THE METAPHYSICS BOOK IX, CHAPTER IV

Transcription

1 Avicenna (Ibn Sina) THE METAPHYSICS BOOK IX, CHAPTER IV A parallel Latin-English text from Avicenna s LIBER DE PHILOSOPHIA PRIMA SIVE SCIENTIA DIVINA, which was originally translated from the METAPHYSICS portion of Avicenna s THE HEALING (i.e., the AL-ILAHIYYAT of the AL-SHIFA). Note: The Latin text is taken from Van Riet s critical edition in Avicenna Latinus: Liber de Philosophia Prima sive Scientia Divina, Libri V-X (E. J. Brill, Leiden, and Louvain, Peeters: 1980). Van Riet s page numbers are marked between forward slashes, e.g., /483/. I have added a basic apparatus to the Latin text to indicate a few crucial variants not present in Van Riet s edition, and to indicate where the Latin text differs significantly from Michael Marmura s translation of the Arabic text in The Metaphysics of the Healing (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 2005). References to Fabr are to the edition by Caecilius Fabrianensis of Avicenna s Opera that were translated into Latin (Venice, 1508; reprinted by Frankfurt: Minerva, 1961). Translated from the Latin by JT Paasch. Last updated April 2, 2009 Typeset in TexShop with Latex, ledmac, and ledpar.

2 CAPITULUM IV DE ORDINATIONE ESSE INTELLIGENTIAE ET ANIMARUM CAELESTIUM ET CORPORUM SUPERIORUM A PRIMO CHAPTER 4 ON THE ORIGINATION OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE INTELLIGENCES AND THE SUPERIOR CELESTIAL SOULS AND BODIES FROM THE FIRST CAUSE /476/ Iam certum est nobis ex supradictis quod necesse esse per se unum est 5 et quod non est corpus nec in corpore nec dividitur aliquo modo, et quod esse omnium quae sunt est ab eo et quod non potest habere principium ullo modo nec causam, scilicet nec a qua est res, nec in qua est res, nec per quam est res, nec propter quam est, ita ut ipse sit propter aliquid. Unde non potest esse ut esse omnium ab illo sit secundum viam intentionis ab illo, 10 quemadmodum est nobis intentio in /477/ his omnibus quae fiunt a nobis: tunc enim ipse esset intendens propter aliquid aliud praeter se. Iam autem expediti sumus ab hoc in aliis quae sunt extra eum, scilicet quod nulla res intendit aliquid quod sit inferius se; in eo autem hoc evidentius est. Sed quod proprium sit ei non habere intentionem ut esse omnium sit ab eo, 15 ratio haec est scilicet quia hoc induceret multitudinem in sua essentia. Tunc enim esset in eo aliquid propter quod intenderet, scilicet quia vel cognitio eius vel scientia eius faceret debere intendi quia indigeret ea, vel bonitas quae esset in ea faceret debere hoc, denique intentio alicuius utilitatis quae prodessit ei, sicut iam praediximus. Hoc autem absurdum est. Omne enim 20 esse quod est ab eo non est secundum viam naturae ad hoc ut esse omnium sit ab eo non per cognitionem nec per beneplacitum eius: quomodo enim hoc esse posset, cum ipse sit intelligentia pura quae intelligit seipsum? Et ideo necesse est ut intelligat sequi ipsum ut esse omnium sit ab eo [...] inquantum ipse est principium eius, et in sua essentia non sit prohibens 25 hoc eo quod eventus omnium sit ab eo, sic quod sua essentia est sciens quod /476/ Now, it is certain to us from what we said before that He 1 who has necessary being in Himself is one; that He is not a body, nor in a body, nor 5 divisible in any way; that the existence of all things that exist comes from Him; and that He cannot have a principle or cause in any way that is, there is nothing from which, in which, through which, or on account of which He is a thing, so He does not exist in virtue of anything else. Whence, it cannot be the case that the existence of all the things that come from Him 10 comes about by way of Him intending it (like how we intend /477/ all the things that we make), for then He would be intending this on account of something else beyond Himself. Now, we have explained about other things (outside Him) that nothing intends something that s inferior to itself, but this is even more evident in Him. It is proper for Him not to have an 15 intention that results in the existence of all the things that come from Him, for this would introduce multiplicity into His essence. For then there would be in Him something on account of which He would intend this. That is, His cognition or knowledge would make Him intend this because He would need it, or the goodness in Him would cause an intention for something 20 that would be useful to Him, as we said before. But this is absurd, for the existence that comes forth from Him does not come forth by way of nature, so the existence of all that comes forth from Him does not come forth from His cognition or good pleasure. For how could that even be, since He is a pure intelligence who understands Himself? For this reason, it is necessary Iam autem expediti sumus... induceret multitudinem in sua essentia. ] The Arabic says: This part [of our metaphysical doctrine] we have established in another place; therein it is also manifest. We have endowed [the argument] with the special characteristic of showing the impossibility of His intending the existence of the whole [that proceeds] from Him, in that this would lead to a multiplicity in His essence (translation from Marmura, The Metaphysics of the Healing, p. 326, lines 25-29) Et ideo... est principium eius ] The Arabic text says: Hence, He must intellectually apprehend that the existence from Him of the whole is a necessary consequence of Himself, because He apprehends Himself only intellectually, as a pure intellect and first principle. He only intellectually apprehends the existence of the whole [proceeding] from Him in being its principle. (Translation from Marmura, The Metaphysics of the Healing, p. 327, lines 4-9.) 2 1 Strictly speaking, I should say It instead of He, but Avicenna clearly thinks this necessary being is God, and besides, Avicenna mentions too many other its here, so I ll use He to refer to this necessary being (God) in order to avoid any confusion. 3

