CHAPTER FOUR EXCLUSIVISM IN BUDDHIST PERSPECTIVE

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1 CHAPTER FOUR EXCLUSIVISM IN BUDDHIST PERSPECTIVE Exclusivism has already been defined and dealt in chapter two of the thesis. However, it would not be out of place if it is again dealt in detail while delineating the Buddhist perspective on it. Exclusivism is the view that my faith (e.g., Christianity) is the true faith; other faiths are false. It generally regards other faiths as products of sin and evil forces that have to be overcome. Those who hold this view are not likely to devote much time and effort to learning about the many false religions. Since they are all false, why should anyone want to cram their heads with knowledge of things that are not true? Doing so might even lead to a temptation to abandon one's own true faith or to the weakening of faith by an exposure to error. Doctrinal Absolutism and Exclusivism are characteristic of the three Abrahamic religions, though they all also have their liberal and moderate wings. The more one learns about a second or third faith other than one's own, the greater is one's appreciation of them. And nothing helps one gain a deeper understanding of one's own religion than travel abroad, coupled with the broadening effect of reading about the teaching and practice of other religions, even those that are themselves exclusivist. However, exclusive claims are a necessary component of religion itself. A believing member of a religion in one way or another considers his religion to be true. But at the same time if such belief leads to conversion and finally persecution is bad. Christian Exclusivism in Present Context The Christian Church has always taught that Jesus is the only way to God. This doctrine is called Christian Exclusivism. The Bible teaches that Jesus

2 Christ is the only savior of the world. All other means of salvation are false. The Apostle Peter declared: "And there is salvation in no one else; for there is no other name under heaven that has been given among men, by which we must be saved" (Acts 4:12). Since there is "salvation in no one else," we must conclude that according to the Bible, those who take refuge in other socalled gods will be given the opposite of salvation, which is eternal punishment. This is reinforced by the phrase "under heaven." Nowhere on earth ("under heaven") is there any oth er name that saves. Not Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, or anything else can provide salvation. Jesus is the only source of salvation in the whole world. In order to understand the Biblical teaching on this issue, we must break it open into three distinct questions. First, does the Bible teach that Jesus Christ is the only savior of the world, or does it allow for the belief that other religions also result in salvation? Second, if Jesus is the only savior, must one believe in Christ in order to be saved, or will Christ save people who know about Him but follow other religions instead? Third, if one must believe in Christ in order to be saved, what about those who have never heard? Does one have to hear of Him in order to be saved or can one be saved by Him without knowing it? As we will see, these questions very much overlap because they all involve making Christ supreme in saving faith. It should be obvious that since Christianity claims to be the only true religion, those who follow other religions will not be saved. So I fear that answering the second question may be redundant. But someone may say, "Sure, Christ is the only source of salvation. But that doesn't mean that followers of other religions are on the path to destruction. Rather, if these 68

3 people are sincere in their religion, Christ saves them even though they don't come to Him. This doesn't contradict the Scriptures we have seen because these people are not saved by their religion--they are still saved by the work of Christ. It is just that He saves them apart from their believing in Him." Buddhist Exclusivism in Present Context Buddhism is not exclusivist. Any person guided in their activities by compassion is regarded as following a beneficial spiritual path. It rejoices in the virtues of all beings Buddhist and otherwise. Unfortunately, in Christianity Exclusivism went to extreme lengths with many denominations (at one time) claiming that they were the one true faith and the other denominations of Christianity were corrupt (or even in league with anti- Christ). Buddhism does not believe in using hatred, war or terrorism to further its cause and does not persecute former Buddhists who have changed their religion. 1 Buddhists have no need to suppress, censor or misrepresent the teachings of other religions, as Buddhist philosophy is totally rational and quite capable of withstanding criticism from other belief systems. Buddhism recognizes that one of the most destructive delusions is excessive attachment to any view, which will thus appear virtuous and right for all people. The harm that can be done by excessive attachment to ideologies and abstractions is far greater than that caused by attachment to wealth or material objects. As a consequence, Buddhism is one of the few religions which have never attempted to propagate itself and exterminate its enemies by war and tyranny. A fanatical Buddhist is, by definition, a deluded Buddhist. 1 Vide The Dhammapada. 69

