Anatta in the prose of the Nikayas

Transcription

1 C h a p te r 5 Anatta in the prose of the Nikayas Sectaon 1: The negation by the formula of three negative phrases {n etam mama, n'eso ahum asmi, na m eso atti) Section 2: The negation by the formula of four ontological relations {rupam attato, rupavantam attanam, attaairupam, rupasmim attanani) Section 3: Anatta in the prose of the Nikayaa 235

2 Section 1: The negation by the formula of three negative phrases in'etam m am a, n 'e s o ah am asm i, n a m*eso atti) 5-l-lj Connectioii with the preceding discussioii We have observed, in the previous chapter, various usages of the term 'atta, and some other concepts related with the meaning of atta, such as citta, vinnana, puggala, satta, jiva and sara. Some of them are said by the Buddha to be searched for, others are said not to be regarded falsely as eternal or substantial existence by the bhikkhus. At the same time, we notice the negative statements repeatedly stated in the Nikayas in various ways of expression. Now, in this chapter, we shall examine the teachings expressed by the negative ways with respect to the notion of self and the self-like concepts. Our main question is how these negative ways of teaching are related with the term atta-s, and other selflike concepts observed in the previous chapter, i.e., concepts which should be negated by the teaching represented in negative way of expressions. This will offer a key to an understanding of not-self doctrine. When we look into the Nikayan hterature written in prose, it must be noted that some stock passages, besides the term anatta, are repeatedly used for explaining the non-self doctrine. The statements presented to attack the improper self and the wrong 236

3 notions about the self are repeatedly emphasized by a form of stock passages, which can be classified in the following ways: (1) The stock passage: "n etarii mama, n eso aham asmi, na m eso atta. (2) The stock passage: 'rupam attato, rupavantam attanarh, attani rupaih, rupasmim attanarri. (3) The statements containing the word anatta. (4) A set of terms used with a view to negating the attachment to the self, such as mama, mamatta, mamayita, mamamkara, ahamkara, asmi-mana, etc. (5) The statement for criticizing the false idea of the self held by the bhikkhus, or the some heretics. The refutation of the heretic s criticism of Buddha s teaching. Our concern is to consider what exactly is negated by the above mentioned statements and to understand what Buddha really intended to negate. We will begin by considering the formulas which seem to denote not-self doctrine without using the term anatta} 5-l-2j The tottomlal: n'etam mama, n esq aham asmi, na m eso atta the basic model or the context in which this formula is used A glance at the Nilayas shows clearly that the three types of negation, i.e. n' etarh mama, n eso aham asmi, na m eso atta are used in many places, in different contexts. The Sequent utilization of these formulaic negations shows These formulas can be understood as the underdeveloped forms of the not-self 237

4 the importance this teaching has been given by the compilers of the Nikayas. Though the contexts and usages of these are varied, they can be classified from the viewpoint of the form by which the three phrases are given in the Nikayas: (A) The three negative phrases appeared in a process of the teaching on anicca- dukkha-viparinamadhamma in a form of dialogue. (B) The three phrases appeared in a process of the teaching on anicca-dukkha-anatta in related series. (C) The three phrases appeared in other forms. The following are the examples for the first and the second types. Some notable phrases belonging to the third group will be examined later (A) Tarn kirn mannatha bhikkhave, rupaih niccam va aniccam va. (Bhikkhus, what do you think of this? Is rupa permanent or impermanent?) Aniccam bhante. (Impermanent, Venerable Sir.) Yam pananiccarh dukkham va tarn sukharh va. (That which is impermanent, is it painful or pleasant?) Dukkham bhante. (Painful, Venerable Sir.) Yam pananiccarh dukkharh viparinamadhammarii kauaih nu tarii samanupassitum Etarh mama eso ham asmi eso me atta. (Is it proper to consider what is impermanent, painful and subject to change, as This is mine. This is 1. This is my self?) No etam bhante. doctrine, anatta{ci. J.P. Remon, Self and Non-self in Early Buddhism, p. 158). 238

5 (Indeed, no, Venerable Sir.) Tasmatiha bhikkhave yarn kind rupam atitanagatapaccuppannam ajjhattam va bahiddha va olarikaih va sukhumarii va hinaih va panitam va, yam dure santike va sabbaih rupam netarh mama neso ham asmi na me so attati, evaih etam yathabhutarii sammapanimaya datthabbarh. (Therefore, btukkhm, any kind of rupa whatever, whether past, future, or present, whether internal or external, whether gross or subtle, whether inferior or superior, whether far or near, all rupa should be perceived with insight wisdom, as it really is, thus: This is not mine, this is not I, this is not my self) [ The same is repeated for all the other aggregates : vedana / sanna / sankhara! vinnaaa]. Evam passam bhikkhave sutava ariyasavako rupasmim pi nibbindati, vedanaya pi nibbindati, samaya pi nibbindati, sankharesu pi nibbindati, viiiiianasmim pi nibbindati. Nibbindam virajjati, viraga vimuccati, vimuttasmirii vimuttam iti iianam hoti. Khina jati vusitam brahmacariyam katam karaniyam naparam itthattayati pajanati. {Bhikkhus, on perceiving this, the well-informed ariya disciple becomes disgusted with rupa, with vedana, with sanna, with sankhara, with vinnana. On being disgusted [thus], he is free from attachment. On being free form attachment, he is Uberated. On being hberated, the knowledge of liberation arises. He knows distinctly, Rebirth is no more, fulfilled is the Noble ^ A sentence in Sanskrit text, the Catusparsatsutra (Teil III, S ), basically coincides with that in the Pali Nikaya. It reads as fouows: Rupam bhiksavo natma. RupaH ced atma syan na rupam abadbaya duhkhaya samvartteta. Labhyeta ca rupasyai varii m e rupaiii bhavatv evam ma bhud iti. Yasmat tarhi bhiksavo rupam anatma tasmad rupam abadhaya duhkhaya samvartate. N a ca labhyate 239

6 Practice of Purity, done is all there is to be done to realize Magga, there is nothing more to do for such realization.)^ (B) Next, let s see the formula of the second type, which is given in the statement of an explanatory sentence, not in a form of dialogue. Rupam bhikkhave aniccarii, ya aniccam tarn dukkharh, yarn dukkharii ta anatta, ya anatta tarn netam mama neso ham asmi na meso atta ti. Evam etaiti yathabhutaiti sammappafiiiaya datthabbarii. (Rupa is impermanent, rupa which is impermanent is painful, rupa which is painful is anatta, rupa which is anatta is: This is not mine. This is not I. This is not my self. Should be thus perceived, with insight wisdom, as it really is.) Evam passarh bhikkhave sutava ariyasavako rupasmim pi nibbindati, vedanaya pi nibbindati, saiinaya pi nibbindati, sankharesu pi nibbindati, viiiiianasmim pi nibbindati. nibbindarh virajjati, viraga vimuccati, vimuttasmiiti vimuttam iti iianam hoti. Khina jati vusitarh brahmacariyarh katarh karaniyam naparam itthattayati pajanati. {Bhikkhus, on perceiving this, the well-informed ariya disciple becomes disgusted with rupa, with vedana, with sanna, with sankhara, with vinnana. On being disgusted [thus], he is free from attachment. On being free form attachment, he is hberated. On being hberated, knowledge of hberation rupasyai vaih me rupaiii bhavatveverii ma bhuditi. 240

7 arises. He knows distinctly, Rebirth is no more, fulfilled is the Noble Practice of Purity, done is all there is to be done to realize Magga, there is nothing more to do for such realization.) Comparing these two statements, in the form of dialogue (A) and in the form of explanatory sentence (B), the difference to be noted is that the term anatta\s used only when it is explained in the form of explanatory sentence, not in a form of dialogue. The point of differences between the two can be summarized in the following way; (A) anicca = dukkha = viparinamadhamma ->n etaih mama, n eso aham asmi, na m eso atta. (B) anicca dukkha-^ anatta n etam mama, n eso aham asmi, na m eso atta. As for this difference between two forms, Shoji Mori states^ that the texts in which the three phrases are mentioned in a form of dialogue is older in compilation than those in a form of explanatory sentence in which the word anatta can be found. He also points out that the fact that the word anatta used as a technical term shows the fixation of this doctrine among the people in early SN.XXII.79 (vol.3, pp ). ^ Shoji Mori, A Study of Buddhist Doctrines from Early Buddhism to Abhidhamma Buddhism, Chapter IV, Anicca - Dukkha = Anattn and Its Doctrinal Development, p.341. In this book, he has collected carefuuy all the materials regarding the anicca = dukkha = anattan doctrine, and classified them into the following various types: the type of anicca = dukkha = anattan in dialogue; 'D the type of anicca (that is) dukkha (that is) anattan in related series; the type of anicca, dukkha, anattan in juxtaposition; J) the type of anicca, dukkha, sunria, anattan in juxtaposition; the type of catur-dharmamudra and tri-dharmaudra (pp ; Summary in Enghsh, 241

8 Buddhism, and that it can be said that the form of dialogue is older than that of explanatory sentences because it is more artless. O.H. De. A. Wijesekera notices an important difference between two patterns of expression to teach the same non-self doctrine, that is, (A) anicca = dukkha = y i p f i n etaih mama, n eso aham asmi, na m eso atta, and (B) anicca -> dukkha-^ anama n tarn mama, n eso aham asmi, n a eso atta. He points out that it is therefore quite legitimate to conclude that the negative anatta is synonymous with the positive viparinamadhamma or changing.' In the texts, it is exhorted to perceive the things as n etarn m a m a, n eso a h a m asmi, na m eso atta, with insight and wisdom, as it really is {yathabhutam s a m m a p a m a y a datthabbam). Those who can perceive thus are caued weu-informed ariya disciples {sutava ariyasavako), while those who cannot perceive are called uninformed worldlings {assutava puthujjano). And the things which should be perceived in this manner are shown by the various concepts, for example: the five aggregates {paaca-khandha), the five aggregates of clinging {pasca upadanakkhandha), the four great elements (earth, water, fire and air), the six internal sense fields {ajjhattika-ayatana), the six external sense fields {bahira-ayatana), the eighteen elements of existence {atthadassa dhatuyo) and the six groups of six {cha-chakka)! vi). ^O.H. De. A. Wijesekera, Buddhist and Vedic Studies, p. 10. The Pali suttas sometimes add further groups of six elements to the eighteen as extensions of mental activity: the six contacts {cha-phassi), the six feehng (caavedana), the six cravings (cha-tanha). CoUectively these and the original eighteen elements of existence are termed as the six groups of six icba-chajdca). An additional extension brings the total number of groups to ten; the six reilectaons {cha-samia), the six collations (cha-cetana), the six reflections (cjia-vitakka) and six investigations {cha-vicara). It is said that the purpose of enumeration ot these supplementary groups is to show that all dharmaa arise in response to conditions 242

9 5-l-3 The formula: n*etam m a m a, n'eso a b a m SLsmi, n a m'eso attm A collection and an analysis of the texts In this section, we shall collect the textual passages which use the above three negative phrases, as exhaustively as possible within the scope of the material found in the prose part of the Nikayas. The following is a list of the suttas (or places) in which the phrases 'n' etam mama, n eso ah am asmi, na m eso atta are used. In the List, I will mention, after the name of the sutta or the place of it, the form of the explanation; A - in a form of dialogue; B - in a form of explanatory sentence, not a form of dialogue (the term anatta is used in this form); C - the others (the phrases are given without any expucit relation with anicca or dukkha). D - some notable expressions which seem to be helpful in understanding the teaching of the not-self though the three phrases are not used in a perfect form (the statements referring the only one or two of the three phrases are included in this group). The name of the objects, which are said to be perceived in this manner, is mentioned in the list at the end of each example. I also refer, if it is necessary, notable explanations or the sentences giving hints in this respect for better understanding. (1) MN.8 (vol. 1, p.40) Sallekha-sutta, / C / the several views When the Buddha teaches Maha-Cunda the way of making himself free from various false views relating to the self and the world/ it is said that those and therefore are impermanent and devoid of self (Kogen Mizuno, Essentials of Buddhism, tr. by Gaynor Sekimori, p. 117). ^According to the 0)mmentary, views concerning the doctrine of the self (^attavadd) are: the twenty types of personality-behef {sakkaya-ditthi), Le. four for each of the five aggregates. Views concerning the doctrine about the world {lokavada) are the eight wrong views: the world is eternal, not eternal, both eternal and not eternal, neither eternal nor eternal, and the same four alternatives concerning finite and infinite. {attavidappatisamyuttati rupam attato samanupassatf ti- 243

10 wrong views are abandoned through perceiving them as 'n' etaiii mama, n eso ahamasmi, nam esoatta. The text reads as follows: ya ima cunda, anekavihita ditthiyo loke uppajjanti -- attavadapatisamsoitta va lokavadapatisamyutta va --yattha ceta ditthiyo uppajjanti yattha ca anusenti yattha ca samudacaranti tam netarti mama, nesohamasmi, na m e so atta ti - evametarh yathabhutarii sa mm ap pa Ma passato evametasarii ditthinarii pahanam hoti, evametasam ditthinarii patinissaggo hoti. (Cunda, as to those several views that arise in the world concerning either with doctrines of a self or with doctrines about the world, if in relation to which these views arise, which they underue, and which become active, is seen with right wisdom as it actually is, i.e.: this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self, then the abandoning of these views, their discarding, comes about.) This statement shows that these views are eradicated by mean of contemplation of the five aggregates as this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self. (2) MN.22 (vol. 1,pp ) Alagaddupama-sutta, I CI pancakhandha (3) MN.22 (vol. 1, pp ) Alagaddupama-sutta, lai pancakhandha (4) MN.28 (vol. 1,pp ) Mahahatthipadopama-sutta, /C /panca upadana-kkhandha In this sutta, the meaning of the five aggregates which are the objects of adinayappavattena attavadena patisamyutta, ta visati bhvanti. lokavidappadsamvuttati sassatoattacalokoca ti-adinayappavattenalokavadena patisamyutta, taatthahonti sassato, asassato, sassatocaasassatoca, nevasassato nasassato, antavaanantava, antavacaanantavaca, nevantavananantavaattacaloko cati evaihpavattatti) <MNA. voll, p.l83>. 244

11 clinging {paaca upadanakkhandhas) is explained in details. It is advised to perceive au of them as this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self. Take an example of explanation about the earth element {pathavi-dhatii), which is one of the material form aggregates which are the objects of cunging (rupa- upadanakkhandha), or one of the four great elements {catu-mahabhuta^. ya ceva kho pana ajjhattika pathavidhatu, ya ca bahira pathavidhatu, pathavidhaturevesa. tarn netarh mama, nesohamasmi, na meso atta ti - evametaiii yathabhutam sammappaiiiiaya datthabbarh. evametaiii yathabhutarii sammappannaya disva pathavidhatuya nibbindati, pathavidhatuya cittaih virajeti. hoti kho so, avuso, samayo yam bhahira apodhatu pakuppati. antarahita tasmirii samaye bahira pathavidhatu hoti. tassa hi nama, avuso, bahiraya pathavidhatuya tava mahallikaya aniccata pamayissati, khayadhammata pamayissati, vayadhammata pamayissati, viparinamadhammata pamayissati. kiiii panimassa mattatthakassa kayassa tanhupadinnassa ahanti va mamanti va asmi ti va? atha khvassa notevettha hoti. (Now both the internal earth element and the external earth element are the earth element. And that should be seen as it really is with right wisdom thus; this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self. W h e n one see it as it really is with right wisdom, one becomes disgusted with the earth element, and makes the mind dispassionate toward the earth element. N o w there comes a time when the water element is angry and then the external earth element disappears. W h e n even this external earth element, great as it is, is seen to be impermanent, subject to destruction, decay, and change, Commentary explains, ahamis ditthi (view), mamaiii is tanha(craving), asmi is 245

12 what of tto body, which is clung to by craving and lasts but a while? There can be no considering that as I or mine or I a m.) (5) MN.35 (vol. 1,pp ) Culasaccaka-sutta, /A/ pancakhandha (6) MN.35 (vol. 1,pp ) Culasaccaka-sutta, /D /pancakhandha This is the suttaof conversation between the Buddha and Saccaka, who was a son of a Jain wo ma n and was the follower of Mahavira. Saccaka was a great controversialist, holding the view of atta, stating 'rupamme attaetc. This statement will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. (7) MN.35 (vol. 1,p. 233) Culasaccaka-sutta, /C /dukkha tarn kirii maiiiiasi, aggivessana, yo nu kho dukkharii auino dukkharii upagato dukkhaiii ajjhosito, dukkharii etarii mama, esohamasmi, eso m e atta ti samanupassati, api nu kho so samarii va dukkharii parijaneyya, dukkhaiii va parikkhepetva vihareyya ti. (What do you think Aggivessana? W h e n one adheres to suffering, approaches to suffering, holds to suffering, and perceives what is suffering thus this is mine, this I am, this is m y self, could he ever fully understand suffering oneself or abide with suffering utterly destroyed?) (8) MN.109 (vol. 3, pp ) Mahapuimamasutta /C /pancakhandha Listening to the formula, the following thought arises in the mind of a certain bhikkhu. Oh, it is said that material form is not self... This being so. mana(conceit). MN.28, vol.l, p Commentary explains: There is no arising of the misconceptions of view, craving and conceit such as I etc. with regard to internal earth elements, for the bhikkhus who see [the element] putting it on the three marks {atha kho assa bhikkhuno evaib tini lakkhanani aropetva passantassa ettha ajjhattikayapathavfdhatuyaahanti vati-idi tividhotanhamanaditthiggahonotevahoti, nahotiyevati atthd) < M N A vol.2, p.224>. Tikaexplains this sentence by using the three marks, dukkha, aniccaand anatta. {dukkhanupassanayatanhaggahassa aniccanupassanaya managgahassa anattanupassanaya ditthiggahassa ujuvipaccanikabhavato ekarhseneva tihi smupassanahi gahapi vigacchantiti aha notevahoti ti) <MNT. vol. 2, p. 168, Myanmar edition>. 246

13 which self is there that can be affected by the acts done by what is not self? (9) MN.109 (vol. 3, pp. 19) Mahapunaamasutta /C /pancakhandha It is said that one who perceives the khandhas as this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self does not hold the idea of ahatiikara, mamarhkara, mananusaya evam kho, bhikkhu, janato evam passato imasminca savinnanake kaye bahiddha ca sabbanimittesu ahamkaramamaiiikaramananusaya na honti. {Bhikkhu, it is when one knows and sees thus that in regard to this body with its consciousness and all external signs there is no I-making, mine-making, or underlying tendency to conceit.) [Cf SN.112 (vol.3, p. 36)]. (10) MN.109 (vol. 3, pp ) Mahapunnamasutta, /A/ pancakhandha (11) MN.144 (vol. 3, pp ) Chnnovadasutta, /C /atthadasadhatuyo This suttarecords reason why every thing should be perceived as this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self, concerning each of the eighteen elements of existence. cakkhusmim, avuso sariputta, cakkhuviiifiane cakkhuviiinanaviniiatabbesu dhammesu nirodharii disva nirodharii abhimaya cakkhuiii cakkhuvimanam cakkhuviixnanaviimatabbe dh am me netaih mama, nesohamasmi, na meso atta ti samanupassami. (Seeing that there is cessation, knowing by higher knowledge that there is cessation in the eye, reverend Sariputta, in eyeconsciousness, and in things to be known by eye-consciousness, I regard the eye, eye-consciousness, and things to be known by eye-consciousness as this is 247