3 sua perfectio et sua excellentia est ut /478/ fluat ab eo bonitas, et hoc est de comitantibus suam gloriam quam ipse diligit per seipsum. Omnis autem essentia quae scit quod provenit ex ea, nec admiscetur ei impedimentum aliquod, sed est quemadmodum iam ostendimus, placet ei 30 id quod provenit ex ea; igitur primo placuit ut ex sua essentia flueret omne quod est. Veritatis autem primae non est sua prima actio nisi per essentiam. Ipse enim intelligit suam essentiam et quod sua essentia est principium ordinis bonitatis in esse, [...] quemadmodum oportet esse, non intellectu procedente de potentia ad effectum, nec intellectu qui movetur de uno intel- 35 lecto ad aliud. Eius enim essentia immunis est ab omni quod est in potentia omnino, sicut iam supra ostendimus, sed ipse est intelligens omnia ut unum simul, et ex hoc quod intelligit, sequitur ordinatio bonitatis in esse, et intelligit qualiter est possibile et qualiter est elegantius provenire esse totius secundum iudicium sui intellecti. Certitudo autem intellecta apud eum est 40 ipsa, sicut nosti, scientia, potentia et voluntas. Nos enim ad exsequendum quod imaginamus, indigemus intentione, motu et voluntate ad hoc ut sit; in ipso autem hoc non est conveniens, nec potest esse propter suam immunitatem a dualitate, in cuius probatione iam multum desudavimus; igitur ipse intelligit se esse causam secundum quod intelligit illud. that He understands the existence of everything that comes forth from Him [...] only insofar as He is its source, and in His essence there is nothing to prohibit that everything that comes forth from Him actually comes forth from Him. In this way, His essence knows that His perfection and excellence is such that /478/ goodness might flow from Him, and this accompanies His 30 glory, which He loves in itself. But as for every essence that knows what comes forth from it, there is no impediment mixed in to it, but rather it is how we have shown: that which comes forth from it pleases it. Therefore, it pleased the first cause that everything which exists flowed from His essence. However, the first action 35 of the First Truth occurs only through His essence. For He understands His essence and that His essence is the source of the order of goodness in existence, [...] and how this ought to be. But this does not happen by an act of understanding that proceeds from potency into effect, nor by an act of understanding that moves from one understanding to another. For His essence 40 is immune to everything that is in potency in any way, just as we showed above. Rather, He understands everything simultaneously as one, and from this which He understands, there follows the origination of goodness in existence, and He understands how this is possible and more elegant for the existence of everything to come forth according to the judgment of His in- 45 tellect. That which, with certitude, is understood along with Him, is this (as you know): knowledge, power, and will. For when it comes to the things that come forth from us, we imagine and need them by intention, motion, and will so that they might come to exist. But this does not belong to Him, nor can it on account of His immunity to duality, the proof of which we have [...] quemadmodum oportet esse ] The Arabic says this: He thus intellectually apprehends the order of the good in existence and how this ought to be (Translation from Marmura, The Metaphysics of the Healing, p. 327, lines 20-21) Certitude autem... et voluntas. ] The Arabic says this: For the reality that is intellectually apprehended with Him is itself, as you have known, knowledge, power, and will (translation from Marmura, The Metaphysics of the Healing, p. 327, lines 30-31) in ipso autem hoc non est conveniens ] Van Riet s critical edition has this: in ipso autem hoc est conveniens. I have followed Fabr., 1508: f. 104vA, line 40, which says In ipso autem hoc non est conveniens. The Arabic text also puts it as Fabr. does (see Marmura s English translation, The Metaphysics of the Healing, p. 327, lines 33-34). Clearly, the argument demands this reading. Unfortunately, Van Riet does not indicate this variant in his apparatus (Van Riet, Avicenna Latinus, Liber de Prima Philosophia, Libri V-X, p. 478, line 81). 4 5

4 45 /479/ Esse autem quod est ab eo est secundum viam consquendi et comitandi eius esse, non quod eius esse sit propter esse aliquid aliud a se, quoniam ipse est agens omne quod est hac intentione quia ipse est ens a quo fluit quicquid est, fluxu discrete ab eius essentia. Sed, quod esse omnis eius quod fit a primo non est nisi secundum viam comitandi, si certum 50 fuerit quod necesse esse per se est necesse esse omnibus suis modis (iam expediti sumus ab hoc in praecedentibus), igitur ea quae primo sunt ab eo et haec sunt creata non possunt esse multa nec numero nec divisione in materiam et formam, quoniam id quod sequitur ex eo, est ab eius essentia, non ab alio aliquo. Modus autem et iudicium de hoc quod est in eius 55 essentia, secundum quem sequitur ab eo hoc, non est modus et iudicium secundum quod sequeretur ex eo non hoc, sed aliud ab hoc. Si enim provenirent ab eo duae res discretae per existentiam, vel duae res discretae ex quibus fit unum, sicut materia et forma, comitantia simul, illae non provenirent nisi ex duobus modis diversis in eius essentia. Si autem illi duo modi 60 essent non in eius essentia, sed comitantes eius essentiam, tunc remaneret quaestio de comitantia istorum duorum, quousque essent de sua essentia, et sic ipsa esset divisibilis in intellectu: iam autem prohibuimus hoc antea et ostendimus destructionem eius. Manifestum est igitur quod primum eorum quae sunt a causa prima unum numero est, et eius essentia et eius quidditas 65 est unitas, non in materia. Unde nihil corporum vel formarum quae sunt perfectiones corporum est causatum eius propinquum, quia primum causatum est intelligentia pura, quia est forma non in materia, et ipsa est prima intelligentiarum /480/ separatarum, quas numeravimus. Videtur autem ipsa esse principium movens corpus ultimum secundum viam desiderii. 