The Sultan and the Revolution

Transcription

1 JOHN MONFRIES The Sultan and the Revolution One of the most famous events of the Indonesian Revolution is Sultan Hamengku Buwono s successful defiance of the Dutch occupation of his city of Yogyakarta from December 1948 to June It may be timely to re-examine the episode, bearing in mind that Hamengku Buwono s early career established the unusual constitutional arrangements in the Yogyakarta Special District which still remain in place today, nearly 60 years later. 2 In terms of power typologies, Hamengku Buwono s career presents a curious case. The Weberian distinctions charismatic, traditional and bureaucratic may perhaps be applied to him, as in some ways he presents as a traditional feudal ruler. In the Indonesian context, however, this would mean a category with only one member, because the other traditional rulers both in Sumatra and Java failed politically to survive the Revolution. Hamengku Buwono thus perhaps fits more usefully into the administrator solidaritymaker distinction proposed by Herbert Feith, 3 as his closest relationships, even as early as the Revolution period, were with administrators such as Hatta, Sjahrir, and Djuanda. But in the crucial year of 1949, his power, though 1 Research for this article, as part of research for a PhD degree, included several weeks at the Nationaal Archief in The Hague, the Centraal Archief Depot of the Dutch Ministry of Defence (cited below as MvD/CAD ), at NIOD Amsterdam on a six-week fellowship (gratefully acknowledged), and research in the NEFIS files still held in the Dutch Foreign Ministry; several visits to Jakarta and Yogyakarta, including visits to the Jakarta National Archives, the Yogyakarta Regional Archives, and the Yogyakarta Kraton archive, as well as some interviews. 2 Briefly, Yogyakarta remains a Special Region (and arguably also still a principality) within the Indonesian Republic, and Hamengku Buwono s son is concurrently Sultan and unelected provincial governor. This unique arrangement has come under challenge in recent years, and proposals for a new Law on Specialness for the Special Region led to an acrimonious debate in Yogyakarta during , which reached no definitive outcome. With the democratization across Indonesia, especially democratic elections of provincial governors, the arrangement in Yogyakarta looks increasingly anomalous, but local support for specialness seems to remain strong. 3 Feith 1962:32. The dichotomy proposed by Feith is almost forgotten today, as political scientists and historians seem to regard it as applicable only to early periods of decolonization. JOHN MONFRIES is a tutor in the Faculty of Asian Studies of the Australian National University (ANU). He graduated in Asian Studies, specialising in Indonesian, in the 1960s, and spent many years in the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, returning to ANU in 2001, where he undertook and completed a PhD in Indonesian history in He edited the book of the 2005 Annual Indonesian Update at ANU, Different societies, shared futures; Australia, Indonesia and the region, Singapore: ISEAS, He was also President of the Canberra branch of the Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA) from Dr Monfries is contactable at john.monfries@anu.edu.au. Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (BKI) 164-2/3 (2008): Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde

2 Dutch-Indonesian negotiations during the conference of Kaliurang near Yogyakarta, 12 April Left to right: Soegandi (adjutant of President Soekarno), Hamengkoe Boewono IX (Sultan of Yogyakarta), Abdoelkadir Widjojoatmodjo, A.K. Pringgodigdo (dir. cabinet of president Soekarno). (KITLV, )

3 The Sultan and the Revolution 271 strongly contested by the Dutch and by some dissident Republican forces, bore the stamp of the traditional type, and in fact he astutely used his ascribed status as Sultan in the service of the Republic during this critical period. The Dutch attack, launched on the early morning of 19 December 1948, was quickly successful, Yogyakarta was occupied, and the Dutch forces captured virtually the entire Republican leadership, including Soekarno, Hatta, Sjahrir and many others. The captives were quickly exiled to various locations, and the three mentioned above ended up on Bangka island. For the time being, Sultan Hamengku Buwono and the other important Yogyakarta prince, the Pakualam, were left alone in their palaces. As bombs rained down on the main streets and Dutch paratroops were landing at the airport, an emergency meeting of the Indonesian cabinet considered the options. Since Prime Minister Hatta was still in Kaliurang, where he had been conducting talks with UN Commission for Indonesia (UNCI) representatives, Hamengku Buwono volunteered to fetch him. At this stage Soekarno was still assuming that he and Hatta should take to the hills and try to evade capture (Mochtar 1982:70). Hamengku Buwono stopped briefly at his office to tell his officials to prepare a refuge for the central government in the Gunung Kidul area, as previously planned. 4 He drove off towards Kaliurang but encountered Hatta in Pakem Street (now Jalan Kaliurang) in the city, which was already under heavy Dutch bombardment, after which they returned to the presidential palace at about 11 a.m. By this time the cabinet meeting had apparently already concluded. Chief of Staff Colonel Simatupang had counselled the leadership to retreat to Wonosari (Yusra 1995:163), but Soekarno changed his mind about joining the guerrillas and decided to allow himself to be captured by the Dutch, because the army could not spare the full battalion of soldiers which, it was thought, would be needed to guard the leadership (Hatta 1981:295). Despite this and other rationales, many in the army regarded Soekarno s decision as cowardly, especially after his previous boasts about leading the guerrilla war himself if the Dutch were to attack again. 5 The Dutch government had calculated that a decisive strike would present the world with a fait accompli. But much of world opinion was outraged because the assault appeared to breach certain provisions of the UN-endorsed Renville Agreement of January The United States ambassador to the United Nations later told his Dutch colleague that this was the biggest mistake by the Netherlands in its entire history. 6 The Republic had greatly strength- 4 Four Princes Letter, p. 3, no. 157, Arsip Daerah Yogyakarta. This is a fascinating handwritten 18-page document dated 21 June 1950, a joint account by three Sultanate princes and one Pakualam an prince about the illegal civilian government during the Dutch occupation. 5 De terugkeer van de regering naar Jogja, pp. 28-9, CMI doc. no of July 1949, Bundle AA16, NEFIS 1948/1949, MvD/CAD. 6 NIB, XVII:255.

