The Vatican and Nazism: The role of the Catholic Church and the Papacy during the rise of Nazism and its reaction to the Final Solution

Transcription

1 The Vatican and Nazism: The role of the Catholic Church and the Papacy during the rise of Nazism and its reaction to the Final Solution Mark Barry B.A National University of Ireland University College Dublin College of Arts and Celtic Studies History of International Relations Presented in part fulfilment of the qualification for the Master of Arts August 2010 UCD School of History and Archives Head of School: Prof. Edward James Supervisor: Dr. Stephan Malinowski

2 ii Acknowledgements I would like to that my supervisor Dr. Stephan Malinowski for his guidance throughout this project and the staff of the University College Dublin School of History for their assistance during the past year. My thanks to the library staff at University College Dublin and Trinity College Dublin. I am particularly indebted to the Dun Laoghaire Rathdown County Council libraries for providing me with most of the reading materials for this topic. Without them this thesis would not have been possible. Thank you to all my family, friends and classmates for their support, endless encouragement, and for putting up with me throughout the year. I would especially like to thank my Dad for his sound advice, tireless effort and genuine interest in this project. I really appreciate all of your help.

3 iii Table of Contents Acknowledgements ii Introduction: 1 - Setting the Scene - The Church in Retreat 2 - Enter Eugenio Pacelli 2 - Literature Review 4 Chapter I: 8 - Did the Reich Concordat of 1933 hasten the rise of Nazism and allow Hitler total control? 8 - Background to the Concordat 8 - Violating the Concordat 10 - The Battle for German Youth 11 - Severing Catholic Communication 13 - The Morality Trials 13 - The Catholic Response to Nazi violations of the Reich Concordat 15 - What was Pacelli s ultimate aim which resulted in the muzzling of the German hierarchy and ending political Catholicism? 17 Chapter II: 22 - The Outbreak of War 22 - The Response of the Holy See to the Holocaust 23

4 iv - Other Catholic Interventions 28 Chapter III: 32 - The Silence of Pius XII 32 - The Legacy of Pius XII 39 Conclusion 42 Bibliography 45

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6 1 Introduction The activities of the Catholic Church in Europe in the decades leading up to the Second World War and all the horrors of that conflagration have cast a long shadow over the Church and in particular the papacy of Pius XII. The role of the Catholic Church during this period and its reaction to evidence of the emerging genocide of European Jews is one of considerable controversy and speculation to this day. During this period were the Church and Secretary of State Eugenio Pacelli, as a central character, more interested in maintaining Church stake holdings rather than the fate of the Jews? Did the bid for unprecedented papal power draw the Church unwittingly into complicity with darker forces in the era? Why did Pacelli demonstrate such indifference and intransigence in the face of the mounting evidence of the transportation of Jews throughout occupied Europe and reliable accounts of the mass extermination which was being perpetrated in the camps of Eastern Europe? To answer these questions and the overriding concern that the Church and Pacelli, through these actions, accelerated the growth of Nazism and which in turn facilitated the Holocaust we need to examine the forces at play at the end of the 19 th century and in the decades leading up to the outbreak of World War II. Setting the scene: From the time of the Reformation the Catholic Church had struggled to survive and exert influence in a climate of liberation, secularisation, science, industrialisation and evolving national states. Most of the modernising states in Europe were inclined to separate Church from state. The Catholic Church became an object of oppression in Europe through much of the 19 th Century, its property and wealth systematically plundered; religious orders and clergy deprived of their scope for action; schools taken over by the state or shut down. The Papal States had been in constant danger of dismemberment and annexation as the forces of Italian unity and modernisation gathered strength. During this time the Church had been riven internally by an issue fraught with consequences for the modern papacy. The struggle was between those who urged an absolute primacy from the Roman centre and those who argued for greater distribution of authority among the bishops. It has been argued that Papal

7 2 autocracy was a principal cause of the Reformation itself. The triumph of the centrists was sealed at the First Vatican Council of 1870 where the Pope was declared infallible in matters of faith and morals as well as undisputed supreme spiritual and administrative head of the Church. The Church in Retreat: The Catholic Church at this time was under immense pressure and persecution in Europe. For centuries its firm grasp which had controlled society was undone by the rise of the state. In Germany, France, Great Britain, Austria, Switzerland and Italy itself, the power of the Church was usurped by political parties and monarchies under a wave of anti-clericalism. Church property was seized, religious orders were outlawed, confessional schools came under state control, and any clergymen who resisted were liable to imprisonment or exile. Enter Eugenio Pacelli: It was against this background of a troubled end to the Papacy of Pius IX that Eugenio Pacelli was born into a family of Church lawyers in The family background was respectable but modest. Pacelli s father and grandfather before him, as well as his elder brother Francesco were part of a caste of lay Vatican lawyers in the service of the papacy. This family association with the Holy See dates from 1819 when the grandfather began the study of Canon Law and became an advocate in the tribunal of the Sacred Rota. Pacelli s father followed in his footsteps and became a lay official in the service of Pius IX, popularly known as Pio Nono. Headstrong, of slender build and a delicate constitution the young Pacelli demonstrated from an early age impressive intelligence and powers of memory. 1 Distant and somewhat of a loner he had a flair for the classics and modern languages. His parents instilled an intense Catholic piety in his upbringing; the family was steeped in ecclesiastical legal knowledge. Having completed his formal education in 1894, Pacelli informed his family of his intention to join the priesthood. 1 John Cornwell Hitler s Pope (London 1999) 17