70 Potest autem aliquis dicere quia id quod fit a primo non prohibetur esse already labored so hard to establish. Therefore, He understands Himself to be the cause, according to which He understands that which comes forth from Him. /479/ Now, the existence that comes forth from Him exists by way of following-from and accompanying His existence. This is not because He 55 has existence on account of something other than His own self, for He actualizes everything that comes to be by His thought, since He is the entity from whom anything that exists flows by a flowing-forth that is discrete from His essence. So the existence of everything that comes forth from the first cause exists only by way of accompaniment. And if it were certain 60 that He who is a necessary being in Himself is a necessary being in all His ways (and indeed it is certain, as we explained before), then the first of those things that come forth from Him and these are created cannot be many, neither in number nor by division into matter and form, for that which follows from Him is from His essence and not from something else. But 65 the mode and judgment in His essence from which this first created thing comes into being is not the same mode and judgment by which not this first created thing but rather something else comes into being. For if there came forth from Him two things with discrete existences, or two discrete things that together made one thing (like matter and form simultaneously 70 accompanying each other), they would only come forth from two diverse modes in His essence. But if those two modes were not in His essence but rather accompanied His essence, there would still be a question about how and to what extent those two accompanied His essence; and besides, then He would be divisible by the understanding. But we prohibited this before, 75 and we made its destruction known. Therefore, it is obvious that the first of those things that come from the first cause is one in number, and there is unity in its essence and quiddity, and it is not in matter. Whence, the first cause does not immediately cause anything that belongs to bodies or forms that are the perfections of bodies, for what the first cause causes 80 first is a pure intelligence, for it is a form that is not in matter, and it is the first of the separated /480/ intelligences that we enumerated previously. However, it seems that this first intelligence is the principle mover of the outermost body by way of being desired. However, someone could say that there s nothing to prohibit that which

5 forma materialis, sed ex ea sequitur esse suae materiae. Ad quod dico quod hoc faceret debere ut ea quae sunt post hanc formam et hanc materiam, essent tertia in ordine causatorum, et esset eorum esse mediante materia, et sic materia esset causa essendi formas corporum quae sunt multa in mundo 75 et suarum virium. Hoc autem est inconveniens, eo quod suum esse materiae est esse receptibile tantum, nec est causa essendi aliquid nisi secundum viam receptionis. Si autem aliqua ex materiis non est sic, tunc non est materia nisi communione nominis. Si autem fuerit res posita stabilis non ad modum materiae nisi communione nominis, tunc primi causati comparatio 80 ad eum non erit inquantum est forma in materia nisi communione nominis. Si vero fuerit hoc secundum sic ut eo modo quo ab eo est materia sit quiddam, et eo modo quo ab eo est forma sit quiddam aliud, ita ut alia forma non habeat esse mediante materia, tunc forma materialis erit sic quod aget actionem in qua non indiget materia; quicquid autem agit suam actionem 85 non indigens materia, ipsum per seipsum est non indigens materia. Igitur forma materialis non indiget materia, et omnino, quamvis forma materialis sit causa materiae extrahens eam ad effectum et perficiens eam, tamen materia habet impressionem in esse illius, et hoc est ipsam appropriari et signari. Si autem principium essendi fuerit de non materia, sicut iam nosti, 90 tunc sine dubio erit unumquodque eorum causa alterius secundum aliquid, et non uno modo. Si vero non fuerit ita, tunc destruetur formam materialem pendere de materia ullo modo. Similiter etiam supradiximus quod ad suum esse materiae non sufficit forma tantum, sed forma est ut partialis causa. Postquam autem ita est, tunc sola forma non potest poni causa mate- 95 riae omnino /481/ sufficiens per se. Palam igitur non posse esse ut primum causatum sit forma materialis; sed quod non sit materia manifestius est. Necessarium est igitur ut causatum primum sit forma non materialis omnino, scilicet intelligentia. the first cause made from being a material form, 2 and then the existence of its matter could come forth from it rather than from the first cause. To this, I say that those things which come after this form and this matter would be third in the order of God s effects, and the existence of those things would then be mediated by matter, so matter would be the cause of 90 the existence of (i) the forms of the many bodies in the world, and of (ii) their powers. But this is inappropriate, because the existence that belongs to matter is only that of receptability, so matter is only the cause of something s existence by way of reception. But if things are made from matter does not mean this, then we re talking about matter only in name. And if the 95 proposed permanent thing 3 exists in the manner of matter only in name, then to say that God s first effect 4 is related to it as a form that s embodied in matter is just to make a comparison in name too. But suppose it were like this: in a certain way, matter would come forth from God s first effect, and then in a certain other way a second form would come forth from it, such 100 that when the first form produced the second form, the second form would acquire its existence without the mediation of the first form s matter. In this case, the material form of God s first effect would perform an action for which it does not need matter, and since anything that performs its action without the need for matter does not itself need matter in the first place, it 105 follows that the material form of God s first effect would