4 272 John Monfries ened its standing in Washington by its suppression of the Madiun revolt a few months before (Reid 1974:146; McMahon 1981:290). In late December and again in January 1949, the Security Council called for the release immediately and unconditionally [of] all political prisoners arrested since 17 December 1948, and [ ] the immediate return of [Republican] officials to Yogyakarta. 7 The Dutch resisted, but their position steadily eroded both on the ground in Indonesia and in their relations with the United States. After the meeting of 19 December, Hamengku Buwono walked back alone to the palace. In what looks in retrospect like a brilliantly calculated political strategy, he resolved to isolate himself in the palace, refusing contact with Dutch officials or emissaries, while running a clandestine government behind the scenes. He told his brother Prabuningrat to listen to Dutch statements and messages and to report back, but to make no comment or response (Kahin 1982:177). He refused to meet federalist emissaries such as Professor Husein Djajadiningrat and Sultan Hamid II of Pontianak, 8 as well as senior Dutch officials. 9 While the phones were still working on the morning of 19 December, officials outside Yogyakarta were told to prepare to administer an illegal government. Hamengku Buwono and the Pakualam would stay in the city; civilian officials should remain in their areas and should try to avoid capture by Dutch troops; they should expect regular visits from couriers using code words who would bring oral instructions and information; all provincial offices would remain closed until the Sultan ordered otherwise. 10 The invisible government functioned with varying degrees of success in different areas; it was notably active and successful in Sleman regency, featuring effective cooperation between the civilian regent (Prodjodiningrat) and the local military leaders Colonel Djatikusumo and Lieutenant Colonel Soeharto. 11 A Dutch official admitted that out of 10,000 public servants in the Special Region, only 150 were cooperating, and these were doing so on the Sultan s orders, to ensure that basic services would still operate (Kahin 1982:177). In the first few days after the attack, numerous locals had reported for work at Dutch-run offices because many were short of food, but interest had quickly dwindled when the Sultan s attitude became known NIB, XVII: Mochtar 1982:75. With the help of mostly pliant local leaders known as the federalists, the Dutch had formed a series of mini-states or negara outside Republican areas during 1946 and Four Princes Letter, p. 5, no. 157, Arsip Daerah Yogyakarta. 10 Four Princes Letter, p. 4, no. 157, Arsip Daerah Yogyakarta. 11 Records of civilian-military meetings during April-August 1949, chaired by Djatikusumo, no. 165, Arsip Daerah Yogyakarta. 12 Four Princes Letter, p. 8 (part IV), no. 157, Arsip Daerah Yogyakarta. Also column in Nasional weekly (Jakarta),

5 The Sultan and the Revolution 273 One risk for Hamengku Buwono s strategy soon emerged as pamphlets circulated in Yogyakarta accusing him of collaboration. 13 This could be refuted by pointing out that he had met no Dutch officials, but as described below he was eventually obliged to speak out. Another risk was that the local population would tire of waiting for a public declaration from him and would turn against him. Indeed, many groups in the community asked him to provide leadership again. 14 He responded that he would consider resuming his position if the people wished it. The Dutch were another potential threat, but Hamengku Buwono banked on their toleration, as he was aware of their hopes to win him over because of his prestige in the region. Kahin (1961:176) mentions that the slogan of the December 1948 attack was to capture Yogyakarta and free the Sultan. Right up to the first direct meeting with Dutch officials in March, the Sultan s silence could be, and was, misinterpreted by the Dutch in self-serving ways. Flawed perceptions of the Sultan were fed by misleading intelligence in the weeks leading up to the attack. In November 1948, Minister of the Colonies E.M.J.A. Sassen quoted a local adviser (Raden Abdulkadir Widjojoatmodjo, the most senior official of Indonesian ethnic origin on the Dutch side) as predicting that just before or immediately after action taken by our side, the Sultan of Yogyakarta would take power in the Republic. This would make the appearance and consequences of our action much less unacceptable internationally. 15 Chief of Staff Major General D.C. Buurman van Vreeden asserted baldly (without giving evidence) that the Sultan is anti- Republican. 16 After the occupation of Yogyakarta, Sassen proposed to High Representative of the Crown L.J.M. Beel in Batavia: it is essential to have a Republican spokesman (for example the Sultan) indicate publicly as soon as possible that the Republic and the people reject foreign interference [in the Indonesia question]. 17 But Beel as the man on the spot had a greater grasp of reality and curtly dismissed this as totally illusory. 18 A senior Foreign Ministry official wrote nevertheless, [ ] it is of the greatest importance that figures such as Soekarno, Hatta, the Sultan of Jogja, Juanda, Leimena and so on (among whom we must not be too choosy) should cooperate [ ] in the formation of the new 13 Samenvatting van gegevens betreffende de Sultan van Djokja, 18 April 1949, p. 1, inv. no. 695, Hoofdkwartier Generale Staf, MvD/CAD. 14 NEFIS Weekly Report, 24 January 1949, p. 9, Bundle AA15, MvD/CAD. Also CMI report by J.A. Gulden of 19 January 1949, reporting a petition to the Sultan to lead the people again, AA21, MvD/CAD. 15 Sassen to Stikker, 12 November 1948, NIB, XV: Report by Buurman van Vreeden, 7 November 1948, inv. no. 27, Collectie Spoor, NA Sassen to Beel, 19 December 1948, NIB, XVI: Beel to Sassen, 22 December 1948, NIB, XVI:249.