8 3 He was enrolled in Rome s prestigious Almo Collegio Capranica. 2 Ordained a priest on the 2 nd of April 1899, Pacelli later studied theology, canon and civil law quickly attracting the attention of the Vatican itself. He was employed in the Vatican s Department of Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs involving him in Vatican diplomacy. In 1904, Pope Pius X assigned him to research and develop the new codification of Canon Law, a project to which he would devote most of his efforts for the next thirteen years. Over the next few years, Pacelli was sent on numerous diplomatic missions on behalf of the Vatican and Pius X visiting England, Austria and Serbia. In Serbia Pacelli was instrumental in developing a Concordat between the Vatican and the Serbian government allowing for complete Papal authority over the country s Roman Catholic institutions. In 1917, he was promoted to bishop and later Archbishop in quick succession before being appointed papal nuncio to Germany, a position he held until It was here in Germany that Pacelli developed a number of friendships within the Catholic hierarchy as well as a close affiliation with the German people themselves. He witnessed the slow disintegration of the Weimar Republic and the rise of right and left wing extremist political groups; some historians pointing to the Bolshevik uprising in Munich in 1919 as the event that sparked Pacelli s fear of a Communism. In 1929, Pope Pius XI further advanced Pacelli s career, elevating him to the position of Cardinal. Within a few months he was recalled to Rome where he was appointed Vatican Secretary of State and worked closely with the Pope on Church policy. He continued his diplomatic missions for the Vatican, concluding numerous European concordats and visiting the United States and South America. Pius XI was noted as saying I make him travel so that he may get to know the world and the world may get to know him. He then added: He will be a splendid Pope. 3 A favourite of Pius XI it was clear that Pacelli was being groomed for the highest position within the Roman Catholic Church. A highly intelligent diplomat, fluent in a number of languages, and charismatic, he was the ideal choice to become the next Pope. It was hardly surprising that after Pius XI s death in 1939, he was elected Pope in one of the shortest conclaves in history. Pacelli was born to be Pope and was on the papal fast track 2 Rabbi David Dalin The Myth of Hitler s Pope (Washington D.C 2005) 47 3 Cornwell Hitler s Pope 167

9 4 even before he was ordained. 4 Elected on 2 nd March 1939, Pope Pius XII was tasked with leading the largest Christian institution in one of the most turbulent periods in world history. His actions over the course of his papal career would come under severe scrutiny from historians and Catholics alike, becoming one of the most controversial figures of the 20 th century. This thesis will examine the influence Pacelli had on the rise of Nazism in Germany and subsequently his conduct during the war as Supreme Pontiff to help save Europe s Jewish population from extermination. Literature Review The Catholic Church during the Papacy of Pius XII has been the subject of debate and scrutiny for nearly half a century. Although not a major area of study within second and third level education the role of the Catholic Church during WWII and in particular its reaction to the Holocaust has been one of the most contested areas of recent history amongst scholars and historians alike. At present there is a considerable amount of literature relating to this topic, however, due to the inability to access to official Vatican Archive documents, much of this work cannot be fully verified. These documents are set to be published and released to the public in the year 2014 which will no doubt cast new light on what is already a hotly contested subject. From examining the literature that is available it is clear that most historians are divided in their opinions of Pius XII and the Catholic Church. Eugene J. Fisher argues that most of the literature can be separated into three categories: criticism of Pius XII; the defence of Pius XII; and those who try to take an objective view of Pius XII during WWII. There is no yes or no answers, no black and white, only grey areas in between. Most of the literature is representative of the author s own personal opinion on the subject, rather than giving a full fair analysis making it difficult to decipher which opinions are to be trusted, or which facts are to be believed. In reviewing the books and articles associated with this thesis, the arguments of all parties have been taken into consideration; compared and contrasted to portray an accurate account of these events and a fair analysis of the main figure involved, Pope Pius XII. 4 Jose M. Sanchez Pius XII and the Holocaust: Understanding the Controversy (Washington D.C 2002) 14