4 Buddhism is not dependent for its existence on self-referential statements. Buddhism is sometimes described as a religion and sometimes as a philosophy. Both these terms are a partial description, but what is often overlooked is that as well as being a set of beliefs, Buddhism is also a technology. Buddhism is a set of tried and tested methods which are used to develop the mind by producing altered states of awareness. In effect it is a psycho-spiritual applied science. A Buddhist teacher will teach his/her students meditation and other techniques which will generate definite mental states (known as realizations). The methods of mental development are designed to free the mind from the accumulated delusions of millennia, and lead to a state of peace and tranquility. Buddha intended his teachings to be personal advice for his students, which is why Buddhists tend to refer to themselves as practitioners rather than believers emphasizing the practical intention of putting Buddha s teachings to work, instead of passively accepting them as revealed truth. Buddha always encouraged his students to gain understanding of his teachings by putting them to the test of personal experience, and not just relying on his authority. 2 In fact the Buddhist idea of authority has much more in common with the idea of scientific authority than it does with ecclesiastical authority. Buddhist authority carries with it the idea of the possession of knowledge which can be conveyed to others and confirmed by of reproducible experiences. In Buddhism there is none of the attitude Here are umpteen unsupported statements which you must believe unquestioningly. 2 Vide, Kalamasutta. 70

5 Buddhism does not attempt to suppress reason by dogma. Unlike most other religions, Buddhism isn t so much about things to believe, as things to do. It is a technology of mind improvement. This is why Buddhists often refer to themselves as practitioners rather than believers. The Buddha told his students to trust their own experience of the effectiveness of the teachings, and not believe things just because he said so. Buddhism does not claim to be the one and only valid spiritual path (a teaching known as Exclusivism in other belief-systems). It is not based on claims of divine authority. Buddha never claimed to be divine or sent from God. His teachings are to be judged by their effectiveness in promoting peace and spiritual realizations, rather than unverifiable claims to their origin. Unlike most of the religions Buddhism is not exclusivistic religion. Any person guided in their activities by compassion is regarded as following a beneficial spiritual path. A person who devoted his/her life to rescuing drug addicts and alcoholics would be regarded as damned for all eternity by traditional Catholic theologians. However, a Buddhist, on the other hand, would regard such a person as an advanced spiritual practitioner a Bodhisattva or possibly even a manifestation of Buddha Tara. (One of the more surprising teachings of Mahayana Buddhism is that Buddha-s can appear in whatever form is beneficial to sentient beings, and Buddha-s need not necessarily be Buddhist!). So, taken to its logical conclusion, Christian exclusivity would require one Christian to regard a fellow Christian as damned, while a Buddhist would recognize him/her as a saint. 71

6 As a further antidote to Exclusivism, Buddhists are required to rejoice in the virtues of all beings Buddhist and otherwise. The Buddha, in his recorded responses to individuals from other religious and philosophical traditions, established for his followers two basic paradigms of response to non-buddhists. On the one hand, non-buddhist traditions came under the Buddha s critique insofar as they might contribute to the very problem he had diagnosed, by absolutizing their religious objects and concepts of self as objects of clinging or aversion. This paradigm was developed by the Buddha s scholastic followers into critiques of non- Buddhist religious systems. On the other hand, the Buddha was skilled at speaking his truths in remarkably accessible ways, often communicating them to others through their own (non-buddhist) modes of thought. This second, inclusive paradigm for relating to non-buddhists inspired a tendency within Buddhism to explore how others symbol systems and modes of thought might serve to communicate, in their own ways, the very truths the Buddha had taught. This tendency became formalized in the special doctrine of skillful means, which informed the successful missionary activity of Buddhism in the first millennium C.E. as it spread to the cultures of East Asia and Tibet. The doctrine of skillful means also supported mystical, universally inclusive views of ongoing Buddhist revelation that stand in tension with the paradigm of scholastic criticism of non-buddhists. Buddhism cannot be exclusive because it makes no claims to ontological truth. Indeed it can make no claims to ontological truth given the nature of sunyata, or emptiness. In fact, no religion, philosophy, or any claim 72