6 274 John Monfries Republican government. 19 Although the intelligence service was reporting that the Sultan s attitude could not be ascertained, 20 Prime Minister W. Drees felt able to report after a visit to Batavia in January, on advice from Sultan Hamid, that [We should arrange] for Sjahrir to join the interim government, that the Sultan of Jogja should take the lead in Central Java, [ ] while Soekarno and Hatta remain out of action for the time being [ ]. 21 Dutch officials generally assumed that their triumph in capturing Yogyakarta was decisive, and the demoralized Republicans would have no choice but to cooperate. Beel reported that the Mangkunegoro and the Susuhunan of Solo are prepared to cooperate. This cannot however be disclosed in the Security Council, as this could adversely influence the attitude of the Sultan of Jogja, [ ] who has not yet positively declared his readiness to cooperate. 22 Beel mentioned Sultan Hamid s planned visit to Yogyakarta. But Hamengku Buwono refused to meet his fellow Sultan. Drees commented: The impression was that he was adopting a wait-and-see attitude, because he first wanted to know what his position would be as an autonomous ruler, [ ] what the position of the Republic would be, and what the Security Council would do. 23 Some of these explanations seem realistic enough, but they still imply that his role would be separable from the Republic. So the Dutch cabinet continued to hope. Foreign Minister D.U. Stikker reported that: It is conceivable that Central Java will come under the administration of the Sultan of Yogyakarta and other Republican ministers, such as Leimena, etc. [ ]. With some flexibility solutions can be found. 24 In the meantime, however, the guerrilla fighters were increasingly active. The first major attack in Yogyakarta city occurred as early as 29 December, only ten days after the Dutch occupation (Elson 2001:31). Further night attacks occurred on 9 and 16 January, 25 and 4 February (SESKOAD 1985:196). A Dutch visitor likened Yogyakarta to a city under siege. 26 Hamengku Buwono declares his position On 21 January, Hamengku Buwono and the Pakualam formally resigned as head and deputy head of the Yogyakarta region (Kahin 1961:213). Hamengku Buwono s letter said: 19 Note of 24 December 1948, by Secretary General of Foreign Ministry Lovink, NIB, XVI: Note by CMI director Somer, 22 December 1948, NIB, XVI: Report by Drees on his visit, 15 January 1949, NIB, XVI: Beel to Sassen, 10 January 1949, NIB, XVI: Note by Drees, 11 January 1949, NIB, XVI: Report by Stikker to Drees, 19 January 1949, NIB, XVII: Soeharto claimed to have devised and led the whole series of attacks (Nasution 1983:325). 26 Attachment to doc. 401, report of 4 January 1946 (must mean 1949), by Teunissen (director Java Bank), NIB, XVI.

7 The Sultan and the Revolution 275 Reports in the press that I am cooperating with the Dutch are a lie. [ ] I cannot approve of the Dutch action towards our Republic. I cannot work to safeguard the peace and welfare of the people of Yogyakarta because of brutal actions of the Dutch towards the people. [ ] I am prepared to face any action the Dutch will employ towards me, but it is for [them] to understand that my attitude is a result of their actions. 27 The letter was circulated clandestinely in Java and became known in Jakarta by early February (David Lee 1998:192). While it gives no specific evidence for the claims of brutal behaviour by the invading troops, sufficient facts exist to substantiate the charges. Kahin (1961:412) writes of Dutch tactics which were alienating the Indonesian population, [ ][such as] increasingly frequent machine-gunning of villages near the roads to make sure that no guerrillas were lurking there [ ]. Indonesian sources have plausibly interpreted the resignations as an effort to disclaim responsibility for local administration and thus make it more difficult for the Dutch to demand cooperation. 28 Meanwhile, at Friday prayers the imam of the grand mosque in Yogyakarta read out Hamengku Buwono s message to continue the struggle with undiminished courage, because the Javanese/Indonesian people must be free. 29 A few days later, in refusing to meet two federalists, Hamengku Buwono wrote to local commander Van Langen that he could not meet anyone without first having the opportunity to talk with Soekarno, Hatta and other colleagues. 30 Reporting this to Beel, General Spoor asked pertinently whether there remained any sense in continuing [ ] these attempts to contact Hamengku Buwono. 31 By this time Dutch leaders were indeed showing signs of concern at their failure to bring any Republicans to their side. Drees reported that contrary to expectations, none of the moderate Republicans, such as the Sultan of Jogja, seem prepared to engage in meaningful discussions [ ]. 32 In this period, Dutch officials appear to have offered Hamengku Buwono the presidency of the planned Central Java federal state, or perhaps even more prestigious posts, 33 all of which the Sultan rejected. While there is a 27 Dutch records contain a translation of a Javanese-language document which is very similar but not identical to this document. Document of 17 January 1949 headed De stem van de Republiek, Bundle AA22, NEFIS , MvD/CAD. 28 Department of Education and Culture 1989:45. The Four Princes Letter, p. 8, no. 157, Arsip Daerah Yogyakarta, says that they remained simply leaders of the people of Mataram. 29 De zegen en de reden van Z E de Sultan, 24 January 1949, NEFIS 1949, AA21, MvD/CAD. The term Javanese/ Indonesian people may be a quirk of NEFIS translation. 30 Beel to Sassen, 26 January 1949, NIB, XVII: Beel to Sassen, 26 January 1949, NIB, XVII:242, note Beel to Sassen, 3 February 1949, NIB, XVII: Kahin (1961:398), seemingly referring to the January-February period. Available supporting evidence for the claimed approaches is thin, but United States reports have one suggestive indication in a report of 27 April: Referring story Sultan approached from Netherlands sources