not need matter at all. In general then, even though a material form is a cause of matter, namely by drawing it into actuality and perfecting it, matter still plays a role in the existence of that form, for a material form is only instantiated and designated in matter. However, if the principle of existence is not solely 110 from matter, as you know, then without doubt matter and form will each be the cause of the other in their own ways, not in one way. And if this were not so, then any dependence that a material form has on matter would be destroyed. Similarly, we said above that form alone is not sufficient for the existence of matter. Rather, form is a partial cause. But with this being so, 115 then form alone cannot be postulated as the entire cause, /481/ sufficient by 73 essent tertia in ordine causatorum ] Marmura translates the Arabic like this: successively [lower] in the ranks of effects (The Metaphysics of the Healing, p. 328, line 34). 8 2 Here, a material form is a form that must be embodied in matter. Any form that is capable of existing apart from matter would not be a material form. 3 I.e., the body of the outermost celestial sphere. 4 I.e., the first intelligence that emanates directly from God. 9

6 Tu scis autem quod hic sunt intelligentiae et animae separatae multae. 100 Unde esse eorum non potest esse acquisitum ab aliquo mediante quod non sit separatum. Item nosti quod, in universitate eorum quae sunt a primo, sunt corpora, et nosti quod omne corpus est possibile esse quantum in se, et quod necessarium est per aliud a se, et nosti non esse illis viam essendi a primo absque mediante aliquo: sunt igitur ex ipso, sed mediante aliquo, 105 et nosti quod medium non est unitas pura; nosti etiam quod ex uno, secundum quod est unum, non est nisi unum. Necesse est igitur ut ex primo causatis propter esse eorum sint alia in quibus oportet esse necessitatem et multitudinem, quomodocumque evenerit. Intelligentiis enim separatis non potest esse aliqua multitudo nisi quemadmodum dicam, quoniam causatum 110 per se est possibile esse in seipso, propter primum autem est necessarium esse. Sed necessitas sui esse est secundum quod est intelligentia, et intelligit seipsum et intelligit primum necessario. Unde oportet ut sit in eo multitudo ex hoc quod intelligit se quod est possibile esse quantum in /482/ se, et ex hoc quod intelligit necessitatem sui esse a primo quod est intellectum per se 115 [...]. Non est autem ei multitudo ex primo. Nam possibilitas sui esse est ei quiddam propter se, non propter primum, sed est ei a primo necessitas sui esse, et deinde multiplicatur per hoc quod intelligit primum et per hoc quod itself, of matter. Therefore, it plainly cannot be the case that God s first effect is a material form. And it s even more obvious that it s not matter by itself, without form. Therefore, it is necessary that the first caused thing is a form that is not a material form in any way - namely an intelligence. 120 But you know that here there are many separated intelligences and souls. Whence, their existence cannot be acquired by some intermediary which is not itself separated. Moreover, you know that in the totality of those things which come from the first cause, there are bodies, and you know that every body is a possible being in itself, and it is necessary by something other 125 than itself, and you know that no existence comes to those things by way of coming from the first cause without some intermediary. Therefore, they come from the first cause, but by some intermediary, and you know that an intermediary is not a pure unity. For you know that from one thing, insofar as it is one, comes only one other thing. Therefore, it is necessary 130 that for the existence of the things that are caused by the first cause, there are other things in which there must be necessity and multiplicity, however it might have come forth. For there cannot be any multiplicity in the separated intelligences except in the way I say, for what is caused per se 5 has possible existence in itself, though it has necessary existence on account of 135 the first cause. But the necessity of its existence comes in virtue of the fact that it is an intelligence, for it understands itself and it understands the first necessary being. Whence, it is necessary that there is multiplicity in it from this: that it understands that it has possible existence in /482/ itself, 105 medium non est unitas pura ] The Arabic adds: having no duality (see Marmura, The Metaphysics of the Healing, English translation, p. 330, lines 1-2; Van Riet also notes this, Avicenna Latinus: Liber de Prima Philosophia, Libri V-X, p. 483, variant for line 50) Necesse est igitur... evenerit. ] The Arabic says: Hence, it is only right that [the body] proceeds from the first innovated things by reason of a duality or a plurality - in whatever form - that must necessarily be in them (translation from Marmura, The Metaphysics of the Healing, p. 330, lines 3-6) quoniam causatum per se... necessarium esse. ] The Arabic says: The effect in itself is possible of existence and, through the First, is necessary of existence (translation from Marmura, The Metaphysics of the Healing, p. 330, lines 8-9) Unde oportet... per se [...] ] The Arabic says: Hence, there must be in it, by way of plurality, the meaning [(a)] of its intellectual apprehension of its essence as being, within its own bound, possible of existence; [(b)] of its intellectual apprehension of its necessary existence, through the First, that intellectually apprehends itself; and [(c)] of its own intellectual apprehension of the First (translation from Marmura, The Metaphysics of the Healing, p. 330, lines 11-16) Effects can be caused per se or per accidens. Roughly speaking, the primary effect of an action is the per se effect, and any side effects are per accidens effects. For example, Socrates parents produce Socrates per se, but they produce his paleness per accidens. 11

