HAVING identified Simplicity of Goodness as the heart of Divine Being, St.

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1 Marilyn McCord Adams SATISFYING MERCY: ST. ANSELM'S CUR DEUS HOMO, RECONSIDERED^ I. Satisfaction First? HAVING identified Simplicity of Goodness as the heart of Divine Being, St. Anselm aims for "elegant simplicity" in theory and explanation, in imitation of the Divine Word! Both his Proslogion "ontological" argument that something is too good not to be real,^ and his classic Cur-Deus-Homo formulation of the "Satisfaction-Theory" of the atonement possess the allure of surface simplicity,^ only to plunge the reader into depths s/he hadn't meant to fathom. Anselm's argument in the Cur Deus Homo for the conditional necessity of the Incarnation seems so straight-forward because it proceeds according to "strict justice.'"* Thus, he reasons: (I) It is necessary for God's purposes to be fulfilled. (II) Given human sin, it is impossible for God's purposes to be fulfilled without an Incarnation. (III) Therefore, the Incarnation was necessary. (I) follows from his Monologian-Proslogion understanding of the Divine nature: Wisdom would not purpose anything that Omnipotence could not get, nor would Almighty Justice start something it could not finish!^ Anselm's principal defense of (II) begins with the thesis that sinful rational creatures owe God a debt they cannot pay. For all creatures owe it to God to be that-for-which they were made; rational creatures to conform thought and choice to Divine will, in particular to use reason correctly to distinguish just from unjust, good from bad, greater from lesser excellence, and to will accordingly.^ The rational creature who "robs" God by not paying what it owes, incurs guilt and remains at fault until it restores what it withheld in the first place and makes satisfaction ("pays a fine") besides.^ Yet, no rational creature who sins can pay this debt itself, for three reasons: (a) First, every rational creature ov^es God complete conformity to His will, and none can do more than always obey. Adam could not compensate for his sin at an earlier time with obedience at a later time, since the latter was part of his original obligation.^ (b) Second, although any rational creature has the natural ability to keep uprightness of will should it have any, none has the ability to recover uprightness once it has lost it. This is because when rational creatures sin, they lose their inclination to justice.^ Since for The Modern Schoolman, LXXII, January/March

2 Anselm unmotivated willing is impossible, angels and humans, once they sin, are unable to will anything but their own apparent advantage and that inordinately.^^ One sin leaves a rational creature unable to render to God the rest of what he owes, (c) Even leaving (a) & (b) aside, someone sensitive to the metaphysical values involved would confirm the inability of any creature to make satisfaction for the least offense against God. For satisfaction must be proportionate to guilt, and guilt depends not simply on the act type but on the worthiness of the offended party. Anselm argues that it would be better for 'I am grateful to my commentator, Brian Leftow of Fordham University, and to other conference participants for helpful discussion. I am also grateful for stimulating discussion to my classes at Yale Divinity School. ^Proslogion, Proeoemium; S 1.93,4-10: "... considerans illud esse multorum concatenatione contextum argumentorum, coepi mecum quaerere, si forte posset inveniri unum argumentum, quod nullo alio ad se probandum quam se solo indigeret, et solum ad astruendum quia deus vere est, et quia est summum bonum nullo alio indigens, et quo omnia indigent ut sint et ut bene sint, et quaecumque de divina credimus substantia, sufficeret...." [All Anselm-references in this paper will be to F.S. Schmitt's edition of the Opera Omnia: 'S 1.93,4-10' abbreviates 'Schmitt edition, volume I, page 93, lines 4-10.] 'For example, note Anselm's boast in Cur Deus Homo I.l; S 11.48,6-9:.. Quoniam ergo de hac multi tractari postulant, et licet in quaerendo valde videatur difficilis, in solvendo tamen omnibus est intelligibilis et propter utilitatem et rationis pulchritudinem amabilis...." ^Cur Deus Homo 1.23; S 11.91,10: "A. Intendeindestrictamiustitiam...."S 11.91,15: "B. Nec districtius nec iustius potest aliquid cogitari." ^Cur Deus Homo 1.6; S 11.53,5-55,9: "B. Hoc est quod valde mirantur, quia liberationem hanc redemptionem vocamus. In qua namque aiunt nobis captione, aut in quo carcere aut in cuius potestate tenebamini, unde vos deus non potuit liberare, nisi vos tot laboribus et ad ultimum sanguine suo redimeret? Quibus cum dicimus: redemit nos a peccatis et ab ira sua et de inferno et de potestate diaboli, quem, quia nos non poteramus, ipse pro nobis venit expungnare, et redemit nobis regnum caelorum, et quia haec omnia hoc modo fecit, ostendit quantum nos dligieret, respondent: Si dicitis quia facere deus haec omnia non potuit solo iussu, quem cuncta creasse iubendo dicitis, repugnatis vobismetipsis, quia impotentem ilium facitis. Aut si fatemini quia potuit, sed non voluit nisi hoc modo: quomodo sapientem ilium potestis ostendere, quem sine ulla ratione tam indecentia velle pati asseritis? Omnia enim haec quae obtenditis, in eius voluntate consistunt. Ira namque dei non est aliud quam voluntas puniendi. Si ergo non vult punire peccata hominum, liber est homo a peccatis et ab ira dei et ab inferno et ab potestate diaboli, quae omnia propter peccata patitur, et recipit ea quibus propter eadem peccata privatur. Nam in cuius potestate est infernus aut diabolus, aut cuius est regnum caelorum, nisi eius qui fecit omnia? Quaecumque itaque timetis aut desideratis, eius voluntati subiacent, cui nihil potest resistere. Quapropter si humanum genus salvare noluit, nisi quo modo dicitis, cum sola voluntate potuit: ut mitius dicam, videte quomodo eius sapientiae repugnatis. Nam si homo quod facile posset, cum gravi labore sine ratione faceret, non utique sapiens ab ullo iudicaretur. Quippe quod dicitis deum taliter ostendisse quantum vos diligeret, nulla ratione defenditur, si nuuatenus aliter hominem potisse salvare non monstratur. Nam si aliter non potuisset, tunc forsitan necesse esset, ut hoc modo dilicetionem suam ostenderet. Nunc vero cum aliter posset salvare hominem: quae ratio est, ut propter ostendendam dilectionem suam ea quae dictis facial et sustineat? An enim non ostendit bonis angelis quantum eose diligat, pro quibus talia non sustinet? quod vero dicitis eum venisse expugnare pro vobis diabolum: quo sensu audetis proferre? Nonne dei omnipotentia regnat ubique? quomodo ergo indigebat deus, ut ad vicendum diabolum de caelo descenderet? Haec nobis infideles obiecere posse videntur." 92