10 5 The majority of literature available on Pius XII is critical of the conduct of the Pontiff during WWII and in particular his attitude toward the Holocaust. This began in 1963, five years after the death of Pius XII, when the controversial play Die Stellvertreter or The Deputy by Rolf Hochhuth was performed in Germany. This play was hugely critical of Pius XII, portraying him as a cold, callous, money-driven man indifferent to the plight of the Jews and more interested in the welfare of the Church. 5 This has since been refuted by many historians and diplomatic documents but it did lead to an unprecedented interest in Pius XII and the Catholic Church during the Holocaust. 6 Since Hochhuth s play, a range of literature has been published criticising the Church and the wartime Pope. Carlo Falconi s book The Silence of Pius XII is one example of the extremely harsh criticism which followed The Deputy. Published in 1965, Falconi likewise accuses Pius XII of not acting adequately to save the Jews or speaking out against the Final Solution. It argues that Pius XII was well aware of the extent of humanitarian crimes perpetrated by the Nazis but failed to act. However due to the time of writing, much of this book relies heavily on speculation without the necessary evidence to support its arguments of what should have been done. Saul Friedlander s book Pius XII and the Third Reich (1966) argues along similar lines. Friedlander, himself a Jew who survived the Holocaust through Church intervention, argues that Pius XII did not respond quickly enough or adequately to save the lives of most of Europe s Jewish population. The author uses primary sources, archival documents and the personal correspondence of Pius XII with foreign diplomats to conclude that Pius XII, in spite of available evidence, did not do everything he could to combat the Nazis and their anti-semitism. Perhaps the two most sensationalist criticisms of Pope Pius XII are John Cornwell s Hitler Pope (1999) and Susan Zucotti s Under his Very Windows (2000). These books reopened the controversy and brought it to a wider audience. Cornwell s account describes Pius XII as a skilled diplomat and career Vatican official whose main concern was the advancement of the power of the Roman Catholic Church through the centralization of Papal power. Cornwell conveys the Pope as trying to maintain the institutions of the Church during WWII while displaying little concern for the fate of the Jews. Widely criticised by historians, 5 Cornwell Hitler s Pope ix 6 Anthony Rhodes The Vatican in the Age of the Dictators (London 1973) 351

11 6 Cornwell s book is still a detailed account of Pius XII and the early life of Eugenio Pacelli, a notable absence from other literature. (It is important to mention that Cornwell has since recanted his opinion of Pius XII). Similarly Zucotti s work is meticulously researched but has come under criticism from historians. Her book focuses on the rescue of Italian Jews by the Church but concludes that the Vatican actually did very little in these aid efforts. Basing her conclusions on available documents and many yet unpublished, Zucotti contends that when Jews were rounded up for deportation, the Papacy did little to intervene. Though labelled as staunchly anti-pius XII, Zucotti s work remains an important source relating to the topic. Noel Gerard s book Pius XII: The Hound of Hitler can be categorised with these books, also asserting the claim that the Pope did not do enough to save the Jews from extermination; however the book uses limited sources to form its conclusion unlike other books in this category. In response to the widespread criticism that shrouded the Catholic Church, sparked by Hochhuth s The Deputy, many historians, clergymen and Jewish scholars have rushed to the defence of Pius XII claiming that his actions were more than successful in helping Jews flee Europe during World War II. Although not as widely available as literature criticising the Pope, articles and books defending the conduct of the Papacy during WWII have emerged in recent years. Most notably is the work of Rabbi David G. Dalin whose book The Myth of Hitler s Pope disputes the accusations of Cornwell and Zucotti. Dalin s book focuses on the relief efforts of individual clergymen in continental Europe as well as those of the Vatican to save Jews from persecution. The book also features praise for Pius XII from Jews who were aided by the Catholic Church during the Final Solution and the German occupation of Italy. It does however lack the extensive detail of most other works relating to the period. There are other works that are also part of this category such as Jose M. Sanchez s Pius XII and the Holocaust: Understanding the Controversy and Margherita Machione s Pope Pius: Architect of Peace. Similarly to Dalin they present a positive assessment of Pius XII and his efforts during the Holocaust, largely condemning critics for ignoring the initiatives that were undertaken by the Papacy. The third category is comprised of literature which aims to give a fair assessment of the Catholic Church and the Pope without necessarily siding with detractors or defenders.

12 7 With such a controversial subject such as this it can be extremely difficult for an author to detach themselves from the hysteria created by critical publications such as Hitler s Pope or the work of the clergy who more often than not will side with Pius XII and the Church due to their own involvement within their religious institutions. However, one of the most objective books written on this subject is Pope Pius XII and the Holocaust, edited by John K. Roth and Carol Rittner (2002). This book is comprised of in-depth articles contributed by leading historians of this era. These combined accounts aim to answer the questions of whether Pius XII could have done more for Europe s Jews; analyses his relationship with Judaism; discusses his supposed silence during the Holocaust; and generally reappraises his Papacy. Despite some of the contributors within the book differing on their opinions of the event, it does aim to take all aspects into account before formulating a conclusion. What is most significant about this book (and what is notably absent from other accounts) is the acknowledgement by the author s that this topic can never have a final, lasting conclusion given the limited number of sources and the unavailability of official Vatican documents. There are a number of other materials and journals that are not devoted to the life of Pacelli but rather concentrate on the broader implications of his policies during the rise of fascist Europe. Articles such as Robert F. Drinan s The Christian Response to the Holocaust and William M. Harrigan s Historical background to Mit Brennender Sorge are good accounts of Church activity beyond the Vatican. Anthony Rhodes The Vatican in the Age of the Dictators is an excellent description of Europe s large diplomatic network during this time. By focusing on individuals other than Pacelli, such as Europe s Catholic hierarchies and foreign diplomats, the author s present a broader outlook of the international political situation and the different forces at work. Although included in a number of works by the aforementioned historians above, there is a severely limited amount of primary sources relating directly to the event. This is due directly to the Vatican archives unwillingness to release their official documents relating to the events which, as already stated, will become available in the year Some are available through internet sources yet many remain absent from third level institutions.

