Review of Alex Tseng s The Lapsarian Dilemma and Karl Barth s Christocentric Doctrine of Election. by Joel Tay

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1 Review of Alex Tseng s The Lapsarian Dilemma and Karl Barth s Christocentric Doctrine of Election by Joel Tay In his paper, Alex Tseng affirms the sovereignty of God and presents the problem of evil as a launching pad for rejecting supralapsarianism. Having done so, he puts forward his own formulation based upon infralapsarian thought combined with elements of Barth s doctrine of election, which supposedly covers the holes in traditional infralapsarian theology. In his rejection of the Supralapsarian position, Tseng claims that there is a need for an alternative because the Supralapsarian position encounters a problem in the area of theodicy. But is that really the case? Firstly, can God ever be charged with evil? How can one determine whether an action is really good or evil? The only way to discern the rightness of an action is to first recognize an absolute standard of morality by which all other moral standards and values are measured against. The Christian understands this standard to be rooted in the very nature of God Himself who is good. By that same definition, whatever God does, must by that same definition be called good whichever side one comes down on the lapsarian controversy is irrelevant to this point. Therefore since Tseng s main objection to the supralapsarian scheme of decrees is through an appeal to theodicy, he misses the point from the very start of his paper. Tseng writes, the Reformed doctrine of predestination begs the question: On what ground did God decree something so contrary to God s will? As demonstrated earlier, if whatever God wills is good, then if God decrees are logically arranged in a supralapsarian scheme, such must still be called good To say otherwise is to put the cart before the horse. Likewise Tseng should not say that reformed scholasticism cannot avoid the logical entailment of a dark, arbitrary element in the will of God. There is no darkness. By definition, whatever that God does must be called light and good. On Barth s doctrine of election Tseng proceeds to describe and interact with Karl Barth's solution to the lapsarian dilemma. Supralapsarians cannot answer the question why God rejected the reprobate except to say that God does everything by God s good pleasure. How this reply does not satisfactorily answer the objection is something that Tseng did not demonstrate. In the matter of election for example, we must remember that Eph 1:5 plainly teaches that we are predestined according to the purpose of God s will. Since this is the plain teaching of scripture, it is difficult to see how such an answer fails to answer Barth s objection. It is one thing to say that Barth is not satisfied with the answer given in scripture, and another thing to say that Scripture as seen in Eph 1:5 does not answer Barth s question. Nevertheless, Tseng does in fact accurately portray Barth s doctrine of election. Barth views Christ as the only reprobate and that in Christ all humans are elected. Tseng approves of Barth s teaching that we can know no other God other than the God who has entered into loving relationship with us, and this relationship is Jesus Christ (not just in Jesus Christ). There are a few problems with this teaching however. Firstly, Christianity is not just Christocentric, but also Theocentric (Trinitarian). We can also say that we cannot know the Father apart from the Spirit and we cannot know the Spirit apart from the Son,

2 and we cannot know the Son apart from the Spirit. Secondly, the Reformed understanding is that the object of faith is the Word (Logos) of God, which is the revelation revealed by the mind of Christ, not the relationship. It is only through the Word that we can recognize revelation; not through a subjective experience of Jesus Christ as Barth claims. Quoting Turretin: The material are the things believed (NAMELY THE WHOLE WORD OF GOD AND ALL ITS PROPOSITIONS, whether they pertain to the law or to the gospel). They become known to us by a divine and supernatural revelation; if not as to the why (to dioti) or the mode and reason, at least as to the fact (to hoti); either explicitly in so many words or implicitly and by necessary evident consequences (which we have proved belongs to the word of God, topic 1, Question 12). The formal object implies a reason or cause under which things are believed (to wit, the principle itself of believing). This is not the authority of the church as Romanist hold (because although the church may be the motive to faith in those about to believe and the human instrument and means of it, yet it can never be called its principle, as we have already seen in the proper place), but the AUTHORITY OF GOD, the only one credible of himself (autopistou) as the first and INFALLIBLE TRUTH, REVEALING HIMSELF IN THE WORD, in which is granted the ULTIMATE ANALYSIS OF FAITH (as in its own formal object, which alone can establish divine faith because it rests in no one except God alone, Jer 17:5, 7) The object of faith is none other than the written word of God according to the measure of revelation... we say that this word as written is the object of faith... 