7 intelligit seipsum, tali multiplicatione quae est comitans esse suae unitatis ex primo. Nos autem non prohibemus ex uno esse essentiam unam, quam 120 postea sequatur multitudo relativa quae non est ei in principio sui esse nec est intrans in principio suae constitutionis; et potest concedi esse unum ex quo proveniat unum, et deinde hoc unum comitetur iudicium et dispositio, vel proprietas vel causatum, et illud etiam fit unum. Sed, propter communicationem illius comitantis, sequatur ex eo aliquid propter quod proveniat 125 multitudo omnis varians eius essentiam. Oportet igitur ut huiusmodi multitudo sit causa possibilitatis essendi aliam multitudinem simul a causato primo. Si enim non esset haec multitudo, profecto non esset possibile esse ab eo nisi unum, nec esset possibile esse ab eo corpus, et omnino non esset ibi possibilitas multitudinis nisi hoc modo tantum. Iam autem manifestum 130 est nobis ex praedictis quod intelligentiae separatae sunt plures numero. Igitur non habent esse simul ex primo, sed necesse est ut excellentior omnibus illis sit esse quod primum est ex eo, post quod sequitur intelligentia et intelligentia. and that it understands that the necessity of its existence comes from the 140 first cause who is understood by Himself [...]. But there is no multiplicity in it from the first cause. For the possibility of its existence belongs to it in itself, not on account of the first cause, while the necessity of its existence belongs to it from the first cause, and thereafter it is diversified by the fact that it understands the first cause, and by the fact that it under- 145 stands itself, for such a diversification accompanies the existence of its unity from the first cause. But we do not deny that from one being, there can come one other essence, from which there may follow afterwards a relative multiplicity which does not belong to it from the source of its existence, nor is intrinsic to the source of its constitution. And we could concede 150 that there is one being from which a second being may come forth, and thereafter a single judgment and disposition - whether it is a necessary property of or whether it is caused by its possessor - might accompany this second being. But, on account of this second being having this accompanying judgment or disposition, there may follow from it something 155 on account of which there may come forth all multitude, diversifying its essence. 6 Therefore, it is necessary that this sort of multiplicity 7 is the cause of the possibility of the existence of other multiplicity 8 simultaneously from God s first effect. For if there were not this multiplicity, there certainly would only be one thing with possible existence that comes from it, and no tali multiplicatione quae est comitans esse suae unitatis ex primo ] The Arabic doesn t mention unity here. Rather, it says that this multiplicity is a necessary consequence of its necessary existence from the First (translation from Marmura, The Metaphysics of the Healing, p. 330, lines 20-21) Nos autem... et illud etiam fit unum ] The Arabic says: We do not disallow that from one thing there should be one essence followed thereafter by an additional plurality that was neither in its first existence nor included in the principle of its subsistence. Rather, it is possible that from the one [only] one proceeds necessarily, and that then this [latter] one will have as a necessary consequence either a governing rule, a state, an attribute, or an effect which would also be one (translation from Marmura, The Metaphysics of the Healing, p. 330, lines 21-26) Sed, propter communicationem... proveniat multitudo omnis varians eius essentiam ] The Arabic says: Then, with the association of this, there would necesssarily proceed from it something, whereby a plurality follows all of which is a necessary consequence of its essence (translation from Marmura, The Metaphysics of the Healing, p. 330, lines 27-29) Oportet igitur... simul a causata primo ] The Arabic says: It follows necessarily, then, that the likes of this plurality is the cause of the possibility of having plurality in [the emanated things] from the first effects (translation from Marmura, The Metaphysics of the Healing, p. 330, lines 29-31) The scenario here is this: a simple x produces some y, and then y has a single thought F. Here, x is simple, and initially, y is too. But when y has its thought F, that introduces diversity into y, for now we can distinguish a discrete thought F within y. And once we have this diversity, more diversity can follow. 7 I.e., the multiplicity of this second being plus its judgment or disposition. 8 I.e., the multiplicity of everything else in the universe. 13

8 /483/ Sub unaquaque autem intelligentia est caelum cum sua materia et 135 sua forma, quae est anima et intelligentia inferius ea. Igitur sub omni intelligentia sunt tria in esse; unde oportet ut possibilitas esendi haec tria sit ab illa intelligentia prima in creatione propter trinitatem quae est nominata in ea, et nobile sequitur ex nobiliore multis modis. Igitur ex prima intelligentia, inquantum intelligit primum, sequitur esse alterius intelligentiae inferioris 140 ea, et inquantum intelligit seipsam, sequitur ex ea forma caeli ultimi et eius perfectio et haec est anima, et propter naturam essendi possibile quae est ei et quae est retenta inquantum intelligit seipsam, est esse corporeitatis caeli ultimi quae est contenta in totalitate caeli ultimi. Unde ipsa et id quod est commune virtuti sunt sic quod ex ipsa sequitur intelligentia, et ex eo quod 145 est commune virtuti, inquantum appropriatur sibi ipsi secundum modum suum, sequitur sphaera prima cum suis partibus duabus, scilicet materia et forma; materia autem est mediante forma et consortio eius, sicut possibilitas essendi trahit ad effectum id quod est apud eam, /484/ scilicet formam caeli. Similiter est dispositio in intelligentia et intelligentia, et in caelo et 150 caelo, quousque pervenitur ad intelligentiam agentem quae gubernat nostras animas. possible body would come forth from it, and there would only be here a possible multitude in this way. 9 However, it is obvious