14 not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self nissitassa calitaih, anissitassa calitam natthi. calite asati passaddhi, passaddhiya sati nati na hoti. natiya asati agatigati na hoti. agatigatiya asati cutupapato na hoti. cutupapate asati nevidha na hurarii na ubhayamantarena. esevanto dukkhassa ti. (There is wavering for one who is reljdng on, there is no wavering for one who is not relying on; when there is no wavering, there is tranquilhty; when there is tranquillity, there is no bias; when there is no bias, there is no [samsaric] coming and going; when there is no coming and going, there is no passing away and arising; when there is no passing away and arising, there is no here nor beyond nor in between. That is precisely the end of suffering.) The point should be noted here is that to see the nature of cessation is one of the reasons why we should perceive the things as this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self. W e should not depend on such things, otherwise we come to be wavering which inevitably lead us to suffering. (12) MN.146 (vol. 3, pp ) Nandakovadasutta, I Al atthadasadhatuyo (13) MN.147 (vol. 3, pp ) Colarahulovadasutta, I Al atthadasadhatuyo (14) MN. 148 (vol. 3, pp ) Chachakkasutta, I CI cha-chakka In this sutta, the way to the cessation of sakkaya, a samsaric individuality * MN.144(vol. 3, p. 265). MN.144 (vol. 3, p. 266). J.P. Remon points out that this argument so often repeated imphes that whatever is impermanent cannot be the self (J.P. Remon, ibid. p. 167). NanamoU explains this instruction with the help of the commentary as follows: One is dependent because of craving and views and becomes independent by abandoning them. Bias {nati, Ut. bending) comes about through craving, and its absence means that there is no inchnation or desire for existence {The Middle LengthDiscourses by thebuddha, The NewTranslationof themajjimanikaya, p. 1352). 248

15 is explained to consider each of the factors (the six groups of six) as this is not mine, this I am not, this is not m y self. The way to arising of sakkaya is explained to consider each of the factors as this is mine, this I am, this is m y self.^ (15) SN. IV.2 (vol. 1, p. 112G) (16) SN.XII.61 (vol. 2, pp ) /C /citta, manas, vinnana (cf = SN.XII.62) Yaiii ca kho etaiii bhikkhave vuccati cittam iti pi mano iti pi vimanaih iti pi, tatrassutava puthujjano nalam nibbinditum nalaih virajjitum nalaih vimucciturii. (But, this, bhikkhus, which is called citta, mano, and vinnana, regarding it, an uninformed worldling is unable to disgust from it, to detach himself from it, to hberate himself from it.) T a m kissa hetu (Why so?) Digharattam hetarii bhikkhave assutavato puthujjanassa ajjhositam m a m a 3dtarh paramattham Etam m a m a eso h a m asmi eso m e attati. (For a long time, bhikkhus, this has been for an uninformed worldling the thing craved to, the cherished, the thing grasped, thinking thus: this is mine, this I am, this is m y self.) Vararh bhikkhave assutava puthujjano imam catumahabhutikarii kayam attato upagaccheyya na tveva cittam. {Bhikkhus, it would be better for an uninformed worldling to approach the body as atta, instead of mind.) (17) SN.XII.70 (vol. 2, pp ) /A/ pancakhandha (18) SN.XVIII.l (vol. 2, pp ) /D / ajjhattika-ayatana! (19)SN.XVIII.21 (vol. 2,p. 252) /B/ pancakhandha (= SN.XXII.71) It also records that perceiving this is mine, this I am, this is m y self is a way to holding the sakkayaditthi (ayaihkhopana, bhikkhave, sakkayasamudayagaminf padpadacakkhum etammama, esohamasmi, esome atta ti samanupassati... rupe

16 (20) SN.XVIII.22 (vol. 2, p. 253) /B/ pancakhandha (=SN.XXII.71) (21) SN.XXII. 8 (vol. 3, p. 18) /B / pancakhandha As an explanation for what is a craving resulting from clinging (upada- pahtassana), it is said that uninformed worldlings {assutavaputhujjana) perceive each of the five aggregates as this is mine, this 1 am, this is m y self. As an explanation for what is an absence of craving resulting from non-cunging {anupada-aparitassani), it is said that well-informed ariya disciples {sutava ahyasavakas) perceive each of the five aggregates as this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self. (22) SN.XXII. 15 (vol. 3, p. 22) IB/ pancakhandha (23) SN.XXII. 16 (vol. 3, p. 22) /B / pancakhandha (24) SN.XXII. 17 (vol. 3, p. 23) /B / pancakhandha (25) SN.XXII.45 (vol. 3, p. 45) /B / pancakhandha evam etaiii yathabhutam sammappamaya datthabbam, evam etarh sammapannaya passato cittaiii, virajjati vimuccati anupadaya asavehi. (To one who perceives things with insight wisdom, as they really are, his mind becomes free of attachment, it becomes liberated, being fi ee from clinging, free from asavas). vimuttata thitam, thitatta santussitam, santussitatta na paritassati, aparitassarh paccattameva parinibbayati. (Being Uberated, [the mind] becomes stable. [The mind] being stable, there is contentment. W h e n there is contentment, there is no craving. In the absence of craving, [the mind] attains supreme peace.) khina jati vusitam brahmacariyam katarii karaniyath naparam itthattayati cakkhuvinnanaifi...) <MN.vol. 3, pp >. 250

17 pajanati. (He knows distinctly: Rebirth is no more, fiiifilled is the noble practice of purity, done is all there it to be done; there is nothing more to do for such realization.) (26) SN.XXII.46 (vol. 3, pp ) /B / pancakhandha Those who have perceived each of the five aggregates as this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self can be following: pubbantanuditthiyo^ no hoti pubbantanuditthinarii asati aparantanuditthiyo^^ na honti, aparantanuditthiinam asati thamaso paramaso na hoti... (There do not arise wrong views relating to the past existences, in the absence of wrong views which are based on the past existences, there do not arise wrong views which are thoughts or speculations on the future. W h e n wrong views which are thoughts or speculations on the future do not arise, there is no tenaciously strong hold over him of wrong view; nor is there any perversion of views regarding the right path.) Thamase paramase asati rupasmirh [vedanaya, safmaya, sankharesu, vimanasmirh] cittam virajjati vimuccati anupadaya asavehi... (Then, in respect to rupa,... the mind becomes fi ee fi*om attachment and becomes hberated, being fi'ee from clinging, free from asavas.) (27) SN.XXII.49 (vol. 3, pp ) /A /pancakhandha (28) SN.XXII.71 (vol. 3, p. 80) /C /panch-khandha Wrong views relating to the past existence mean the eighteen views mentioned in the BrahmajalaSutta<SNA. vol. 2, p. 269>. Wrong views which are thoughts or speculations on the future are explained as the forty-four views, which are listed in the BrahmajalaSutta<SNA. vol. 2, p. 269> (C KhandhaSamyutta, Myanmar Pitaka Association, 1996, Delhi, p. 106). 251

18 In this sutta, perceiving each of five aggregates as this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self is taught for the purpose of no occurrence in one of I- concept, mine-concept and conceited egoism. Evarii kho Suradha janato evam passato imasmiih ca saviiiiianake kaye bahiddha ca sabbanimittesu ahamkara mamariikara manapagatam manasam hoti vidhasamatikkantam suvimttan ti. (Radha, by knowing in this manner, by perceiving in this manner, there will be no occurrence in one of the I- concept, of the mine-concept and of conceited egoism, in respect of one s own body endowed with consciousness or of another s body endowed consciousness, or of all external sense-objects.) (29) SN.XXII.72 (vol. 3, pp ) /C / pancakhandba (30) SN.XXII.76 (vol. 3, pp ) /B / pancakhandha (31) SN.XXII.77 (vol. 3, p. 84) /B /pancakhandha (32) SN.XXII.79 (vol. 3, pp ) /A /pancakhandha (33) SN.XXII.82 (vol. 3, p. 103) / B /pancakhandha[= SN.XXII.71 (vol. 3, p. 80)] (34) SN.XXII.82 (vol. 3, p. 104) /A/pancakhandha A m a n has a question: Oh, it is said that rupais not atta,... vinnanais not atta. This being so, which attais there that can be afiected by the acts done by what is not att^ {Iti kirabhorupamanatta,... vinnanaihanattaanattakatani kammani katamattanamphusissanti). Then, the m a n is exhorted to perceive each of the five aggregates as this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self. (35) SN.XXII.91 (vol. 3, p. 136) /B /pancakhandha [= SN.XXII.71 ] 252

19 (36) SN.XXII.92 (vol. 3, pp ) /B /pancakhandha [= SN.XXII.71] (37) SN.XXII.IOO (vol. 3, pp ) /C /pancakhandha E v a m eva kho bhikkhave assutava puthujjano rupam etam m a m a esc h a m asmi eso me attati samanupassati.... So gacchati ce pi ime pancupadanakkhandhe upagacchati, titthati ce pi ime pancupadanakkhandhe upatitthati. (Bhikkhus, in the same way, an uninformed worldling takes rupa as: this is mine, this is I, this is m y atta. W h e n he moves, he moves cunging to the five aggregates which are the objects of chnging, when he stands, he stands chnging to the five aggregates which are the objects of clinging, when he sits...) (38) SN.XXII.118 (vol. 3, pp ) /C /pancakhandha (39) SN.XXII.119 (vol. 3, p. 166) /C /pancakhandha (40) SN.XXII. 124 (vol. 3, p. 169) /C /pancakhandha [= SN.XXII.71 ] (41) SN.XXII. 125 (vol. 3, p. 170) /C I pancakhandha [= SN.XXII.71 ] (42) SN.XXII. 150 (vol. 3, pp ) /C /pancakhandha Rupe kho bhikkhave sati rupam upadaya rupam abhinivissa, vedana... sama..sankhara... viniiane sati viniianam upadaya vimanam abhinivissa. Etam m a m a eso ham asmi eso me atta ti samanupassati. {Bhikkhus, because of the presence of rupa, because of chnging to rupa, and because of adhering to rupa,... one holds the view thus this is mine, this is I, this is m y atta. (43) SN.XXII. 150 (vol. 3, p. 182) /A / pancakhandha If there is no chnging {anupadaya) to rupawhich is impermanent, painful, and changeable, would one hold the view; this is mine, this is I, this is m y atta? No, it would not, Venerable Sir. (44) SN.XXV.2 (vol. 3, p. 204) /C /pancakhandha [= SN.XXII. 150] 253

20 (45) SN.XXV.71 (vol. 3, p. 223) /A /pancakhandha (46) SN.XXXV. 1 (vol. 4, pp. 1-2) /B /ajjhattika-ayatana (47) SN.XXXV.2 (vol. 4, p. 2) /B / ajjhattika-ayatana (48) SN.XXXV.3 (vol. 4, p. 2) /B / ajjhattika-ayatana (49) SN.XXXV.4 (vol. 4, pp. 2-3) /B /bahira-ayatana (50) SN.XXXV.5 (vol. 4, p. 3) /B / bahira-ayatana (51) SN.XXXV.6 (vol. 4, pp. 3-4) /B / bahira-ayatana (52) SN.XXXV.32 (vol. 4, pp ) /A/ cha-chakka (53) SN.XXXV.62 (vol. 4 pp ) /A/ cha-chakka (54) SN.XXXV.71 (vol. 4, p. 43) /C / ajjhattika-ayatana (55) SN.XXXV.72 (vol. 4, p. 44) /C / ajjhattika-ayatana (56) S N. X X X V 73 (vol. 4, p. 45) /A/ ajjhattika-ayatana (57) SN.XXXV.74 (vol. 4, pp ) /A/ ajjhattika-ayatana (58) SN.XXXV.86 (vol. 4, pp ) /A/ atthadasadhatuyo (59) SN.XXXV87 (vol. 4, pp ) /A/ atthadasadhatuyo After encouraging to perceive each of the eighteen elements of existence as this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self, the following words are given: Nissitassa cahtam anissitassa calitam natthi, calite asati passaddhi hoti, passaddhiya sati nati na hoti, natiya asati agatigati na hoti, agatigatiya asati cutupapato na hoti, cutupapate asati nevidha na huraih na ubhayam antarena esevanto dukkhassati. (There is wavering for one who is dependent, there is no wavering for one who is not dependent. W h e n there is no wavering, there is tranquillity. W h e n there is tranquhhty, there is no bias. W h e n there is no bias, there is no [samsaric] coming and going. W h e n there is no coming 254

21 and going, there is no passing away and arising. W h e n there is no passing away and arising, there is no here not beyond nor in between. That is precisely the end of suffering.) (60) SN.XXXV.89 (vol. 4, p. 63) /A/ cha-chakka (61)SN.XXXV.121(vol. 4, pp ) /A/ cha-cbakka (62) SN.XXXV. 149 (vol. 4, pp ) /A / cha-chakka In this sutta, it is explained that the nibbinasappayaihpatipada (the way suitable for nibband) is to perceive each of the six groups of six as this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self. (63) SN.XXXV. 179 (vol. 4, p. 153) /B /ajjhattika-ayatana (64) SN.XXXV. 180 (vol. 4, p. 154) /B / ajjhattika-ayatana (65) SN.XXXV. 181 (vol. 4, p. 154) /B / ajjhattika-ayatana (66) SN.XXXV. 182 (vol. 4, p. 154) /B / bahira-ayatana (67) SN.XXXV. 183 (vol. 4, p. 155) /B / bahira-ayatana (68) SN.XXXV. 184 (vol. 4, p. 155) /B/ bahira-ayatana (69) SN.XLIV2 (vol. 4, pp ) /A/ paucakhandha (70) SN.XLIV.7 (vol. 4, p. 393) /B / pancakhandha Here not perceiving as this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self is said to be a reason for the ten wrong views of heretics represented as ten unanswered questions. (71) AN.III (vol. 1,pp ) /C /pancakhandha (72) AN.rV (vol. 2, pp ) /C /the four great elements Each of the four great elements is explained to be regarded as this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self. 255

22 ya ca, rahula, ajjhattika pathavidhatu ya ca bahira pathavidhatu, pathavidhaturevesa. tarn netarii mama, nesohamasmi, na meso atta ti, evametam yathabhutarii sammapannaya datthabbam. evmetam yathabhutaiii smmapannaya disva pathavidhatuya nibbindati, pathavidhatuya cittaih virajeti (The earth-element, Rahula, which is subjective and the earth-element which is external constitute the earth-element. This should be regarded with insight wisdom, as it really is, as this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self. Thus seeing with insight wisdom, as it really is, one feels disgust for the earth-element and cleanses his mind of attachment for the earthelement.) The same is asserted of the other elements. Then, the bkikkhmwho could perceive the fact as it really is are said to receive the following results: yato kho, rahula, bhikkhu imasu catusu dhatusu nevattanam na attaniyaiii samanupassati, ayaiii vuccati, rahula, bhikkhu acchecchi tanham, vivattayi sarhyojanaiii, samma manabhisamaya antamakasi dukkhassa ti. (And because, Rahula, a bhikkhudoes not see, in these four elements, either the self or what belongs to the self, it is said, Rahula, that such a bhikkhuhas cut off craving, has destroyed au bonds and by a perfect understanding of conceit has made an end of pain.) (73) AN.IV (vol. 2, p. 171) /C /pancakhandha 256

23 5-1-4I Some interpretations by the scholars In this section, I shall look into the interpretations made by some scholars concerning this formula. They try to clarify what the word attameans in the stock passages: n etammama, n esoahamasmi, nam esoatta, and further, what the passage intends to convey. Firstly, let s see J. P. Remon s interpretation.he says about the attain this phrases as follows; If the term comes in a series with n etammamaand n esoahamasmi, which obviously refer to the concrete reflecting subject, attais bound to be also the concrete attaof the same reflecting subject. As it has been pointed out, atta has basically a reflective meaning even when used in the nominative case; therefore when I say, this is not m y self,i mean to say, this not m y own self. It wiu not do to say that this attais the empirical self,because it is being opposed to the khandhas which constitute the empirical self and are identified with the self by those immersed in the spirit of the sakkayaditthi. The tenor of the exhortation seems to imply that the atta(everyone s own self!) metaphysically speaking should be regarded as having nothing in common with the khandhas, which are impermanent, painful and mutable by nature. After a careful analysis of the suttas, in which the similes of the sound of J.P. Remon, Self andnonself inearly Buddhism, pp. 158ff. J.P. Remon, ibid. p *'J.P. Remon, ibid. pp

24 lute (SN.XXXV.205, vol.4, pp ), and the famous verses ofvajira (SN.V.IO, vol. 1, pp ) are referred, Remon concludes that it is the denial of selfhood regarding the khandhas, not the absolute denial of atta.^^ Then he continues to say as follows: If I say that material form etc. are not m y self, m y first intention is to assert that I a m not of those who fall into the error of identifying the self with material form, etc., and opposing it to the attaof the heretics which is conceived as identified with material form, etc. Further still, it is indisputable that ahaiii stands for atta, and that mamarefers directly to ahaiii and through it to atta. This will make sense if m y reasoning fouows a line of thought such as, material form is not m y (true) self therefore I a m not material form and material form is not mine, and that is why I feel disgust for it, get detached from it, and thereby a m Uberated.^ According to Remon s explanations, it may be said that when one says I feel J.P. Remon, ibid. p J.R Remon, ibid. p As for the meaning of the word attain this formula, Remon also states: This identification of the khandhas with the self is at the root of au theories or heretical views about the self and the world (J.P. Remon, ibid. p. 162, based on the Alagaddupama-sutta<MN.22> and the Sallekha-sutta<MN.8>); There is certainly someone who is liberated, even though of his condition as a liberated being we are not told anything positive, because it transcends all our empirical concepts (p. 168); It has been already indicated that the self mentioned in all these passages cannot be a merely hypothetical and unreal self, but the self of the reflecting subject* (p. 168); The text AN. Catukkanipato(18,7) shows that the expression n ev attanaihna attaniyaibis equivalent in meaning to this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self (p. 169); Besides the expression, the self in me or m y self clearly indicates that it refers to the self of the concrete individual who speaks (p. 169). 258

25 disgust for it as the result of considering the khandhas as this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self, the T as a subject to disgust means the true self, and the it as being disgusted means khandhas, which are misunderstood to be the true self. Nyanaponika Mahathera, mentioning the textual passage in SN. XXII.47 (vol.3, pp.46-47) viz. Any ascetics or brahmans who conceive manifold (things or ideas) as the self, all of them conceive the five aggregates (as the selo or any one of them,then he points out as follows: This textual passage also excludes any misinterpretation of the standard formulation of the Anattadoctrine, This does not belong me, this I a m not, this is not m y self. Some writers believe that this statement permits the conclusion that the Buddha supposed a self to exist outside, or beyond, the five aggregates to which the above formula usually refers. This wrong deduction is finally disposed of by the words of the Buddha quoted above, which clearly say that au the manifold conceptions of a self can have reference only to the five aggregates or to any one, or several, of them. H o w else could any idea of a self or a personality be formed, if not fix>m the material of the five aggregates and fi-om a misconception of them?^ E. Conze, after the survey of statements and thought in the Anattalakkhana-sutta(SN.XXII,59), states as follows; O n the reconsidering the argumentation behind the formula, this is not mine, I amnot this, this is not Nyanaponika, Pathways of Buddhist Thought, Essay firom The Wheel, ed. Venerable Nyanaponika, and selected by M.O.C. Walshe, London, 1971, p. 163 (Cf. J.P. Remon, ibid. p Remon mentions and criticizes his interpretation). 259

26 myself, we find that anything which falls short of the standard of complete selfcontrol should be seen as not-self and should therefore not be appropriated. ^ E. J. Thomas states: But if we translate nam esoatta(this is not m y self) as this is not m y soul,there is the possibility of supposing that Buddha impued that there was a permanent soul somewhere else, even if not in the five khandhas. Such a translation is perfectly arbitrary. ^ D. J. Kalupahana gives detailed account on this formula.^^ He says that the Buddha s assertion regarding no-self is presented in three-separate sentences (the formula), and translates them as It is not mine. He is not me. He is not m y self.^ According to him, only the first statement refers to the aggregates; hence the subject is in the neuter form. The first sentence, n etaih mama is the question of possession or ownership. What is denied in this sentence is the existence of a mysterious entity to which each of the aggregates is supposed to belong. The Buddha is here arguing that it is not necessary to posit a mysterious entity that is perceived as the owner of such experiences. The second sentence, n esoahamasmi refers directly to the mysterious entity negated in the first statement. This explains the use of the mascuhne pronoun {esd) instead of the neuter {etaiii) of the pervious sentence. The Buddha is not denying each and every conception of I {aham) that is associated with the aggregates but only the metaphysical presupposition behind the E. Conze, Buddhist thought inindia, p. 44. He also states that the failure to obtain complete control fi equently perturbs us, and that only in supreme self-activity do we have something that is worth being cjdled our own (ibid. pp ). E.J. Thomas, TheHistoryof Buddhist Thought, p S. Radhakrishnan translates the formula as this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y eternal soul (S. Radhakrishnan, ibid. p. 383). D. J. Kalupahana, A History of Buddhist Philosophy, pp ^ In his book entitled ThePrinciples of Buddhist Psychology, he differently translates the three phrases as that is not mine; that person is not me; that person is not myself. 260