1 Although Barth attempts to avoid all forms of voluntarism, his scheme ironically faces the same problem which was raised by himself against the Supralapsarian scheme, Why does God reprobate Christ whom God does not presuppose to be sinful apart from ultimately explaining it by God s good pleasure. Barthian election therefore does not in fact escape the very objections raised against the Supralapsarian scheme. Tseng further explains to us that Barth had rejected the classical lapsarian formulations because it detaches God s will from God s being, and make God s good pleasure incompatible with God s natural goodness. But this objection of incompatibility that God s decree of sin is contrary to his nature is not possible because, as we have seen, whatever God does must by necessary implication be good. Barth claims that the Supralapsarian view makes God a capricious tyrant. But isn t this the very objection that Paul answers in Romans 9:14? What then shall we say? Is there injustice on God s part? By no means! Proceeding from this false caricature of contradicting nature, Barth rejects the classical lapsarian views and erects in its place a completely unbiblical notion whereby the only reprobate is in Christ. Tseng states that Barth s lapsarian scheme synthesizes the infra and supra positions, making all God s decrees subordinate to double predestination while presupposing that double predestination 1 Turrettini, F., G. M. Giger, et al. (1992). Institutes of Elenctic Theology. Phillipsburg, N.J., P&R Publishing, p.573

3 presupposes the decree of the fall. This is an example of a contradiction that is prevalent in Barth s dialectical theology. Another such contradiction can be found in the statement made by Barth: that the decree of the fall serves the overflowing of god s inner glory in the person and work of Christ, who is God s highest decree. Christ however is not a decree; He is a person, and decrees are neither persons nor persons decrees. It is therefore a contradiction to state that Christ is a person, a relationship and a decree all at the same time. In an effort to clear the misunderstanding that Barth makes one of the persons of the divine Trinity to be reprobate, it is pointed out that according to Barth, the Son of God is eternally elected only in the sense that his deity is inseparably united to humanity. Conversely, Christ is considered as the only reprobate only in the sense that his inseparable unity to fallen humanity makes Him the reprobate when he took upon Himself the reprobation that is due to Man. However, such a conclusion is not a misunderstanding but a logical conclusion. Since Christ s deity is understood by Barth to be inseparably united to humanity, it logically follows that Christ must be eternally reprobate, being inseparably united to humanity in her reprobation. (Being inseparable, the status of reprobation will never cease as long as Christ s humanity is present). On the doctrine of Total Depravity, it is also difficult to agree with the claim that Barth agrees with the Reformed understanding of the phrase. As with all the other reformed terminology that Barth used (e.g. the five solas), Barth completely changed the meaning of those words so that in his mouth, those words take on an entirely different meaning. Total depravity is not the teaching that man cannot maintain his goodness, but that as fallen creatures we cannot do good at all. Fallen man is not just guilty of death (which Arminians and Semi-Pelagians believe in too; even Pelagius will believe that of those who sin grievously), but that they are already spiritually dead in Adam. Barth s definition of Total Depravity is not reformed in any shape or form. If anything, it is a denial of the Reformed doctrine of Total Depravity. Tseng also does well in mentioning that Barth sees Jesus flesh as assumed by God in the likeness of sin (a) fallenness view of Christ s humanity and that Christ took on a flesh of Sin. Such a Christ, being made actually sinful, cannot be a substitutionary atonement, and questions may even be raised concerning the necessity of the virgin birth. Finally, if Barth s heretical understanding of election has been missed, we can see that Barth understands the grace of God as including judgment and that the judgment of God serves the purpose of grace. But where in Scripture does Barth get the notion that reprobate individuals will experience the grace of God? If Christ be the only reprobate while supposedly human reprobate ones will experience the grace of God, then universalism is the logical conclusion despite Barth s denial of it. Tseng is correct in pointing out that Barth s election is very much analogous to process theologians answers to theodicy. He also does well in identifying Barth s rejection of decretum absolutum as an imaginative renovation of justification by faith alone. He quotes Warfield who observed that there is no such thing as justifying faith only Christ who justifies through faith. Faith is the vessel of justification. Salvation is by grace through faith, not by faith through grace. Barth claims that humanity is justified with or without [personal] faith. Like the doctrine of total depravity, Tseng correctly charges Barth with changing the historic definition, and in so doing, denying the doctrine of justification by faith alone. Barth s view thus logically ends in Universalism.