3 countless created worlds to be annihilated than for creatures to do/omit to do anything contrary to the Divine will. But no mere creature not even countless world's worth can do or be anything incommensurately meritorious or deserving incommensurate compensation. To do or be something incommensurately worthy belongs to God alone. Nevertheless, Wisdom dictates "efficiency." Such estimates of sinful creatures' indebtedness and inability to pay even if correct fall short of a proof of (II), because two other options, "easier" than Incarnation, seem available. Why couldn't God save humans through third-party payment by some other mere creature'^ or better still through His will alone. Anselm rules out the former twice-over: no mere creature can make satisfaction for sin, because, once again, none can do or be anything incommensurately valuable. But even if it could, such benefaction would leave humans beholden to their creaturely patron and so would fail to restore them (us) to their (our) original dignity, subordinate to God alone.'* What better way, then, to cement exclusive loyalty to the Divine patron than for God simply to forgive human sin, cancel the requirement of satisfaction? Surely Divine freedom is subject to no law. His Kindness maximal. Besides, such clemency would set us a good example to forgive our debtors.'^ Here, Anselm's "no, in the name of justice" becomes almost strident! To forgive without satisfaction would be unjust thrice-over. First, it would leave something disordered in God's kingdom*^ not some trifling detail, but something maximally indecent, an offense against God's own dignity. Justice demands that when created sin makes a lying claim to rightful insubordination, God must contradict it, reasserting Divine precedence by punishing sinners with unhappiness unless and until satisfaction is paid.'^ Second, it would represent a failure of fairness: of not treating sinners differently from non-sinners, and of allowing human sinners but not fallen angels to enter heaven without satisfaction.'* Third, it would render sin God-like in being subject to no law.'^ Divine freedom and kindness have to be understood to operate within the parameters of Divine justice.closing off the last route of escape, Anselm contends, it would also be a mockery of mercy for God to excuse on grounds of culpable inability to pay,^^ a mockery of Divine Justice to forgive what He can't obtain.assessing the whole sequence, Boso laments, "If God is guided by the principle of justice, then there is no way for this unhappy insignificant human to escape; and the mercy of God seems to vanish. "^^ Anselm sharply corrects: the mercy of God in creation and providence stands, but the ultimate mercy of awarding humans post-mortem happiness requires the forgiveness of sins, which can fittingly occur only with the payment of proportionate satisfaction!^* Desperate about Satisfying Mercy: St. Anselm's Cur Deus Homo, Reconsidered Marilyn McCord Adams 93

4 such a "satisfaction-first" policy, Boso presses, How, then, will man be saved if he does not pay what he owes and if he ought not to be saved unless he pays it? Or how can we impudently maintain that God, who is rich in mercy beyond human understanding, cannot bestow this mercy?^^ ^Cur Deus Homo II. 1; S 11.97,4-14: "Rationalem naturam a deo factam esse iustam, ut 1110 fruendo beata esset, dubitari non debet. Ideo namque rationalis est, ut discernat inter iustum et iniustum, inter bonum et malum, et inter magis bonum et minus bonum. Alioquin frustra facta esset rationalis. Sed deus non fecit eam rationalem frustra. Quare ad hoc eam factam esse rationalem dubium non est. Simili ratione probatur quia ad hoc accepit potestatem discernendi, ut odisset et vitaret malum, ac amaret et eligeret bonum, atque magis bonum magis amaret et eligeret. Aliter namque frustra illi deus dedisset potestatem istanm discernendi, quia in vanum discerneret, si secundum discretionem non amaret et vitaret. Sed non convenit ut deus tantam potestatem frustra dederit...." Cf. Monologion, cc. 68; S 1.78,21-79,9. 'Cur Deus Homo 1.11; S 11.68,14-69,2: "A. Hoc est debitum quod debet angelus et homo deo, quod solvendo nullus peccat, et quod omnis qui non solvit peccat. Haec est iustitia sive rectitudo voluntatis, quae iustos facit sive rectos corde, id est voluntate. Hie est solus et totus honor, quem debemus deo et a nobis exigit deus. Sola namque talis voluntas opera facit placita deo, cum potest operari; et cum non potest, ipsa sola per se placet, quia nullum opus sine ilia placet. Hunc honorem debitum qui deo non reddit, aufert deo quod suum est, et deum exhonorat; et hoc est peccare. Quamdiu autem non solvit quod rapuit, manet in culpa. Nec sufficit solummodo reddere quod ablatum est, sed pro contumelia illata plus debet reddere quam abstulit. Sicut enim qui laedit salutem alterius, non sufficit si salutem restituit, nisi pro illata doloris iniuria recompenset aliquid: ita qui honorem alicuius violat non sufficit honorem reddere, si non secundum exhonorationis factam molestiam aliquid, quod placeat 1111 quem exhonoravit, restituit. Hoc quoque attendendum quia, cum aliquis quod iniuste abstulit solvit, hoc debet dare, quod ab illo non posset exigi, si alienum non rapuisset. Si ergo debet omnis qui peccat, honorem deo quem rapuit solvere; et haec est satisfactio, quam omnis peccator debet facere."»cur Deus Homo? 1.20; S 11.86,24-87,24: "A. Die ergo: quid solves deo pro peccato tuo?/ B. Paenitentiam, cor contritum et humiliatum, abstinentias et multimodos labores corporis, et misericordiam dandi et dimittendi, et oboedientiam./ A. Quid in omnibus his das deo?/ B. An non honoro deum, quando propter timorem eius et amorem in cordis contrititione laetitiam temporalem abicio, in abstinentiis et laboribus delectationes et quietem huius vitae caico, in dando et dimettendo quae mea sunt largior in oboedientia me ipsum illi subicio?/ A. Cum reddis aliquid quod debes deo, etiam si non peccasti, non debes hoc computare pro debito quod debes pro peccato. Omnia autem ista debes deo quae dicis. Tantus namque debet esse in hac mortali vita amor, et ad quod pertinet oratio desiderium perveniendi ad id ad quod factus es, et dolor quia nondum ibi es, et timor ne non pervenias, ut nullam laetitiam sentire debeas, nisi de iis quae tibi aut auxilium aut spen dant perveniendi. Non enim mereris habere quod non, secundum quod est, amas et desideras, et de quo, quia nondum habes et adhuc utrum habiturus sis an non in tan to es periculo, non doles. Ad quod etiam pertinet quietem et delectationes mundanas, quae animum ab ilia vera quiete et delectatione revocant, fugere, nisi quantum ad intentionem illuc perveniendi cognoscis sufficere. Dationem vero ita considerare debes te facere ex debito, sicut intelligis quia quod das non a te habes, sed ab illo, cuius servus es tu et ille cui das. Et natura te docet, ut conservo tuo, id est homo homini, facias, quod tibi ab illo vis fieri; et quia qui non vult dare quod habet, non debet accipere quod non habet. De dimissione vero breviter dico quia nullatenus pertinet ad te vindicta, sicut supra diximus; quoniam nec tu tuus es, nec ille tuus aut suus qui tibi fecit iniuriam, sed unius domini servi facti ab illo de nihilo estis; et si de conservo tuo te vindicas, iudicium quod proprium domini et iudicis omnium est, super ilium superbe praesumis. In oboedientia vero quid das deo quod non debes, cui iubenti totum quod es et quod habes et quod potes debes?" 94