to us from what has been said that the separated intelligences are many in number. Therefore, they do not have existence simultaneously from the first, but it is necessary that the more excellent of all those things is the first to have existence from 165 the first cause, after which there follows intelligence after intelligence. /483/ Now, under each intelligence, there is a heavenly sphere with its matter and its form (which is its soul), and an inferior intelligence. Therefore, under each intelligence there are three things in existence. Whence, it is necessary that the possibility of the existence of these three be in creation 170 from that first intelligence on account of the triad of thoughts which we named in it above, so that the noble follows from the more noble in many ways. Therefore, from the first intelligence, (i) insofar as it understands the first cause, there follows the existence of another intelligence inferior to it; (ii) and insofar as it understands itself, there follows from it the form 175 and perfection of its outermost sphere, and this is the soul of that sphere ; (iii) and on account of the nature of being possible, which belongs to it and which is retained insofar as it understands itself, there is the existence of all the corporeity of the outermost sphere which is contained in the totality of the outermost sphere. Whence, the first intelligence, as well as that 180 which exists by common power, is such that from that first intelligence, another intelligence follows, and from that which exists by common power (insofar as that power belongs to it in the appropriate way that suits its own manner of being ), follows the first sphere with its two parts, namely its matter and form. However, the matter only exists by the mediation of or 185 partnership with the form, just as the matter s possibility of existing draws 138 nobile sequitur ex nobiliore multis modis ] The Arabic says: the best follows the best in many ways (translation from Marmura, The Metaphysics of the Healing, p. 331, lines 4-5) quae est ei... totalitate caeli ultimi. ] The Arabic says: enfolded in [the act of] intellectually apprehending itself, is the existence of the corporeality of the outermost sphere, enfolded in the entity of the outermost sphere, [taken as] a species (translation from Marmura, The Metaphysics of the Healing, p. 331, lines 10-13) Unde ipsa... suis partibus duabus ] The Arabic says: This [possibility] is the thing that has a sharing in common with potentiality. Thus, inasmuch as it intellectually apprehends the First, there follows necessarily from it an intellect; and, inasmuch as in one respect [its intellection is applied] specifically to itself, there follows necessarily from it the first multiplicity in its two parts (translation from Marmura, The Metaphysics of the Healing, p. 331, lines 13-17) That is, there could only be many things in the sense that there could only be a chain of causes and effects, where the first cause produces only one effect, and that effect in turn produces only one effect, and so on. 15

9 Non oportet autem ut hoc procedat in infinitum, ita ut sub unoquoque separato sit separatum. Dico enim quod, si ex intelligentia provenit esse multitudinis, tunc erit hoc propter intentiones multitudinis quae sunt in ea, 155 sed non convertitur ita ut in unaquaque intelligentia sit haec multitudo et quod eius multitudinem sequantur haec causata, nec hae intelligentiae sunt convenientes in specie ita ut iudicia suarum intentionum sint convenientia. Igitur incipiamus ostendere hanc intentionem alio modo. Dico igitur quod caeli sunt multi supra numerum qui est in primo cau- 160 sato, quantum ad multitudinem eius praedictam, et praecipue cum unumquodque caelum dividitur in suam materiam et in suam formam. Igitur non potest esse principium eorum unum quod sit causatum primum. Nec etiam potest esse ut unumquodque corporum sit causa eius quo est prius: corpus enim ex hoc quod est corpus non potest esse principium corporis. 165 Nec ex hoc quod habet virtutem animalem, potest esse principium animae in alio corpore: nos enim iam ostendiums quod anima cuiusque caeli est eius perfectio et eius forma, nec est substantia separata; alioquin, esset intelligentia, non anima, nec moveret ullo modo nisi ad modum desiderii, nec contingeret in ea variatio ex motu corporis, nec ex consortio corporis con- 170 tingeret imaginatio et aestimatio. Consideratio autem iam perduxit nos ad stabiliendum has dispositiones in animabus caelorum, sicut nosti. into effect that which exists with it, /484/ namely the form of the heavenly sphere. In a similar way, this disposition passes from intelligence to intelligence, and from sphere to sphere, until we arrive at the agent intelligence who governs our souls. 190 However, this process cannot go on infinitely such that under each separate intelligence, there is still another separate intelligence. For I say that if a multitude came into existence from an intelligence, this would be because that intelligence has many thoughts. But this is not passed along such that in each intelligence there would be this same sort of multiplicity of 195 thoughts and effects 10 that follow from that multpilicity of thoughts. Nor do these intelligences agree in species, so that their thoughts might agree. But we shall try to show this point in another way. I say, therefore, that there are many more heavenly spheres than the number in God s first effect, insofar as the multiplicity that I just men- 200 tioned is concerned, and especially for each heavenly sphere which is divided into its matter and into its form. Therefore, there cannot be one source - i.e., God s first effect - for all those things. Nor can it be that each of the bodies is caused by the body that s prior to it. For insofar as it is a body, a body cannot be the source of another body. And from the 205 fact that it has animal power, it cannot be the source of a soul in another body. For we showed that the soul of each heavenly sphere is its perfection and its form, and it s not a separated