4 A reformed Orthodox Solution? Tseng, in this section of his, attempts to construct his view with regards to the lapsarian dilemma, sticks to John Owen s infralapsarian position with a few modifications. He starts by giving an overview of Owen s struggle with the lapsarian dilemma and his switch to the infralapsarian position. Like Barth, Owen is said to have understood that the Supralapsarian scheme result in an extremely voluntaristic view of God. However, there is nothing to this objection. As demonstrated before, there can be no problems with theodicy when the relation of the nature of God to morality is properly understood. Even if God is understood to be voluntaristic, it is still impossible to charge God with evil. The potter has the voluntaristic right to make one pot for honor and another for dishonor. An even larger problem with the infralapsarian position emerges when, as Tseng pointed out, the infralapsarian does not think that he has any exact knowledge either of the content of God s primal and basic plan, or the reasons for the divine decree in respect of creation and the fall the reasons for this decree are ultimately unknown and unknowable. But if this is true, the infralapsarian position is not better off than the supralapsarian position; the Infralapsarian who claims ignorance of the reasons for a decree cannot in the same vein of thought reject the Supralapsarian who claims to know the reasons for the same decree. Tseng further claims that both the Supralapsarians and Infralapsarians cannot give any reason why God decrees evil except to appeal to God s eternal counsel. As I mentioned earlier in this review, it has never been explained why God s good pleasure does not adequately answer the cause of God s counsel. May I suggest that since God is the ontological first being, no other answer is needed (nor can exist) apart from the eternal counsel of God as the cause of reprobation, and that this reprobation was ordained for the greatest possible glorification of God through both the election and reprobation of individuals. The first cause(god) wills it is thus probably the most completely answer anyone can give for the decrees far more complete than merely appealing to Christ s revelation of all God s decrees. Therefore, is Owen right in seeing the whole counsel of God as being centered in Jesus Christ alone? This reviewer would disagree. The whole counsel of God is Trinitarian centered on the Trinity, not merely Christ-centered. Tseng is also very confusing in saying that God s will in and of itself cannot be known apart from the incarnate Son Jesus Christ; at least without further qualifications, this view appears to complicate the work of the Spirit in Old Testament believers. On epistemology and the nature of God, Tseng claims that Owen s idea of the origin of divine decrees is in fact similar to Barth s understanding of God-in-Himself that God is wholly other and wholly hidden. It is in doubt that this presentation is an accurate portrayal of Owen s view. However, let us examine Barth s view: that God is presented as wholly other and wholly hidden, and that it is impossible for men to know God by logical deduction. This view is problematic for a number of reasons. If God is wholly other, and if all truth is God s truth, then man cannot know any truth. An analogy of the truth is not truth itself. God should not be understood as wholly other in the Barthian sense, but rather, the relation between God s knowledge and Man s knowledge is to be understood as being quantitatively

5 different in relation to knowledge, but qualitatively similar in knowledge. For example, God knows all true propositions, while man only knows some. But God s true propositions are univocal to men s true propositions qualitatively; 2+2 = 4 for both God and man. A rejection of this qualitative and quantitative divide as Barth has done leads to complete agnosticism and theology as knowledge becomes impossible. In the area of theology, since God has revealed himself through Scripture, starting from the revelation revealed in the propositions of scripture, men can use logical deduction derived from scripture and then applied to scripture to know God. A rejection of truth being univocal at some points here (which is necessary if God is wholly other) renders theology impossible. Barth s revelational writings of Christ is explained by Barth using logical deductions, while at the same time Barth denies logical deductions in the area of language. This attempt by Barth to have his cake and eat it at the same time is self defeating and renders all his theology hopelessly incoherent. In the final part of this section, Tseng goes on to explain that Owen s focuses on the design of God s decree rather than the origin. But isn t this the focus of both the supra- and infralapsarian positions all along, rather than dealing with the mistaken appeal to theodicy utilized by Tseng against the Supralapsarian position? Moreover, since when has the infra/supra debate dealt with the origin of God s decree? (Assuming that by origin, we are referring to ontological procession) Tseng s Conclusion In the conclusion of this paper, Tseng made a couple of