8 276 John Monfries baffling lack of clear supporting evidence in the Dutch archives, 34 the unanimity about the offers among Indonesians in a position to know, including Hamengku Buwono himself, make it likely that offers of some kind were indeed made. 35 Hamengku Buwono had issued further instructions to the illegal apparatus in late January or early February: The Dutch will definitely leave Yogyakarta at some stage. The people must remain patient and united. The local populace should evacuate all places occupied by the Dutch, to facilitate attacks by the TNI. Any Dutch-appointed officials should be abducted (or worse). 36 The people should refuse to use federal currency and only use Republican currency. Food supplies should not be prevented from entering Yogyakarta city, so that the city s population should not starve. Local government in rural areas should be as autonomous as possible. (During January regional civil servants had somehow been provided with four months pay, to tide them over the crisis period.) 37 The regent of Sleman was appointed Special Deputy Head of the Special Region, to manage the illegal government in areas free of Dutch control. 38 On 22 February, Dutch soldiers raided the Sultan s main office building (the Kepatihan), and discovered some of the secret instructions. 39 Spoor reported that Hamengku Buwono had seriously compromised himself by issuing orders to isolate Dutch troops through a blockade system, to spread anti- Dutch rumours, to abduct or even assassinate two village chiefs in Bantul who view taking over matters law and order Jogja residency, Van Royen said possible one or more approaches may have been made to Sultan some weeks ago [February? March?] when Netherlands officials in Batavia hoped a daerah [region] might be formed out of that area. Report by Consul General Livengood, 27 April 1949, FRUS 1950: NIB, XVII, which includes the period of early February quoted by Kahin, has no reference to these approaches, nor have I found direct evidence of the offers in the Dutch archives mentioned above. 35 Hamengku Buwono refers to these offers in the Asiaweek interview, 4 May 1986 (Vol. 12, no. 18), p. 60. But from December 1948 to March 1949, Dutch archives including cabinet documents are full of references to the need to contact the Sultan, and to win him over, but with no reference to inducements in NIB, XVI, see for example pp. 11, 238, 379, 525, 579, 613, 619, and XVII, pp. 24, 217, 587, Four Princes Letter, p. 10, no. 157, Arsip Daerah Yogyakarta. 37 Unmarried civil servants received ƒ7.50 per week, while married ones received ƒ15.00 per week during this period, according to Van Kaam, Natijd lists, p. 108, NIOD Four Princes Letter, pp. 9-11, no. 157, Arsip Daerah Yogyakarta. See the reference above to the effectiveness of the Republican network in Sleman. 39 Belanda Serbu Jogja, in Siasat weekly magazine, Year VII, ; Suwarno 1994:247.

9 The Sultan and the Revolution 277 were cooperating with the Dutch, 40 an indication of his support for a holy war (perang sabil) by Muslim groups, 41 and the resolute continuation of the guerrilla struggle. 42 The Dutch had learnt that he was holding twice-weekly cabinet meetings with those ministers still in Yogyakarta (Juanda and Koesnan) and several members of the KNIP, the Republic s parliament, and that he was providing monetary support to the resistance leaders, Lieutenant Colonel Latief and Lieutenant Colonel Soeharto. 43 By the end of February, Dutch officials were losing patience. Resident of Yogyakarta E.M. Stok suggested: The Sultan must be advised that the Republic and its government no longer exist [ ]. [If he rejects this], he should be deactivated and if necessary exiled [...]. We must then look for another Sultan. 44 This illustrates not only unwillingness to recognize that times had changed, but also the rigidity characterizing the thinking which led to the attack in December The new Minister for Overseas Territories J.H. van Maarseveen agreed that Beel could occupy the Kraton [palace] and replace the Sultan if the situation deteriorated. 45 Stok s advocacy of deposing and exiling Hamengku Buwono recalls the removal by the Dutch of the Sultan s ancestor Hamengku Buwono II in the early nineteenth century, and his subsequent exile during the British interregnum (Ricklefs 1981:108-9). The Dutch were apparently actively seeking a replacement for the Sultan, and some Indonesian sources admit that various members of his family were tempted by Dutch promises. 46 An account by the Sultan reveals the growing tension in Yogyakarta: 47 A week before 1 March I already knew that relations with the Dutch would soon erupt, because up to then I had not received a single Dutch official. They were committing many provocations, the greatest of which was the raid on the Kepatihan building, which they had thoroughly looted. [ ] The attack by our people occurred on 1 March at 6 a.m. I thought if they [the Dutch] were smart, they would use this attack as an excuse. [ ] And I was right. 40 Spoor to Beel, 24 February 1949, NIB, XVII:672. The word used was disrobot, meaning to kidnap (or perhaps kill ). 41 See NEFIS/CMI files in Dutch Foreign Ministry, inv. no , 25 February This document, however, long predated the Dutch attack. 42 NIB, XVII: NIB, XVII: NIB, XVII:671, note Van Maarseveen to Beel, 1 March 1949, NIB, XVIII: The late Professor Selosoemardjan, in an interview on 31 July 2002, confirmed that some of the uncles (not further specified) were considering cooperation with the Dutch. 47 Mochtar 1982:85. Letter of 26 March 1949 to Sudjono (secretary to the Republican delegation in Jakarta).