27 statement, such and such an aggregate belongs to such and such self. As to the third sentence, nam esoatta, Kalupahana goes on to give the following explanation; Equally important to the Buddha was safeguarding the use of the term self without rejecting it altogether as absolute fiction. Hence the necessity for repeating the previous sentence, replacing I {ahaiti) with self {atta). This accounts for the constant use of the term self {atta) in a positive sense in the discourse, along with its negation, no-self {anatta}. Then, he concludes; It seems appropnate to say that there are two different meanings or uses of the terms F and self, one metaphysical and the other empirical. The metaphysical meaning cannot be accounted for by any of the aggregates, and that this is the thrust of his argument in the above context. " E. Frauwallner, translating the formula as it is not mine, it is not I,it is not m y self, points out the gist of the doctrine as contained in this formula: With this manner of argumentation the Buddha attained what he wanted, with that he rejected the false belief which sees the I in the earthly personahty. At the same time every assertion about the existence or non-existence of the I is bypassed. "' A. K Coomaraswamy asserts that the phrases denied only the false self but not the Supreme Self of the Upanisads~^. D. J. Kalupahana, AHistoryof Buddhist Philosophy, p. 70. In his another book {The Principles of Buddhist Psychology, p. 39), he explains; Thus the Buddha spoke of I or myself {aham) and mine {mama), but avoided and discouraged I-making {aharii-kara) or mine-making {mamam-kara), both terms impl5mig egoism. This distinction should be kept in mind when interpreting the very popular statement by the Buddha in his admonition to his disciples asking them to consider the aggregates as that is not mine; that person is not me; that person is not myself {n etaibmama, n esoaham, nam esoatti). E. Frauwallner, History of IndianPhilosophy, vol.l, p He takea a critical attitude towards those who try to find more in this formula, for example, the existence of the Soul. ^ A K Coomaraswamy, HinduismandBuddhism, p.60. Cf L.A De Silva, The 261

28 p. Harvey states: W h e n he considers this is not mine, this is not I am, this is not m y Self, therefore, he has merely transcended craving (this is mine), conceit (this I am), and views on the existing group (this is m y Self). H e is not alluding to any real Self or I which is not the personahty-factor. ^ A. Hirakawa pays attention to the fact that two different words {ahamand atta) chosen to suit the semantic content, therefore the two words should be understood in different meanings in this formula. He states that the meaning of self is represented by the word aharh, so the word 'attain this formula should be understood to have the meaning of a substantial self, or the internal self As the word attais appeared in contrasting with the nature of impermanence, it can be said that attahave a nature of the permanence. Hirakawa made the following important statement concerning the object of the teaching of the formula: A n uninformed worldling regards the object as permanent and self because of his attachment. This attachment, however, is located in his subjective side, so that it can not be known objectively by him. W h e n this subjectively existing attachment reflected on the object, the object comes to be regarded as permanent and self Here, this inner attachment can be expressed as the term self. Problemof theself inbuddhismandchristianity, p. 56. P. Harvey, TheSelfless Mind, p. 33. Here, he explains by using two types of the sense, i.e., I a m (self-attitude) and this I a m (self-view). Introducing the passages in which the monk Khemaka explains his understanding about selt Harvey states as follows: The monk Khemaka explains that he does not consider any of the personality-factors as Self or what belongs to Self, such that he is without views on the existing group {sakkaya-ditthi). This shows that he is at least a Stream-enterer, one of the types of Holy person. However, he stiu has the conceit and latent tendency of I am,and so he is not yet an Arahat, the highest t5t>e of Holy person. According to Harvey's explanation, the thought of this I a m means to have a view on the existing group, while thinking I a m is more deep-rooted conceit, which can exist even after the view of this I am is destroyed. But, both thinking evaporate under the hght of knowledge developed on the path to Arahatship. An Arahat has feeling, but does not misinterpret this so as to hold the conceit that he is permanent (P. Harvey, ibid. p.32, c pp.40-41). 262

29 Therefore, the aim of this teaching which expressed by the phrases: this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self should be understood to aim at removing the attachment which regards the object as permanent or self.^ J. Imanisi states that the formula denies the philosophy of Sanatkumara in the ChandogyaUpanisad. As one of the examples of his ideas, Imanisi quotes the triple explanations mentioned in VII.25, which read as follows: Sa^ eva dhastat, sa uparistat, sa pa^t, sa purastat, sa daksinatah, sa uttaratah, sa eve dam sarvam iti. (That, indeed, is below. It is above. It is to the west. It is to the east. It is to the south. It is to the north. It, indeed, is this whole world.) A h a m ^" eva dhastat, aham uparistat, aham pascat, aham purastat, aham daksinatah, aham uttaratah, aham eve daiii sarvam iti. (I, indeed, a m below. I a m above. I a m to the west. I a m to the east. I a m to the south. I a m to the north. I,indeed, a m this whole world.) Atmai va dhastat, atmo paristat, atma pa^t, atma purastat, atma daksinatah, atmo ttaratah, atmai ve dam sarvam iti. (The Self, indeed, below. The Self is above. The self is to the west. The Self is to the east. The Self is to the south. The Self is to the north. The Self, indeed, is this whole world.) A. Hirakawa, Atman and Anatmaii, Biilletin of the Graduate Division of Ldteratureof WasedaUniversity, vol20. Imanisi comments that the subject sd in this sentence means things which belong to one or possession. And this sentence denies the notion of possession. Then, the three sentences in question mean the deepening process, that is, possession -> I Atmaii (J. Imanish, TheConcept of AtwanintheAnatma-vada(1), p.61). Ahani means abamkari (self-sense). ^ ChandogyaUpanisad, VII (S. Radhakrishnan, ThePrincipal Upanisads, p ). 263

30 Then, the Chandogya continues to explain: He who sees this, who thinks this, who understands this, who has pleasure in the Selt who has delight in the Self, who has intercourse with the Self, who has ultimate fi^edom in all worlds. But they who know otherwise than this are heterogamous; they have perishable worlds; in au worlds they have no freedom. ^ Imanisi, noticing the three subject, so, aham, and atmanin the above statements, states that the three negative phrases in the Nikayas (this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self) intend to criticize respectively the views represented by the above triple explanations {so, aham, atmaii).^ From these interpretations by the scholars, it can be said that there is a fairly general agreement as to the point that this formula teaches that one should not misunderstand what is not self as self. However, opinions are divergent on the point what kind of attais referred in this formula and on the point whether or not this formula imphes admiration of the true Self or the metaphysical self. Do the words attaand ahamin the formula mean a true self an eternal self metaphysical self or an empirical self or a self we should make as an island, or a Uberated self? It is worth while examining this point more closely. Most t5t)ical reasoning given by those who admit the Self which is something beyond khandhas is: There should be the self who disgusts the self of khandhas and who will be liberated. Khandhas cannot deny khandhas themselves, so the Self who denies them is to be other than the khandhas-maaeself that is, the Self exists beyond khandhas, which are sometimes called as a true Self or a metaphysical Self O n the other hand, other scholars are opposed 34 ChandogyaUpanisad, VII (S. Radhakrishnan, ibid. p.488). 264

31 to such interpretations and state that the Buddha did not talk about anything behind khandhas, so the self in this formula does not means the true Self or metaphysical Self existing behind the khandhas The aim of the formula In this section, we shall discuss the formula in detail. W e will begin by summarizing the main points of this teaching taught in several contexts in the prose part of the Nikayas that have been collected in the previous section. The fouowings are distinctive features common to au the examples concerning the doctrine presented by the formula. (1) It is said that an weu-informed ariya disciple {sutavaariyasavaka) perceives with insight wisdom, the fact as it reauy is, thus this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self. On the contrary, an uninformed worldung {assutava puthujjana) does not perceive in this manner. (Or, it can be said that one who can perceive so is called a well-informed ariya disciple, one who cannot perceive so is called an uninformed worldling.) (2) The reason why one should perceive things as this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self is just because they exist in such a manner But the texts give some more important reasons from the viewpoint of the religious practice. The nature of impermanence of the existence It is not proper to regard what is impermanent, painfiil, subject to change as J. Imanisi, TheConcept of AtmanmtheAnatma-vada(1), pp

32 this is mine, this I am, this is m y self <SN. vol. 2, pp , and in ma ny places>. W e can see the law of impermanence {aniccati), the law of decay (Jchayadhammata), the law of loss {vayadbammati), and the law of change {vipariaamadhammati) <MN.28. vol. 1, p. 185>. Seeing that there is cessation {nirodharh disva), knowing with insight wisdom that there is cessation (nirodhamabhinnaya) <MN.144. vol. 3, p. 264>. 2)One attaches to the existence. One says, I {ahanti), mine {mamanti), I a m {asmiti) with regard to the body attached by craving, which stays for only a short time {mattatthakassa kayassatanhupadinnassa) <MN.28. vol. 1, p. 185>. One holds the view this is mine, this I am, this is m y self because of chnging {upadayd) to khandhas, because of adhering {abhinivissa) to the khandhas. <SN. vol. 2, pp. One does not have the power (vasa) to control the things as he wishes. One can not say, for instance, to the rupa evamme rupaihhotu, evaihme rupaiii miahosi ii <MN.35, vol.l, pp >. There is agitation for one who cungs. There is wavering for one who clings {nissitassacalitaiii), and there is no wavering for one who does not cling {anissitassacalitaihnatthi) <MN. 144, vol. 3, p. 264; SN. vol. 4, p. 55>. This is mine, this I am, this is m y self is considered to be a cause of In the Patisambhidamagga (vol.1, pp ), attachment is explained with reference to the formula, this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self. As to the question, of what kind is the wrong view [full of] mental adherence and grasping? (kathaibabbinivesaparamasodit^?), the text reads as follows; The rupa is mine, that I am, that is m y self, this is a wrong view [full of] mental adherence and grasping (rupani etarhmama, esohamasmi, esome attati - abhinivesaparamasodittbi). The same explanation is asserted regarding other elements (Cf J.P. Remon, ibid. pp ). 266

33 saihsara, like a dog tied with a leash to a stake of pillar <SN. vol. 3, pp >. (3) The results of perceiving this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self is explained in detail. CD The most frequently brought up result in the Nikayas is as follows: One who has perceived things as this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self, disgusts with them {nibbindati), frees from attachment (virajjati), and is hberated {vimuccati), the knowledge of Uberation arises for him, -> knows distinctly, Rebirth is no more, fulfilled is the Noble Practice of Purity, done is all there is to be done to realize Magga, there is nothing more to do for such reahzation <SN. vol. 2, p. 125, and in many The wrong views relating to self and the world are abandoned. It is said that perceiving in that manner is the way of making oneself free from various wrong views <MN.8. Vol. 1,p. 4; cf.mn. 22. vol. 1, pp. One disgusts with them {nibbindati) and estranges the mind frx)m them {cittaihvirajeti) <MN.28. vol. 1, p. 185>; his mind becomes free of attachment (cittaiii virajjati), it becomes Liberated {vimuccati), being free from clinging In MN.8, the Sallekha-sutta, to perceive this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self is taught as a way to abandon various false views. The process by which the views arise in one s mind and they are abandoned by way of right perceiving are psychologically illustrated: These views arise {uppajjanti), underline {anusenti), and become active {samudacaranti). They are seen with right wisdom as they really are, thus this is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self. They Eire abandoned and discarded. The word anuseti basically means to dwell on, to fill the mind persistently", which is explained in the Commentary, again and again to be pursued, has become strong, is not removed {punappunamasevitathamagataappadvinlta) <MNA. vol. 1, p. 182>. The word samudacarati has the meaning o occur to, to assail, which is commented, come to the gate of the body and the speech {kayavacidvaramsampatts) <MNA. vol. 1, p. 182>. This explains how one attaches to the wrong views and is agitated by them, how one mind is not under his control when he aims at nibbana. 267

34 {anupadayaasavehi) mind becomes stable, there is no contentment -> there is no craving -> the mind attains supreme peace -> knows distinctly Rebirth is no more, fulfilled is the noble practice of purity, done is all there is to be done, there is nothing more to do for such realization <SN. vol. 3, p. 45>. The concept of I (ahamkara), mine (mamainkara), and the predisposition of pride (maninusaya) do not arise <MN.109. vol. 3, pp >; no occurrence of the concept of I (ahaiiik^a), concept of mine {mamarhkara), and conceited egoism (mina) <SN. vol. 3, p. 80>. Thinking in this manner is called, the way to the cessation of sakkaya <MN.148. vol. 3, pp > and the absence of craving resulting firom nonclinging <SN. vol. 3, p. 18>. The first thing that we should notice in the above statements is that avoidance of attachment is often taught in connection with this formula. The structure of attachment is described by several wards such as upadaya, abhinivesa, nissita, and one s state which is attaching to something is characterized by the notion of' ahamkara, mamaihkara, and 'maninusaya. While paying attention to the statements about impermanence explained in various ways in the Nikayas, the important point to be noted is that doctrine of impermanence is taught by the Buddha presupposing the fact that one is attached to something impermanent. Impermanence taught by the Buddha is not just the law of physical phenomenon. The teaching of impermanence appearing in the Nikayas are taught with greatest concern by the Buddha for the dehverance from suffering. W e need frequently to remind ourselves of the historical matter that Gautamajoined the religious life in order to eliminate the 268

35 suffering. W h e n he teaches the nature of impermanence, an aim of the discourse is not to show the law of physical phenomenon without any value system, but to teach the bhikkhus to know and get rid of their attachment to the impermanent things because they produce the suffering. One does not have the absolute power to controp the thing which is impermanent, and to which he is attached. Here, dissatisfaction arise. There is agitation for one who attaches to. W h e n the Buddha dehvers his teaching of impermanence, it is presupposed that the ordinary person is attached to something impermanent, and it is also hoped that they can emancipate themselves from the attachment and suffering. Every teaching in the Nikayas starts from this point. Therefore, one is suggested to perceive everything with which he is attached by pointing out this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self. Perceiving thus, one can disgust with it and get freed form attachment. His mind is estranged from the object, to which he had attached and, becomes free from chnging. This means that the concept of ahamkara, mamamkara, and mananusayado not arise. W e may say that each phrase of the formula (i.e. this is mine, this I am, this is m y selo is correspondingly related to the situations of the one who is steeped in attachment, which are conditions being represented by the notions of ahamkara, mamaihkaraand mananusayarespectively. W e can show the schematically as fouows: What the power in this context means? It is not clear from the Umited material whether the power to control referred here is said with an implication that one can not control things as he desires (which are strongly connected with one s attachment), or it is said so with reference to that one who has enughtened can control himself as he likes. However, in either case, it seems that this power do not imply that of 269

36 ^ mamarhksra to regard something this I a m {esoahama^mi) ^ ahamkara to regard something this is mine (jetathmania) to regard something this is m y self {me esoatta) ^ mananusayȧ3 9 And the sentence in MN.28 (vol. 1, p. 185), One says I {ahanti), mine {mamanti), I a m {asmiti) with regard to the body attached by craving,seem to be corresponding in meaning to each of the phases of this formula. It, however needs further consideration on the relation of the last phase me esoattato the concept of mananusyaand the phrase asmiti (or the word asmimana, literally meaning I a m -conceit). 5-l-6 Similar expressions found in the literature of other schools In this section, we shall look carefully into some of the similar characteristics of the expressions appearing in the sources of other schools, concerning the formula, this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self. A similar expression found in the Samkhya-Karika, viz., nasmi name nahamhas been the subject of controversy.^ O n the basis of this similar expression in Issaraor Upanisadic of Atmanor Brahman. The phrases, this is not mine and this I a m not are repeatedly taught not only by Buddhism but also by other religious groups at the time of the Buddha in order to get rid of the concept of mine {nirmam^, and concept of I {nirahamkar^. But, it is questionable whether the third phrase this is not m y self {name esoattif is taught in the same meaning as self (anatta) (J. Imanishi, TheConcept of Atmaninthe Anatma-vada(1), 1990, p.49). Richard Garbe firstly points out this similarity {Der Mondscheinder Samkhya- Wahrheu-.ISQ2, S.525). H. Oledenberg states, But the Buddhism lets the Atman speak of natiu*e: That is not mine. That I a m not. That is not m y Self almost word for word like the knowledge put down in the three-fold formula bestowed upon the Purusaof the Samkhys. I amnot. Nothing is mine. This is not I. {The Doctrineof the Upanisads andtheearly Buddhism, p.205). This question is discussed also by J. P. Remon, Self andnonself inearly Buddhism, p. 155; 164; S. Ck)llin8, SeMess Persons, 270

37 Buddhism and Saiiikhya, some scholars try to prove that Buddhism also had stated that something real or absolute Self transcends individual self, or egocentric self. The Samkhya-KarikaQAreads as follows: evarii tattva-'bhyasan na smi na m e na h a m ity apari^sam, aviparyayad visuddham kevalam utpadyate jnanam. (So through a repeated study of principles arises that knowledge of the form / a m not, nothing is mine, nothing is I, knowledge that is pure, that leaves nothing to be known, is free from Ignorance and is absolute.)^' It must be noted that the similarity in a terminology between the two systems does not always mean the sameness of their thought. The sameness must be stated after the careful observation of the underhning ideas through which the formula came to be used by both the systems. And when we notice the historical development in Buddhist idea of the self and not-self we must be careful in order to avoid an oversimplification regarding a relation between the two systems. Because, in MahayanaBuddhism, we can trace the idea of two selves, a small self and a big Self, which can not be found in the texts of Early Buddhism. So far as the statements in the Nikayas are concerned, as for the terminological similarity with Samkhyasystem, the important point is expressed best by H. Nakamura. He says as fouows: p.99; A.B. Keith, Buddhist Philosophy of IndiaandCeylon, p As for the comparative studies between two sj^tems concerning the theory of attaand anatta, see also, V.P. Varma, Early Buddhismaudits Origins, pp T.G. Mainkar, Saihkbyakariki of Isvarakesnawith the commentary of Gaudapada, pp Megumu Honda, Study of SamkhyaPhilosophy [SankyaTetugakuno 271

38 W e can find the similarity superficially between the two systems, but apparent difference in their foundation should also be noted, concerning the idea of the substantial existence. For while Buddhism consistently refuses to explain such concept, the Samkhyaschool beheves in a metaphysical concept, Pursa.*^ From the context of Samkhyasystem, the formulaic phrases {nasmi, ne me, nah) are stated in order to remove an illusion which hides one s true nature.^ The commentaries also vary in their interpretations of the verse, i.e. the Samkbya-Karika 64.^ The phrases are expressed in the Samkhya-Karika presupposing a metaphysical concept. O n the other side, the Buddhist notion of attahas more psychological and practical overtones.^ The ftiuer study of the relation between the two systems lies outside the scope of the present discussion. Kenkyu\, vol. 1,p H. Naiamura, Thought of Early Buddhism[Gensi BukkyonoShiso], vol.l, p. 672; Ways of Thinkingof EasternPeoples, p ^ S. Radhakrishnan, IndianPhilosophy, vol 2, p Chandradhar Sharma, A Critical Survey of IndianPhilosophy, p nasmi tattvani, name tattvani, nahaiii tattvanam(matharavritti); nahameva bhavami, namamasariramyato hamanyahsariramanyat, ahankara-rahitoham (Gaudapadabhasya); aharhlaiyavanna smi, na me svamita sti, ahamkartana (Vacaspatimisra:Sariikhyatattvakaumudi); suksma-sarire bhautike cana bhavami, api tu prakrtih, na mame dam api tu prakrtih, na pi aham prakrtih {Sankara:JayamangalS). Cf. Megumu Honda, Study of SamkhyaPhilosophy, vol. 1, p T.G. Mainkar, Samkhyakarika of Isvarakesna with the Commentary of Gaudapida, pp ^ V. P. Varma comments: But, while both the Sariikhya and Buddhism are similar in their repudiation of the infinite spirit, Buddhism appears more nihilistically radical in having reduced the self to a psycho-physical complex process while the Sariikhya, all the while, retains its adherence to the principle of the multiplicity of selves (V. P. Varma, Early Buddhismandits Origin, pp ). Th. Stcherbatsky says: In Buddhism as well as in Sajiikhya the human personality consists of an infinite number of pointinstants of gunmor dhammas which are held together in Saifakhya by a pervading Matter {pradhana) and an eternal soul, in Buddhism exclusively by causal law ipratitya-samutpida) (Th.Stcherbatsky, The Dhammaaof the Buddhists and Gunas of the Samkhya', TheIndianHistorical Quarterly, vol. X, 1934, pp , depend on the quotation by V. P. Varma, p. 318). 272

