront of the movement for Hindu Muslim Unity. When Jinnah s amendments to the Nehru Report were summarily rejected, the only natural course open to Jinnah was to concentrate on Muslim unity. Jinnah explored the possibility of unification of the two Leagues when he came to Delhi in February 1929 to attend the Legislative Assembly s winter session. Meanwhile Sir Shafi also happened to be in Delhi. Both the leaders met and after the meeting the two expressed themselves as satisfied with the views of each other and the prospects of unity appeared exceedingly hopeful. 91 The meeting of the Council of the Jinnah group was held on 28 March 1929, with Jinnah in the chair. It was attended by more than sixty members. The president initiated the discussion on the question of bringing unity in the ranks of the AIML. 92 After some discussion on the question of unity, the consideration of the matter was postponed to the following day, 29 March Meanwhile the Shafi League delegation consisting among others, of Sir Abdul Qadir, Dr. Iqbal, Nawab Muhammad Yousaf and Malik Firoz Khan Noon had been waiting in the adjacent room. 93 Informal discussions went on between the ten member delegation of the Shafi Group and an equal sized delegation of the Jinnah Group. The discussion proved inconclusive. 94 At the subsequent meeting of the council of Jinnah Group antagonistic spirit prevailed among the section of the members whose support for the Nehru Report was well known. 95 The President Jinnah, himself announced on behalf of the Shafi Group that 16 members of their party who were members of the AIML, were prepared to take part in the deliberations of the Council provided three members of their party who were not members of the AIML Council were admitted as members of the AIML Council. The Council failed to oblige

20 Jinnah in his address emphasized, if the Indian Muslims wanted their will to be registered then that could only be accomplished by united decision. Talking about his 15 point Resolution, he clarified that he had taken the idea from various persons. He had consulted various groups and schools of thoughts and prepared a draft which he thought would command the support of a large body of people. A committee was formed and the open session was adjourned to the next day 31 March The efforts to evolve an agreed formula continued till 31 March 1929, when the Council of the AIML Jinnah Group held its meeting in the morning where some 75 members were present. 98 Some of them were in favour of Nehru Report and other opposed it. 99 This proposal was not agreed to by a majority of the committee and some members including Ali Brothers, Shafi Daoodi, Moulvi Muhammad Yakub and Nawab Ismail Khan walked out of the subject committee and they went to Hakim Ajmal Khan s house where they held conference with other leaders and discussed Jinnah s draft resolution. 100 This walkout amounted to a further split in the AIML and was a split caused even in the Jinnah Group as well as the Subject Committee. 101 Shafi Group already staying away and a section of the Jinnah Group having walked out, Jinnah was left alone to fight the pro-nehru extremists in the AIML Council of Jinnah Group as best as he could. 102 When these negotiations broke down. Jinnah left for Hakim Ajmal Khan s house requesting Shah Zubair ( ) to continue the committee meeting. He also announced that the session of the AIML would commence at 4:30 p.m. 103 He asked Muhammad Yakub, Ali Brothers and their followers to return to the Subject Committee. He requested them to attend the open session of the AIML and help him to adjourn it. However, they did not agree. 104 Meanwhile the Subject Committee under Shah Zubair continued discussion on the resolutions. The pro-nehru Report group was in an overwhelming majority. The committee meeting concluded at 5 p.m. but the President who was busy in negotiations at Hakim Ajmal Khan s house had not yet arrived. Taking advantage of this Ali Imam proposed and T.A.K. Sherwani ( ) seconded that Dr. Muhammad Alam ( ) should preside over the session. They did not even bother to put the motion to vote and put Dr. Alam in the chair. At this Juncture a number of delegates moved their hands or sticks and shouted that they did not want Dr. Alam as President. Dr. Alam asked Abdur Rahman Ghazi to move his resolution 100

21 which he did without a speech seconded by T.A.K. Sherwani also without a speech, the uproar continued all the time. The Secretary AIML Dr. Kitchlew by now a well known pro-nehru Report informed Jinnah on his arrival that he himself was not satisfied with the manner in which the resolution was declared as passed. When Jinnah returned to the session he was greeted with cheers by the audience and immediately after that there was a pin drop silence. He addressed the audience and then adjourned the session till such a date as the Council of the AIML would decide. Then he returned to Hakim Ajmal Khan s house and continued his discussion with Maulvi Muhammad Yakub and Ali Brothers. Dr. Alam, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and T.A.K. Sherwani proceeded to Dr. Ansari s house. 105 The next meeting of the Council of the AIML Jinnah Group was held on 1 April It was chaired by Jinnah and attended by 59 members including those who had walked out of the Subject Committee meeting. In the meeting objection was raised on the constitutional grounds that the meeting was invalid because only the Secretary could call such a meeting who had not done so. The Secretary had failed to give any notice in spite of the president having specifically told him to intimate the members. He did not even inform those who were present at the headquarters. 106 On 31 October 1929 the Viceroy announced that a Round Table Conference (RTC) would be convened in London to settle the Indian political problems. Prominent Hindu leaders met the Viceroy on 23 December 1929 to clarify certain issues regarding the RTC but it failed because of the INC demand to make the Dominion status as the basis of the proposed RTC. Consequently the INC at its Lahore session passed resolution of complete independence for India and Nehru Report was declared lapsed. 107 The INC Working Committee on 2 January 1930, declared 26 January 1930, to be celebrated as Independence Day throughout India. Ali Brothers, Shafi Daoodi and Nawab Ismail Khan urged the Muslims not to participate in the INC led Independence Day demonstration on 26 January 1930, in the absence of any settlement on the Hindu Muslim question. 108 All this was enough to awake the AIML from its slumber from which it had been suffering since April, Under the 101