substance. Otherwise, it would be an intelligence, not a soul, nor would it move anything in any way except by being desired, nor would it have any variation from the motion of a body, 210 nor would it have any imagination and estimation from its partnership with the body. But this consideration led us to ascribe these dispositions to the souls of the heavenly spheres, as you know sed non convertitur... haec causata ] Van Riet s critical edition has sed convertitur... haec causata, but I have followed Fabr. 1508, f. 105rA, line 16, which has sed non convertitur... haec causata. The Arabic also uses the negative: This statement of ours [however] is not convertible whereby every intellect having this multiplicity would have to have, as a necessary consequence of its multiplicity, these effects (translation from Marmura, The Metaphysics of the Healing, p. 331, lines 26-29, emphasis added). Again, Van Riet does not offer this variant (see Van Riet, Avicenna Latinus: Liber de Prima Philosophia, Libri V-X, p. 484, line 3). 165 habet virtutem animalem ] The Arabic says: has a psychological power (translation from Marmura, The Metaphysics of the Healing, p. 331, lines 38-39) I.e., the body and soul (matter and form) of a celestial sphere. 17

10 /485/ Si autem res ita fuerit, tunc non poterit esse ut ex animabus caelorum proveniant actiones in aliis corporibus, nisi mediantibus suis corporibus. Formae enim corporum et eorum perfectiones sunt duobus modis. 175 Aut enim sunt formae quarum existentiae sunt propter materias corporum, et ideo existentia eorum est in materiis illorum corporum; et ob hoc, calor ignis non calefacit quidlibet, sed quod fuerit obvians suo corpori vel secundum comparationem sui corporis; similiter, sol non illuminat quidlibet, sed quod fuerit oppositum suo corpori. Aut sunt formae quarum existentiae sunt 180 per seipsas, non propter materias corporum sicut animae, quia unaquaeque anima non appropriatur corpori nisi quia eius actio est propter illud corpus et in illo; si autem anima esset separatae essentiae et actionis utriusque ab illo corpore, tunc esset anima omnis rei, non anima illius tantum corporis. Iam igitur manifestum est secundum omnes modos quod vires caelestes 185 quae sunt impressae in suis corporibus non agunt nisi mediantibus suis corporibus. Absurdum est autem ut agant animam mediante corpore: corpus enim non potest esse medium inter animam et animam. Si autem illae agunt animas absque mediantibus corporibus, tunc habent solitariam existentiam absque corpore et appropriationem et actionem separatam a sua 190 essentia et ab essentia corporis: hoc autem est praeter propositum. Si autem non agit illud anima, tunc multo minus agit illud corpus caeleste; anima enim antecellit corpus in ordine et perfectione. /486/ Quod autem in unoquoque caelo ponatur aliquid ex quo in suo caelo proveniat aliquid et impressio sine infusione suae essentiae cum occu- 195 patur circa illud corpus, sed eius essentia sit discreta in existentia et actione ab illo corpore, nos non prohibemus hoc, quia hoc est quod nos vocamus inteligentiam spoliatam, ex qua ponimus advenire id quod est post eam; sed est praeter patiens a corpore, et praeter communicans ei, et praeter formam eius propriam, et praeter omne id quod diximus cum stabilivimus animam. 200 Iam igitur certificatum est quod caeli habent principia quae sunt nec corporalia nec formae corporum, et quod unumquodque caelorum appropriatur alicui illorum principiorum; universitas autem eorum communicat in uno principio. /485/ However, if such were the case, then it could only be that the actions that would come forth from the souls of the celestial spheres would 215 have an effect on other bodies by the mediation of their bodies. For the forms that are the perfections of their bodies are twofold. Either (i) they are the forms of those things whose existence occurs on account of the matter of their bodies, and for this reason the existence of those things is in the matter of their bodies. Thus, the heat of fire does not heat anything unless 220 it touches its body or comes close to its body. Similarly, the sun does not illuminate anything unless it stands opposite to its body. Or (ii) they are forms of those things whose existence occurs on account of themselves, and not on account of the matter of their bodies - like souls. For each soul appropriates a body only insofar as its action occurs in virtue of and in that 225 body. However, if a soul were separated from its body in both essence and action, then it would be the soul of everything, not the soul of that body alone. Therefore, it is obvious in every way that the celestial powers which are impressed in their bodies only act by the mediation of their bodies. But it is absurd that they might actualize a soul by the mediation of a body, for 230 a body cannot be an intermediary between a soul and a soul. But if they did actualize souls without the mediation of bodies, then they would have a special existence and instantiation without a body, and they would have a special action separated from its essence and from the essence of the body. But this is beyond what s proposed. However, if it were not to actualize 235 that soul, then much less would it actualize that celestial body, for the soul surpasses the body in order and perfection. /486/ But if in each celestial sphere you were to postulate that there is something which (i) produces some body and impression within its sphere, and (ii) whose essence is not infused in that body but rather is discrete in 240 existence and action from that body, then we would not prohibit this. For this is what we call a bare intelligence, from which we postulate that which comes after it. But it is other than that which is receptive to the body, and it is beyond sharing with it, and it is other than the proper form of the body, and it is other than each thing that we ascribed to the soul. Therefore, it is 245 certain that the heavenly spheres have sources which are neither corporeal nor the forms of bodies, and that each of the heavenly spheres belongs to one of those sources. But the totality of them shares in one source