13 8 Chapter 1: Did the Reich Concordat of 1933 hasten the rise of Nazism and allow Hitler total control? Background to the Concordat Germany witnessed a rapid political transformation in the inter-war period. The failure of successive Weimar governments heralded the end of democracy and the rise of extremist political factions. With a huge economic hangover as a result of the Great War and the payment of reparations, in their desperation the German people turned to the National Socialist German Workers Party of Nazi Party. Its leader Adolf Hitler promised false and fantasised solution to German problems. The popularity of the party steadily rose throughout the 1920s and eventually formed a new government in March Hitler became Chancellor and Nazi ideology was imposed on German society. The Catholic Church in Germany had been long-time opponents of Nazism. Its anti- Semitic ideology and policies toward the disabled and infirmed conflicted with the moral teachings and doctrine of the Church. The German hierarchy used its sermons and pastoral letters to publicly denounce the Nazi Party and the violent behaviour of the SA. As early as September 1930 the diocese of Mainz enforced an Episcopal ban against the party attending Church services. 7 Possessing considerable power and the ability to influence its congregation of 20 million Catholics, the German hierarchy was one of the major obstacles of a Nazi dictatorship. Similarly, the Zentrumspartei or Catholic Centre Party was one of the largest and most powerful democratic parties in the Reichstag. It had been a key power sharer in a series of Weimar coalition governments between 1919 and 1933 during which five chancellors were drawn from the Centre Party. 8 Hitler was wary of the threat Catholicism posed to the formation of a new Third Reich influenced by the Catholic resistance during the Kulturkampf in the 1870s. He had written about the futility of directly confronting the Church in his book Mein Kampf. 9 Its 7 William M. Harrigan Nazi Germany and the Holy See : the historical background of Mit Brennender Sorge, The Catholic Historical Review, Vol. 47, no. 2 (July 1961) Gerard Noel Pius XII: The Hound of Hitler (London 2008) 43 9 Adolf Hitler Mein Kampf trans. Ralph Manheim (London 1992)

14 9 organization and ability to influence made it the most prominent opponent of Nazism. For this reason Hitler approached the Catholic Church seeking a diplomatic agreement between Church and State. In a speech in 1933 he referred to Christianity as:...the unshakeable foundation of the morals and moral code of the nation and attached the greatest value to friendly relations with the Holy See which it was endeavouring to develop. This declaration opened the door for Pacelli to begin negotiations with the Third Reich; however it would be impossible to conclude a treaty given the opposition of the German hierarchy. Under pressure from the Vatican and German politicians such as Franz von Papen and Dr. Ludwig Kaas, the German hierarchy were forced to rescind their stance against Nazism. Issuing an Episcopal letter after their Fulda conference, the German bishops declared: Without revoking the judgement made in our previous declarations in respect to certain religious-ethical errors, the episcopate believes it can cherish the confidence that the designated general prohibitions and warnings need no longer be considered necessary There is a clear reluctance for this change of opinion visible within this statement. Essentially the bishops had not recanted on their opinion of the Nazis but were willing to relax it for the sake of negotiations with the Vatican. This announcement was met with surprise by the rest of the German clergy. Father Franziscus Stratmen of the Berlin University wrote to Cardinal Faulhaber reflecting the confusion and anger of the clergy themselves:...the authority of the bishops among innumerable Catholics and non-catholics has been shaken by the quasi-approval of the Nationalist-Socialist movement. 11 The pressure exerted by Pacelli was a major factor in the confusion which now enveloped the Catholic Church in Germany. Nonetheless the way was now clear for negotiations to proceed, leading to the signing of the Reich Concordat on July 20 th The talks had not been as smooth as originally hoped. The most disputed points of the treaty were Article IV, 10 Cornwell Hitler s Pope Klaus Scholder The Churches and the Third Reich Vol. 1 (Michigan 1988) 253