5 Since all parties to the dispute agree that God's purpose (referred to in (I)) would not allow all members of Adam's race to be lost, Anselm triumphantly responds that (II) is established, an Incarnation is conditionally necessary for the fulfillment of Divine purpose Anselm waits until Book Two to spell out how justice can be satisfied only if a God-man pays the debt: (i) Adam's race owes God a debt greater than countless worlds. (ii) No creature but God alone is able to be/suffer/do something worthy of such incommensurate compensation. (iii) It is unfitting for anyone not a member of Adam's race to pay its debt. (iv) Therefore, only a person who is both God and a member of Adam's race can pay the debt with justice. (i,iii) (v) It is necessary for the debt to be paid. (vi) Therefore, the Incarnation is necessary. (iv,v) Such conditional necessity does not mean that God is constrained or compelled by anything from the outside, but rather is undergirded by the immutable Divine nature which is at once Supreme Justice, Supreme Wisdom, and Supreme Power following through on what It purposes. The logic of the ingenious "commercial" transaction unfolds in later chapters (viz., in CDH 11.11,14,15,19). As a member of Adam's race, Christ owes God what Adam's race always owed: to be and do that for which humans were made, to use reason and will to love God above all and to persevere in justice for His sake. Yet, Anselm argues, humans are not essentially mortal, because death makes no contribution to the end for which humans were made. Death assails us as a punitive consequence of sin. Consequently, as innocent, Christ does not owe it to God to die, and so has something to offer which He did not already owe: "obedience unto death."^^ But killing Christ is an offense against the Divine Word, not merely the possessions, but the very person of God. It renders Christ deserving of compensation greater than anything that is not God.^^ And although God does not owe the compensation, it is only fitting that such a rich Lord should reward the servant who suffers so great an offense in His honor. As God, the God-man does not need these benefits and asks that they be applied to the Adam's family debt. Anyone who applies for pardon (via sacramental participation) and purposes amendment of life participates in this benefit.^ What shall we say? The "elegant simplicity" of "strict justice"? or baroque book-keeping, a ridiculous display of God the being a greater than which cannot be conceived somersaulting through the Incarnation and passion to pay Himself the satisfaction Adam's race owed?^* Satisfying Mercy: St. Anselm's Cur Deus Homo, Reconsidered Marilyn McCord Adams 95

6 Once again, we may echo Boso's question: What sort of scenario binds the hands of the Omnipotent, locks the flood-gates of Mercy and Kindness unless and until satisfaction is made? Significantly, eminent successors, Aquinas^^ and ^De LibertateArbitrii, cc.x-xii; S 1.222,5 224,32. ">D^ Casu Diaboli, c.l3; S 1.255,23 258,4; C.17; S 1.262,9-19. De Concordia III. 13; S ,9-287,21. "Cwr Deus Homo 1.21; S 11.88,13-89,32. Cf. II.6-7;S ,1-102,22.»^Cwr Deus Homo I.l; S 11.48,2-5: "qua scilicet ratione vel necessitate deus homo factus sit, et morte sua, sicut credimus et confitemur, mundo vitam reddiderit, cum hoc aut per aliam personam, sive angelicam sive humanem, aut sola voluntate facere potuerit." Cf. 1.5; S 11.52,14-18: "B. Haec ipsa liberatio si per aliam quam per dei personam, sive per angelum sive per hominem, esse facta quolibet modo diceretur, mens hoc humana multo tolerabilius acciperet. Potuit enim deus hominem aliquem facere sine peccato, non de massa peccatrice, nec de alio homine, sed sicut fecit ADAM, per quem hoc ipsum opus fieri potuisse videtur."»3cmr Deus Homo 1.6; S ,9; cf. I.l; S 11.48,2-5. ''Cur Deus Homo 1.5; S 11.52,19-24: "A. An non intelligis quia, quaecumque alia persona hominem a morte aeterna redimeret, eius servus idem homo recte iudicaretur? Quod is esset, nullatenus restauratus esset in illam dignitatem, quam habiturus erat, si non pecasset: cum ipse, qui non nisi dei servus et aequalis angelis bonis per omnia futurus erat, servus esset eius, qui deus non esset et cuius angeli servi non essent." ''Cur Deus Homo 1.12; S 11.70,5-10; "B. Removisti repugnantiam quam putabam in esse; sed est aliud ad quod tuum habere volo responsum. Nam cum deus sic sit liber ut nulli legi, nullius subiaceat iudicio, et ita sit benignus, ut nihil benignius cogitari queat, et nihil sit rectum aut decens nisi quod ipse vult: mirum videtur si dicimus quia nullatenus vult aut non ei licet suam iniuriam dimittere, a quo etiam de iis quas aliis facimus solemus indulgentiam petere." Cf. De Casu Diaboli, c.23;s 1.270,4-18. '^Cur Deus Homo IA2;S 11.69M-n: "A. Sic dimittere peccatum non est aliud quam non punire. Et quoniam recte ordinäre peccatum sine satisf actione non est nisi punire: si non punitur, inordinatum dimittitur./ B. Rationabile est quod dicis./ A. Deum vero non decet 96 aliquid inordinatum in suo regno dimittere./ B. Si aliud volo dicere, timeo peccare./ A. Non ergo decet deum peccatum sic impunitum dimittere./ B. Ita sequitur." '''CurDeusHomolA4-{5; S 11.72,3-74,7. '»Cur Deus Homo 1.12; S 11.69,19-20: "A. Est et aliud quod sequitur, si peccatum sic impunitum dimittiur: quia similiter erit apud deum peccanti et non peccanti; quod deo non convenit." Cf. 1.19, S 11.85,2-33. '^Cur Deus Homo 1.12; S 11.69,25-31: "A. Si autem peccatum nec solvitur nec punitur, nulli legi subiacet./ B. Non possum aliter intelligere./ A. Liberior igitur est iniustitia, si sola misericordia dimittitur, quam iustitia; quod valde inconveniens videtur. Ad hoc etiam extenditur haec inconvenientia, ut iniustitiam deo similem faciat; quia sicut deus nullius legi subiacet, ita et iniustitia." ^Cur Deus Homo 1.12; S 11.70,11-30: "A. Verum est quod dicis de übertäte et voluntate et benignitate illius; sed sic eas debemus rationa biliter intelligere, ut dignitati eius non videamur repugnare. Liberias enim non est nisi ad hoc quod expedit aut quod decet, nec benignitas dicenda est quae aliquid deo indecens operatur. Quod autem dicitur quia quod vult iustum est, et quod non vult non est iustum, non ita intelligendum est ut, si deus velit quodlibet inconveniens, iustum sit, quia ipse vult. Non enim sequitur: si deus vult mentiri, iustum esse mentiri; sed potius deum ilium non esse. Nam nequaquam potest velle mentiri voluntas, nisi in qua corrupta est Veritas, immo quae deserendo veritatem corrupta est. Cum ergo dicitur: si deus vult mentiri, non est aliud quam: si deus est talis natura quae velit mentiri; et idcirco non sequitur iustum esse mendacium. Nisi ita intelligatur, sicut cum de duobus impossibilibus dicimus: si hoc est, illud est; quia nec hoc nec illud est. Ut si quis dicat: si aqua est sicca, et ignis est humidus; neutrum enim verum est. Itaque de illis tantum verum est dicere: si deus hoc vult, iustum est, quae deum velle non est inconveniens. Si enim deus vult ut pluat, iustum est ut pluat; et si vult ut homo aliquis occidatur, iustum est ut occidatur. Quapropter si non decet deum aliquid iniuste aut inordinate facere, non pertinet ad eius libertatem aut benignitatem aut voluntatem, peccantem qui non solvit deo quod abstulit impunitum dimittere."