10 278 John Monfries The General Offensive Hamengku Buwono heard a radio broadcast about an important UN Security Council meeting scheduled for early March (Wild and Carey 1986:188), and contacted General Sudirman proposing a major assault, to demonstrate internationally the continued potency of the Republic s military arm. Sudirman suggested that he contact the local commander, Lieutenant Colonel Soeharto. Around 14 February 1949, the Sultan received Soeharto, 48 who entered the palace disguised as a palace official. 49 They discussed a major counterattack, and Soeharto devised an operational plan with a speed and efficiency which impressed Hamengku Buwono (Wild and Carey 1986:189). This was a momentous meeting as it turned out, because it was Hamengku Buwono s first contact with Indonesia s future second president; but it was unimaginable then that this humble young village man would eventually appoint Hamengku Buwono, immeasurably his social superior, as his vice-president. At 6 a.m. on 1 March, therefore, in what was to become known as the Serangan Umum or General Offensive, several thousand TNI soldiers attacked Yogyakarta, and fought their way onto the main street. 50 Indonesian losses were said to be very severe, variously estimated at nearly 200 to as many as The Dutch losses were seven soldiers killed and fourteen wounded. 52 By early afternoon, the Sultan heard of Dutch reinforcements arriving from Magelang, and suggested to Soeharto that his forces withdraw. 53 The Dutch concluded that the attack was intelligently organized and revealed central direction, probably from the kraton. 54 The next day, Dutch officials led by Central Java commander General Meijer had a stormy meeting with Hamengku Buwono, at which Meijer confronted him with the evidence of his illegal activities. The Sultan was defiant; he had expected to be arrested and had even brought a bag of clothes. 55 The visitors recorded that he gave evidence of considerable emotion, and his appearance unshaven, wearing sandals showed that he wished to accentuate the involuntary nature of the meeting. He announced that he was abdicating as Sultan because of Dutch provocations, adding I didn t ask you gentlemen to come to Yogyakarta. He added that if the kraton were to be ransacked like the 48 Asiaweek interview, (Vol. 12, no. 18), p Prabuningrat document, an untitled and undated three-page account of Hamengku Buwono IX s conduct in 1948 and 1949 written personally by Prabuningrat (early 1980s?), typescript, p Nasution (1979:95) quotes Dutch sources (not otherwise identified) as saying that about 2,000 Indonesians were involved. See also Elson 2001: Elson 2001:36. Confusingly, no detailed breakdown of fatalities and wounded is given. 52 Aneta Mochtar 1982:79; Wild and Carey 1986:190-1; and Asiaweek interview, (Vol. 12, no. 18), p MvD/CAD, Hoofdkwartier Generale Staf, inv. no. 695, 2 March 1949, p Prabuningrat document, an untitled and undated three-page account of Hamengku Buwono IX s conduct in 1948 and 1949 written personally by Prabuningrat (early 1980s?), typescript, p. 2.

11 The Sultan and the Revolution 279 Kepatihan building, he would prefer to die first. 56 The meeting ended inconclusively, but Hamengku Buwono had reaffirmed his non-cooperative stance. His defiance of the Dutch, commonly presented as his saying they would enter the kraton over my dead body, became one of the legends of the Revolution. Although Republican claims to have nearly captured Yogyakarta can be discounted (Kahin 1961:411; Elson 2001:36), the attack was taken very seriously by the Dutch authorities. 57 While it was just one of a series of incessant raids across Java during this turbulent period, it was probably the boldest, and played its part in convincing the outside world, the federalists, and ultimately the Dutch that the Indonesian nationalist movement could not be overcome. Hamengku Buwono s significant role remained widely known, and contributed to the prestige he acquired as an important figure in the Revolution. The Javanese king The meeting of 2 March 1949, which is so often taken as an example of the model behaviour of an Indonesian patriot, might also be seen as a case study of the behaviour of a Javanese king. Much has been written about Javanese conceptions of power and kingship, 58 and the Sultan s performance during this episode might be seen in these terms. We cannot go into this in any detail here, but some elements of the behaviour of an ideal Javanese king might be relevant. According to the literature on this subject, a Javanese king should weigh his words carefully because they cannot be taken back, 59 should prefer diplomacy to fighting (Kumar 1997:383), and should understand the benefits of and frequently practise tapa (asceticism). 60 During this episode, the Sultan could be seen in Javanese terms as first cutting himself off from the world and performing meditation and selfabnegation in the kraton (a form of tapa). Stories about Indic princes are full of episodes where the subject retreats from the world (usually in a forest or on a mountaintop), builds up virtue and strength, and then emerges to confound and defeat his enemies. 61 By remaining incommunicado in his palace, the Sultan could be seen as exercising tapa in order to gain mystical knowledge of God s will (Moertono 1968:40). 56 NIB, XVII: Beel to The Hague, 1 March 1949, NIB, XVIII:16. It was the only attack to cause Beel to send Spoor to Yogyakarta to investigate the situation in person. 58 See for example Anderson 1972; Kumar 1997; Ricklefs 1981; Soemarsaid Moertono 1968; Moedjanto Sabda pandita ora kena wola-wali see Moedjanto 1987: Kumar 1997:394-5, 404. Moertono (1968:66) renders tapa as ascetic practice. 61 The most famous mythical example is King Yudhistira in the Mahabharata epic, exiled with his brothers for 14 years.

12 280 John Monfries In terms of the correct behaviour of an ideal Javanese king, the Sultan no doubt did a creditable job at his meeting with the Dutch officials. Although allowing his agitation to be evident to the Dutch, he repelled his base desires (one of which is anger), retained his self-control, and was able to make several cogent points. The statement I didn t ask you gentlemen to come to Yogyakarta is especially telling. In refusing their demands and in successfully asking to be left in peace while remaining stiffly correct if not wholly polite, he approximated ideal behaviour (Anderson 1972:44, 50). His Javanese halus-ness contrasted with the kasar (coarse) behaviour of General Meijer. The Sultan made his arguments with the minimum number of words, none of which he had to take back. It might be argued that in Javanese terms he subdued his enemy without fighting, the most convincing possible sign of his high standing. Another way of looking at this incident is in terms of the wayang shadow play. The Dutch could be seen as the Kurawas in the Mahabharata epic who had usurped the kingdom and had to be defeated by the noble Pandawas (the Republic). 62 Alternatively, they could be seen as the buta (ogres) or raseksa (giants) from tanah sabrang (lands across the sea), who by invading Yogyakarta had disturbed the kingdom s natural harmony. 63 The Sultan had been powerless to stop this, but it was his right and duty to do everything possible to regain harmony by restoring the status quo ante. Hence he would surreptitiously aid the resistance fighters, refuse to meet the Dutch and thus deny them legitimacy, and when brought to bay, would face them off I didn t ask you to come. Effects and aftermath Three weeks after the General Offensive, a Dutch cabinet paper provides the clearest available statement of the official Dutch attitude: 64 If there is something which the Netherlands authorities had not expected, it is this the Sultan of Yogyakarta has slipped through our fingers. It was known that he had established good relations with the Republic [ ] but the Netherlands authorities had conceived this [ ] as a more or less forced compliance, convinced that [ ] no mutual understanding could exist between [the radical Republic and the feudal Sultan]. It was thus expected that if the Netherlands could overcome the Republic, this would be a great relief for the Sultan and that an agreement with him could be reached. 62 For the Dutch as Kurawas, see Dahm 1969: In the Javanese world-view great store is set on harmony. See, for example, Anderson 1972:51; Quinn 1992: This unsigned document was apparently prepared for the Dutch cabinet meeting of 21 March 1949, headed De houding van de Sultan van Yogyakarta (The standpoint of the Sultan of Yogyakarta). From bundle labelled GS/45-54/390 among papers passed to David Lee (DFAT Historical Documents Section) in 2000 by P.J. Drooglever of the Netherlands History Institute, The Hague.