22 presidentship of Jinnah the Council of the AIML Jinnah Group held its meeting on 9 February 1930 and urged the government to fix and announce a date for the same. It demanded that NWFP be put on the same footing as other provinces. It appointed Moulvi Mohammad Yakub, Deputy President of the Legislative Assembly, as the Honorary Secretary of the AIML temporarily till the next election. 109 Another meeting of Jinnah Group Council was called for 23 February The real purpose of calling this Council Meeting was, however, given in the letter of Secretary AIML of 15 February 1930 to the members. It disclosed that Sir Shafi and Jinnah had met and discussed several questions of national importance and both the leaders had agreed to reunite and form a strong Muslim political organization. The two leaders agreed to call the meetings of their respective Councils simultaneously at the AIML office in Delhi on 23 February An urgent notice was issued on 20 February 1930, from league office shifting the date of Council Meeting from 23 to 28 February 1930, because of Sir Shafi s unavoidable professional engagements. His presence was extremely necessary to bring about unity between the two sections of the AIML. 111 On 28 February, after the Jumatul Wida Prayers, a meeting of the Council of the AIML was held at 3 p. m. in the office of the AIML with Jinnah as President. Members of both the sections of the AIML were present. Jinnah proposed a resolution that the two factions of the AIML are now united. It was cordially seconded by Sir Shafi. Thus, the two Leagues were united after their separation over two year s ago. 112 The A.I.M.L was the party claiming to be the sole representative of Muslim interests in India. In 1940 it had passed a resolution which unequivocally demanded self-determination for the Muslim majority provinces of India. Its aim was independence from both the prevailing British rule and also the seemingly imminent Hindu majority dominance of India after the departure of the British. It considered the Muslims of India to be not a minority but in fact a nation within a nation which was waging a struggle for its right to a nation of its own. M. A. Jinnah was the undisputed leader of A.I.M.L and since the party had garnered massive grassroots support thorough intense political mobilization, Jinnah emerged as the Quaid-i-Azam of the Indian Muslims

23 3.7 C.R Formula If the Muslims really want to go, well, let them go and take all that belongs to them. 114 These were the words of Chakravorti Rajagopalachari, the seasoned Madrassi chief minister who was the first top-tier Congress leader to publicly declare the inevitability of partition. 115 But being the first, Rajagopalachari was also quite alone in seeking a compromise with A.I.M.L over the final settlement. These views and others, like his advocacy of cooperation with the British in it s war efforts, had made him unpopular in the I.N.C. To bridge the gap in the Indian polity and present a unified front to gain independence from the British, Rajaji was prepared to contemplate partition of India and in keeping with this; he presented his formula for an agreement between Congress and the Muslim League. This formula called on both parties to accept points which could then help them formulate a plan for independence. After his release Gandhi proposed talks with Jinnah on his twonation theory an d negotingon issue of partition.thec.r Formulaacted as the basis for the negotiations. Gandhi and Jinnah met in September 1944 to ease the deadlock. Gandhi placed the C R formula his proposal to Jinnah. Both leaders deliberated at length and in hairsplitting detail their respective positions and possibilities of finding the common ground. In the although, the talks broke and no solution to the Hindu- Muslim question could be formulated. These negotiations shed great light on the political climate in India and the correspondence between Jinnah and Gandhi, which was exchanged in the duration of the talks remains an invaluable resource for those who wish to understand what the state of affairs were at the time. 116 Muslim Politics of Separation during British Rule the bargaining of separate homeland for Muslims and finally acceptance of Pakistan for Jinnah s mental and ego satisfaction has been critically analyzed in this chapter. He visualized the idea of Pakistan and used it as a political bargain to gain mileage over the congress, failing which he planned and manipulated the communal politics of hatred and violence which facilitated the creation of Pakistan and partition of India. 103

24 Map 3.1 INDIA BEFORE PARTITION Source: 104