7 Bonaventura," could not follow Anselm down the path of strict justice to the necessity of satisfaction. Rather, Omnipotence could have spared humans some other way, but instead chose to require satisfaction as an optimal or excellent approach. Certainly, beginning with Justice is not alien to Anselm. For according to him (in Proslogion 9-11), this is where God begins: Justice is the root and source of Divine Goodness! Nevertheless, Divine Simplicity is a rich integration of whatever it is in general better to be than not to be.^ Anselm aims at elegant simplicity, not simple-minded caricatures. Has Mercy really vanished? More accurately, given human sin, must it observe a moratorium until the demand of strict justice for satisfaction has been met? Is it waiting in the wings for the third act? or has it been backstage all along directing the play? II. Merciful Management: The Satisfaction Argument takes its cue from the form of Divine-human relations, from the structure of obligations between the Heavenly patron and the created client, and calculates the consequences of their incommensurate dignities. As Anselm turns, in Book Two, to flesh out the content and the means of plot implementation, Mercy emerges as initiator and relentlessly driving force. (1) First comes God's prevenient mercy in destining humans to eternal beatific intimacy, to places in the Heavenly Utopia." Because the rest is all means to this gratuitous end, the whole work is grace. (2) Next grace builds in the powers of reason and will, equipping will with freedom, spontaneity, inclinations to justice and advantage all needed to distinguish just from unjust, good from bad, greater from lesser good, and to love accordingly, to love God above all and persevere in justice for its own sake." These gifts would make created justice the creature's rendering to God that-for-which-it-was-made a Divine-human cooperative venture, quite apart from created sin.^* (3) Further initiatives of Mercy are required to make the payment of satisfaction possible for Adam's race should the fall occur. For just as when a lord disgraces a courtier, the whole family shares the concrete hardships of the father's fall, so Adam's sin results in loss of happiness^^ and damage, not only to his own individual nature, but also to that of all of his descendents. In particular, Adam's natural offspring suffer a weakened body, affected like the brutes by carnal appetites and subject to death^; a soul that is weakened in being affected by carnal appetites to the point that in infancy it can't even understand or think of justice"^'; a soul that not only lacks justice but is unable without grace to keep Satisfying Mercy: St. Anselm's Cur Deus Homo, Reconsidered Marilyn McCord Adams 97

8 justice if it were received/^ Moreover, Adam's descendents share with all creatures the obligation to have justice (even though they lack it), and inherit the obligation to make satisfaction/^ Obviously, the God-man will not be able to do His soteriological work if His human nature is thus damaged and carries such "legal" liabilities. Without the inclination for justice, He could not lead a sinless life; and once a sinner. He would deserve death like everyone else and so have nothing to offer God that He didn't already owe. Consequently, God must take a sinless human nature from Adam's race. Both of Anselm's accounts of how God might do this involve Mercy planning ahead. 2>CMr Deus Homo 1.24; S 11.92,10-93,2. 22CMr Deus Homo 1.24; S 11.93,20-23: "... Sed dirisio est, ut talis misericordia deo attribuatur. At si dimittit quod invito erat ablaturus, propter impotentiam reddendi quod sponte reddere debet: relaxat deus poenam et facit beatum hominem propter peccatum, quia habet quod debet habere...." ^^Cur Deus Homo 1.21; S 11.89,24: "B. Ut audio, nimis periculose vivimus." Ibid.; S 11.89,32: "B. Nimis est gravis haec sententia." 1.22; S 11.90,6: "B. Nisi fides me consolaretur, hoc solum me cogeret desperare." 1.23; S 11.91,27-28: "B.... Sed ex his omnibus videtur misericordia dei et spes hominis perire, quantum ad beatitudinem spectat, ad quam factus est homo." 24CMr Deus Homo 1.24; S II. 94,10-16: " A. Rationem postulasti, rationem accipe. Misericordem deum esse non nego, qui 'homines et iumenta' salvat, 'quemadmodum' multiplicavit 'misericordiam' suam. Nos autem loquimur de ilia ultima misericordia, qua post hanc vitam veatum facit hominem. Hanc beatitudinem nulli dari debere nisi illi, cui penitus dimissa sunt peccata, nec hanc dimissionem fieri nisi debito reddito, quod debetur pro peccato secundum magnitudinem peccati, supra positis rationibus puto me sufficienter ostendisse. Quibus si quid tibi videtur posse rationibus obici, dicere debes." Cf. De Concordia 111.2, S II.264, \S-20. ^Cur Deus Homo 1.25; S 11.94,26-28: "Quomodo ergo salvus erit homo, si ipse nec solvit quod debet, nec salvari, si non solvit, debet? Aut qua fronte asseremus deum in misericordia divitem supra intellectum humanum, hanc misericordiam facere non posse?" ^^Cur Deus Homo 1.25; S 11.95,1-14: "A. Hoc debes ab illis nunc exigere, qui Christum non esse credunt necessarium ad illam salutem hominis, quorum vice loqueris, ut dicant qualiter homo salvari possit sine Christo. Quod si non possunt ullo modo, desinant nos irridere, et accedant et iungant se nobis, qui non dubitamus hominem per Christum posse salvari aut desperent hoc ullo modo fieri posse. Quod si horrent, credent nobiscum in Christum, ut possit salvari./ B. A te quaeram, sicut incepi, ut ostendas mihi qua ratione salvetur homo per Christum. /A. Nonne sufficienter probatur per Christum hominem posse salvari, cum etiam infideles non negent hominem ullo modo fieri posse beatum, et satis ostensum sit quia, si ponimus Christum non esse, nullo modo potest inveniri salus hominis? Aut enim per Christum, aut pro aliquo, aut nullo modo poterit homo salvus esse, quapropter si falsum est quia nullo aut alio aliquo modo potest hoc esse, necesse est fieji per Christum." ^'Cur Deus Homo II.5. S II. 99,18-100,29. ^»Cur Deus Homo II. 11; S II. 109,4-112,4. ^^Cur Deus Homo 11.14; S ,21 115,4. 30CMr Deus Homo 11.16; S ,5 119,10. ^'Cur Deus Homo 11.18; S ,17-25: "A. Honor utique ille totius est trinitatis. Quare quoniam idem ipse est deus, filius dei, ad honorem suum se ipsum sibi sicut patri et spiritui sancto obtulit, id est humanitatem suam divinitati suae, quae una eademque trium personarum est. Ut tamen in eadem ipsa veritate manentes apertius loquamur quod volumus, dicamus, sicut usus habet, quia filius sponte se ipsum patri obtulit. Hoc namque modo aptissime dicitur quia et in una persona totus deus, cui secundum hominem se obtulit, intelligitur, et per nomen patris et filii im mensa quaedam in cordibus audientium, cum patrem filius hoc modo postulare pro nobis dicitur, pietas sentitur." 98