13 The Sultan and the Revolution 281 The paper laments Hamengku Buwono s subversive activities, but adds that the Netherlands had maintained its lenient attitude up to now, without giving reasons for doing so. Then the paper concedes: That the Sultan, unlike the other Javanese rulers, had been able to maintain his position vis-à-vis the Republic and had continued to be respected by the people, certainly demonstrated great statesmanship on the part of this relatively young man, who a decade ago was called to his princely throne from the Leiden University student body without any transition period. 65 Surprisingly, the paper adds: The hope to achieve cooperation with him should nevertheless not yet be abandoned, claiming that if matters had gone better for us [ ], he could [then] have shown willingness to cooperate, while in the meantime he could sound out the public reaction to the cooperation [offered so far]. 66 A report by Hamengku Buwono on the General Offensive and the 2 March meeting soon reached the Republican delegation in Jakarta and became known to the rest of the Republican leaders. 67 One result of the General Offensive and other widespread TNI activity was that it further daunted the federalists. Their representatives had visited the Republican leaders imprisoned on Bangka, and had been impressed by their confident refusal to negotiate unless they could return to Yogyakarta. Then came the news that the TNI was daring enough to mount a frontal assault on Yogyakarta city (Kahin 1961:411; Elson 2001:40). The BFO passed a resolution on 3 March calling on the Dutch to restore the Republican leaders to Yogyakarta. Beel, who was not used to disobedience from the federalists and whose Beel Plan was based on establishing a puppet federal government without allowing the Republicans to return to their capital, even considered resigning. 68 The representatives of the Indonesian Republic in New York publicized the General Offensive as widely and quickly as they could. 69 Although the effect the news had cannot be known with any precision, the knowledge that the Dutch were unable to pacify Java must have made some impression on UN delegates. Three weeks later a resolution was passed in the Security Council which came to be known as the Canadian Resolution. Although this was considered as much too weak by Republicans (Kahin 1961:413), it did have the effect of reinforcing the Council s similar resolution of January Cabinet paper, from bundle labelled GS/45-54/390, passed to David Lee (DFAT Historical Documents Section) in 2000 by P.J. Drooglever of the Netherlands History Institute, The Hague. 66 Cabinet paper, from bundle labelled GS/45-54/390, p. 2, passed to David Lee (DFAT Historical Documents Section) in 2000 by P.J. Drooglever of the Netherlands History Institute, The Hague. 67 The report seems to have reached the addressee, Sudjono, in Jakarta by early February; sources do not reveal how it reached him. One reason for Hamengku Buwono to produce this report was to clear himself of any imputation of collaboration with the Dutch. 68 David Lee 1998:xv-xvi. Some will dispute that the Beel Plan was aimed at establishing a puppet government, but at least to the Republicans the Beel Plan certainly looked like another effort to exclude them from power. 69 SESKOAD 1985:129. But Security Council records of 1949 contain no specific reference to the General Offensive. See UNSC 1949.

14 282 John Monfries Perhaps more significantly, threats were rising in the American Congress against aid to the Netherlands, and by March the Dutch were conceding that the Republican government might be restored to Yogyakarta under certain conditions. 70 The Dutch-language press too was reporting the idea of a conditional return of the Republican leaders (Het Dagblad ). The United States official attitude also firmed around this time. The State Department was describing Dutch (and French) colonial policies as follows: (1) anti-historical in direction; (2) an economic drain on and political liability for us; (3) a vain and insupportable extravagance for the Dutch and the French; (4) a drag on the economic and military revitalisation of Western Europe [ ] (8) doomed to ultimate failure (McMahon 1981:290). The report concluded that the United States interest was the creation of a sovereign Indonesian state which will satisfy the fundamental demands of militant nationalism [ ] (McMahon 1981:290). Secretary of State Dean Acheson told the Dutch Foreign Minister that the Congress would certainly not authorize military assistance to the Netherlands if the Indonesian question remained unresolved. The Americans kept up steady pressure on the Dutch from then on (McMahon 1981:290), and it soon became evident that new and serious negotiations would have to commence and that the Republican leaders would be restored to Yogyakarta (De Beus 1977:103). The Sultan had an important role in arranging the latter enterprise. How loyal was Hamengku Buwono? Some reports have emerged over the years that Hamengku Buwono flirted with collaboration at this time or earlier. In view of the persistence of these claims it may be useful to explore the evidence. For example, Dutch records refer to a mysterious conversation between General Spoor and a brother of Hamengku Buwono in February 1948, 71 apparently in the context of Abdulkadir s plans to involve the Sultan in creating a negara of Central Java. A subsequent report, as noted earlier, claims that the contact in February was a feeler from Hamengku Buwono to the effect that if the Dutch were to attack Yogyakarta, he (Hamengku Buwono) would take power in the Republic. 72 Read literally, such an approach looks like an invita- 70 Letter of 8 March 1949 from Stikker to British Foreign Minister Bevin. From bundle labelled GS/45-54/390 among papers passed to David Lee (DFAT Historical Documents Section) by P.J. Drooglever of the Netherlands History Institute, The Hague. 71 Sassen to Stikker, 3 November 1948, NIB, XV:573. No direct report of the alleged conversation can be found in NIB, XII: and XIII:1-120, which cover February 1948; these sections contain no references to Hamengku Buwono. 72 Sassen to Stikker, 7 November 1948, NIB, XV:613.