7 whatsoever can be said to be ontologically true due to the inability of language to exactly describe existence. (I reserve judgment on the realm of mathematics and, by extension, physics, but only by assuming an evil genius or Matrix like situation does not pertain.) Buddhism, as compared to other religions, merely emphasizes this recognition. Religious Exclusivism & Inter-religious Dialogue In the context of discourse on interreligious dialogue exclusivism has been posited as the default position inimical to dialogue and against which, through the application of either inclusivism or pluralism, positions of openness to dialogical engagement have been contrasted and advocated. A close analysis shows, however, that exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism do not denote three discrete paradigms but that each refers, in fact, to a range of sub-paradigms that may be better thought of as expressing relative positions upon a continuum. Furthermore, it can be argued that, in the end, the pluralist must necessarily be an exclusivist of some sort, and that the paradigm of inclusivism, when pressed, also tends to collapse into some form of exclusivism. Nevertheless, the critical issue today is not so much the vexed issue of pluralism, nor even problems raised by inclusivism, but questions posed by the persistence even growth of religious exclusivism. In today s world a rather sharp question can be posed: Is there a proper way of speaking of exclusive religion, or of religion in terms of exclusive identity, without necessarily falling into the pit of exclusivist extremism? It seems that, especially in the context of interreligious engagement and dialogue, if religious identity is not to succumb to syncretistic blurring or relativist reduction then some measure of exclusivity must necessarily apply. 73

8 Religious identity, in being discrete, must as with any discrete identity incorporate a measure of the exclusive if only as a marker of, or a synonym for, being unique.; for uniqueness is a necessary element of identity per se. In which case, the paradigm of exclusivism, so long virtually automatically eschewed by all except, supposedly, fundamentalists, needs to be rehabilitated or at least given a more nuanced attention so as to admit the distinction between exclusion ( qua the behaviours of excluding ) and exclusive (qua the mark of distinctiveness). What interests me, in particular, is the fact that on the one hand a measure of exclusivity is logically required for clarity of identity, and that clarity of identity is a necessary prerequisite for dialogical engagement; yet, on the other hand, when taken to an extreme, exclusivity of identity militates against any sort of dialogical rapport by becoming exclusionary and that is a hallmark of extreme religious fundamentalism. So, the distinctive contemporary challenge is to clarify the exclusivity that adheres to proper religious identity as something distinct from the exclusion of religious exclusivism that is inimical of any validation of the other. Plurality names much of the context of contemporary life; it names the present situation of religion in society. Religious plurality is a fact of our time in a way that, arguably, is qualitatively different to almost anything hitherto. Indeed, an affirmation of plurality is a hallmark of so-called postmodernity. Individual freedoms today juxtapose with accommodating the presence of otherness: that which was formerly other in the sense of being not-present, of being over-there, is now on our doorstep and down our street. Today, in just about all quarters of the globe, the religious dimension of any given community is pluriform. And this raises many issues, not the least of 74

9 which is the manner of interrelating across religious identities. The question of interreligious dialogue is thus not merely theoretical. People of different religious allegiances are neighbours who must talk with each other, live together in our communities, and together address concerns held in common. While most, if not all, religious traditions have unity or internal uniformity and coherence proclaimed as a sine qua non, the lived reality of many religious people today is the context of, and contention with, difference of viewpoint, experience, cognition, interpretation, and hence competing claims for allegiance and identity. Furthermore, this plurality is not only between religions, it is also something within religions. Both intra- and inter-faith dialogue, to be authentic, necessarily involves dialogical partners who are committed to, but not close-minded about, both their own religious identity and the cause of dialogue. And it is also the case that such dialogical engagement is rejected by some indeed possibly many, if the global resurgence of religious fundamentalisms is anything to go by as too threatening to the fundamentals of their faith, or too potentially disruptive of a secure religious identity. One would argue that the conditions for interreligious engagement and dialogue are set by the contextual paradigms that pertain to the understanding of the nature of religious diversity, or plurality, as such. These paradigms of perspective and interpretation in turn govern the nature and extent of interreligious engagement as lived reality. Broadly speaking, exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism may be regarded as the contextual paradigms for contending with this plurality, so setting the scene for interfaith relations and allied dialogical engagements. It is these paradigms which form the cognitive or intellectual background to interreligious 75

10 engagement and dialogue and, indeed, provide the context within which things happen, or not as the case may be. They denote various means of cognitively coping with religious diversity. Thus, religious plurality may be an inescapable reality, but it can be responded to cognitively in a number of ways, given its acknowledgment as fact. And one mode of response indeed, arguably, the default position of Christianity until comparatively recently, and the apparent default position of much of Islam is that of exclusivism. 76