39 so we need mention here only the following: W e can find similar expression in the two systems. But, in Buddhism, the phrases this is not mine, this I a m not, this is not m y self are emphasized in ma ny places, but, in the Samkhya- Karika, the usage of these phrases occur only once in verse 64. (a) W e should admit the difference in both cases concerning the intention in which the phrases are given, one is psychological and practical purpose (Buddhism), and the other is metaphysical {Samkhya). It is difficult to say that early Buddhism believed in the notion of real Self only on the basis of the similarity Another example of a fi^quent discussion is the statement in the Maitri Upanisad, yi.so."^ It reads as follows: aharii so m a m e d a m ity evam manyamano nibadhnaty atmanatmanam jaleneva khecarah; athh puruso dhyavasayasamkalpabhimana-lingo baddhah, atas tadviparito muktah, tasmat nirdhyavasayo nihsariikalpo nirabhimanas tisthet, etan moksa-laksanam, esatra brahma-padavi. (In thinking This is I and That is mine one binds himself with himself, as a bird binds itself in a s n a r e. H e n c e a person who has the marks of determination, conception and self-conceit is bound. Hence, in being opposite of that, he is liberated. Therefore one should stand free firom determination, fi*ee fi:om conception, fi-ee from self-conceit. This is the mark of liberation. This is the pathway to Brahmahere in this world). The Maitri Upanisadis late in date, which is said to be compiled after 200 AD. A similar simile of a bird and snare can be found in the Nikaya, SN.I.8 (vol.l, p.44), pasenasakuniyathati. Mait. Up. VI. 30. S. Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upanisads, pp. 839; R.E. Hume, The ThirteenPrincipal Upanishads, p A similar statement can be found also in 273

40 The Maitri Upanisad, one of the post-buddhist Upanisada,, is an important source when we consider the doctrine of the self and not-self in Buddhism because the words 'niratmaii, 'niratmakatvd and nairitmyavada actually appear in it. As for the similar phraseology of the Maitri Upanisad with the Nikayas, aharii somamedam, there is fairly general agreement that it has been influenced by the Buddhist expression. S. Radhakrishnan says that suggestions of the illusory character of the world, monentariness of phenomena show the influence of Buddhist thought.^ P. Harvey points out; This [the phrases this is r and that is mine ] is very reminiscent of Buddhism, and may well have been influenced by it to divorce the universal Self from such egocentric associations. In the Maitri Upanisad, the formula This is F and That is mine is made use of stating that one who thinks this is I, that is mine with regard to the elemental self {bhutatman) which is a combination of the elements (bhnta),'"^ binds himself Then, not thinking in that manner is one who can get rid of a dhyavasaya(apprehension), samkalpa(conception or idea formed in the mind, or determination) and abhimana(self-conceit, pride). In this point, it can be said that the statement in the Maitri Upanisadhas the same intention with the formula in the Nikayas, the main purpose of which is also to abandon the attachment concerning the self However, the Maitri Upanisadclearly shows that one who has such marks as determination, conception, and self-conceit is a ma n of reincarnating suffering self {atman). ^ Therefore one should stand free Mait. Up. III.2. S. Radhakrishnan, ThePrincipal Upanisads, p P. Harvey, p. 34. On this point, see also H. Nakamura, Thought of theupanisads [Upanisadsnoshis(^, pp Mait. Up. III.2; VI.30. Mait. Up. III. I. there is still another, one also called selc who, being overcome by the bright or the dark fruits of action,^ enters a good or an evil womb, so that his course is down ward or upward and he wanders around, overcomed by the pairs of 274

41 from determination, conception, and self-conceit. This is the mark of liberation and the pathway to Brahman. In this sense, he becomes m a n of the great Self (Atman) which is immortal and fearless.^ It is to be noted that, in this point, there is a difference between early Buddhism and the Maitri Upanisadabout their intention though they use similar terminological formula. W e can not find any exphcit statement of the Buddha to show the idea of the Great self {Atman). In the Nikayas, the formula is used in a practical sense for the teaching of abandoning one s attachment without mentioning metaphysical concept. Let us now turn to the word niratman used in the Maitri Upanisad. The following quotation shows its important characteristic. yo ha khalu vavoparisthah sruyate gunesviordyhva-retasah sa va esa suddhah putah sunyah ^nto prano niratmananto ksayyah sthirah ^svato jah svatantrh sve mahimni tisthaty ajenedaih sariraih cetanavat pratisthapitam pracodayita vaiso py asyeti. (He, who is reputed as standing aloof amidst quauties, like those of vigorous chastity, he indeed, is pure, clean, void, tranquil, breathlessselfless. endless, undecaving. steadfast, eternal, unborn, independent. H e abides in his own greatness. By him this body is set up as possessing intelligence or in other words, this one, verily, is its driver.)' "'[underline mine] opposite [like pleasvire and pain] (anyovaparah; ko yamatmakbyoyo yamsitasitaih karma-phalair abhibhuyaminahsad-asad-yonimapadyataity avancyordhvavagatir dvandvair abhddhuyamanahparibhramati). Mait. Up. II.2. Mait. Up. II.4, and VI.28. See also, Mait. Up. VI.31, VII.4. Other examples are: yad atmana atmanamanor aniyamsamdyotamanammanah-ksayat pasyati tad atmanatmanamd^p/anirarmabhavati, (When, by the suppression of the mind, he sees through self the shining self, more subtle than the subtle, then having the self through the self he becomes selfless) <VI.20>. niratmakatvadasarbkhyo yonis cintyomoksa-laksanamity etat paramrahasyam(because of being selfless, he is to be regarded as immeasurable, without origin. This is the mark of Uberation, the supreme secret doctrine) <VI.20>. In Mait. Up., it is noted that the suppression of 275

42 In the statement, the twelve words are used to describe the subject he. An d the he is described in this Upanisadas: subtle, invisible one, called the person (sa vaesasuksmo'grahyo drsyabpurusa-samjndf^and he is the self that is immortal, the fearless, that is, Brahman {esaatmeti hovacaitadamrtam, abhayam, etad brahmeti).^ In VI.31, the question W h o is the Self?" {katama atmeti) is raised, and the marks such as pure, clean, void, tranquil and so on are give to define the Self {yo yamsuddhahputahsunyah santadi-laksanoktah). From the above recorded facts, it is obvious that the word selfless (niratman) is used to describe the nature of the Self {atmaii)?" It will be clear fi-om these examples that niratmanmeans the negation of the small self that is suffering, reincarnating self So the atmanin niratman means the small self which should be eliminated in order to be the great Self. The word niratmanmeans an event of changing into the Atmanthrough the negation of small self, or the characteristic of the one who has eliminated the small self. The above-mentioned formula this is I and this is mine is used in order to eliminate this small self, in other words, it is used to divorce the universal Self from such egocentric associations. It can be summarized as follows: Not to think as aharhsomamedam niratman= Atman(= Brahman). the mind {manahksayd) is urged and is regarded as a way to niratman. See, also, not-thought {acittd) <VI. 19>; mindlessness {amanibhavam) <VI.34>. In VII.8, we can find a criticism on nairatmyavada, which may means Buddhism. (Shinkan Murakami, Niratmanand Anatman, p. 551; K. Tukinowa, Thought of the AnatmanandMahatmanainBuddhism[Bukkyoni okerumuganodaiganoshisou\, pp ). Mait. Up. II.5. ^ Mait. Up. II.2. As for the negative expression in the Upanisada, VP. Varma comments: It is true that at times the Upanisads, also tend to characterize the supreme reauty in negative terms - the terms neti neti are supreme example of this negative methodology, but notwithstanding these negative characterizations, there is no doubt in the minds of the Upanisadic teachers that the final spiritual goal of man is positive plenitude of bliss {Early Buddhismandits Origins, p. 90). 276

43 W e must draw attention to an important difference between this statement in the Maitri Upanisadand that in early Buddhism observed so far. In the prose part of the Nikayas, the word anatta means, in some contexts, an absence of power of mastery, and absence of permanency. And anattais frequently referred in the same line with anicca, dukkhaand other marks which have a negative value, in the sense that they are to be removed, while in the Maitri Upanisad, the word niratman is used along with the marks of pure, clean, void, tranquil, breathless, endless, undecaying, steadfast, eternal, unborn, independent. They describe the nature of the Great Self {Atman), and they are marks which should be searched of and are not to be avoided. In the Maitri UpanisadIII.2, immortal Atman is compared to a drop of water on the lotus leaf (bindur iva puskaraiti). In a similar simile found in Suttanipata, 392 and 812, what is compared to a drop on the lotus leaf is a bhikkhuand muni not the Atmanor such type of concept.taking one of the marks as example, permanent and impermanent, the significant characteristics in both systems will be summarized as fouows; I Nikayas anatta= anicca(impermanence) I) Maitri Upanisad niratman- sthira(permanent) Sn.392 reads as follows; But without cunging to these things, to food, to bed, and chair, to water for removing dirt from his robe, to these things a bhikkhushould not chng, like a drop of water on the lotus leaf {Tasmahi pindesayanasanecaapeca samgha^ajupavahane, etesu dhammesu anupalitto bhiiddiu, yatha pokkhare varibindii). Cf. Shinkan Murakami, 'Nairatman and anatmaii, p The ChandogyaUpanisadalso uses this figurative expression, stating as water does not cung to the lotus leaf, so evil deed does not cling to one who knows it {yatha puskara-palasaaponaslisyante, evamevarh-vidi papamkarmanaslisyat^. Here, the water is compared to evil deed. 277

44 The question now arises. W h e n anattameans lack of the power of mastery or the absence of the nature of permanence, and when attaof the word anatta means the power of mastery or the nature of permanence, it is a matter of argximent whether the character of mastery and permanence should be understood as nature of being searched for, or nature of being ehminated. Do they derive from a standard of value in the same quality of Great self, which is depicted to be permanent, independent? Or, are they to be derived from a standard of value in the same quahty of one s egocentric clinging to try to gratify one desire, for instance, desire to do just as one wants to, to be young eternally for example? In other words, do they Unk to something nibbanic, or to one s strong desire to be master or be permanent? W e may note, in passing, that when we pay attention to the statements of some of the Mahayanatexts, the idea similar with the Maitri Upanisadcan be found. For example, the Mahayana-Sutralarhk^astates; getting the foremost Self which is selfless, getting pure Self, the Buddhas arrived at selfs nature of the great Self {nairatmyatmagralabhatah buddha suddhatmalabhitvat gata atmamahatmatani)p'^ And MahaparinirvanaSutraof Mahayanais also famous for the statement of this type. Mahayana-Sutralamlara, IX.23. Cf Giyu Nish, On Atmanand anattad, p.701; Shinkan Murakami, Nairatmanand Anatman, p.553. E. I^anakura, The Thought of Self in Indian Philosophy [Indotetugakuno Jigasishd^, pp ; Kyokou Fujii, 'Onthe Atman Theory inthe Mahayanamahaparinirvanasutrd, pp ; K Tukinowa, ibid. pp

45 Section 2 T h e negation b y the fo r m u l a of four ontological relations {rupam attato, rupavantam attanam, attani rupam, rupasmim attanani) The formiila :rupamattato, rupavantamattanam, attani rupam, rupasmimattanam the basic model and a collection of the texts --- Let us look closely at the formula to negate the wrong notion of the self concerning its ontological relations with the objects {khandhas, etc.), which are sometimes called sakkaya-ditthi. The followings are the model sentences of the teaching by using this formula, which frequently appear in the prose part of the Nikayas. Idha bhikkhave assutava puthujjano ariyanam adassavi ariyadahammassa akovido ariyadhamme avinito sappurisanam adassavi sappurisadhammassa akovido sappurisadhamme avinito, rupam attato samanupassati, rupavantam va attanam attani va ruparh rupasmim va attanarii. (Here, an uninformed worldhng who habitually disregards the ariyas, who is ignorant of the teachings of the ariyas, who is not trained and disciphned in the teachings of 279

46 the ariyas, who habitually disregards m e n of virtue, who is ignorant of the teachings of men of virtue, who is not trained and disciplined in the teachings of me n of virtues, regards rupaas atta, attaas possessed of rupa, ropaas in atta, attaas in rupa.) [The same is repeated of all the other khandhas.] Tassa tarn ruparh viparinamati aiiilatha hoti, tassa rupapaparinamaiiiiathabhava uppajjanti sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupayasa (The rupa of that person undergone change, suffer alteration. Owing to the condition of change and alteration in rupa, there arise in him grief, lamentation, pain, distress, despair.) [The same is repeated of all the other khandhas.] In the some suttas, more detailed psychological analysis is given as supplement to the above statement. That is: Tassa taih rupam viparinamati aiiiiatha hoti, tassa rupaviparinamafifiathabhava rupaviparinamanuparivatti^ viiiiianam hoti, tassa rupaviparinamanuparivattaja paritassana dhammasamuppada cittam pariyadaya titthanti, cetaso pariyadana uttasava ca hoti vighatava ca apekhava ca upadaya ca paritassati. (The rupa of that person undergone change, suffer alteration. Owing to the condition of change and alteration in rupa, his consciousness is preoccupied with the change of rupa. Agitated mental states born of preoccupation with the change of rupaarise together and remain obsessing his mind. Because his ^The word anuparivattati means to go or move around and keep on rolling'. It can be said that the word skillfully represents the nature of the mind of the ordinary person who is attached to something. 280

47 mind is obsessed, he is anxious, distressed, and concerned, and due to clinging he becomes agitated.)" [The same is repeated of all the other khandhas.y The followings is a list of the texts in which these four ways of false regarding are mentioned. Of course, in some texts, the opposite reasoning is given, that is, the right regarding to see something as not attain such four ways. The objects of the wrong concepts are noted after the name or the place of the sutta. If there will be some notable explanations for better understanding, I shall also refer to them. (1) MN. 44 (vol. 1, p.300) CulavedallaSutta/pancakhandha As a reason of arising of sakkayaditth^, which is held by an uninformed worldling {assutavaputhujjand), the following explanation is given concerning the five aggregates. ruparii attato samanupassati, rupavantarh va attanam, attani va rupam, rtipasmirh va attanaiii. vedanam... samaih....sahkhare....vimanarh...,evaiii kho, avuso visakha, sakkayaditthi hoti ti. (He regards material form as atta, atta as possessed of material form, material form as in att^ attaas in material The following is the translation of the KhandhaSaihyuttaby MPA., p. 30. That Corporeahty of the person deteriorates and becomes different. Because of the nature of changeable ness and impermanence of the Corporeality of this person, there arises in him the Consciousness which constantly follows all these changes [taking place in Corporeality which he takes as his atta[. Being thus constantly conscious of these changes, his mind is overwhelmed by the arising of demeritorious factors due to Craving resulting from Clinging. His mind being thus overwhelmed by demeritorious factors, he becomes frightened, troubled and obsessed [with Corporeahty]; he also craves due to Clinging 3MN.138, vol.3, pp ; SN.XXIL7, p. 16, etc. ^P. Harvey translates: views on the existing group {The Selfless Mind, p. 6). 281

48 form [The same is repeated of all the other khandhaa], in this way sakkayaditthi arises.) Then, the reason of extinction of sakkayaditthi is explained as not regarding the five aggregates in this way. (2) MN.109 (vol. 3, p ) MahapunnamaSutta /pancakhandha As a reason for arising of sakkayaditthi the formula is explained. (3) MN.131 (vol. 3, p ) BhaddekarattaSutta /pancakhandha. H o w is one carried away [by craving and wrong view] with respect to the presently arising physical and mental phenomena? {kathauca, bhikkhave, paccuppannesudhammesusaiiihirati^)^ As an answer for this question, it is said that an uninformed worldling regards material form as atta, or attaas possessed of material form, material form as in atta, attaas in material form. [The same is repeated of all the other khandhas.] (4) MN.132 (vol. 3, p. 190) Ananda-BhaddekarattaSutta/paUcakhandha (5) MN. 138 (vol. 3, p ) UddesavibhangaSutta tatha tatha, bhikkhave, bhikkhu upaparikkheyya yatha yatha upaparikkhato bahiddha cassa viniianarh avikkhittarii avisatam, ajjhattarii asanthitam anupadaya na paritassej^a. (Bhikkhus, a bhikkhushould examine things in such a way that while he is examining them, his consciousness is not distracted and scattered externally nor stuck internally, and by not clinging The term saiiihlrati, passive oi saiiiharati, means to be drawn away or caught in. MNA.(vol.5, p.4) explains 'tanhadi^hi akad^yati (becarried away by craving and wrong views). This sentence implies the condition of the man who is defeated and controlled by the object he is clinging to. It can be said that one does not gain mastery over the khandhas, but the khandhas gain mastery over him. 282

49 he does not become agitated.) Then, the text explains how consciousness is distracted and scattered externally. idhavuso, bhikkhuno cakkhuna ruparh disva rupanimittanusari vifmanam hoti ruanimittassadagadhitam rupanimittassadavinibandharii rupanimittassadasamyojanasaihyuttarh bahiddha vifmanam vikkhittaih visataniti vuccati. (Here, when a bhikkhuhas seen material form with the eye, if his consciousness follows after the sign of form, is tied and shackled by gratification in the sign of material form, is fettered by the fetter of gratification in the sign of material form, then his consciousness is called distracted and scattered externally.) [The same is repeated of all the other elements such as sound and ear, odor and nose etc. And the opposite is said concerning not distracted and scattered externally.] As an explanation for how there be agitation due to clinging {kathancavuso, upadaparitassanahotf), it is said that an uninformed worldling regards the PTS text reads here 'anupadaparitassana(agitation due to non-clinging), which is difficult for understanding when we consider the general teaching of the Buddha. The Buddha repeatedly teaches that agitation arises form clinging and ceases with the removal of cunging. The Commentary accepts 'anupadaand comments: what is here called agitation due to non-chnging is in meaning agitation due to clinging by way of views {evamesa ditthivasena upadaparitassanapi samana atthato anupadapatitassamyeva nama hotlti veditabbs) <MNA.voL4, p.28>. However, SN.XXIL7(vol.3, p. 17) gives same teaching with MN.138, and there it reads upada paritassana, not 'anupadaparitassana. And both suttas seem to teach in a way of contrasting assutavaputhujjano- upada-paritassana/autavaariyasavako-anupada aparitassani, therefore I read the sentence in MN.138 as 'upadaparitassana. Nanamoli reads it as upadaparitassana (see, TheMiddle LengthDiscourses of the Buddha, p. 1344). 283

50 m aterial form as the self, or the se lf as having m aterial form. (6) SN.XXII. 1 (vol. 3, p. 3) pascakjiandba The formula is explained as an answer for the question who the person with a sick body and sick mind is {aturakayocevaboti aturacittoca). A n uninformed worldling regards material form as self, self as possessed of material form, material form as in self, self as in material form. He is overwhelmed by the thought I a m material form, material form is mine {aharit rupammamrupanti pariyutthatthayi hoti). That material form deteriorates and becomes different. Because of the nature of change and impermanence of this material form, there arise in him grief lamentation, pain, distress and despair (tassa rupaviparinamaimathabhavivauppajjantisokaparidevadtikkbadomanassupayasi). [The same is repeated of all the other kbandhas.] The opposite description is given about the person with a sick body but not with a sick mind {aturakayoboti nocaaturacitto). (7) SN.XXII.7 (vol. 3, p. 16) paucakbandba In this sutta, the four ways of false regarding are said to be a reason of the craving resulting from clinging {upada-paritassana), and not regarding so is said to be the absence of craving resulting from non-clinging {anupada-paritassans). (8) SN.XXII. 43 (vol. 3, pp ) pancakbandba This is an important suttawhen we consider the thought on the self in Early Buddhism, because the formula of the four ways of false regarding is given in a context of stating the phrase Attadipa...'. The text reads as follows; Attadipaman bhikkhave viharatam attasarananam anamasarananarii dhammadlpanarii dhammasarananam anamasarananam yoni yeva 284