15 The Sultan and the Revolution 283 tion to the Dutch to launch an attack. But the difficulty in assessing this report is its vagueness. Even if we assume that some kind of indirect contact indeed took place, the intention of one side may have been misunderstood by the other. At various times in 1949, self-appointed intermediaries such as the leading federalist Sultan Hamid II and the senior Republican Interior Ministry official, Hermani, advised Dutch officials that Hamengku Buwono was, or had been, considering cooperating with them. Hermani told Resident Stok in February that although Hamengku Buwono was at present not cooperating with the Dutch, 73 he privately favoured the policies of the conservative PIR party, which supposedly took a more cooperative line. 74 Later, Hermani claimed that the Sultan did not object to cooperation with the Dutch; on the contrary, the Sultan himself regards cooperation as a very real requirement for the reconstruction of an independent Indonesia and he shall, as far as his position allows it, be pleased to engage in such cooperation. 75 A key point here is the meaning attached to the word cooperation ; in other words, did it mean collaboration rather than just cooperation? In the circumstances at the time (late March), clearly it did not. A further piece of evidence was that around August 1949, well after the crucial period, Sultan Hamid reported Hamengku Buwono as saying that the Dutch had erred in a. not making him sign an instrument of surrender [ ], and b. not sending him into exile. Then he would have come over to the Dutch side (Drooglever 1996:17, note 19). In both these cases, the problem is not only vagueness but also doubtful provenance. After initially giving some credence to Hermani, the Dutch themselves came to have doubts about his reliability, 76 and in any case Hamengku Buwono s remarks as reported by Hermani are ambiguous. Various reasons exist to question Sultan Hamid s reliability, 77 and it seems improbable that in 1949 Hamengku Buwono would have trusted Hamid whom he had known for many years but now regarded with suspicion as a Dutch puppet to the extent of making such remarks to him Drooglever 1996:9. Quoting a document in the Stok archive at the Nationaal Archief. 74 Drooglever 1996:9. The implication here that Hermani represented Hamengku Buwono in some sense must be open to some doubt. 75 Drooglever 1996:9. Also NIB, XVIII:185 (18 March 1949). 76 Spoor to Beel, 30 March 1949, NIB, XVIII:282, note 1 marginal note by Koets, Alas, the reliability of Hermani s reporting is not always 100%. 77 We saw above Hamid s inaccurately optimistic assessment of Hamengku Buwono s position in January 1949 report by Drees on his visit to Indonesia, 15 January 1949, NIB XVI: In his early years, Hamengku Buwono had attended the same primary school as Hamid, and had met him again when they were both studying in the Netherlands in the 1930s. On his later attitude towards Hamid, see his testimony at Hamid s treason trial in 1953 (Persadja 1955:98, 100). This is admittedly after the Revolution period, but it shows that Hamengku Buwono was suspicious of Hamid by January 1950; his lack of trust of the federalists (common enough among Republicans) must have existed well before this.

16 284 John Monfries The one genuinely puzzling document along these lines is a report by Berkhuysen, Assistant Resident of Central Java, on a conversation with Prabuningrat on 11 April Berkhuysen reports Prabuningrat as saying: a. that the Sultan felt personally bound to Soekarno, but circumstances might arise where the bond could be loosened [ ], b. the Dutch (or perhaps the UN) should ask the Sultan which areas of Java he wished to take responsibility for [ ], c. as a result of such a process, the Sultan would stand above the other Republican leaders. 79 Since this report relates to the period when the Dutch had given up hope of preventing a return by the Republican leaders to Yogyakarta, Hamengku Buwono could hardly have been offering to side with the Dutch; but the reference to standing above other Republican leaders is surprising. The prestige of the main civilian leadership, especially Soekarno, was clouded because they had tamely allowed themselves to be captured in December 1948; their standing among TNI leaders was low, 80 and alternative political leadership was perhaps being considered by Republicans in Yogyakarta; there were claims that Hamengku Buwono s popularity exceeded that of the Soekarno- Hatta leadership, at least in Java; 81 the circle around Hamengku Buwono may have had their own aspirations for their leader; but all this can only be speculation in the absence of clearer evidence. Some Dutch intelligence reports indicated suspicions in military quarters that Hamengku Buwono wanted to be president. 82 Dutch reports regularly claimed that Hamengku Buwono desired the maximum autonomy for his own region, as separate as possible from the Republic. 83 Unfortunately, these reports, though voluminous and often useful, usually exaggerated any signs of dissension in the Republican camp. Nevertheless, if there was a push in some Republican circles to have Hamengku Buwono replace Soekarno, few Indonesians after the Revolution would have wished to admit it. But another possible explanation for the phrase standing above other Republican leaders suggests itself. At this stage (early April), Hamengku Buwono was concerned to ensure that his word carried as much weight as possible in the confused circumstances of Central Java. The term Republican 79 Berkhuysen report, 11 April 1949, NIB, XVIII:413. The report is written in a staccato style which does not aid efforts to discern its meaning. 80 Military respect for civilian authority was gravely weakened during this period, with results that have been obvious ever since (Reid 1974:155). 81 NIB, XIV: NEFIS Weekly Report no. 7, 3 March 1949, p. 3, NEFIS 1949, Bundle AA15, MvD/CAD. Officials of the former Parindra party agitated for the Sultan to become leader of the newly mooted United States of Indonesia, NEFIS Weekly Report of 24 March 1949, p. 3, NEFIS 1949, Bundle AA15, MvD/CAD. 83 Elson 2001:33. Dutch ideas about Hamengku Buwono s supposed ambitions were put to the UNCI, but met with scepticism from the Australian UNCI representative Critchley (FRUS 1949:415), cable of 26 May 1949 from Cochran.