9 (i) In Cur Deus Homo, instead of holding that, e.g., the patriarchs would not be cleansed of original sin until Christ's saving work had occurred ca CE, Anselm suggests that they are cleansed during their own life times because of the future merits of Christ, although none actually enters heaven until His passion is actually accomplished. Thus, His mother was cleansed in advance of His birth, with the result that His human nature was taken from a pure mother.^ This reasoning seems to generate an explanatory circle: Christ is pure because his mother is pure, and she is pure because of His saving work which He was able to do only because He was pure through her. Yet, if Anselm elsewhere dismisses circles of causes as impossible,here he finds an explanatory starting point in Divine aseity. Christ has His purity through Himself^ because Christ's Divine will wills Christ's human nature free of original sin and its damaging consequences. The human nature is pure through the Divine nature, but because both are His, Christ is pure through Himself. The latter picture seems confirmed by Anselm's reply to Boso's objection that past cleansing would necessitate the future death and so Christ would die of necessity. Anselm concedes that in His human nature Christ couldn't will not to die, but because He had it from Himself (i.e., from His Divine nature) that He couldn't will it in His human nature. He didn't will to die by necessity but spontaneously. For its part, the Divine will immutably wills the whole temporal sequence. The apparent upshot is this: since an untainted human nature is a necessary means and precondition of Christ's making satisfaction, Divine choice to cleanse constitutes another initiative of mercy prior to satisfaction's being paid. (ii) In De Conceptu Virginali et de Originali Peccato, Anselm speculates that God created Adam, with twin stipulations: viz., that the natural progeny of Adam would be born in the condition in which Adam was created if he didn't sin; in the condition into which he fell, if he did sin. Since these proviso's do not apply to members of Adam's race produced otherwise than from the exercize of the natural reproductive powers of two human parents, no policy change was required for God to take a sinless human nature from the Virgin Mary alone.^ Noteworthy is the fact that Anselm understands both these conditional stipulations, and the restriction of their scope to natural progeny, to be a matter of Divine generosity providing this "loop-hole" in advance of either sin or satisfaction. (4) Moreover, the steps God actually took in the Incarnation and passion of Christ which from the side of "strict justice" seem necessary for making satisfaction, have another complementary rationale from the side of mercy. For suppose God miraculously produced but did not assume a sinless human nature Satisfying Mercy: St. Anselm s Cur Deus Homo, Reconsidered Marilyn McCord Adams 99

10 from Adam's race. That individual human being would have the same chance Adam and the angels had of loving God above all, of persevering in justice for its own sake; and the same opportunity to repeat the tragic fall. How can God make sure that Divine purpose is fulfilled by Adam's race, that it reaches even its originally intended dignity? In De Casu Diaboli, Anselm imagines God ^^In the Summa Theologica, for example, Aquinas distinguishes not only between absolute and hypothetical necessity/impossibility (cf. ST III,q.46,a.2), but also between two ways in which something may be necessary for an end: either [i] as a sine qua non condition, or [ii] as a better or more appropriate means to an end (57111,q. 1,a.2,c.), and maintains that the Incarnation, passion, and death of Christ are necessary only in the last sense of being a very excellent and appropriate way for God to accomplish Divine purposes (ST III,q.l,a.2,c.; q.46,a.l,ad 3um; q.46,a.2,ad 3um). He reasons that where merely human judges cannot justly dismiss guilt or punishment for a crime committed against another human being or the whole republic or a higher prince, God has no superior, and God is the supreme and common good of the whole universe. Therefore, if He dismisses sin, which is at bottom an offense against Him, He no more does injury to anyone than David did when he dismissed sins against himself (ST III, q.46.a.2,c.). ^^Evidently concerned not to impose a blasphemous limitation on Divine power, Bonaventure acknowledges that God could have freed humans from sin and its consequences another way than by requiring satisfaction, say [i] by establishing some other name through which we could be saved if He willed or [ii] by simply cancelling human demerits and restoring Adam's race to its prior state, and this without marring the order of the universe because sin is its own punishment. The question of whether God could have arranged for satisfaction to be made another way, he finds more difficult. He speculates [iii] that "perhaps" a small amount of suffering by a person so noble as Christ would have sufficed for satisfaction, but closes by returning to his first point: even if God could not have made satisfaction or redeemed another way. He could have freed humans from sin another way. (Ill Sent.d.20,a. I, q.6) Yet, in III Sent.d.20,ai.l,q.2, Bonaventure defends the requirement of satisfaction as the most fitting integration of Divine Justice with Divine Mercy, and insists that the passion of Christ was "the noblest of all possible or thinkable ways" for satisfaction to be made (III Sent.d.20,SL.\.q.5). Thus, it may be that Bonaventure's concessions are only by way of assessing God's "absolute power" i.e. of calculating what the scope of Divine power would be, bracketing His other perfections. ^^Monologion, c.xv; S 1.28,24-28 & 28,24-29,33; Proslogion, c.v; S 1.104, CMr Deus Homo II.I; S 11.97,4-5: "Rationale naturam a deo factam esse iustam, ut illo fruendo beata esset, dubitari non debet...." ^CurDeus Homo II.5; S 11.99,18-100,28; esp. 100,27-28: "... totum sit gratia bonum quod facit." ^'Cur Deus Homo II. 1; S 11.97,9-14: "... Simili ratione probatur quia ad hoc accepit potestatem discernendi, ut odisset et vitaret malum, ac amaret et eligeret bonum, atque magis bonum magis amaret et eligeret. Aliter namque frustra illi deus dedisset potestatem istam discernendi, quia in vanum discereneret, si secundum discretionem non amaret et vitaret. Sed non convenit ut deus tantam potestatem frustra dederit...." Cf. Monologion, c.68; S 1.78,21-79,9; De Casu Diaboli, c.l4; S 1.258,21-26; De Concordia III.5; S ,21-23; 270,7-9; III ; S ,9-286,8. ^^Emphasized in De Concordia III.3-4; S ,26-268,4. 39CMr Deus Homo 1.14; S 11.72,16-22: "... Quoniam ergo homo ita factus est, ut beatitudinem habere posset, si non peccaret: cum propter peccatum beatitudine et omni bono privatur, de suo quamvis invitus solvit quod rapuit, quia licet deus hoc ad usum sui commodi non transferat quod aufert sicut homo pecuniam quam alii aufert in suam convertit utilitatem, hoc tamen quod aufert utitur ad suum honorem, per hoc quia aufert. Auferendo enim peccatorem et quae illius sunt, sibi subiecta esse probat." Cf. De Casu Diaboli, c. 17; S 1.262,

11 making rational creatures and endowing their will-instruments with the affectio iustitiae only, so that they are able to will-use only what appears just. But such creatures would act by natural necessity and so not realize the Divine aim of rational creatures who spontaneously, "somehow of themselves," uphold justice for its own sake.^^ The only way to guarantee that Adam's race render what it owes through itself, is for God to do it through Godself viz., by becoming a member of Adam's race Godself. Thus, to certify that the human race will reach its original dignity, the Divine Word has to raise it to a still higher dignity by hypostatically uniting a sinless human nature to itself. Christ's Divine will causes Christ's human will to persevere in justice for its own sake, and to will whatever God wills it to will. But, once again, since both Divine and human wills are His, Christ's human choices remain a se and spontaneous.^ Moreover, Christ's actual career of "obedience unto death" serves an educational function as "role model" for rehabilitating other members of Adam's family.^' By applying for His merits, by imitating His life, by releasing themselves to Death, they (we) cooperate with grace and participate in their own restoration. Thus, if the Satisfaction argument from "strict justice" calculates from the dignity of Divine nature, Anselm's God makes the dignity of human nature an overarching aim. Rational creatures are His "most precious work."" Redemption by other mere creatures is ruled out in Book One, because it would not restore Adam's race to its original dignity of being subject to God alone." No, God gives Godself to the sinner the Father offers the Son; the Son, His very self.^ The fact that the same acts constitute both the satisfaction-making that "strict justice" demands and the restoration of Adam's race to its rightful orientation, shows that for Anselm (as for Aquinas and Bonaventure) satisfaction is but one strand of Christ's saving work. Because Justice is the root of Divine Goodness, it is impossible that proper acknowledgement of Divine dignity be omitted from the equation. But given the content of God's projects, it is impossible that human dignity not be factored in. Anselm's differences with distinguished successors, narrow down to his estimate that satisfaction is a necessary (not merely an excellent or optimal) dimension of repentant sinful creation's esteem for God. III. Priorities Demystified: Thus, Anselm's full soteriological story does not place satisfaction-making prior to Divine in the economy of Divine Justice. Rather, in the order of explanation, Mercy is prior to both sin and satisfaction insofar as Mercy orders the beatific end and chooses as means "loop-holed" general policies with regard to Adam's race; in the order of execution, Mercy is prior to and simultaneous Satisfying Mercy: St. Anselm's Cur Deus Homo, Reconsidered Marilyn McCord Adams 101