51 upaparikkhitabbo, kimjatika sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupayasa kimpahotika ti. (Having the self as island, having the self as refuge, having the self as no other refuge, having dhammaas island, having dhamma as refuge, having dhammaas no other refuge, bhikkhus, you should investigate the cause thus: What is the origin of grief, lamentation, pain, distress and despair and what is their source? ) To explain for making the self as island etc, the four ways of false regarding concerning the five khandhas are said to be the cause of one s grief lamentation, etc. One thinks of in four wrong ways concerning self and khandhas, then, that material form of that person deteriorates and become different {tassa tam rupamviparinamati annathahoti). Because of the nature of changeableness and impermanence of this material form, there arise in him grief lamentation, pain, distress, despair, (tassa rupaviaparinamannathabhava uppajjanti sokaparide vadukkha-domanassupayasa). The conclusion of this suttais as follows: Bhikkhus, to one who perceives the impermanent nature of material form, its deterioration, its extinction and its cessation, and who discerns the truth as it reauy is, that all material form in the past as well as at present are impermanent, pain, and subject to change, there is abandonment of grief, lamentation, pain, distress and despair. The abandonment of grief, 285

52 lamentation etc. results in an absence of craving. A n d when there is no craving, there is bliss. A bhikkhuwho enjoys such bliss is called one who attains momentary supreme peace {tadanganibbutd). (9) SN.XXII.44 (vol.3, p.44) pancakhandha The false regarding in the four ways as to the five khandhas is said to be sakkaya-samudayagaminiiii (the practice that leads to the arising of five aggregates), and not regarding in that manner is said to be 'sakkayanirodhagaminiiii (the practice that leads to the cessation of the five aggregates). (10) SN.XXII.47 (vol.3, p.46) pancakhandha This sutta, entitled Samanupassanasutta, deals with the views on attaand the reason why such views regarding attaarise. Ye hi keci bhikkhave samana va brahmana va anekavihitam attanam samanupassamana samanupassanti, sabbe te pancupadanakkhandhe samanupassanti etesam va amatararii (Those samanas and brahmanas who consider what attais have various views regarding atta. All of them hold that attais the five khandhas, that are the objects of clinging, or one of these five khandhas.) Then the Buddha explains what the five khandhas which are the objects of clinging (five upadanakkhandhas) are. Here, the formula is given. That is, an uninformed worldling regards material form as self, self as possessed of material form, material form as in selfi self as in material form [the same is repeated of all the other khandhas]. Then, the explanation goes on; Viewing in this manner, he is not 286

53 firee of the concept of I am.{iti ayarhcevasamanupassanaasmiti cassaadhigatam hoti) -* Bhikkhu, when not free of the concept of I a m,there arise the five sense faculties {Asmiti kho pana bhikkhave adhigate atha pancannamindriyanam avakkanti hoti) Bhikkhva, there is mind, there also are mind objects, and there also is the element of ignorance {Atthi bhikkhave mano atthi dhamma atthi vijjadhatu). Then, the explanation goes on as follows; avijjasamphassajena bhikkhave vedayitena putthassa. assutavato puthujjanassa Asmiti pissa hoti, A y a m ah am asmiti pissa hoti. Bhavissanti pissa hoti, Na bhavissanti pissa hoti, Rupi bhavissanti pissa hoti, Arupi bhavissanti pissa hoti, Saiifii bhavissanti pissa hoti, Asanni bhavissanti pissa hoti. NevasaMinasaml bhavissanti pissa hoti. Titthanti kho pana bhikkhave tattheva paiicindriyani. (When, bhikkhus, an uninformed worldling experiences sensation that arises through concept with the element of ignorance, there arise in him the concept of I a m,there also arises in him the concept This is F, there also arises in him the concept I shall be,there also arises in him the concept I shall not be,there also arises in him the concept 1 shall be one who has material form,there also arises in him the concept I shall be one who has no material form,there also arises in him the concept I shall be one who has consciousness, there also arises in him the concept I shall be one who has no consciousness,there also arises in him the concept I shall be one who has neither consciousness nor non-consciousness. In this manner, bhikkhus, the five sense faculties arise.) (11) SN.XXII.55 (vol. 3, p. 56) panca khandha 287

54 (12) SN.XXII.55 (vol. 3, pp ) pancakbandha (13) SN.XXII.81 (vol. 3, p. 96) pancakhandha In this sutta, it is explained to a bhikkhuhow the asavas disappear in him in an instant {Kathamcabhikkhave janatokatbampassatoanantaraasavanam kbayo boti). Then the Buddha teaches him to see and to know in the following way. Idha bhikkhave assutava puthujjano...rupam attato samanupassati, yo kho pana bhikkhave sa samanupassana sankharo so. So pana sankharo kimnidano kirhsamudayo kirhjatiko kiriipabhavoti. Avijjasamphassajena bhikkhave vedayitena phutthassa assutavato puthujjanassa uppanna tariha, tatojo so sankharo. lit kho bhikkhave so pi kho sankharo anicco sahkhato paticcasamuppanno, sa oi tanha anicca sarikhata pati(;casamuppanno, sa pi vedana, so pi phasso anicco saiikhato paticcasamuppanno, sa pi avijja anicca sahkhata paticcasamuppanna. E v a m pi kho bhikkhave janato evam passato anantara asavanam khayo hoti. (An uninformed worldling person regards material form as atta, bbikkhua, [the holding of] such a view is a compounded and conditioned things. N o w what is the cause, the origin, the genesis and the source of this compounded and conditioned thing? BMkkbus, craving arises in an uninformed worldling when there is an impact on him of sensation resulting from contact associated with ignorance. That craving is the cause of the arising of that compounded and conditioned thing. Thus bbikkhua, that compounded and conditioned thing is impermanent, is conditioned and arises from a cause. That craving also is impermanent, is conditioned and arises from a cause. That sensation also... That contact 288

55 also... That ignorance also... Bhikkhua, in one who knows thus, wh o sees thus, asavas disappear in an instant.) Then each of the four false regarding is brought up, and the same explanation is repeated. N a have kho rupam attato samanupassati, api ca kho rupavantam attanarii samanupassati. (An uninformed worldling does not view material form as atta, but views attaas having material form.) N a have kho rupam attato samanupassati, na rupavantam attanarii samanupassati, api ca kho attani rupam samanupassati. (An uninformed worldling does not view material form as atta, and does not view atti as having material form, but views material form as in atta.) N a have kho rupam attato samanupassati, na rupavantam attanarii samanupassati, na attani ruparii samanupassati, api ca kho rupasmirii attanarii samanupassati (An uninformed worldling does not view material form as atta, does not view attaas having material form, and does not view material form as in att^ but views attaas in material form.) The parallel explanations are held with respect to each of the other khandhas. And, the sassataditthi and the ucchedaditthi are brought up and explained in the same way. Here, sassataditduis: That is atta, that is the world, I will come into being hereafter, and shall be permanent, lasting, eternal and not subject to change {soattasolake, sopecca bbavissami niccodhuvosassato aviparinamadhammd), and ucchedaditthi\a\ If I should not exist, there will not be 289

56 anything that is mine. If I should not exist in the future, there will no more be anything that is mine {no cassamno ca me siya na bhavissami na me bhavissati)j (14) SN.XII.82 (vol. 3, p. 102) pancakhsmdha As the reason for arising of sakkayaditthi, the four ways of false regardings are given. (15) SN.XXII.85 (vol. 3, p ) A n uninformed worldling regards material form as self, self as possessed of material form, material form as in self, self as in material form. He does not know, fundamentally and truly, impermanent material form as impermanent material form. He does not know, fundamentally and truly material form which is dukkha as material form which is dukkba. He does not know, fundamentally and truly material form which is not self as material form which is not self. He does not know, fundamentally and truly material fonn which is compounded and conditioned as material form which is compounded and conditioned. He does not know, fundamentally and truly material form which is murderer as material form which is murderer. [The same reasoning apphes to each of the other khandhas]. Then following explanation is given with regard to the self. He takes material form as his atta, clinging to it and believes firmly that it is his atta(sorupamupeti upadiyati adbitthati Attame ti). But these five khandhas which are the objects of chnging, when thus taken and clung to [as atta\, lead him to misfortune and suffering for a long. " SN. vol 3, pp

57 (16) SN.XXII.93 (vol. 3, p. 138) pancakhandha (17) SN.XXII.99 (vol. 3, p. 150) pancakhandha In this suttaentitled being fastened with a thong {gaddhulaor bhaddula), those who regard khandhas falsely in the four ways are compared to a dog tied by means of a leash to a stake or a pillar, and runs circles round and round. (18) SN.XXIL117 (vol.3, p ) pancakhandha A n uninformed worldhng who regards khandhas falsely in the four ways is said to be one who is bound by the bonds of the body (rupabandhanabaddhd), is bound by internal and external bonds (santarabahirabandhanabaddho), does not see either this bank or the other bank (atfradassf aparadasss), grows old in bonds [of defilements] {baddhojayati), dies in bonds [of defilement] {baddhomiyati), and goes in bonds fi o m this existence to another existence {baddhoasmaloka paramlokamgacchati). [The same is repeated of all the other khandhas.] (19) SN.XXXV.91 (vol. 4, pp ) the six groups of six (20) SN.XLI.3 (vol. 4, pp ) In this sutta, firstly it is said that views of the ten unanswered questions and the views mentioned in the Brahmajala-sutta arise because of the sakkayaditthi Then, as the reason of arising sakkayaditthi, the explanation of the four false ways of regarding are given. (21)SN.XLIV.8 (vol. 4, pp ) pancakhandha In this sutta, the four false ways of regarding are given as a reason of the views of the ten unanswered questions. (22) AN.IV (vol. 2, p. 215) pancakhandha 291

58 5-2-2 The interpretations by the scholars and the Commentary In this section, let s see some of the interpretations about this formula, which exhort one not to regard material form as self, self as possessed of material form, material form as in self, self as in material form, etc. J.P. Remon, translating the sentence in question as regards the body as the self, the self as having a body, the body [as having] in the self, the self [as being] in the body, here again stresses on his point that the reahty of attais clearly impued in this formula too. He states: the attain question is not a hypothetical or theoretical atta, but the very self of the person involved ; W e fail to see how this denies the reality of attain an absolute way, on the contrary, it asserts atta as free in reality from any ontological admixture with the peripheral factors of samsaric existence. * P. Harvey translates the sentence as Self is vopa, Self has the property of rupa, rupais in Self, Self is in rupa, stating: this view concerns a putative Self and its relation to the personahty-factors. Parallel views are held with respect to each of the other four personality-factors, so that there are twenty such views in all, covering all the way that an ordinary person might look on the personality-factors as Self. This means, for example, that it is wrong to say that the body is Self, or that the body is a property of Self or that the body is contained within (i.e.part o^ Self or that the body contains a Self! *^ S. Collins explains this formula as the four possible ways of regarding the relationship between self and the constituents of personality, all of them. J.P. Remon, Self andnonself inearly Buddhism, p He also states: the differentiation from what is not ego is explicitly expressed with relative terms such as attaand paraand the aggregates are considered to be not attabut para( ahen, another ) (J.P. Remon, ibid. p. 177). P. Harvey, The Selfless Mind, p

59 naturally, mistaken. His translation is; regards rupaas self, self as having the ropa, the rupaas in the selc the self as in liipa. A n ordinary m a n regards the khandhas in one or other of the four relations with self, and there comes to be the feehng law. From this feeling arise various speculations concerning this I,in the present and the future. Views of self, then, are not merely castigated because they rest on supposedly untenable intellectual foundations: rather they are conceptual manifestations of desire and attachment. Y. E^arunadasa s translation is: Hence the learned and noble disciple does not consider corporeality, sensation, perception, mental formation, or consciousness, as the ego, nor the ego as the owner of these factors, nor these factors as included within the ego, nor the ego is included within these factors." Then, let us see the explanations found in the Commentary. The Commentary (MNA) explains these four relations between the self and the khandhas as follows: Tupamattatosamanupassatiti: One regards material form as F, I as material form, and that self and material fonn are identical, in the way that, when an oil lamp is burning, one regards the flame as the hght, the hght as S. CoUins, Selfless Persons, pp Translations of other scholars are: regards corporeality as the self, or the self as possessing corporeality, or the corporeality as being within the self or the self as within the corporeality (K.N. Upadhyaya, p. 309); regards the self as bodily form, or as something having a bodily form, or bodily form as being in the selt or the self as being in the bodily form (S. Rahdakrishnan, p. 384); There are four tjt)es of such misapprehensions, namely, atta is the same as rupa, etc.; it is possessed of irupa, etc.; in it there is rupa, etc.; and, it is in rupa, etc. (N.N. Bhattacharyya, p. 70); take rupa as atta, take remaining aggregates as atta, takes rupaas existing in atta, takes attaas existing in rupd(mpa, KhandhaSamyutta,^^.Q-T). Y. Karunadasa, TheBuddhist Critique of Atmavadaandthe Buddhist Ideal of Nibbana, p.51 [This is a translation of the sentence in SN. vol3, p. 122]. 293

60 the flame, and that the flame and the light are identical, iyaiii rupathsoahaih, yo ahamtarnrupanti rupancaattancaadvayaihsamanupassati. seyyatbapi nima telappadipassajhayatoya acci so vanno, yo vannosaacciti accinca vslnnancaadvayaihsamanupassati.) rupavantamvaattaaanti: Taking material form as separate firom self,as if the tree has its shadow, one regards self as possessing material form, {arupam attati gahetv^^ chayavantaih rukkhaiii viya taiii attanaih rupavantam samanupassati) attani varupanti. Taking material form as separate from self, as if scent is in flower, one regards material form as in self, {arupameva attati gahetva pupphasmimgandbamviyaattani rupaihsamanupassati) rupaamimvaattananti: Taking material form as separate from self, as if a ruby is contained in a casket, one regards self as in material form, {arupameva attati gahetvakarandiyamanimviyaattanamrupasmimsamanupassati)^^" The meaning of the formula What these phrases mean concretely? Here we shall consider in detail each of these four ways of wrong recognition. %IPA, KhandhaSamyutta, p. 6n. explains this meaning as follows: This refers to the view that only the mental aggregates of vedana, sanha, sankharaand vimana apart from the aggregate of Corporeality are atta, and this attahas Corporeality as the tree has its shadow. Depending on the Commentary to MN.44 (vol.1, p.300). MNA.vol.2, pp.359. C 294

61 rupamattatosamanupassati {rupam[acc], attato[abl]) This relation between attaand khanhhaa. compared to the relation between the flame and light of an ou-lamp as stated in the Commentary, is a mistaken view to hold the conceit of identification of self with the khandhas. It also can be said a direct and exphcit identity, the conceit to hold that the self has same extent as rupahas,'^ or the view regarding that the whole individual (both the mental and physical part of the being, that is all of the five aggregates) is the self.' E. Conze interprets it as the relation of 1 a m the khandhas,which mean an essential or a complete identity. This false identification of self with the khandhas in this formula basically the same with phrase of esoahamasmi {this is I), one of three negative phrases mentioned in previous section, though they differ inthe point of the terms aham or atta. W e can find the same tj^e of expressions in the verses of the Nikayas, for instance, in the Udana, VII.l, uddhaiii adho ca sabbadhi vippamuttoayamahamasmi ti (Above, below, everywhere released, he does not focus on I a m this ): in the SamyuttaNikaya, vol.l, p. 112, [with regard to five khandha^ n esohamasmi n etaihme, evamtatthavirajjati. Some examples come with the word para (other), for instance, in the Therigatha 177, paccavekjdiathasaiikhare paratonacaattato (see the formations as other, not as self); in the Theragatha, 1160, ye paucakhandhe passantiparato nacaattato (he sees five aggregates as other, not self); in the SamyuttaNikaya, vol.l, p. 188, Patisambhidamagga, vol.l, pp j.p. Remon, Self andnonself inearly Buddhism, p A. Hirakawa, Not-self and Subject [MugatoShytai], p.407. He adds that the' extent here do not necessarily have only spatial meaning. I.Funabasi, Study of Early Buddhism\Gensi BukkyousisonoKenkyu], p. 54. And H. Ui explains that, to put the matter simply, it is the view to regard the body as the aem{study of Buddhist Thought [Bukkyoshisonokenkyii\, p.64). 295

62 sahkhare paratopassa, dukkhatomacaattato(see the formations as other, as pain, and not as sel^. rupavantarhvaattanaifi smanupassati {rupa-vant,^'{aicc], attanam[acc]) This relation between attaand khanhhttfi, compared to the relation between the tree and its shadow, is the conceit to hold that the self has the khandhas. It can be said that the self possesses material form as we possess a watch or a pen for instance,' I Funabashi points out that the attain this phrase means the soul which is inherent in an individual as a central existence having a power of controuing the individual. He goes on to say that attain question does not mean etammama {t\iqfirst phrase of the three negative expressions), but means atta oi m esoatta(the third phrase of them). It is difficult to know the exact meaning of the atta. However, the sentence 'rupavsmtamvaattanaihsmanupassati seems to show the ownership of the self And the owner, or the self, is often misunderstood as the substantial or eternal existence which have the omnipotent power (S)attani varupamsamanupassati It means that material form is in attaas if a scent is in the flower, or that material form as enveloped in the self" It is also understood as the view to regard the self as the real substrate of the khandhas,^'^or the view to hold an The term rupa-vant means having bodily form, having the form of. A. Hirakawa, ibid. p.407. I.Funabasi, ibid. p. 54. ^ A. Hirakawa, ibid. p.407. J.P. Remon, ibid. p

63 eternal subject existing in the every thing as the self.~ I. Funabashi points out that the self in this phrase means a concept of a cosmic Self like Brahmantaught in Brahmanism^ rupasmimvaattanaihsamanupassati This is the view to hold that attais in material form as if a ruby is contained in a casket. It is also understood as the view to regard the khandhas as the real substrate of the self the view to hold that material form is bigger than the self and the self stays in it as a master,' or the view to hold that the five khandhas envelope the self" H. Ui states that it is the view to regard the mental side of individual (opposed to the physical body) as being substantial.'* Opinions differ among the scholars as to the meaning of attain these phrases. However, to inquire further into the matter would lead us into that specialized area of an imaginary interpretation, and such a discussion is not so important to the main subject. It is better for us to understand here that these four relations between the self and the khandhas are elaborated from every possible ontological point of view, that is, an analytic way concerning the self and khandhas by considering the possible relations of them. 1 cannot bring myself to accept the interpretation to consider easily the word attain the formula in relation with the Upanisadic concept of Atman/Brahman. If we pay attention to -2 H. Ui, ibid. p. 64. I. Funabasi, ibid. p.55. J.P. Remon, ibid. p ^ A. Hirakawa, ibid. p.407. I. Funabasi, ibid. p. 54. He goes on to say that the self means dharma-atman existing in dhamma, or the subjective eternal self existing as svabhavawithin five khandhas. 2' H. Ui, ibid. p

64 the contexts in which the formula is given, it is not possible to understand attaas such a concept. However, this is the point to be decided after further considerations. Then, what the Buddha or his disciples try to teach through this formula? Here, let m e summarize the main points of the teaching by the formula given in several contexts. The thought underlining the teaching of this formula is almost the same with the that given by the previously mentioned formula of the three negative phrases, that is, this is not mine, this Ia m not, this is not m y self. The main points are: A n uninformed worldling {assutavaputhujjana) perceives the self as the khandhas in the four wrong ways, but the khandhas are impermanent. Because of the nature of changeableness and impermanence of the khandhas, and because of his strong attachment to the khandhas, there arise in him grief, lamentation, pain, distress, and despair. So we have to know and perceive the true relations correctly in order to get rid of them. But, when we carefully examine this formula of four ways of wrong recognition in comparison with the formula of the other, we notice the following distinctive features: (1) In many places, these four false recognitions are explained as sakkayaditthi, or as a reason for arising of sakkayaditthi.'^^ Though sakkayaditthi \ataken up as one of the defilement in case of the formula of the three negative phrases too, it is taught with more strong relation to the formula of the four ways of wrong recognition. It is quite natural fix>m this fact that the sakkayaditthi is explained ^ The word sakkaya is usually translated as personality, but according to the commentaries it corresponds to sat-kaya, existing group,hence not to Skt. sva-kaya, own group or own body (Cf. MN.44. & Nyanatiloke, Buddhist Dictionary, p. 182). 298