interesting points. Somewhat strangely, he states that God rejected those who reject Jesus Christ. If Tseng meant this to mean that God rejected people only because they rejected Christ, he would find similarities with Barth. This position concretely expressed however opens up the inclusivists Pandora s box with regards to the status of those who have never heard of the Gospel. Since these people have not even heard of the Gospel, they cannot reject Christ, so they shouldn t be rejected by God, should they? Upon what basis are sinners condemned: rejection of Christ or their sins? It would be helpful for Tseng to clear up the confusion regarding this issue. Tseng attempts to sum up his paper by answering the problem of evil raised by him in the beginning. In light of all that he has said so far, Tseng claims that theodicy can never be solved apart from the person and works of Jesus Christ as revealed infallibly in Scripture. This however is not true for the reason given near the beginning of this review God by definition, is good in all He does; and therefore there is no problem of theodicy at any time. Moreover, Scripture does not have a problem with theodicy where angels are concerned. Finally, if God decides to reprobate everyone and elect no one, it does not in any way imply that God is evil. The famous reply Why does He save any? is a good reminder that God is still righteous even if he saves none, for God is under no obligation to save anyone at all, and is thus righteous whether he saves none or in actual fact, some. Challenges to infralapsarianism Has Tseng really solved the problems facing the infralapsarian side, and has he demonstrated an intrinsic difficulty in the Calvinist-Augustinian formulation of predestination?

6 The first question that must be raised is whether an appeal to theodicy is a sufficient cause to reject Supralapsarianism. There are a few common objections to infralapsarianism that Tseng fails to address. Firstly, infralapsarianism cannot account for the election and reprobation of angels 2 (1 Tim 5:21). Since the elect angels are not elected out of an entire race of fallen angels, the election of angels must be understood from a Supralapsarian position. These fallen angels are in as much need of redemption as fallen men, yet God did not choose to redeem any of them (Heb 2;16; 2 Pet 2:4; Jude 6). Here, Scripture testifies that God did not have any problem with the issue of theodicy in a Supralapsarian scheme at least in relation to the angels. Why then should we expect a different standard to be applied to men? But if there is no issue relating to theodicy in a Supralapsarian scheme, then the very objection of theodicy which Tseng utilizes to refute Supralapsarianism collapses. If God elects the angels in a supralapsarian scheme, there is no concrete reason to believe He could not have done the same to men. This problem is equally problematic for Barth whose discriminating scheme does not cover the angels. Secondly, if the infralapsarian scheme presents the reprobation of sinners as an act of justice alone (by placing the reprobating decree after the decree of the fall), in which God logically prior, sovereignly determine to pass them by and to leave the non-elect in their sin (preterition), he makes reprobation solely a conditional decree, a position in accord with the Arminian contention that God determines the destiny of no man, but that he merely decreed to react in mercy or justice to the actions of men. 3 But if in distinguishing himself from Arminianism, the infralapsarian acknowledges (correctly) that sin is not the ultimate cause of reprobation, but that reprobation is rooted in the working out of God s will in accordance to the counsel of his will, and if it is God alone who determines the destiny of the non-elect sinner, then his objection against the Supralapsarian scheme (that the discriminating decree must not be advanced to any positions prior to the decree concerning the fall lest God appears responsible for sin ) becomes meaningless 4. Since the infralapsarian must now see God s preterition of the non-elect as grounded solely in the sovereign will of God, apart from their sin, they now find themselves in the same shoes as their Supralapsarian brothers their appeal to infralapsarianism as a reaction against supralapsarianism accomplishes nothing. Whether God decrees the election of individuals before or after the fall is still arbitrary if God was able to elect all but only choose to save some. The solution to supralapsarianism s alleged theodicy problem therefore, is not to jump onto the infralapsarian bandwagon as Tseng has done, but to first demonstrate that there is a problem of theodicy in the Supralapsarian scheme. This, he has not been successful. Thirdly, the infralapsarian view (similar to the Amyraldian scheme) sees the historical principle as governing the order of decree 5. However, the order in which the historical arrangement happen 2 Reymond, R. L. (1998). A new systematic theology of the Christian faith. Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, p Ibid., p Ibid., p Ibid., p.484