12 with the payment of satisfaction, insofar as Mercy orders the Incarnation and insures the God-man's sinless career. Why, then, does Cur Deus Homo lead with an argument from "strict justice" that seems to put satisfaction first? In my judgment, rhetorical strategy is key. Notice Cur Deus Homo like the Monologion was written for twin audiences with opposite epistemological priorities. Believers follow "right ^De Conceptu Virginali et de Originali Peccato, c.2. S , *'De Conceptu Virginali et de Originali Peccato, C.2; S ,13-15, 23-24: "... Anima vero, quia ex corruptione corporis et eisdem appetitibus atque ex indigentia bonorum quae perdidit, carnalibus affectibus est infecta. Et quia tota humana natura in illis erat et extra ipsos de ilia nihil erat, tota infirmata et corrupta est... et tunc maxime quando infirmius est ut in infantia et in utero matris, ut nec intelligere iustitiam possit...."; cf. C.29; S ,7-8: "... quamdiu infans est, nec intelligere potest iustitiam quam servet...." '^De Conceptu Virginali, c.8; S ,1-4: "Quod ilia quidem necessitas qua humana natura sola per se iustitiam recuperare nequit, et ilia qua corpus quod corrumpitur aggravat animam, ut eandem iustitiam nec acceptam in aetate perfecta sine auxilio gratiae servare nec in infantibus saltem intelligere queat, ab illo semine sint alienae...." This seems to contradict De Libertate Arbitrii, where Anselm defines freedom of choice as the ability to preserve uprightness of will, and insists that this ability survives sin (cc.iii-iv; S 1.210,25 214,12). '^De Conceptu Virginali, c.28; S II. 170,26 121,26; cf. c.2; S ,24-142,1. ^Cwr Deus Homo II. 16, S II. 118,5-120,1. ^monologion, c.3; S 1.16,10-12: "Ut vero plura per se invicem sint, nulla patitur ratio, quoniam irrationabilis cogitatio est, ut aliqua res sit per illud, cui dat esse...." ^Cwr Deus Homo 11.16; S ,34-35: "A. Non ita est; sed quoniam matris munditia per quam mundus est, non fuit nist ab illo, ipse quoque per se ipsum et a se mundus fuit." '-^Cur Deus Homo 11.16; S , 15-26: "A. Nonne quando quaesivimus utrum ille mentiri potuerit, monstravimus in mentiendo duas esse potestates, unam videlicet volendi mentiri, alteram mentiendi; et quoniam cum mentiendi potestatem haberet, hoc a se ipso habuit ut non posset velle mentiri, idcirco de sua iustitia qua veritatem servavit eum laudandum esse?/ B. Ita est, /A. Similiter est in servando vitam potestas volendi servare et potestas servandi. Cum ergo quaeritur utrum idem deus-homo potuerit servare vitam suam, ut numquam moreretur, dubitandum non est quia semper habuit potestatem servandi, quamvis nequiverit velle servare ut numquam moreretur; et quoniam hoc a se ipso habuit, ut scilicet velle non posset, non necessitate sed libera potestate animam suam posuit." "^De Conceptu Virginali, c.2; S ,8 21; c.lo;s ,20-152,11 & 17-27; c.23; S ,20-164,31. '^De Casu Diaboli, cc.xii-xiv; S ,4. Cf. De Concordia III ; S , ^Cur Deus Homo 11.10; S ,27 108,12: "A. Angeli non sunt laudandi de iustitia sua, quia peccare potuerunt, sed quia per hoc quodam modo a se habent quod peccare nequeunt; in quo aliquatenus similes sunt deo, qui a se habet quidquid habet. Dicitur enim dare aliquid, qui non aufert quando potest; et facere esse aliquid, qui cum possit id ipsum facere non esse, non facit. Sic itaque cum angelus potuit auferre sibi iustitiam et non abstulit, et facere se non esse iustum et non fecit, recte asseritur ipse sibi dedisse iustitiam, et se ipsum iustum fecisse. Hoc igitur modo habet a se iustitiam, quia creatura eam aliter a se habere nequit; et idcirco laudandus est de sua iustitia, nec necessitate sed libertate iustus est, quia improprie dicitur necessitas, ubi nec coactio ulla est nec prohibitio. Quapropter quoniam deus perfecte habet a se quidquid habet, ille maxime laudandus est de bonis quae habet et servat, non ulla necessitate, sed, sicut supra dixi, propria et aeterna immutabilitate. Sic ergo homo ille qui idem ipse deus erit, quoniam omne bonum quod ipse habebit, a se habebit, non necessitate sed libertate, et a se ipso iustus et idcirco laudandus erit. Quamvis enim natura humana a divina habeat quod habebit, idem tamen ipse a se ipso, quoniam duae naturae una persona erunt, habebit." Cf ; S ,15-26.

13 order,"^^ first committing themselves in faith, then seeking understanding for joy and delight.unbelievers" this time, arguably not hypothetical, but real Jews and Moslems^^ raise objections against the "foolish" if not "blasphemous" "simplicity" of Christians.Yet, despite their contrasting motives, not only the same rational reflections^ but also the same rhetorical dynamics will satisfy both Polemic Reversal: Anti-Christian polemics furnish the institutional justification for a further post-patristic probe into such deep doctrinal waters. The disputatio between Boso and Anselm in Cur Deus Homo turns infidel objections and patristic replies into arguments contra and pro, framing the proto-quaestio, Cur Deus homo? Considerations against the propriety of the Incarnation and passion sum to three. (A) Metaphysical Objection from Justice: Justice requires a thing to strive for/be as much good as it can. But it would be degrading for God to be born of a woman, to be nourished by her milk and ordinary human food, much less to get tired or hungry, to be beaten and crucified between thieves.^* (B) Juridical Objection from Justice: Even if it could be fitting for God sometimes to return good for evil, it seems altogether contrary to Supreme Justice to make the innocent suffer and die for the guilty. (C) Objection from Wisdom and Power: As omnipotent, God has power to spare as the power to create: simply by uttering a word. As supremely wise. He would save the human race the easiest way and not undergo anything so unbecoming as an Incarnation without sufficient reason. And no sufficient reasons are to be had, because God could have done it some other way." Anselm's preliminary answer to (B) is that God did not compel or command Christ to suffer against His will; rather Christ volunteered. In reply to (A), Anselm appeals to Chalcedonian Christology for the claim that Incarnation does nothing to Divine nature; suffering and weakness and death rather occur in the human nature. Still, Anselm feels the force of (C), and so undertakes to argue for the conditional necessity of the Incarnation. His principal manuveur is to invert the adversaries' own emphases on Divine metaphysical aloofness and justice towards the innocent. God is the innocent offended party par excellence; "strict justice" to Divine dignity requires that satisfaction be paid by the offending sinners. Likewise, the "ontological gap" between God the being a greater than which cannot be conceived^ and created "almost nothings"" is used to measure the seriousness of sin, and demonstrate the impossibility of human salvation apart from the passion of the God-man. Throughout his negative case in Cur Deus Homo , Anselm rebuffs Boso's attempts to insinuate Divine Mercy and Kindness into the picture^ precisely because he is trying to prove the propriety of mercy restricting himself to premisses taken Satisfying Mercy: St. Anselm's Cur Deus Homo, Reconsidered Marilyn McCord Adams 103