65 later as the twenty kinds of personality belief, viz., the four wrong recognition with respect to each of the five khandjias.^ They are also explained as sakkaya-samudaya-gamimiii (the practice that leads to the arising of the five aggregates)^. (2) One who regards khandhas in the four wrong ways is described as not firee, and a lack of power to control. For example, 'paccuppannesu dhammesu saiiihlrati (carried away in respect of presently arising physical and mental phenomena):^' tied to the khandhas like a dog tied by means of a leash to a stake or pdlar, he is not free fi-om birth, old age, death, a n d with a sick body and sick mind.^^ (3) The four wrong views are said to be the cause of the false views appearing in the ten unanswered question, or the views in the Brahmajala-sutta?^ This formula is taught for the purpose of avoiding our attachment, in the same way as the teaching of the previous formula (three negative phrases). In other words, one s misunderstandings of the relation between the self and khandhas in such foior ways are the reason of the attachment, or the attachment itself. The false ^ MN.44. vol. 1, p. 300; MN.109, vol. 3, pp ; SN. vol. 3, p. 102; SN. vol. 4, pp Sakkayaditdii is usually translated as personality-beuef, the twenty kinds of personahty behef. Sa^ayadiahi is said, especially in abhidhamma hterature, to be the first of the ten fetters {samyojand), and to be abandoned only by reaching the path of Stream-winning {sotapatthi-magg^. NyanatHoka explains; There are 20 kinds of personality-behef, which are obtained by applying 4 tj^pes of that belief to each of the 5 groups of existence. (1-5) the belief to be identical with rupaetc., (6-10) the behef to be contained in them, (11-15) behef to be independent of them, (16-20) behef to be the owner of them (Nyanatiloke, Buddhist Dictionary, p.182). 3 SN.vol. 3,p. 44. MN.131, vol.3, pp SN.vol.3, p ^ SN.vol.3, p. 3. SN.vol.3, p.46; SN.voL4, pp

66 understanding is also said to be upada-paritassana (the craving resulting from clinging).^ It is important to note that the process of one s attachment is explained more minutely and psychologically in case of this formula than that of the three negative phrases. W h e n we compare these two formulas (three negative phrases and the four wrong relations as to the self and the khandhas), the former is simple and unaffected. It seems to be given from an educational standpoint to exhort the bhikkhus to avoid holding a wrong conceit and a wrong view concerning self and the khandhas, which is supported by the fact that the word aharii is used in the former formula. However, the latter formula uses the term atta, which is used from the standpoint of more objective speculation The similar examples and the later development of the fbrmiila (1) W e can find, besides the stock phrases, some statements which teach not to perceive wrongly the relation between the self and the khandhas. The Mulapariyayasutta,^^the first suttain the MajjimaNikaya., discusses the cognitive processes, in which the four ways of conceiving {mamati) are mentioned, bearing some resemblance to the formula we have observed. In this sutta, the objects to be conceived are given as follows: eatrh ipathavi), water (apa), fire {tejo), air {vayd), beings (bhuta), gods (deva), lord of creation (Pajapati), the SN.vol.3, p. 16. MN.l (voll, pp.1-6). It Uterally means the root of all things'. In this Buddha analyses the cognitive process of four types of individuals, that is, the untaught ordinary man, the disciple in higher training, the arahant, and the, Tathagata. It is said that this is one of the most difficult suttas in the Nikayas. the 300

67 gods of Streaming Radiance {Brahma, Abhassara), the gods of Refulgent Glory {Subhakinhsi), the gods of Great Fruit {Vehapphald), the Overlord {Abhibbu), the base of infinite space {akasanancayatana), the base of infinite consciousness {vinn^ancayatana), the base of nothingness {akincannayatand), the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception {nvasamianasamayatana), the seen {dittha), the heard {suta), the sensed (muta), the cognized (vinnata), unity {ekatta a type of pluralism), diversity (nanatta- a type of the monistic), all {sabbaf', and nibbana?^ I will take the example of earth in order to see the illustration for the wrong conception of the self held by an uninformed ordinary person. Here, bhikkhus, an uninformed ordinary person... perceives earth as earth. Having perceived earth as earth, he conceives [himself as] earth, he conceives [himself] in earth, he conceives [himself apart] fix»m earth, he conceives earth to be mine,he dehghts in earth. W h y is that? Because he has not fully understood it,i say. Then, the parallel explanations are said with respect to each of the objects All phenomena of personahty are collected together and shown as singlefold. This idea of totality can form the basis for philosophies of the pantheistic or monistic t5t)e, depending on the relation posited between the self and the all (ISIanamoli, TheMiddle LengthDiscourses of thebuddha, p. 1166). ^ It is pointed out that one can see a close relation between the teaching in this sutta and the statement in the Brhad-aranyaka UpaaisadIII , in which similar concepts such as earth, water, fire, etc. are listed. C S. Radhakrishnan, The Principal Upanisads, p. 225; D.J. Kalupahana, The Principles of Buddhist Psychology, p. 58; AHistory of Buddhist Philosophy, p. 80. It can be said that these concepts hsted in this suttahad been affected by the expressions of the Upanisadic Uterature. However, it is difficult to decide whether the teaching of the Mulapariyiya-suttaintended to negate the idea of the Upanisads, or the suttahad just used only the expressions of the Upanisads in order to explain the teaching of the Buddha without any negative intention. 301

68 listed above. Here, the word 'atta is not used explicitly, but it is obvious that these words {ahaiii or atta) are presupposed as a subject of the sentence judging from its meaning. Now, we shall examine each of the four relations. Firstly, the suttagives an introductory statement to explain the basic reason of the false understanding: he perceives earth as earth {pathaviihpathavito sanjanati). Then, to explain this, a more analytical account is given in the four ways. 3)pathaviih(acc.) mannati (he conceives [himself as] earth) This is a relationship of a direct identification (he conceives pathaviya(\oc.) mannati (he conceives [himself] in earth) This is a relationship of inherence (he conceives in X) wpathavito(abl.) mannati (he conceives [himself apart] from earth) This is a relation of contrast or derivation (he conceives from X). pathaviih(acc.) meti mannati (he conceives earth to be mine )^ This is a relation of a simple appropriation (he conceives X to be mine). Stating these four ontological relations,^ it is said that he dehghts in earth D. J. Kalupahana s translation is: conceives the self to be thfe possessor of earth (A History of Buddhist Philosophy, p. 80). MNA. explains: this is m y hair, this is m y hair on the body, this is m y iron, this is copper, conceive thus explained all the earth inside and outside to be mine {si cayaihmamakesa, mamaloma, mamaayo, mama lohanti eveih yathavuttappabhedaya sabbayapi ajjhattikabahiraya pathaviya yojetabbath) < M N A voll, p.28>. As to the four ways of conceiving, Nanamoli comments as follows: The Buddha shows that the conceiving of any object may occur in any of four ways, expressed by the text as a foiurfold linguistic pattern: accusative, locative, ablative, and appropriative. The primary significance of this modal pattern - enigmatic in the Pali as weu seems to be ontological. I take the pattern to represent the diverse ways in which the ordinary person attempts to give positive being to his imagined sense of egohood by posting, below the threshold of reflection, a relationship between himself as the subject of cognition and the perceived phenomenon as its object {The Middle LengthDiscourses of thebuddha, p. 1163). 302

69 (jpatbavimabhinandati). The reason of the conceiving in such a way is that he has not fully understood it. O n the contrary, the tathagataaccomplished and fully enlightened, directly knows earth as earth (pathaviiii pathavitoabhijanati). Then he does not conceive [himself as] earth {pathaviiii namamati), he does not conceive [himself] in earth {pathaviyana mannati), he does not conceive [himself] fix)m earth {pathavitona mamati), he does not conceive earth to be mine (pathavirh meti na mahnati), he does not delight in earth {pathavim nabhinandati). W h y is that? Because the tathagatahas fuuy understood it to the end/^ The word mannati' (Oman to conceive, to think ) is often used to mean a distortional thinking,*^ the thought ascribes to its object characteristics and a significance derived not fi*om the object itself but fix>m its own subjective imaginations. According to the commencaries, the activity of conceiving is governed by three defilements, craving {tanha), conceit {mana), and view (ditthi).^ The twenty kinds of personahty beuef which are called sakkayaditthi have gone through the process of intricate development since the time of the Nikayas. In Abhidhamma literature, a methodical consideration was given to SN.XXXV.30 (vol.4, pp.21-23) reads as follows: Idhabhikkbave bhikkhucakkhum namamati cakkhusmiibnamannati cakkbutonamannati cakkbumeti namannati. {Bbikkhua, a bhikkhudoes not conceive [himself as] eye, he does not conceive [himself] in eye, he does not conceive [himself apeurt] fii^m eye, he does not conceive eye to be mine ) [The same is asserted of all the other six groups of six]. SN.XXXV.31 gives same teaching. And, in SN.XXXV.90 (vol 4, pp ), as an explanation for free firom desire {anej^ and without a sting {vftasalla), the following sentence is given; Cakkhumnamanneyyacakkhumsimna manneyya cakkbutonamanneyyacakkbumeti namahneyya(do not conceive [oneself as] eye, do not conceive [oneself as] in eye, do not conceive [oneself apart] ^ m eye, do not conceive eye to be mine ) [The same is asserted of all the other six sixes]. Then, as a conclusion, it is said that: Sabbaihnamanneyya, sabbasmirhnamameyya, sabbato ne manneyya, sabbamme ti namanneyyd. ^ For instance, mama-y-idanti mannati (Sn.806); Yenayenahi mannanti, tatotarn hoti annatha(sa588), etc. RanamoU, TheMiddle LengthDiscourses of the Buddha, p. Il63n. 303

70 sakkayaditthithi. They distinguished the views on attafrom the views on things which belong to atta. These twenty kinds of personauty beuef, what is the behef on the self, and what is belief on the things which belong to the self? There are five kinds of behef on the self, that is, to regard the self as rupa[the same is asserted of the other khandhas]. There are fifteen kinds of belief on things which belong to the self, that is, to regard that the self has rupa, to regard that rupais in the self, and to regard that the self is in rupa[the same is asserted of the other khandhas].^ (2) The term 'tathagatd has been used in the Nikayas,^ and in some other places. It was discussed with regard to its relation to the khandhas. In SN.XXII.86 (vol.3, p. 116) and SN.XLIV.2, (vol.4, p.380), Anuradha holds wrong view concerning a state of the tathagataafter death. Anuradha s wrong view is; The tathagata&state after death can be described in the four ways, that is, the A-p i-ta-mo tap i-p o-sha-lun{abhidharma-mahavibhasi-sastra) <Taisho.vol.27, p.36a>. If I generahze what the statement means, it come into: A=B, A D B [A has B, B belongs to A A is in B]. Cf Jikido Takasaki, A Study of sabbedhammaanatta[sho houmugakoi^, p ^ The term tathagata, Literally means thus-gone,easily arouses one s interest to ask the conception of one who has thus gone. In the Buddhist texts, many epithets in extolling virtues of the Buddhas are used. Among them, the term tathagatdseems to be most controversial concept to be discussed about its substantiauty, which may be caused by a featiu*e of the word itself (See, D.J. Kalupahana, MulamadhyamakakarikaofNagaijuna, p. 302). S. Mori states: the term tathaoithe tathagatacan be understood as meaning awareness or a state of awareness (S. Mori, ibid. p.95). Uda.VI.4 (p. 67) mentions the ten unanswered questions and the word tathagataoccurring in them is explained by the commentary as 'atta{tatagato parammarana ti ettha tathagato ti atta. tarnhi dit^igatiko karaka-vedakadisankhataih nicca-dhuvadi-sankhltamva tathagata-bhavamgato ti, tathagato ti voharati (UdaA. p.340). 304

71 tathagataexists after death, does not exist after death, both does and does not exist after death, neither exists nor does not exist after death. And, in SN.XXIL85 (vol.4, p. 109), Yamaka holds the view: Arabatis cut off and perishes when his body breaks up, after death he is not. "* The Buddha denied such views held by Anuradha and Yamaka. While criticizing it is said that one should perceive each of the five khandhas as being anicca, dukkhaand anatt^ Then, the Buddha leads them to admit that the tathagatacan not be described in any of the following ways: ruparhtathagatoti samanupassati (to regard rupaas the tathagato). This is a view to regard tathagataas one of the khandhas. This way of reasoning is ruparh attato samanupassati, the first type of the four ontological relation or sakkayaditthi. [The same is asserted of the other khandhas.] vd rupasmimtathagatoti samanupassati (to regard the tathagataas being in rupa). This is a view to regard tathagataas being present in any of the five khandhas, in a same way of reasoning as rupasmimattanamsamanupassati, the forth type of the four ontological relation or sakkayaditthi. [The same is asserted of the other khandhas.] aimatrarupatathagatoti samanupassati (to regard the tathagataas being elsewhere than rupa). This is a view to hold the tathagataas apart from rupa, that is, the khandhas except rupa. [The same is asserted of the other khandhas.] ruparhvedanasannasankhara vimanamtathagatoti samanupassati (to 46 tathahambhagavatadhammamdesitamijanami, yathakhlnasavobhikkhukayassa 305

72 re g a rd the tathagata a s oirupa-vedani-sanna-sankhira-vinnana). T h is is a view to regard the tathagata as a ll the five kh a n d b a s together. ayaiii so arupi avedano asannl asankharo avinnano tathagata ti samanupassati (to regard the tathagata as being w ith o u t rupa, w ithout vedana, w ithout sansa, w ithout sankhara, and w ithout vinnana). T h is is a view to hold the tathagata as a p a rt fi*om a ll the khandhas.*' E t t h a ca te A nuradha ditthevadham m e saccato thetato tathagato anupalabbhiyam ano, kallaih nu te tarn veyyakaranarh. Yo so avuso tathagato u ttam ap u riso param apuriso p aram apattip atto tarn tathagato aim atra im e h i catu h i thanehi pam apayam ano pam apeti.... (And so, A n u ra d h a, w h en you ca n t pin down the tathagata as a tru th or re a lity even in the p resen t hfe, - is it pro p er for you to declare, F rie n d s, the tathagata, the best m an, the su p rem e m an, one who has attained the su p rem e goal, is described otherw ise th a n w ith these four positions: T h e tathagata exists after death, does not e x ist after death, both does and does not e x ist after death, n eith er exists nor does not exist after death?)^ [A nuradha rep ly s N o.] T h is method of the negation in four given w ays w as handed dow n to the philosophy of M a h a y a n a Buddhism {catuskoti method). In the ch ap ter tw enty- two o f the Mulamadhyamakakarika, the relatio n betw een the tathagata and the five k h a n d h a s is m entioned in the following five tst)es: bheda ucchijjati vinassati na hotiparam maranati (SN.X X II.8 5, vol.4, p.109). S N.X X Il, vol3, p.i l l ; SN.X X IL86, vol3, p.ll8 [ is omitted]; S N.X LIV.2. vol4, p ^ S N.X X IL8 6, vol.3, pp Cf. P. Harvey, ibid. pp ; H. N akam ura, Self and No-Self [Jiga to Mugd[, p

73 sk andha n a nanyah skandhebhyo nasm in sk an d h a n a tesu sah / tathagatah sk andha van na katam o tra tathagatah // (T h e tathagata is neith er the skandhas nor different from them. T h e skandhas are not in him, nor is he in the skandhas. H e is not possessed o f the skandhas. In su ch a context, w ho is a tathagatatf^ T h e se can be sum m arized into the following five relations: tathagata is the aggregates T h is is to see the tathagata as id en tical w ith the aggregates, (tattva- paksa) I) tathagata is different from the aggregates T h is is to see the tathagata as different from the aggregates, {anyatvapaksa) 3) aggregates are in tathagata T h is is to see the tathagata co n sists of the aggregates, {adhara-paksa) tathagata is in the aggregates T h is is to see the tathagata is located in the aggregates, {adheya-paksa) tathagatah is possessed of the aggregates T h is is to m ain tain that the tathagata p ossesses the aggregates, {tadvat- p a k s a f Madhyamakavrttih: Mulamadhyamakakarikas (Madhyamikasutras) de Nagaijuna, avec la Prasannapada Commentarie de Candrakirti, Publiee p ar Lo u is de la Vallee Poussin, Biblioteca Buddhica rv, p.4 3 2, Prasannapada, ed. by de la Vallee Poussin, p.439. H. N akam ura, Self a n d N o Self [Jiga to M u g a \, p

74 H ere, the purpose of the reasoning is to e x p lain the non existence o f e te rn a l in d ivid u al, su b sta n tia lity of the one. In e a rly B u d d h ism, th is type of negation aim ed a t show ing the subjective relatio n s betw een the s e lf an d the k h a n d h a s in order to cut off one s attachm ent to them. H owever, in A b h i d h a m m a lite ra tu re and M a h a y a n a Buddhism, we notice th a t the reaso n in g w as used to dem onstrate the non-existence of a perm anent in d ivid u a l or a su b sta n tia l existence. I t is the negation of objectively speculated existence {bhava). In early B u d d h ism, it w a s a relatio n betw een the se lf and the k h a n dhas. (subjective re la tio n s = epistem ology), but here it is a relatio n betw een the ete rn a l existence (w hich are objectively held = ontology) and the khandhas. T h e in d ivid u a l existence w h ich is objectively held is the sam e in m eaning w ith the notion of puggala. It is testified by w hat M vr 16-2 speaks: It m ay be assum ed th at a person {pudgala) transm ig rates. Yet, su ch a person, sought for in the fivefold w ay in the aggregates, spheres of sense and elem ents, does not exist. ^ T h e M a h a y a n a - sutralaihkara, ^ and the Yogacira-bhumi ^also m ention a thought reg ard ing the relatio n s betw een the skandhas and atman. Taisho. vol. 30, p.659b. The Yogacara-bhumialso mentions a sim ilar idea as to the skandhas and the atman. Mahayana-sutralamkara, X V III (pp ). The relations between the five skandhas and pudgala are discussed by using a sm ile of the fire and firewood. Yu-chia shih-ti-lun (Taisho. vol30, p.659 b). C H. N akam ura, F r o m Early Buddhism to Mahayana Buddhism [Genisi Bukkyo kara Daijyou Bukkyoii\, p

75 Section 3 Anatta in the prose of the N i k a y a s 5-3-ij Etym ology of the term anatta T h e term anatta is used in v a rio u s contexts in the prose p a rt of the Nikayas. A lm o st au exam ples are used as a predicate in nom inative case. In th a t case, the form anatta is alw ays used reg ard less of its gender and num ber, for exam ple, r u p a m [n.sg.] anatta, vedana [ sg.] anatta, sankhara [m.pl] anatta, sabbe d h a m m a [m.pl] anatta, y a m dukkharii tad [n.sg.] anatta. Therefore, it is not appropriate to understand the word anatta in question as a Z>aAuv77Ai'-compound m eaning one who does not have an atta, i.e. a n adjective.' Though oth er cases su ch as anattanaih [sg.acc.], anattana [sg.inbtr.], anattato [abl.], anattani [sg.loc.] are also used in the Nikayas, they are used, for the most part, not as an adjective" H. Sakurabe, S o m e Problems ofan-atman - Theory in Reference to the Pali Nikayas -, p.86. J.P. Ramon, regarding this point, states from the viewpoint of asserting to the real self: The practical consequence of this is important. W hat are affirm ed by means of the predicate anatta is not an abstract idea, but a concrete existing reality. Therefore, if I say that m aterial form is anatta, I do not m erely say that m aterial form exhibits the characteristic of non-selfhood, but that m aterial form is part of the totahty of things constituting the non-self {anatta), a totauty of things opposed and contradictory to the se lf {Self said N o n self in Early Buddhism, p. 195). S. CoUins says: In au cases where the gram m atical form of the term can be decided definitely it is used as a noun, placed in apposition to the subject of the sentence, and is to be translated HteraUy as a not-self; T h a t is, it is a substantive of the -an declension, nominative singular. In Sanskrit gram m atical terminology it is a karmadharaya rath er than compound {Selfless Persons, p. 95; 278). ^In a few cases, we find examples of adjectival usage. Fo r instance, SN.vol.3, p. 56, 114 reads anattam rupam anatta rupan ti yathabhutaih na pajanati (He does not understand the selfless body as it reedly is [thus], body is not self). Here, anattam should be understood as an adjective in the a declension. (C f S. Collins, Selfless Persons, p.278). J.P. Remon points out as to anatta in this passage: its translation 309