15 10 which guaranteed the freedom of the Pope and the bishops to communicate with the faithful and publish Church materials without hindrance ; Article XXIII which guaranteed the rights of the Church to existing Catholic denominational schools and to establish new ones; and Article XXXI which proved the most problematic of all. Under this last article all Catholic organizations would be protected and respected by the government so long as its activities lay outside the realm of politics. Any Catholic groups found in breach of this were to be forcibly liquidated by the state. What exactly constituted political Catholicism was to be determined by the Nazi government and the German hierarchy. This would prove incredibly problematic for the Catholic Church in the coming years. Violating the Concordat The vagueness of the agreement enabled the Nazi party to immediately manipulate its terms. The government immediately launched a wide-scale attack on German Catholic institutions. From 1933 onwards, Catholicism was harassed and subjugated through a combination of Nazi propaganda campaigns and terrorism of the general public. In a speech in January 1934 by the Bavarian Minister of Education, Herr H. Schemm stated: The government is well aware that the Nazi state still has numerous enemies in economic life, in the confessional and elsewhere. I will not rest until these malcontents are destroyed root and branch. 12 The Catholic Church was considered one of these numerous enemies. All Catholic organizations became targets of persecution especially religious orders, confessional schools and the Catholic press. Their resistance was limited and ineffectual against the totalitarian government; compounded by their own unwillingness to violate the terms of the Reich Concordat. Eventually, under constant pressure and limitations, many Catholic institutions would be forced to yield to the will of Nazi authority. Political Catholicism, as already stated, was one of the most contentious issues of the concordat. A traditional source of Church strength in Germany, it was sacrificed by the Vatican as part of the attempt to centralize the authority of the Papacy. Against the wishes of 12 The New York Times (Jan ) available from =destroyed%20root%20and%20branch&st=cse; accessed 29 June 2010

16 11 most of the German hierarchy, the Catholic Centre Party and the Bavarian People s Party were forced to disband. In doing so, one of the last bastions of German democracy was lost as well as the ability of the clergy to influence the state. The demise of these parties left the Catholic Church without an outlet to protest; it was now at the mercy of Nazi oppression. The terms of the concordat forbidding political Catholicism also applied to all Catholic organizations. In July 1933, the Nazi government issued a statement citing Article XXXI of the concordat and warning Catholic organizations that: They will have to take special care to avoid any semblance even of party-political or labour-union activities. 13 Catholic organizations were essentially walking on thin ice; the slightest provocation inviting the full wrath of the Gestapo and SA. John Brown Mason, writing in 1934 observed that all Catholic groups, especially if they are of a professional nature, are therefore under constant threat of dissolution. 14 Catholic institutions would be monitored carefully, many of which would be forced to disband in face these charges over the next few years. The Battle for German Youth It soon emerged that the Nazi government had no intentions of upholding the terms of the concordat, in spite of Hitler s constant assurances to the Vatican. Beginning in 1934, Nazi forces embarked on a campaign targeting Germany s youth knowing that whoever controlled the Church controlled the future of Germany and neither the party nor the Church were willing to concede any ground on the issue. 15 The Nazi party launched a two-pronged attack on Catholic youth organizations and the confessional schools. These youth organizations had always been a mainstay of the Church; a means of indoctrinating children into the traditions Catholicism and ensuring its survival. The Nazis wished to server this relationship, replacing the teachings of the Church with their own ideology. 13 Markishe Volkszeitung, July 23, trans. John Brown Mason in The Concordat with the Third Reich, The Catholic Historical Review, Vol. 20, No. 1 (April 1934) Mason The Concordat with the Third Reich,30 15 Harrigan Nazi Germany and the Holy See 184

17 12 The campaign against youth groups began with the introduction of provisions reducing the functionality of Catholic youth groups. Accusing them of political activity, they were no longer allowed to wear uniforms and were limited to lectures, singing hymns and attending Church services. 16 On 15 March 1934 the Hitler Youth leader Baldur von Schirach condemned the divisive influence of Catholic Youth groups and urged parents to enrol their children in his movement. He encouraged Hitler Youth units to pick fights with members of rival Catholic youth groups, thus beginning to apply the kind of coercion on the streets that had proved so effective on a wider scale in the first half of Most Catholic youth groups were forced to disband under this pressure. They were dealt a further blow in December 1936 when a new Reich law was passed ordering the all German youth organizations to be amalgamated into the Hitler Youth so that they might be educated physically, intellectually, and morally in the Spirit of National Socialism. 18 By 1939 all Catholic youth organizations had either joined the Hitler Youth or disbanded entirely. Under the Weimar constitution confessional schools were maintained so long as parents wished to send their children there. 19 The Nazi propaganda ministry launched a campaign managed by Dr. Josef Goebbels himself targeting German parents aiming to persuade them to enrol their children in state run community schools. Like most Nazi political initiatives, it was enforced by the Gestapo and the SS subjecting the public to physical intimidation. The campaign was a huge success; by 1939 all denominational schools in Germany had been either been replaced by community schools or were closed down by the state. The Church was yet again powerless to stop this violation of the concordat. The government now controlled all major aspects of youth culture in Germany; the way was now paved for the indoctrination of its new generation into the ideology of National Socialism. The Church could only look on. 16 Mason The Concordat with the Third Reich Richard J. Evans The Third Reich in Power (London 2005) Harrigan Nazi Germany and the Holy See Harrigan Nazi Germany and the Holy See 183