17 The Sultan and the Revolution 285 leaders may in fact refer only to local leaders in the area and not to the exiled Republican leadership on Bangka; and this approach to the Dutch may have been connected to Hamengku Buwono s request to Hatta the previous month for a full-powers letter to enable him to negotiate with the Dutch as well as to strengthen his authority vis-à-vis other centres of power, including the military. 84 Claims that Hamengku Buwono was playing his own game are not consistent with his actual behaviour, including his close relationship with Hatta in particular. 85 His subsequent conduct in arranging the return of Soekarno and Hatta and organizing the ceasefire do not conform with an ambition to stand above other leaders. The notion that Hamengku Buwono was plotting either to replace Soekarno or to carve out an autonomous region for himself is not supported by strong evidence. This is not to say that he might not have been forced like his forebears at some stage to treat directly with the Dutch if their military success of December 1948 had been sustained; but his judgement evidently was that such a stage had not been reached in early 1949, and in fact it never was reached. Coordinator of security During March-April 1949, the question became not whether the Republican leaders would be restored to Yogyakarta, but under what terms and exactly when. This was formalized by the Roem-Van Royen agreement of 7 May, which meant a defeat for hardline Dutch officials, weakened by Sassen s resignation in February, the evidence of an effective Republican insurgency, and defections among the federalists. Beel himself resigned in mid-may, and a further blow was the sudden death of General Spoor from a heart attack two weeks later. 86 On 20 March, UNCI officials had paid their first visit to Yogyakarta since the Dutch occupation. 87 Hamengku Buwono told them that he was confident of 84 Cutts to DEA, 14 April 1949 (David Lee 1998:378). The full powers letter seems to have been sent by Hatta to Hamengku Buwono around mid-march. CMI Report Het Staakt het Vuren en het herstel der Republiek te Jokja, p. 18, Bundle AA 18, MvD/CAD. According to Suwarno (1994:253), Hamengku Buwono had requested the powers from the Bangka leadership to make clear his authority vis-à-vis other centres of power, such as Sudirman and the military, and communist groups. News of this request may have fired Dutch impressions of Hamengku Buwono s plans to obtain maximum autonomy for his region. 85 Report by Resident Stok, 30 March 1949, p. 5, inv. no. 695, Hoofdkwartier Generale Staf, MvD/ CAD. 86 Critchley described Spoor as reactionary. Critchley to Burton, 5 June 1949, doc. 428, (David Lee 1998:455). 87 Report of visit by Deputy UNCI leaders to Yogyakarta, 21 March 1949, p. 6, inv. no. 4542, NA

18 286 John Monfries maintaining security after the return of the Republican government, provided he had sufficient weapons and other equipment for the Republican police force. He could take responsibility for regional security at three days notice. 88 As noted earlier, Hamengku Buwono was given full powers by Soekarno and Hatta to organize the restoration of the Republican government (David Lee 1998:378). Many problems remained, including how to ensure a peaceful withdrawal by the Dutch and colonial troops, and how to conciliate those in the Indonesian military who regarded the negotiations with suspicion. Among the latter could be numbered Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief Sudirman himself who, despite his grave illness, retained enormous prestige among the TNI and the people at large. The Sultan was in a unique position as a Republican leader who could speak to Dutch commanders at any time but could also liaise albeit with some difficulty with TNI leaders like Sudirman and Simatupang. He began commuting to Jakarta in UN aircraft, 89 met senior Dutch and UN officials, and visited Bangka in early June to confer with the interned Republican leaders. During the first visit to Jakarta, the plan emerged that immediately after the return of the Republican leaders to Yogyakarta, Soekarno as Supreme Commander would issue a ceasefire order. According to Hamengku Buwono, this would be obeyed, as the TNI units were intact and operational. He believed, too optimistically as it turned out, that he could reach an understanding with all leftwing groups in the Yogyakarta region. 90 He told the press that the Dutch presence was the main obstacle to the restoration of security in Yogyakarta (Darmosugito 1956:173). Hamengku Buwono, in his new capacity as Minister of State/Security Coordinator of the Republic of Indonesia, 91 told the joint committee on the return of the Republican government that he needed arms and uniforms for his police. 92 The Dutch were willing to provide uniforms but were most reluctant to arm Republicans. Complex negotiations ensued on the restoration of the railways, road repair, radio and air communications, and the exact terms under which an initial suspension of arms and then a full ceasefire would occur. 93 The process was complicated by many incidents, including the arrest by the Dutch of officials who were re-establishing the Republican Department of Defence in the Kepatihan building. 94 The Sultan accused the 88 Critchley to McIntyre, 21 March 1949, doc. 305 (David Lee 1998:314). 89 Four Princes Letter, p. 13, no. 157, Arsip Daerah Yogyakarta. 90 NEFIS Weekly Report no. 13, 14 April 1949, Bundle AA15, NEFIS 1949, MvD/CAD. 91 Suwarno (1994:252), gives the date of the appointment as Security Coordinator as 1 May This appointment was presumably made at the same time as the conferring of full powers on Hamengku Buwono by Hatta mentioned above, though no source explicitly confirms this. 92 Critchley to Burton, 20 May 1949 (David Lee 1998:428). 93 Critchley to Burton, 20 May 1949 (David Lee 1998:428). 94 Critchley to Burton, 10 June 1949, doc. 431 (David Lee 1998:458).