76 b ut as a noun. Then, it can be sa id th at alm ost a ll the usage of the term anatta w ith in the lim its of the prose p art of the Nikaya& m ean not-atta as a re la tiv e negation.^ T h e term niratta is found in the Suttanipata (787,858,919). T h e w ord niratta h a s two m eanings: [nis-attan, Skt. niratman] souuess, v iew of souu essness, unsu b santiality; 2) [past p articip le of nirassati, Skt. nirasta (nir v'^as)] rejected, throw n off, give up.^ In terp retatio n s differ as to the term niratta in the Suttanipata among not only the m odern sch o lars but also the com m entaries. Take Sn.919 for exam ple: A jjh a tta m eva upasam e, nafmato b h ik kh u sa n tim eseyya. ajjhattarh u p asan ta ssa na tth_i_attarii. kuto nirattam va. T h e translatio n s according to the two sets of m eaning are: are: no Self, no n o n -Self (Lo rd Chalmers) ; there is not se lf and n o t-self' (K. M izuno); there is now here a se lf can be found, w here, th e n could a n on-self be found (H. should not be not possessing a se lf, but w hich are non-self. T h is m eans to say that this adjective should be taken as an attributive adjective, not as a possessive compound (J.P. Remon, ibid. p.358). ^ Com m entaries to the Nikayaa state that anatta has both the m eaning oi not-atta {sayam va na atta ti) and the meaning of no-atta {n atthi etesam atta). Chinese A g a m a s also translated it in both ways, not-self {hi-ga) and no-self {mu-ga) depending on the contexts. ^P T S D. p. 369; PBD. p ^ Th e other two examples read as follows: Upayo hi d h a m m e s u upeti vadam, anupayara kena kathaih vadeyya. Attam nirattam na hi tassa atthi, adhosi so dittbim idh eva sabbaiii.{^n.lsd)\ N a tassaputta pasavo khettaiti vatthim ca vijjati, attam va pi nirattam va na tasmiih upalabbhati (Sn.856). Lord Chalm ers, B u d d h a s Teaching, p.220. He translates the words in Sn.787 and Sn.858 as no yesor no has he for views on S e lf (p.205), naught asserts and naught denies (p. 189) respectively. ^Kogen Mizuno, The Nanden Daizo Kyo, vol

77 Saddhatissa). A nd the translatio n s adopting the m eaning o f are: there is nothing grasped or rejected (F. Fausboll); there is nothing grasped, so how rejected? (H. N akam ura). Th e Mahaniddesa com m ents on the p hrase 'natthi atta kuto niratta va as follows: natthi m eans negation, atta m eans there is no sp eculatio n on th e se lf, niratta m ean s there is no doctrine of the an n ih ilatio n of se lf, atta m eans there is no grasped, and niratta m eans there is nothing to be rejected." The Paramatthajotika comments, as follows (the com m ent on the p h rase atta niratta n a hi tassa atthi in Sn.787): Indeed, for him, there is no sp eculatio n on the se lf and speculation of the an n ih ilatio n of self, there is no obstruction, th e re is no release, a n d there is no obstruction-release either. - H ere, it is possible to in terp ret the term s atta and niratta 3iS s e lf arid no- s e lf depending on the statem ent by the com m entators. H o w ever w e should notice the explanation of nothing grasped {gahitaiii natthi ) and nothing to be rejected {muncitabbam natthi) given by the commentary. In addition, w h a t h as to be noticed is the statem ent in S n.l0 9 8, uggahitam nirattaih va m a te vijjittha kihcanaiii w h ich should be translated as let there not be an yth in g e ith e r grasped after or rejected by. In th is context, it is inappropriate to u n d e rstan d the w ord * H. Saddhatissa, The Sutta-Nipata, Cu rzon Press, 1998, p S B E. vollo, Part II, p H e gives the same translation for Sn.787. Translation for Sn.858 is nothing grasped or rejected is to be found (p. 158). H. N akam ura, The Suttanipata (Iwanami), p.200. [English translation is mine]. He comments on this verse as fouows: the word attass used in the neuter gender in Sn.787, so it may be understood that this case in Sn.919 is the p lu ral form of the neuter gender (as usage in Rig- Veda). Though the verb atthi is in the sin g u lar here, it is possible to be used in singular for the subject in the plural of the neuter gender, (p. 400). natthjti patikkhepo. attati attaditthi natthi; nirattati ucchedaditthi natthi. attati gahitaiii natthi; nirattatimuncitabbam natthi (^Al. p.352. C N d l. p.82 and 248). tassa hi attaditthi va ucchedaditthi va natthi, gahanaih m u n c a n a m vapi attanirattasannitam natthi(pi.vol2, p.523). 311

78 nirattaiii in th is sentence as the m ean in g of no se lf. T h e Paramatthajotika com m ents th is sentence a s niratta m ea n s to be thrown off or to be rejected {nirattam va ti nirasitabbam va, muncitabban ti vuttaih hoti)}^ V iew ed in th is light, it is better that we understand the term 'niratta in the Suttanipata as m eaning rejected. In the fouowing sections, I sh a ll exam in e the texts w h ich teach not-self doctrine by using the word anatta. O ne of the notable featu res o f anatta doctrine in the prose p art of the Nikayas is being taught in a relatio n to anicca and dukkha, th at is, it is taught in the course of logical reasoning: som ething is anicca, w hat is anicca is dukkha, w h at is d u k k h a is anatta. Before tu rn in g to a closer exam inatio n of the usages of anatta given w ith relatio n to anicca and dukkha, a few rem arks should be m ade concerning a basic p atte rn of the usag e of the w ord anatta T h e basic model of anatta teachin g T h e sim plest form of the exam ples teaching anatta doctrine w ith reg a rd to the five khandhas is a s follows: Rupam b hikkh ave anatta, vedana anatta, seinna anatta, sankhara anatta, vim anam anatta. (Bhikkhus, rupa is not-self, vedana is not-self, sanna is not- Pj. p See, H. Nakam ura, The Suttanipata {Iwanami), p Lord C h alm ers translates here as le t naught find lodgment, naught require to be expelled {Buddha s Teaching, p.261). Though we can not read a logical relation out of the sentences mentioned below, it w ill be clear that the compilers of the Nikayas seem to adm it a certain relation among anicca, dukkha, and anatta, judging firom the fact that the teaching on anicca and dukkha are given in the same section in w hich anatta is referred 312

79 self, sankharais not-self, vinnana is not-selo.^ T h e thing s that are taught to be seen as anatta are illu stra te d, b esid es the five khandhas, by such concepts a s the tw elve sense fields {cha ajjhattika- ayatanas and cha bahira-ayatanas), the eighteen elem ents of existence {atthadasa dhatus), the six groups of six (cha-chakka), sabbe d h a m m a, etc. In som e places in the Nikayas, the bhikkhus are exhorted to perceive the thing s as anatta by- more a n a ly tica l w ay of recognition. R upam b h ikkh ave anatta, yo p i hetu yo p i paccayo ru p assa uppadaya so pi anatta, anattasam bhutam b h ikkh ave ruparii kuto atta b h a vissa ti. {Bhikkhus, rupa is not self, the conditioning factors, the cau sative factors th at b ring forth th is rupa are also not self. Bhikkhus, how could rupa th a t is conditioned and cau sed by the factors that are them selves not se lf be self?) [The sam e is repeated of au the other khandhas. R upam b hikkh ave anatta atitanagatam, ko p an a vado paccuppannassa. E v a m p assa m bhikkh ave sutava ariyasavako atitasm irii. ru pasam im an apekkho hoti. anagatarh rupaiii nabhinandati, p accu p p annassa ru passa nibbidaya viragaya nirodhaya patipanno hoti. {Bhikkhus, rupa in the p ast w as not s e lf it w iu be not se lf in the future. A nd th at it is so in the present h a rd ly needs sajdng. P erceivin g in this way, bhikkhus, a w ell-inform ed ariya disciple is indifferent S N.X X II. 14 (vol.3, p. 21). in the sam e manner. Before this statement, anicca and dukkha are explained S N.X X II.2 0 (vol3, p.24). S N.X X X V (vol.4, pp ) gives the sam e teaching w ith regard to the six in tern al sense fields {ajjhattika-ayatana), and S N.X X X V (vol.4, pp ) w ith regard to the six external sense fields {bahira- 313

80 to the p ast rupa, does not delight in the future rupa and he a tta in s to d isg u st w ith the present rupa\ he a tta in s the freedom from attach m e n t to it a n d its cessatio n.) [The sam e is repeated o f a ll the other khandhas.^^ T h e point of this doctrine is th a t one should perceive an d know, as re a lly it is, thing s th a t are not atta as thing s th a t are not atta. B u t the o rd in a ry person u su a lly w rongly regards things th a t are not atta as th in g s th a t are atta, an d clings to them firmly. A nattam rupam Anattarh rupan ti yathabhutam na pajanati... (He does not know, fundam entally and truly, 'rupa w h ich is not s e lf a s 'rupa w h ich is not se lf.) [The sam e is repeated of a ll the other khandhas.]^^ H e tak es rupa as h is atta, clin g s to it and beheves firm ly th at it is h is atti {so r u p a m upeti upadiyati adhitthati atta m e ti) [The sam e is repeated o f a ll the other khandhas]. Then, it is said th a t these five khandhas w h ich are the objects of chnging, w hen thus taken and clung to [as att^, lead h im to m isfortune and su fie rin g for a long time. Th en, the text rep eated ly tea ch es to get rid of su ch ayatand). S N.X X H.il (vol3.p.20). The followings are some other suttas teaching anatta in this way. SN.XXXV.9 (vol4, p.4); C a k k h u m bhikkhave anatta atitanagatam, k o p a n a vado paccuppannassa. E v a m p a s s a m bhikkhave sutva ariyasavako atftasmiih cakkhusmim anapekho hoti, anagatam c a k k h u m nabhinandati, paccuppannassa cakkhussa nibbidaya viragaya nirodhaya patipanno hoti. (Eyes of the past and future are not-self, what then shau we say of the present eyes? T h u s discerning, bhikkhus, a w ell informed ariyan disciple is indifferent regarding the eyes of the past, does not dehght in future eyes, and has attained to disgust, dispassion, cessation, as regards the present eyes.) [The sam e reasoning apphed to a ll the other six in tern al sense fields {ajjhattika-ayatana). In S N.X X X V IO (vol4, p.6), the sam e reasoning applied to the six external sense fields {bahira-ayatan^l S N.X X II.8 5 (vol.3, p. 114). 314

81 clin g in g to the things w hich are not atta. Rupam b h ikkh ave anatta, ta tra vo chando pahatabbo. rago pahatabbo. chandarago pahatabbho. (Rupa is non s e lf and you should get rid o f d e sire for that, you should get rid of attach m en t to that, you sh o uld get rid o f strong attach m en t to that.) [The sam e is repeated of au the o ther khandhas.y^ Y o kho Radha anatta, tatra te chando pahatabbo. (Radha, you should get rid of desire for w h at is n o t-self) [ H ere, the six groups of six are sa id to be anatta.]^ O ne w ho regards things as not-self, getting rid of clinging and a tta ch m e n t to them, clearly understands w h a t rupa is, is lib erated from rupa [The sam e is repeated of a ll the other khandhas], is lib erated from birth, aging, d eath, grief, lam entatio n, pain, distress, and despair."* To know and p ractice the te a c h in g of SN.X X II (vol.3, p. 179). SN.X X X V.78 (vol.4, p. 49). The followings are other suttas w hich teach to get rid of clinging or attachment to the things w hich are anatta. (1) SN.X X X V.163 (vol.4, pp ), Yo kho Kotthika anatta tatra te chando pahatabbo. (For w hatever is not-selt Kotthika, you must get rid of desire.) [The six groups of six are given to be explained for anatt^\ (2) SN.X X X V.169 (vol.4, p. 150), Yo bhikkhave anatta tatra vo chando pahatabbo, rago pahatabbo, chandarago pahatabbo. (For w hatever is not-self, bhikkhm, you must get rid of desire, you m ust get rid of attachment, you m ust get rid of strong attachment.)[the sam e is apphed to each of the six in tern al sense fields]; (3) SN.XXXV.172 (vol.4, p. 151), Yo bhikkhave anatta tatra vo chando pahatabbo, rago pahatabbo, chandarago pahatabbo (For w hatever is not-self, bhikkhus, you must get rid of desire, you m ust get rid of attachment, you m ust get rid of strong attachment.) [And the sam e explanation is give to each of the six external sense fields. SN.XXXV.175, E a c h of the six external sense fields in relation to past, future and present is expleuned as not-self; SN.XXXV.178, E a c h of the six internal sense fields in relation to past, future and present are explained as not-selq. S N.X X IL1 4 8 (vol.3, p. 180). Here, it is said that a worthy m an who joins the order should strive to practice according to the following way: First, he should repeatedly contemplate m aterial form as not-self {yam rupe anattanupassi vihareyya). [The sam e is repeated of au the other khandhas]. 315

82 anatta is sa id to be p ath suitable for nibbinsi {nibbanasappiya patipadi) '^ It is also sa id to m ean to get rid of view o f one s s e lf i^attanuditthi pahiyati),^ to get to rem o va l o f fetter {samyojana samugghatam gacchanti)}^ Anatta and its relatio n to the fo rm ulas In the previous sections, we h ave observed the not-seif doctrine w h ich is represented by the se veral ways, viz., by negative p h rases of the w ords a h a m and m a m a, the form ula of the three negative p h rases, and the form ula of four w a y s of ontological negation. In th is section, we are going to study the not-self doctrine presented by the term anatta. D enoting in the broad sense of the word, w e m ay enum erate these expressions in the follow ing way, takin g riipa for exam ple. [It is sa id to see so for No. 1-3, not to see so for No.4-8], 1, n'et a m m a m a 2, n eso a h a m asmi 3, na m eso atta 4, r u p a m attato 5, rupavantam attanarh 6, attani rupaiii 7, rupasmim attanaih SN.X X X V.148 (vol.4, pp ). ^ SN.X X X V.166 (vol.4, p. 148). C a k k h u m kho bhikkhu anattato jinatopassato.... SN.XXXV.55 (vol4, pp ). C a k k h u m k h o bhikkhu anattato janato passato samyojana samugghatam gacchanti. (The sam e is repeated of a ll the other six groups of six {cha-chakkd)\. In S N.X X X V 5 6 (vol. 4, pp ), the sam e explanation is give as to 'asavi samugghataid and SN.X X X V.56 (vol.4, pp ), as to 'anusaya samugghatani. 316

83 8, rupaih anatta T h e aim of the teaching represented by the w ord anatta is b a sic a lly the sam e w ith w h at the form ula of three negative p h rase s try to convey. T h e eq u ality of the form ula w ith the teach in g o f anatta can be supported by the statem en t y a d anatta tarn n e t a m m a m a n eso a h a m a s m i na m eso atta repeatedly appearing m the Nikayas as a form ulaic p a s s a g e.a s for anoth e r form ula, the four w ays of ontological negation, though they are view ed from a different angle, putting stress more on ontological and psychological w a y of thinking," it can be said that they are also taught for the sam e purpose w ith the teaching given by the word anatta, ju d g in g from the context. However, we notice that the term anatta seem s to have ce rtain p e cu lia r m eanings w h ich the form ulas of the three or four do not possess. WTien we observe carefu lly some distinctive contexts in w hich the doctrine o f anatta is expanded, we surm ise th at the new m eanings would be added to the o rig in al sense of not-self doctrine under the process of doctrinal developm ent. It m ay J.P. Remon states: We find in this connection a series of texts that yield the following statement of equahty, viz. anatta = n etaiii m a m a, n eso h a m asmi, na m e so atta {Self and N o n self in Early Buddhism, p. 197). Fu rth er he states that w hether the anatta doctrine is taught by denial of positive term s [by three negative phrases or the four ontological negative phrases], or by the predication of the negative term anatta, the meaning is su b stantially the same (J.P. Remon, ibid. p. 198). O n this point, see also, J. Im anishi, The Concept of A t m a n in the Anatmanvada, N o.l, p.49. Compared with the three negative phrases w hich m aintain close ties w ith anatta, the four ontological negative phrases m ay have httle to do w ith the word anatta. S. Mori, concerning the difference between the two formulas, states that the four ontologiced negative phrases [the tw enty kinds of personahty-behef] represent the meaning of not-self when it was seen from the outside, but it is not directly linked w ith the sem antic content of the term (S. Mori, A study of Buddhist Doctrines from Early Buddhism to A b h i d h a m m a Buddhism, ibid. p. 377). However, here I treat the two formulas as the not-self teaching of E a rly Buddhism in the wide sense of the word, w hich seem to be better when we observe the development and change of the not-self teaching, into w hich much influence of kindred idea or concepts have flowed 317

84 sa fe ly be assum ed that the word anatta h a s acq uired new in terp re tatio n s, b ecause of a dem and for showing the reason w h y everyth in g is anatta, b ecause o f the necessity of m aking an explanation for the relatio n betw een anatta and h e re tic view s, and because of psychological a n a ly sis or ontological sp ecu latio n given to the term anattahy the w ork of com pilers of the Nikayas. In the following sections, 1 s h a ll exam in e some ch a ra cteristics o f n ot-self doctrine presented by the word anatta in the prose p art of the Nikayas j Anatta taught in relation to anicca an d d u k k h a T h e teaching of a n a. ^ is often p resented w ith a close relatio n to anicca an d (1) dukkha. F ro m the fact that we ca n find the p hrases, in the Nikayas, w h ich teach sep a ra te ly each of m arks, anicca, d u k k h a and anatta, we can sa y th a t the teaching given in a form of anicca-dukkha-anatt^' had been form ed in the process of com piling the Nikayas. It should be confirm ed that, historically, the anatta doctrine itse lf did not have its origin in both the anicca and the dukkha. T h e y are orig in ally independent topics. A firm relatio n am ong them w a s the fru it of m any years of the groping process w ith logical pigeonholing by the com piler of the Nikayas."^ As to the relatio n am ong these three m arks, M a n g a la at the time of the Buddha. I w ill use an expression anicca-dukkha-anatta when the three m arks are taught w ith a close relation one another in any forms. Fo r example, the m aterial form is anicca, m aterial form which is anicca is dukkha, m aterial form w hich is dukkha is anatta. ^ In the verses of the Nikayas, we can find some examples of teaching on anicca, dukkha and anatta arranged in a Hne without a logical relation. Also in the oldest parts of the prose, those three m arks {anicca, dukkha, anatts) were taught w ithout 318