7 cannot demonstrate why or how the decree to create necessitate the next decree concerning the Fall, or why the decree concerning the fall necessitates the following particularzing decree 6. Fourthly, since the infralapsarian scheme cannot demonstrate the logical necessity between the decree of creation with the decree of the fall, it cannot answer the question of why God decreed to create the world and then decree the fall except to point to a general pleasure and glory of the creator. As Tseng points out in his paper, quoting Bavinck, if the decree of reprobation did not occur until after the decree to permit sin, then why did God permit sin? Was the fall a frustration of God s plan? Reprobation cannot be explained as an act of divine justice, for the first sinful act at any rate was permitted by God s sovereignty. 7 At any rate, Tseng did not seem to adequately address these problems in his infralapsarian synthesis. Fifthly, the infralapsarian scheme, in interpreting the controversy as a historical order of the decree, reverses the manner in which a mind plans an action 8. The order of the decrees is not the reasoning process that occurs in the mind of God in eternity past, but it is the logical order of the priority of God s decree in working together for the glory of God. For example, in building a house, we have the entire plan in mind from the very start, but there is a logical series of thoughts on how we are to go about accomplishing that plan. E.g. First draft out the dimensions, then get the building materials, then get enough workers, etc. Likewise, in the mind of the eternal Godhead, the entire schemes of salvation coexist at the same time from all eternality. It is not as if God goes through a series of thought processes by which He develops His thoughts from one point to another; the immutable omniscience of God demands complete knowledge of all things from eternity past. But in carrying out the decrees of His will, there is a logical order for the decrees to be carried out. In planning, God sees the end of creation first in His omniscience, and then proceeds to work out the decree of things to accomplish that end. In rational planning, the mind maps out the ends before the means. The charge of theodicy against the supralapsarian view, demonstrates this very confusion by infralapsarians. For example, Tseng appears confused when he wrote that, in ascribing the logical priority to the decree of reprobation over the decree to permit the fall, supralapsarians cannot answer the question why God rejected the reprobate. In the mind of God, all things, including the reprobation of some, are planned out from eternity past. It is not as if God made the choice to decide to decree that some are reprobate before He decide to decree that the fall happens. Since God already has the ends in mind from eternity past, the order of decrees has no correlation to the issue of theodicy at all. Sixthly, the infralapsarian position does not fit adequately with Paul s apology in Romans 9. In this passage, Paul anticipates two objections: 1) What then shall we say? Is God unjust? divine fairness 9 2) Why then does God still blame us? For who resists his will? 10 humans freedom 6 Ibid. 7 Bavinck, Herman (2004). Reformed Dogmatics II: God and Creation. Ed. John Bolt. Trans. John Vriend. Grand Rapids: Baker Academics, p Reymond, p Ibid.

8 If Paul was an Infralapsarian, he would have simply answered both questions with who are you oh sinner, to question God s justice? Since we all fell into sin, God could justly reject us all. As it is, in mercy he has determined to save some of us while leaving the rest to their just condemnation. 11 But Paul did not do that. Paul appealed to the sovereignty of God to do as He pleases and brought a comparison of Moses and Pharaoh saying that He hardens whomever He wills. The theodicy defense in Romans 9 was an appeal to God s right to harden some and have mercy on others. Then in answering the second objection, Paul replied with Who are you, O man, to answer back to God? and then went on to give the sovereign right of a potter to make both a vessel for honor and one for dishonor. Paul did not appeal to any consideration of the clay s prior condition 12. In other words, there is no scriptural necessity for the discriminating decree to come after the decree of the fall. Conclusion: Alex Tseng s paper, while excelling in presenting the views of Barth, is lacking when it comes to grasping with the issues of theodicy and lapsarianism. His modification of Owen s infralapsarian view is certainly interesting, yet he fails to demonstrate a conclusive charge of theodicy against the supralapsarian view assuming that theodicy is even relevant to the lapsarian dilemma at all. Bibliography Bavinck, Herman (2004). Reformed Dogmatics II: God and Creation. Ed. John Bolt. Trans. John Vriend. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academics Reymond, R. L. (1998). A new systematic theology of the Christian faith. Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson. Turrettini, F., G. M. Giger, et al. (1992). Institutes of elenctic theology. Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R Publishing. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid., p.486