14 from the opponents' view. In the end, God turns out to be the innocent party who volunteers, who bears the cost, the ultimate mercy^^ which is also just in the highest degree.^ 3.2. Patterns of Prayer: Most of Anselm's works are in one way or another participatory, spiritual exercizes training the reader in his/her search for God. The Monologion adapts the method of monastic meditation; the Proslogion is a philosophical prayer. Both stir up the mind to seek, only to confront it with its ''Cur Deus Homo 11.18; S ,17-22: "A. An non intelligis quia, cum iniurias et contumelias et mortem crucis cum latronibus sibi, sicut supra diximus, propter iustitiam quam oboedienter servabat, illatas benigna patientia sustinuit, exemplum dedit hominibus, quatenus propter nulla incommoda quae sentire possunt, a iustitia quam deo debent declinent, quod minime dedisset, si secundum potentiam suam mortem pro tali causa illatam declinasset?" Cf ; S ,28-131,2: "A. Quibus convenientius fructum et retributionem suae mortis attribuet quam illis, propter quos salvandos, sicut ratio veritatis nos docuit, hominem se fecit, et quibus, ut diximus, moriendo exemplum moriendi propter iustitiam dedit? Frustra quippe imitatores eius erunt, si meriti eius participes non erunt. Aut quos iustius faciet haeredes debiti quo ipse non eget, et exundantiae suae plenitudinis, quam parentes et fratres suos, quos aspicit tot et tantis debitis obligatos egestate tabescere in profundo miseriarum, ut eis dimittatur quod pro peccatis debent et detur quo propter peccata carent?" «Cwr Deus Homo II.4; S 11.52,8: "genus humanum, tam scilicet pretiosum opus eius...." "Cwr Deus Homo 1.5; S 11.52,19-24: "A. An non intelligis quia, quaecumque alia persona hominem a morte aeterna redimeret, eius servus idem homo recte iudicaretur? Quod si esset, nullatenus restauratus esset in illam dignitatem, quam habiturus erat, si non pecasset: cum ipse, qui non nisi dei servus et aequalis angelis bonis per omnia futurus erat, servus esset eius, qui deus non esset et cuius angeli servi non essent." ,7-19: "Amplius. Sicut ADAM et totum genus eius per se stetisset sine sustentatione alterius creaturae, si non peccasset: ita oportet ut, si idem genus resurgit post casum, per se resurgat et relevetur. Nam per quemcumque in statum suum restituatur: per ilium utique stabit, per quern statum suum recuperabit. Deus etiam quando humanum naturam primitus fecit in solo ADAM, nec feminam, ut de utroque sexu multiplicarentur homines, facere voluit nisi de ipso, aperte monstravit se non nisi de ADAM voluisse facere, quod de natura humana facturus erat. Quapropter si genus ADAE per aliquem relevatur hominem qui non sit de eodem genere: non in illam dignitatem, quam habiturum erat, si non peccasset ADAM, et ideo non integre restaurabitur et dei propositum deficere videbitur; que duo inconvenientia sunt. Ergo necesse est ut de ADAM assumatur homo, per quem restaurandum est genus ADAE." ''Cur Deus Homo IL20; SII. 131,27-132,6: "Misericordiam vero dei quae tibi perire videbatur, cum iustitiam dei et peccatum hominis considerabamus, tam magnam tamque concordem iustitiae invenimus, ut nec maior nec iustior cognitari possit. Nempe quid misericordius intelligi valet, quam cum peccatori tormentis aeternis damnato et unde se redimat non habenti deus pater dicit: accipe unigenitum meum et da pro te; et ipse filius: tolle me et redime te? Quasi enim hoc dicunt, quando nos ad Christianum fidem vocant et trahunt. Quid etiam iustius quam ut ille cui datur pretium mains omni debito, si debito datur affectu dimittat omne debitum?" "Cur Deus Homo I.l; S 11.48,16-17: "B. Sicut rectus ordo exigit ut profunda Christianae fidei prius credamus, quam ea praesumamus ratione discutere...." '^CurDeusHomol.US II : "Saepe et studiosissime a multis rogatus sum et verbis et litteris, quatenus cuiusdam de fide nostra quaestionis rationes, quas soleo respondere quaerentibus, memoriae scribendo commendem. Dicunt enim eas sibi placere et arbitrantur satisfacere. Quod petunt, non ut per rationem ad fidem accedant, sed ut eorum quae credunt intellectu et contemplatione delectentur, et ut sint, quantum possunt, 'parati semper ad satisfactionem omni poscenti' se 'rationem de ea quae in' nobis 'est spe'...." Cf. Proslogion, C.26; S 1.120,23-122,2. 104

15 inadequacy to the task, which precipitates fear and anxiety; these resolve into humility and desire which fuel the soul's renewed efforts; further positive results bring the soul up against more obstacles, renew its sense of inadequacy, etc. Both end with acceptance of the human vocation to seek and live in such ante-mortem tension, with thanks for understanding that brings interim joy and delight. Likewise, Cur Deus Homo bears the marks of monastic inquiry, carefully structured as it is to rouse the soul at all levels cognitive, affective, and conative. If Anselm's inadequate "patristic" replies to Boso's "infidel" objections stir the latter's mind (CDH ), while the dialogue-format jerks the reader back and forth between different points of view, Anselm explains how emotions also are engaged in seeking out the deepest mysteries of God:... For in this mortal life, there ought to be so much love, and prayer is relevant to this so much desire to arrive at that end for which you are made, and sorrow that you are not yet there, and fear lest you not arrive, so that you ought to experience joy only over those things that help you to arrive or give you hope of doing so... Once Anselm seizes the initiative in Cur Deus Homo 1.10, his arguments sola ratione evoke from Boso, not merely an intellectual response, but a series of emotional reactions that trace the parabola from fear to despair to pleasure to joy typically charted in Anselm's prayers. The argument from "strict justice" drives Boso and the reader downhill to the nadir of despair. Thus, when Anselm concludes (in 1.11) that sinners are obliged to repay the honor they have stolen from God, Boso confesses, "you alarm me a bit."^^ When Anselm contends (in 1.12) that it is unfitting for God to forgive something that is disordered in His kingdom, Boso replies, "I fear I would be sinning" to deny it.^' When Anselm estimates that it is worse to commit any small sin contrary to the will of God than for infinitely many worlds of creatures to be destroyed, Boso responds that "we are living in great dangen''^^ To Anselm's claim that God cannot because He ought not elevate anyone to happiness if that person bears a debt of sin, Boso mutters, "This verdict is very grave""^^ and "would make me despair/'^"^ Having confessed himself already maximally frightened, Boso gasps at the next argument, "God's mercy and man's hope vanish."^^ And at the next, he exclaims, "very grave"^^; "If God follows the principle of justice, there is no way for this miserable little man to escape, and the mercy of God seems to perish!"^^ Just as Anselm intends his prayers to lead the believer who prays them into deeper levels of commitment, so Anselm qua apologist intends the Cur Deus Homo to bring the infidel to original conviction by using reasoned argument to stir his heart as well as his mind. This is evident in the Satisfying Mercy: St. Anselm's Cur Deus Homo, Reconsidered Marilyn McCord Adams 105