18 13 Severing Catholic Communication One of the Church s main outlets of communication was through its various newspapers and magazines. An effective method of maintaining a close relationship with its congregations, the press enabled the Church to provide guidance for the twenty million Catholics in Germany. This was another target of Nazi suppression. In complete disregard for Article IV of the concordat, another wave of attacks was launched on the Catholic press organizations regarded by the government as a superfluous element of German society. 20 Catholic newspapers and magazines were accused of political activity, in breach of Article XXXI of the Concordat, leading government forces to occupy and vandalise their premises. Editors and publishers were imprisoned; labelled enemies of the state. Under immense pressure, countless Catholic press organization disbanded. By 1941, almost the entire Catholic press had been silenced. 21 The Church s ability to communicate was severely reduced throughout the country. The protests of the German hierarchy as well as messages from the Vatican were censored by the government, often never reaching their destination. The Gestapo were ordered to monitor Church services negating any protest from the pulpit; any perpetrators were liable to arrest. The Church resorted to smuggling letters between its various authorities, even papal messages were sent in the utmost secrecy. The complete destruction of the Church communication systems gave the impression of that the German hierarchy were indifferent to these serious assaults on Church institutions. In reality however they were powerless to stem the Nazi onslaught, hamstrung by their obedience to the concordat and its terms. This enabled the government and its propaganda ministry to instigate its final offensive against the waning strength of the German Catholic Church. The Morality Trials The so-called morality trials were an open attack on the lives of the German Catholic clergy themselves. Beginning in 1935, accompanied once again by a massive propaganda campaign, the clergy were accused of financial corruption and sexual crimes. 20 The New York Times (April ), available from =superfluous%20element&st=cse; accessed 6 July Richard Grunberger A Social History of the Third Reich (London 1971) 450

19 14 Often priests and nuns who worked in orphanages and schools were the targets of such crimes. 22 These grotesque stories were based on little or no evidence; in most cases the accusations were complete fabrications by the Nazi propaganda ministry themselves. In November 1935 the Nazi newspaper Volkischer Beobachter reported that fifteen monks were brought before the courts for offences against the law on homosexuality in a home for the mentally ill in western Germany. They received severe prison sentences and the attention of endless column inches in the press. In May 1936, up to 200 Franciscan friars were put on trial in Koblenz for similar sexual crimes. 23 The trials received widespread publicity over the next few years. Coinciding with the suppression of the Catholic press and the censorship of Church materials, it became incredibly difficult for the Catholic Church to defend themselves against these sensational accusations. Likewise, the trials were instigated at the same time as the state campaign against the confessional schools and German youth associations. In such a climate of scandal and intimidation, the close relationship between the Church and its congregations deteriorated rapidly. The once esteemed position of the Catholicism in Germany was severely damaged. In the absence of Catholic political parties and the censorship of the press and indeed the German hierarchy, the Nazi government were able to attack Catholic institutions and associations without any serious resistance. The special position of the Catholic Church in the Third Reich never materialised; their rights were denied and they were subjected to state terrorism. The events in Germany in the late 1930s indicated that the Nazi party could not be trusted, and more importantly, that the Reich Concordat was a flimsy diplomatic agreement. Structurally weak, the failure of the Vatican to properly finalise the vagueness of its terms led to serious repercussions for the German Catholic population. By signing the Concordat the Holy See had hamstrung the Germany hierarchy and all Catholic organizations leaving them vulnerable to the violent forces of the totalitarian Nazi regime. With the suppression of German Catholicism, one of the most powerful opponents of fascism had been immobilized. The concordat had inadvertently precipitated the end of political opposition and facilitated the rise of Nazism in Germany. 22 Cornwell Hitler s Pope Evans The Third Reich in Power

20 15 The Catholic Response to Nazi violations of the Reich Concordat After the Nazi government had begun to openly violate the Articles of the Concordat, the German hierarchy and the Vatican began protesting in earnest against the widespread attacks. Given the dissolution of the Catholic political parties in Germany, the Catholic population of Germany looked to the German Episcopate to defend them from Nazi brutality and for guidance. As an opponent of Nazism from its inception, the Catholic Church in Germany had long since protested against its extremism and radical ideology. Initially the Catholic clergy had no reservations about condemning the Nazis, yet after the Concordat this proved extremely difficult. The Nazis intensified their campaign against the Church to such an extent that by 1939 the clergy were reluctant to voice any protest for fear of further persecution of Catholics. The German hierarchy had expressed its concerns regarding such an agreement before it was finalised. They knew that they would shoulder the burden of Catholic resistance to the Nazi regime; an especially dangerous task given the totalitarian environment of the Third Reich. As early as 1931 the bishops of Germany had collectively issued public warnings against Nazism and objected to Catholic membership of its party. 24 When the Reich Concordat was signed the hierarchy lost part of its ability to protest through the Catholic Centre Party. Yet they continued their resistance of Nazi policies from the pulpit and through pastoral letters. They were given greater cause for protest when as soon as the Nazis began violating the terms of the Concordat. Attacks on Catholic organizations led to complaints from the clergy through sermons as well as from the bishops. Hitler s false promises of a peaceful Church-State relationship eased Catholic concerns but the continued open violations continued, arousing the concerns of the hierarchy and the Holy See. The attacks on Catholic schools, youth groups and clergy themselves escalated prompting a reaction from the upper echelons of the Church. As early as 1934, the German hierarchy and the Holy See were already complaining that the concordat was not being adhered to by the Nazis. Two diplomatic notes were sent to the government by the Holy See and the German hierarchy covering not only the matter of the application of the concordat but also the growth of neo-paganism within the Reich. The 24 Harrigan Nazi Germany and the Holy See,