11 Non est autem dubium hic esse intelligentias simplices separatas quae 205 fiunt cum factura corporum humanorum, quae non corrumpuntur sed permanent (iam autem hoc manifestum est in scientiis naturalibus) quae nec proveniunt a primo principio, eo quod multae sunt, quamvis sint una in specie. Sed, quia fiunt, sunt causatae primi mediante aliquo. Causae autem agentes mediae inter primum et illas non possunt esse inferiores eis in or- 210 dine, quia non sunt intelligentiae simplices separatae; causae vero datrices esse sunt perfectiores in esse, recipientes vero esse sunt inferiores in esse. Oportet igitur ut causatum primum sit intelligentia una per essentiam, ex qua non potest esse multitudo conveniens in specie. Intentiones enim quae multiplicantur in ea secundum quod multitudo potest esse in ea, si /487/ 215 fuerint diversae certitudinibus, tunc id quod provenit ex unaquaque earum aliud est in specie ab eo quod provenit ab alia, et sic non comitabitur unumquodque eorum quod comitatur alterum, sed alia natura. Si vero fuerint convenientes in certitudine, tunc in quo erunt diversae et multae, cum non sit ibi divisio materiae? Igitur ex causato primo non potest esse multitudo 220 nisi diversa in specie. Igitur hae animae terrenae non fiunt a causato primo absque mediante alia causa iam essente. Similiter fit ab omni causato primo sublimiore, quousque perveniatur ad causatum quod fit cum factura elementorum receptibilium generationis et corruptionis quae multiplicantur numero et specie simul. Igitur multitudo 225 recipientis causa est multitudinis actionis principii quod est unum in essentia. Et hoc est post completionem esse omnium caelestium, et sequitur semper intelligentia post intelligentiam, quousque fiat sphaera lunae, et deinde fiant elementa et aptantur recipere impressionem unam in specie, multam numero, ab intelligentia ultima. Si enim causa multitudinis non fuerit in 230 agente, debebit esse necessario in patiente. Oportet igitur ut, ex unaquaque intelligentia, fiat intelligentia inferior ea et esset tunc quousque possint fieri substantiae intelligibiles divisibiles multae numero propter multitudinem causarum, et usque huc perveniunt. Iam igitur vere manifestum est quod There is no doubt here that there are simple, separated intelligences who are made with the making of human bodies, who are not corrupted 250 but permanent (but now this is obvious in the natural sciences), and who neither came forth from the first source, for they are many, even though they are one in species. However, because they are made, they are caused by the first cause through some intermediary. But the agent causes that are intermediaries between the first and these intellects just mentioned cannot 255 be inferior to these intellects in order, for that would mean that they are not simple, separated intelligences themselves. For causes that give being are more perfect in being, and recipients of being are more inferior in being. Therefore, it is necessary that God s first effect is an intelligence that is one by essence, from whom there cannot be a multitude that agrees 260 in species. For the thoughts that are multiplied in God s first effect, insofar as multiplicity can be in it, if /487/ there were diverse thoughts, then that which comes from each of those thoughts would differ in species from that which comes forth from another thought, and in this way, the effect which accompanies each thought will not accompany another thought, 265 for it will have a different nature. Besides, if these thoughts were to agree, then in virtue of what would there be diverse and many things, since there would not be any division of matter there? Therefore, from God s first effect, there cannot be a multitude of things unless they differ in species. Thus, these earthly souls are not made by God s first effect without the 270 mediation of other causes already in existence. The same goes for each thing that s made by a higher cause, and this process continues until we reach some effect that is made along with the elements that are receptive of generation and corruption, and which are multiplied in number and species simultaneously. Therefore, the multiplic- 275 ity of recipients is the cause of the multiplicity of the actions of a principle which is one in essence. But this is after the completion of the existence of evey celestial sphere, and there always follows intelligence after intelligence, until they make the sphere of the moon, and thereafter they make the elements that are disposed to receive from the last intelligence one impression 280 in species that is many in number. For if the cause of multiplicity is not in the agent, then it will have to be necessary in the patient. Therefore, it is necessary that, from each intelligence, another intelligence is made who 20 21

12 ex omni intelligentia superiore in ordine, secundum hoc quod intelligit pri- 235 mum, provenit esse alterius intelligentiae inferioris ea, sed, secundum hoc /488/ quod intelligit seipsam, provenient circuli per se tantum; corpus vero caeli fit ab ea et permanet mediante anima caelesti; omnis enim forma causa est ut sua materia sit in effectu; ipsa enim materia non habet existentiam. is inferior to it, and the same again and again until they can make intelligible substances that are divisible into many in number, on account of the 285 multiplicity of recipient causes. This process goes all the way up to this point, where it stops. Therefore, it is truly obvious that from each intelligence that s superior in order, insofar as it understands the first cause, there comes into existence a further intelligence who is inferior to it, but insofar as /488/ it understands itself, only spheres per se will come forth. 290 But the body of the heavenly sphere is made by it, and it is permanent by the mediation of the soul of its celestial sphere, for every form is a cause such that its matter exists in effect, for matter does not have existence itself