16 shift in 1.20 from questions that invite Boso to consider the seriousness of sin in the abstract, to those that focus on his own person qua member of fallen humanity: "Tell me, what will you pay God in proportion ioxyour sin?"^«which eventually elicits Boso's "I have nothing with which to make satisfaction for sin,"^^ upon which Anselm drives the point home with, "Then what will become of youl How can you be saved?"^ And in 1.25, after having proved that human salvation is impossible apart from the Incarnation and death of Christ, ''Cur Deus Homo, Praefatio; S 11.42,9-13: "Quorum prior quidem infidelium Christianam fidem, quia ratione putant illam repugnare, resuentium continet obiectiones et fidelium responsiones. Ac tandem remoto Christo, quasi numquam aliquid fuerit de illo, probat rationibus necessariis esse impossibile ullum hominem salvari sine illo." Cf. Cur Deus Homo 1.3,16-21: "B. Patere igitur ut verbis utar infidelium. Aequum enim est ut, cum nostrae fidei rationem studemus inquirere, ponam eorum obiectiones, qui nullatenus ad fidem eandem sine ratione volunt accedere. quamvis enim illi ideo rationem quaerant, quia non credunt, nos vero, quia credimus: unum idemque tamen est quod quaerimus. Et si quid responderis cui auctoritas obsistere sacra videatur, liceat illam mihi obtendere, quatenus quomodo non obsistat aperias." '»Cur Deus Homo 11.22; S ,5-11: "... Cum enim sic probes deum fieri hominem ex necessitate, ut etiam si removeantur pauca quae de nostris libris posuisti, ut quod de tribus dei personis et de ADAM tetigisti, non solum ludaeis sed etiam paganis sola ratione satisfacias, et ipse idem deus homo novum condat testamentum et vetus approbet: sicut, ipsum veracem esse necesse est confiteri, ita nihil quod in illis continetur verum esse potest aliquis diffiteri." Cf. Rene Roques, "La Method de Saint Anselme dans le 'Cur Deus Homo'," Aquinas V. 1 (1962),3 57; esp Roques cites evidence of twelfth century use (mostly a little later than Anselm) of 'pagani' to refer to Moslems, and cites evidence from Eadmer that during his first exile in Italy, Anselm would have had the opportunity to meet Moslems among the mercenaries of Count Roger of Sicily. Likewise, he documents the existence of anti-christian treatises by Moslem philosophers, notably Alghazali (although there is no evidence that Anselm read Alghazali). ''^Cur Deus Homo I.l; S 11.48,1: "... infideles nobis simplicitatem Christianam quasi fatuam diridentes obiecere"; 1.3; S 11.50,24: "Obiciunt nobis deridentes simplicitatem nostram infideles"; 1.3; S 11.51,3-4: "...Si enim diligenter considerarent quam convenienter hoc modo procurata sit humana restauratio, non deriderent nostram simplicitatem...." «^CMr Deus Homo 1.3; S 11.50,16-20: "B. Patere igitur ut verbis utar infidelium. Aequum enim est ut, cum nostrae fidei rationem studemus inquirere, ponam eorum obiectiones, qui nullatenus ad fidem eandem sine ratione volunt accedere. Quamvis enim illi ideo rationem quaerant, quia non credunt, nos vero, quia credimus: unum idemque tamen est quod quaerimus...." ^'CurDeus Homo 1.3; S 11.50,24-28: "B. Obiciunt nobis deridentes simplicitatem nostram infideles quia deo facimus iniuriam et contumeliam, cum eum asserimus in uterum mulieris descendisse, natum esse de femina, lacte et alimentis humanis nutritum crevisse, et ut multa alia taceam quae deo non videntur convenire lassitudinem, famen, sitim, verbera et inter latrones crucem mortemque sustinuisse." ^^Cur Deus Homo 1.8; S II. 60,1-10: " B. Ita sit, nihil imputetur divinae naturae, quod secundum infirmitatem hominis de Christo dicitur. Verum quomodo iustum aut rationabile probari poterit, quia deus hominem ilium, quem pater filium suum dilectum in quo sibi bene complacuit, vocavit et quem filius se ipsum fecit, sic tractavit aut tractari permisit? Quae autem iustitia est hominem omnium iustissmum morti tradere pro peccatore? Quis homo, si innocentem damnaret ut nocentem liberaret, damnandus non iudicaretur? Ad idem enim res deduci videtur inconveniens, quod supra dictum est. Nam si aliter peccatores salvare non potuit quam iustum damnando: ubi est eius omnipotentia? Si vero potuit sed non voluit: quomod defendemus sapientiam eius atque iustitiam?" 106

17 Anselm invites the infidels either to give up on the possibility of human fulfillment or to become Christians.*' The upswing in Boso's spirits begins in II.6, when Anselm proves the necessity of a God-man, and Boso exclaims, "Blessed be God! we have now found a large part of what we sought!"*^ Anselm's account of Chalcedonian Christology elicits, "Everything you say pleases me"*^ likewise, the rationale for His being born of a virgin, prompts, "you speak according to the pleasure of my heart. Boso expresses the same pleasure at Anselm's deployment of the parable of the King and the Rebellious City.*^ When Anselm offers his explanation of how Christ's death opens the way for human salvation, Boso exclaims: B. The world can hear nothing more reasonable, nothing sweeter, nothing more desirable. Certainly, I receive so much confidence from this thought now that I cannot say with how much joy my heart exults Thus, Anselm's pattern of argumentation adhering to "strict justice" until tension climaxes, only to let Satisfaction be recontexualized by wider proprieties manipulates the reader's emotions in time-honored, tradition-prescribed ways. IV. Conclusion: Unsurprisingly, Anselm finds "the foolishness of God" more elegant than human follies. "Infidel" opponents caricature when they pit "strict justice" against mercy to exclude the Incarnation and passion of God. By contrast. Wisdom and Justice dictate consistency of purpose. Once the merciful content of Divine purpose has been admitted, "strict justice" shows "grace upon grace" to be required. Boso mocks mercy when he proposes an alternative failure of follow-through, imagining, even hoping that Omnipotent Goodness might live without receiving from Adam's race that-for-which-it-was-made. Yet, by joining Adam's race, God gets what He wants with elegant simplicity, at once spontaneously from Adam and by and through Godself! For his own part, Anselm is justified in congratulating himself on a beautiful solution,*^ one that evidences his own consistency of purpose (following through on Proslogion, cc.ix-xi),** to discover in Supreme Justice the roots of Mercy that exalts human dignity and respects the Goodness of God! ^^CurDeus Homo 1.6; S 11.53,5-55,9; 1.10; S 11.66,19-26: "B. In hoc adhuc versamur, qualiter mors ilia rationabilis et necessaria monstrari possit. Aliter namque nec ipse filius eam velle, nec pater cogere aut permittere debuisse videtur. Quaeritur enim cur deus aliter hominem salvare non potuit; aut si potuit, cur hoc modo voluit. Nam et inconveniens Satisfying Mercy: St. Anselm's Cur Deus Homo, Reconsidered Marilyn McCord Adams 107