21 16 Nazi authorities censored many of these notes, restricting the flow of communication between the papacy, German episcopate and the laity. In January 1936, the Holy See sent a long note to the German government protesting the so-called morality trials and the persecution of the clergy. This note also went on to point out that every diocese, conceivably every parish, had complaints to register with the government authorities in the existing religious situation. 25 Protests such as these fell on deaf ears and were mostly ignored by the Nazi government. The harassment of Catholic associations continued unabated with letters of protest the feeble weapon of resistance. There was however some sporadic resistance on a larger scale where Catholics campaigned in great numbers against the onslaught. In late 1937, in the Catholic part of southern Oldenburg, a massive public protest was held in reaction to plans to close confessional schools and impose Nazism on society. Prayer services were held, church bells were rung and mass petitions were handed into the Education Ministry. Parishioners began to resign from the Nazi Party and one branch of the Brownshirts dissolved itself. 26 Such an incident was reminiscent of the mass Catholic mobilisation against the Kulturkampf of the 1870s. However, in Nazi Germany they were isolated incidents and despite protests, Nazism began to erode the power of the Church. Over the remainder of the decade the Church continued its protests in vain. Both the German episcopate and the Vatican sent constant diplomatic notes of complaint, yet their efforts yielded no reward. The Catholic Church was at the full mercy of the Nazi forces who manipulated the concordat to marginalise the power of the Church. Pacelli himself was distraught by the failure of the concordat but supported it in the hope a resolution. As with the reaction to most Nazi policies, protests from the Church came too late to be effective. 27 Between September 5, 1933, and July 26, 1936, the Vatican sent thirty-four notes to the Berlin government, five pro memoriae, three aide-memoires, six letter containing proposals and outlines for discussion, and six other letters, in all covering some 336 pages. 28 Most letters ended with a statement of loyalty to the Reich in the hope of reconciliation. Greater 25 Harrigan Nazi Germany and the Holy See, Evans The Third Reich in Power p Michael Burleigh Death and Deliverance: Euthanasia in Germany (Cambridge 1994) Harrigan Nazi Germany and the Holy See,

22 17 censorship of the Catholic Press made it increasingly complicated to reissue pastoral letters to the congregations. The German hierarchy appealed to the Pope himself to respond to the plight of German Catholicism. On March 14, 1937, the papal encyclical Mit Brennender Sorge (With burning Anxiety) was issued by Pius XI. It complained of the Nazi violations of the Concordat and condemning Nazi ideology. 29 The papal encyclical indicated the seriousness of the German situation within the Catholic Church. Yet it did not have sufficient effect. By this time Nazi Germany was in the advanced stage of its campaign against the Church who could offer little other resistance. The encyclical did not reach all members of the laity due to censorship of the Catholic press. It did however provoke a reaction from the Nazi authorities who intensified their attacks on Catholicism. With the laity as well as the clergy in serious danger, the Catholic hierarchy made the decision to cease its protests for fears of a Nazi backlash. The Catholic Church was voluntarily rendering itself impotent and subjecting itself to a self-imposed gagging order. 30 The concordat had hamstrung the Catholic Church to such an extent that it became selfpolicing and could do little to stop the Nazis. It also made it increasingly difficult to protest future Nazi atrocities. A mighty Church with dedicated pastors and a host of lay social and political organizations was in a state of self-imposed inertia, looking to the Vatican for the next move, the next idea, the next directive. 31 What was Pacelli s ultimate aim which resulted in the muzzling of the German hierarchy and ending political Catholicism? The Reich Concordat proved to be a diplomatic disaster for the Catholic Church in Germany. Its terms essentially ended years of Catholic political participation, the demise of one of the country s most powerful democratic parties, the Catholic Centre Party, and the silencing of the Church. Had the terms of the agreement been adhered to by the Nazis and the Catholic Church then it may well have been declared a diplomatic success for the Holy See. However, even before the concordat was finalised, many within the Catholic Church in 29 Martyn Housden Resistance and Conformity within the Third Reich, (London 1997) Noel Pius XII: The Hound of Hitler Cornwell Hitler s Pope 147

23 18 Germany and the Vatican had serious reservations about concluding a treaty with such an extremist authoritarian state. So why did the Vatican agree to the Concordat with the Nazi government? In order to answer this question it is important to understand who orchestrated the negotiations, and what the Catholic Church, and it particular the Holy See, stood to gain from the outcome of this agreement. During the collective reigns of Pope Pius X, Benedict XV and Pius XI ( ), the Church had instituted a movement toward greater centralization of the Papacy. The Vatican wanted greater control of the Catholic Church worldwide with more responsibility resting with the Pope. A significant initiative undertaken during the papacy of Pius X was the reformation of the Code of Canon Law beginning in 1904 and finalised during the papacy of Benedict XV in This was essentially a modernizing act to create conformity, centralization and discipline. 32 The document empowered the office of the Pope declaring him infallible in all Church matters. Canon 218 states: The Roman Pontiff has not only the primacy of honour, but also supreme and full jurisdiction over the universal Church, in matters of faith and morals as well as in those pertaining to the discipline and government of the Church throughout the whole world The researching and subsequent publishing of the Code of Canon Law was led and supervised by Cardinal Pietro Gasparri and Eugenio Pacelli. Pacelli spent most of his clerical career working in the Vatican itself, or in very close correspondence with it. He rose quickly to positions of prominence and by was appointed Secretary of State for the Vatican during the papacy of his predecessor Pius XI. In this position, Pacelli was diplomatically active and communicated with much of the international Catholic Church. In a position of considerable power and influence; Cardinal Pacelli often spoke on behalf of the Pontiff and concluded various negotiations around the world. He was a supporter of centralized Church control and as he steadily rose to more important Church offices it was widely speculated that he was preparing himself for papal office in the future. Indeed he was the favourite of many within the Vatican, including Pius XI, to become the next Supreme Pontiff. In his capacity as a diplomatic official in the Vatican, Pacelli devoted 32 Cornwell Hitler s Pope Rev. Stanislaus Woywod A Practical Commentary on the Code of Canon Law, New York (1957) 98

24 19 his time to expanding the power of the Holy See in Europe through numerous treaties and concordats. In 1914, Pacelli was instrumental in creating a concordat between Serbia and the Vatican. The concordat displayed the hallmarks of Pacelli s future policy: the expansion of papal power over the Catholic Church at the local level, and, in particular, control over the appointment of bishops. 34 The treaty implied the abrogation of the ancient protectorate rights of the Austro-Hungarian Empire over the Catholic enclaves in Serbia s territory. 35 The concordat essentially removed a significant portion of Austro-Hungarian power and control in Serbia, deeply angering their government. Tensions between Europe s powers were already severely strained. Four days after the signing of the concordat, Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated on a visit to Sarajevo. In the heat of anti-serbian feeling war was declared culminating in the First World War. To say Pacelli was partly responsible for the start of the war is still a subject of debate. No doubt his role in signing the concordat with Serbia did not help relations between Serbia and Austro-Hungary. However, Europe at this time was a ticking time bomb. Disagreements between governments over arms and foreign territories had long since created a fragile political environment. With various European alliances and diplomatic conflicts war was not a possibility, but inevitable. The concordat between Serbia and the Vatican did not help the political environment in relation Austro-Hungary and the Balkans but to say, as Cornwell suggests, that Pacelli was directly responsible for the outbreak of the greatest armed conflict the world had seen at that time seems very unfair. What is notable about the concordat is that Pacelli valued the policy of Church centralization above the welfare of the European state relations between other countries. This indifference to the problems that arose from the treaty highlighted the man s single-mindedness in pursuing the Vatican s goals regardless of the consequences. For Pacelli the absolutist, the position of the Church was ultimately all that mattered Cornwell Hitler s Pope Cornwell Hitler s Pope Noel Pius XII: The Hound of Hitler 45

25 20 It is no surprise therefore that Pacelli would have favoured a similar agreement with Nazi Germany. Under the terms of the Reich concordat, the Catholic Church would receive a privileged position within the Reich, including control of confessional schools, and freedom of communication. In the political environment of Europe in the 1930s, with the growth of fascism and communism, the Church faced a new political threat from the state. In the extremist right-wing Nazi Germany, a concordat guaranteeing the security of the Catholic Church would have been very appealing to the Holy See. However, they knew themselves that the Nazis were very volatile and that associating themselves with such a radical group could prove disastrous. No doubt this feeling was echoed by the German Catholic hierarchy who had already condemned Nazi policies and the behaviour of its auxiliary groups. From the outset an agreement with the Nazis could prove problematic. There was distrust amongst both parties. The Nazi s were dangerous, violent and their policies contradicted Church doctrine. But Pacelli saw the opportunity to centralize the papacy through the concordat, extending Vatican control over some 20 million Germans. The terms of the agreement were reasonably favourable to the Holy See, certainly more so than for the German hierarchy. The end of political Catholicism would not have proved a problem for Pacelli or the papacy. They reflected the attitude of Pius X; they did not care for Catholic political parties because they could not control them. 37 Thus the German hierarchy and German Catholics were under no other influence other than the Vatican. However, the concordat would have adverse results for the German hierarchy. No longer able to hold political office, they re involvement in State affairs was ended. Not only was this a serious setback, but they would also bear the brunt of Nazi aggression as the regime openly violated the concordat. What is remarkable about this is that Pacelli knew of the dangers that the German hierarchy would be exposed to in the aftermath of the concordat. He had resided in Germany from as an Apostolic Nuncio in Munich and Berlin. He was acquainted with the Nazi movement and apparently was one of the first European statesmen to read Mein Kampf. 38 Pacelli was familiar with the fanatical ideology of the Nazis and their militaristic nature. He knew that the Nazis would violate the agreement, but 37 Cornwell Hitler s Pope Harrigan Nazi Germany and the Holy See, : the historical background of Mit Brennender Sorge 169