85 R. C h in ch o re states: T h e y are independent not o nly w ith reg ard to th e ir g en esis b u t also functions they perform in B u d d h ist philosophy. None o f th e m is a d e rivative from the other. "' M oreover, she goes on to sa y a s follows co n cern in g a process of the development of this teaching. M a jo r B u d d h ist scholarship is given to the in vestig atio n into the th ree p illa rs of B u d d h ism and articulation of appro priate mode o f interconnection o f th em together w ith explanation of ch a ra c te ristic conception of em an cipatio n viz. Nirvana in the light of refined in terp retatio n o f B u d d h a s teaching a n d its relevance in the altered circum stan ces in w h ich the concerned sch o la rs hved together w ith the issu e s such circu m stan ces th rew up.^30 H ow ever, once the three m a rk s w ere taught in a close relation, it is obvious connection one another. But when the sam eness of the purport in those three m arks received much attention, they had been understood in the relation of logical basis, aim ing at the teaching of anatta (H. N akam ura, Self a n d Non-Self \Jigato pp ). [When the three m arks came to be given in a farm of logical relation,] the statements which em phasized the original m eaning of anatta itse lf might go out of sight. And the relation among these three teaching cam e to be explained w ith being more firm ly connected because of the attitude to value strongly consistency of teachings in the Nikayas (M. Saigusa, ibid. vol. 2, pp ); O n this point, see also Teturo Watuji, Practical Philosophy in Early Buddh i s m [Genshi Bukkyo no Jissen tetugakii\, p ^ M angala R. Chinchore, Anatta/Anatmata: A n Analysis of Buddhist Anti- Substantialist Crusade, p. 48. Then, she explains the functions of each p illar, for anatta, she says, Anatmata functions as a critique of substantialist continuity and operates as a crusade against substantialism of any form whatsoever. A t the sam e time it also wants to assure the concerned that loss of the perpetual need not speu the doom of the effacement of the possibdity of continuity, growth and development of knowledge or annihilation of the possibility of m oral progress (ibid. p.49). ^ M angala, R. Chinchore, p-44. However, she adm its com plem entary nature of them, stating Although the three p illars are independent and irreducible to each other, they are complementary to each other (ibid. p.49) In the consideration of the nature and significance of each of the three pillars and appropriate mode of interrelation among them, she points out the four m ajor aspects: U n iv e rsa lity of conception, U niversahty of application, U niversah ty in explanation and/or justification, and U niform ity of distinction (ibid. pp.44-48). 319

86 from the sentence that anicca and d u k k h a p layed a n im p o rtant role o f lo g ical b asis for sta tin g anatta. W hen su ch a logical relatio n w a s settled, it is quite possible th at the new ch aracteristic w ere in stille d into the w ord 'anatta, b ecause it w ould be necessary for the com pilers to try to m ake th ree m a rk s co n sisten t lo g ically w ith one another I f so, w e s h a ll find here one o f the reason w h y the not-self doctrine has changed. Now, let u s see one of the exam ples o f anatta taught w ith logical relation to anicca an d dukkha. R upam b h ikkh ave aniccam, y a d aniccam tarii dukkharii, yam dukkharii tad anatta, yad anatta tarn netam m am a nesa h am a sm i n a m e so attati. E v a m etarh yathabhutam sam m appaiinaya datthabbarii. {Rupa is im p erm an en t, rijpa w h ich is im perm anent is dukkha, rupa w h ich is d u k k h a is anatt^ rupa w h ich is anatta is: T h is is not m ine. T h is is not I, T h is is not m y s e lf Should be th u s perceived, w ith in sig h t w isdom, as it re a lly is.)^* T h e teachings of anicca, d u k k h a an d anatta are u su a lly called the th ree ch a ra cte ristics of existence (ti-lakkhana)^^^ but th is term did not take a firm hold in the N ik a y a n Uterature. It is p ointed out th a t the w ords patipuccha vinita ^ S N.X X IL5 4, vol.3, pp etc. N yanatiloka, Buddhist Dictionary, pp Later, the word the seals o f the law {dharma-mudra or dharma-uddana in Skt^ was used to denote: all things are aniccd, a ll things are anatti, all things are dukkha, and nirvana is tranq uil as a name of the Four Seals of the L a w. W hen Three Seals of the Law are used, the statem ent a ll things are dujddid is om itted (Kogen Mizuno, Essentials of Buddhism, pp ). C f S. Mori, ibid. p.336. In M N.109. the Mahapunnama-sutta (volb, pp ), the Buddha says: Now, bhikkhus, you have been trained by me through interrogation on veirious occasions in regard to various things? [PTS. edition reads paticca viniti, but the sam e sutta appeared in S N (vol.3, p. 104) reads patipuccha vinita and also in a S h a m e s e M S. Here, I take the latter for my translation.] Then, the Buddha explained the teaching on anicca-dukkha-anatta regarding the five khandhaa. Cf. M N.146, Mandakovada-sutta (Vol.3, pp ). 320

87 a n d patipuccba katha (talk in the form o f question)^ seem to be used to denote the teach in g of anicca-dukkba-anatti In the Jatakas, the Visuddbimagga, etc. the w o rd tilakkhana is found.^ (2) S h o ji M o ri, in h is book entitled A St u d y of Buddhist Doctrines from Early B u d d h i s m to A b h i d h a m m a Buddhism, observed the question of anicca-dukkha- anattan teaching w ith m inute investig atio n of the texts collected from the Nikayas and the C h in ese Agamas. B a se d upon the a n a ly sis of the collected texts, he tried to clarify how the anicca-dukkba-anattan doctrine h a s developed in E a r ly B uddhism. F o r the present, it m ay be u sefu l to look more clo sely at som e of the im portant points concerning the developm ent of anicca-dukkba- anattan doctrine depending on h is survey. (1) M o ri points out the following stages of developm ent in E a r ly B u d d h ism concerning anicca-dukkba-anattan doctrine, view ed io the lig h t of the sty le in w h ich the three m arks w ere taught. H is classificatio n, from the old to the new, is as follows: the sentence in w h ich anicca-dukkba-anattan is ta u g h t in the sentence of explanation (not in dialogue) w ith logical reasoning: anicca-^ (that is) dukkha-^ (th a t is) anattan in rela ted the sentence given in a style of anicca, dukkha, anattan in juxtaposition. ^ M N.146, Mandakovida-sutta (vol.3, pp.271). pp ^ Ja. vol.1, p. 48; See, Shoji Mori, ibid. O n this point, see, S. M ori, ibid. 321

88 the sentence given in a sty le o f anicca, dukkha, sunna, anattan in ju xtap osition. the sentence in a style of the F o u r S e a ls o f the L a w or the T h re e S e a ls o f the Law. T h e m ain reasons for this chronology can be sum m ed up as follow s: T h e suttab teaching anicca-dukkha-anattan in a style of dialogue have m o stly th e ir corresponding texts in the C h in ese Ag a mas. T h e n the next is the texts teach in g by the type of anicca-^ (that is) du k kha-^ (th at is) anatta in related se rie s, an d few o f the suttab w ith a tj^je of anicca, dukkha, anattan in ju xtap o sitio n have th e ir corresponding C h inese A g a m a s. ^ T h e teaching on the four ch a ra c te ristics 'anicca, dukkha, sunna, anatta can be sa id to be late in com pilation, because the term s u M a is added la te r to the anicca-dukkba-anatta by the N o rth ern B u d d h ists. T h a t the w ord anatta cam e to be used as a technical term in d ica tes the fact th at the doctrine of n o t-self had ta k e n a firm fold in early B uddhism. A n d the w ord anatta can not be found in the teaching of anicca-dukkha-anattan in the style of dialogue, but o n ly in the style of related series and in the type of juxtaposition. F ro m th is point, one m ay say th a t the teaching in the style o f dialogue is older than th at of re la te d series. (2) G ram m atically, this teaching rep re sen ts th a t som ething (the subject) is predicated by the words anicca-dukkha-anatta (the predicate). S. M o ri e x a m in e s the development of the anicca-dukkha-anatta doctrine, v iew ed in the ^ It is disputable that there are three verses in Dhp Q (the three m arks are given in juxtaposition form) which have been regarded late in origin because they are w ritten in a form of verses (S. Mori, ibid. p. 333). 322

89 lig h t o f w h a t subject is used in the sentence of anicca-dukkha-anatta doctrine. T h e follow ing is a chronological order d e p e n d ii^ on the observation o f w o rd s o f the subject. T h e five khandhas (the five upadanakkhandhas) T h e tw elve sense fields and the six groups o f six. sabbe sankhara sabbe sankhara (for anicca and dukkha), sabbe d h a m m a (for anatt3) T h e greatest num bers of the suttas in the Nikayas w h ich h a v e th e ir corresponding texts in the C h in ese A g a m a s refer the five khandhas. T h e greatest n um ber of the suttas teach in g anicca-dukkha-anatta in a sty le of dialogue refer to the five khandhas. T h e w ord sabbe is not used in a sty le of dialogue and in related series, used o nly in a style of juxtaposition. A cco rd in g to the teaching method in E a r ly B u d dhism, the B u d d h a explained his teach in g and exhorted to practice by show ing an a ctu a l exam ple concretely, not by w a y of abstract explanation. The actual th ing s w ere explained gen erally by the w ord five khandhas, later they were more a b stractly term ed as sabbe sankhara or sabbe dhamma. (3) E x a m in in g both the aspects the style and the subject he concludes the follow ing points concerning the developm ent of the teaching. S. Mori, ibid. p It is rare that word panca-khandha itself is used in the sentence. E a c h of the khandhas is individ ually taken up to explain anicca, dukkha and anatta. 323

90 T h e doctrine of anicca-dukkha-anatta taught in re la tio n to one anoth er began to be formed in the statem ent in a style of dialogue w ith reg ard to the five khandhas,, and its final stage o f the developm ent is th a t of ju xtap o sitio n w ith regard to "sahhe {sankbara / d b a m m a ). T h e n a statem ent about 'simna w as added to the 'anicca-dukkha-anatta w ith the rise of the N orthern B u d d h ism, on the other hand, the sentence Nirvana m e a n i n g eternally tranquil w a s added to anicca-dukkha-anatta doctrine, and to a ll th is the n am e of the F o u r S e a ls of the L a w {dharma- m u d r a or dharma-uddana) w as given. T h e p hrase a ll things are su fferin g w as om itted fi-om the F o u r S e a ls o f the Law. T h e n the three m arks rem ain ed w ere called as T h re e S e a ls o f the L a w. A t th is tim e, sabbe sankbara used as a subject for anicca and sabbe d h a m m a is u sed for differently. (4) H e fu rth e r stated as to w hat anicca-dukkha-anatta doctrine tried to teach. T h e doctrine of anicca-dukkha-anatta w as not given w ith the in tentio n of form ing a u n iversal proposition. T h is doctrine is not m eant to a n sw e r the m etap h ysical question such as D oes a t m a n e x T h e m ost typical things (subject o f the statem ent on th is doctrine) w h ich are predicated w ith anicca-dukkha-anatta are the five khandha9. (or upadanakhandha^. A n d the five khandhas fall u n d e r the category of samskrta and sasava, p lain ly speaking, w h ich m ean the o rd in ary person (puthujjana) who is ruled by w o rld ly passion. It can be sa id th a t anicca- dukkha-anatta describes the situ a tio n o f the o rd in ary persons. 324

91 @ Ju d g in g firom that, the B u d d h a and A r a h a t come to be excluded firam the category of anicca-dukkha-anatta, though texts do not m ention about w h eth er th e y are 'anicca-dukkha-anatta o r not. (B u t it ca n not be sa id e ith e r th a t the B u d d h a and Arahat are nicca, s u k h a and attaicom th is state m ent.)^ Anicca, d u k k h a and anatta a.ie equal, no one being m ore im p ortant to th a n other. Therefore, it is im possible to ad m it an y difference of valu e am ong the three.^ W hen dukk h a is the w oeful condition of the m an w h ich is to be solved (negative in value, disadvantage), th e n anicca an d anatta are also the w oeful situ atio n s to be solved. (5) W h a t the word anatta va.ea.ns, in the p h rase of anicca-dukkha-anatta^ M a k in g introductory rem ark th a t it is o n ly conjectural because we ca n not find an y exphcit explanation by the Nikayas, he explains the m eaning of the w ord anatta in the phrase as fouows: O u r five groups of clinging {upadanakkhandhas), in w hich the defilem ents are im m anent, are not free and w ithout our control concerning birth, aging, ill, and death. Anatta m eans w ithout perfect fi^edom, w ithout com plete control or not being w illfu lly. T h e n atta in the w ord an-atta comes to m ean w ith freedom, w ith o u r control. ^ S. Mori, ibid. p.353. We should also note the following statem ent by him, however, it seems th at there is a slight gap between anicca-dhkkha and anatta (S. Mori, inid. p.b358). He also states: It is impossible to understand the teaching of anicca-dukkhaanatta as meaning that: 'dukkha arises because one clings to the objects w hich are anicca and anatta w ith desire for their nature of perm anent and eternal. A nd furthermore, he states that it is not appropriate to understand that dukkha has a negative value to be avoided and anatta has a positive value to be searched for (Mori, ibid. p.356) S. Mori, ibib. p

92 (3) L e t us now retu rn to our ob servatio n w h a t 'anicca-dukkba-anatta te a ch in g m eans, and w h at kind of new ch a ra cte ristic m ig ht be added to the w ord anatta ow ing to the relevancy to anicca an d dukkhsp. W hen the expression is fixed a s ' R u p a m aniccam, y a d anicaii taih d u k k h a m, y a m d u k k h a m tad anatta, it is appro priate to in terp ret th at anatta is reasoned by the n a tu re o f anicca and dukkha, an d th at the triad cam e to rep re sen t b a sica lly the sam e purport in its value system, viz., anicca = d u k k h a = anatta^^ T h en, w h at the word anatta m eans in the context expressed in th is m a n n e r? W h en we compare the two typ es of the statem ent on the not-self, viz., the teaching of anatta taught in relatio n to anicca and d u k k h a and the teach in g of anatta taught separately w ithout a n y relatio n to anicca and d u k k h a, it ca n be sa id th a t th e ir purpose of the teach in g s seem to be the sam e. B e ca u se the reason w h y one should perceive e v e ry th ing a s not-self and the consequence of one s perceiving in that w ay are b a sica lly the sam e in both typ es o f the explanation. Both the cases em p h asize to perceive the khandhap. etc. a s the re a lly are, and to get rid of the attach m e n t to them. O n the other hand, w hen w e in te rp re t the m eaning of anatta ta k in g account of the logical reasoning o f 'anicca > dukkha-^ anatta, it is possible to read a developed nature of the w ord anatta. T h a t is, if w h at is im p erm an e n t is T h is means that if amcca and dukkha have the nature to be avoided for the bhikkhus by their practice (a disadvantage in negative value), anatta also should be understood as nature to be avoided, not as nature to be searched for (an advantage in positive value). It is obvious that dukkha is expressed in the Nikayaa as n atiu e to be avoided, so anicca and anatta also should be understood in that m anner (S. Mori, ibid. pp ). L y n n.a De Silva, commenting on anattis relation to anicca and dukkha, states: The three go together and one can be understood only in relation to the other two ; there can be no conflict between the law of im perm anent (anicca) and the im perm anent self (anatta) because they are seem to be identical (The Problem of the Self in Buddhism and Christianity, p. 36). 326

93 suffering, an d i f w h at is im p erm anent an d su fferin g is anatta (anicca = d u k k h a anatta), w h a t is im perm anent and su fferin g ca n not be atta. T h en, atta sh o u ld be p erm an e n t and bliss. However, w e have to note th a t the B u d d h a d id not m ention about the nature of atta, fu rth e r b u t stric tly refu sed to s a y a n 5rthing fu rth e r about the atta. So it is not propre to reach a conclusion b y o u r sp eculatio n th a t the term atta p resu m ed the n a tu re of p erm anence an d b liss in e a rly B u d d h ism. W hat we should keep in m ind is th a t su ch a logical sp eculatio n is a straightforw ard consequence if w e pay atten tio n o nly to the sentence, and th at there might be som e p o ssib ility of atta being in terp reted and discu ssed as im plying to m ean a p erm an e n t and b h ssfu l by the people in e a rly B u d d h ism a p a rt from w hat the B u d d h a in ten d ed to m ean. Som eone m ay try to draw a stra ig h tfo rw a rd conclusion from the sta te m e n t of amcca-dukkha-anatta m entioned above, th a t w h a tever is im p erm an e n t, m utable by n atu re and painful is not m y sel^ therefore the se lf is so m ethin g perm anent, im m utable by nature an d h ap p y, and further, the teach in g of amcca-dukkha-anatta w as given by the B u d d h a presupposing the p o sitive knowledge o f the perm anent, happy, and the S e lf. N everth eless, th e se w ill re m a in only the inferential speculations w ith o u t any expucit sources to su p port its v alid ity. B ecause a statem ent logically v a h d does not a lw ays m ean th a t it is true. W e have to pay attention to w h a t the B u d d h a intended to convey, in th is p art o f the Nikayas, to the b h i k k h m w ho w ere listen in g to his d isco u rse on anicca-dukkba-anatta. D id he w an t them to d raw th eir ow n logical co n clu sio n from h is explanation of the Th ree great ch a ra c te iistic s {tilakkhaaani)? 327

94 (4) In the Nikayas, it is frequently stre sse d not to see w h a t is anicca a s aiccca, w h a t is d u k k h a as sukha, w hat is anatta as atta. T h a t is, it teaches to re a lize the th ing s as they really are, i.e. w h a t is anicca as anicca, w h a t is d u k k h a as dukkha, w h a t is anatta as anatta. T h e n, is it tru e to sa y th a t the d ia m e trica lly opposite n atu re of anicca-dukkha-anatta is th at of nicca-sukha-atta in the teach in g of e a rly Buddhism? Th e B u d d h a som etim es m entions th a t the sta te of nibbana is perm anent and happy, describ in g h is ow n experience of aw aren e ss, but he never explain it by using the concept of atta, or p erm an en t S e lf In a fam ous verse, the extinctio n o f the com pounded thing s w h ic h are im p erm an e n t is explained as bliss {sukha). A nicca v a ta sankhara, uppada-vaya-dham m ino, uppajjitva n iru jjh a n ti, tesarii vupasam o^ sukho. (Im perm anent a re com pounded things, prone to rise and fau. H a vin g risen, they are destroyed, th e ir cessation is tru e st b h ss.)^ In the Patisambhidamagga, a n e a rly in terp re tative text, the forty typ es of q u a lities are given^ concerning n atu re of people (the n ature of the o rd in a ry m an). ^ T h is means their allying or their suppression. asankhatam nibbanam. Com m entary explains this as ^ D N.16 Mahaparinibbana Sutta, (vol2, p.. 157). Frequently quoted verse. Also in D N.17 Mahasudassana Sutta (vol.2, p.l99); S N.V I.1 5 (voll, p.l58); S N.X V I.2 0 (vol.2, p.193); Therag.1159 etc. C S N.I.ll( v o l.l, p.6). ' The forty quahties and their opposite ones are listed as follows. In the sutta, after giving each of the forty qualities, they are classified into three groups viz. aiccnupassana, dukkhanupassana, and attanupassana [[ sh all mention them in < > in the following hst]. 1 aniccato / niccaih (impermanent) <aniccanupassan3>\ 2 dukkhato /sukhaih <dukkhanupassan^, rogato / arogyaih (a disease) <dukkhanupassans>\ 4 gandato / agandaih (a boil) <dukkhanupassans>\ 5 sallato / visallaih (a dart) <dukkhanupassana>; 6 aghato / anagbo (a misfortune) <dukkhanupassans>\ 7 abadhato / anabadho (a sickness) <dukkhanupassan3>, 8 parato / aparapaccayaih (other) <anattanupassani>-, 9 psdokato / apalokadhammo 328

95 an d th e ir opposite n atures (the n a tu re o f the w ell-inform ed ariya disciple, o r the n a tu re o f the Buddhas). Th ese forty q u alities possess the n a tu re o f anicca, d u k k h a and anatta. paiicakkh andhe aniccato p assan to an u lo m ikaiii khantirii p atilab h ati. paiicannam khandhanam nirodho nifpam n ib b an an ti p a ssa n to sam m attaniyam am o k k a m a ti (P erceivin g the five k h a n d h a s as im p erm an ent one obtains the gentle and forbearing disposition. P e rceiv in g the cessation of the five khandhas as p erm an ent nibbana, one en te r th e rig h t method.) (decay) < aniccinupassana>] 10 Itito / anltikam (a plague) <dukkhanupa3sans>\ 11 upaddavato/ anupaddavam (a distress) <dnkkhmupassans>\ 12 bhayato / abhayaiii (a danger) <dukkhanupassans>-, 13 upasaggato / anupasaggam (a menace) <dukkhanupassans>\ 14 calato / acalam (wavering) <aniccanupassans>-, 15 pabhanguto / apabhajigu (perishabls) <aniccanupassan3>\ 16 addhuvato / dhuvaiii (unstable) <aniccanupassana>] 17 atanato / tanam (not a protection) <dukkhanupassani>\ 18 alenato /lenaih (not a cave of shelter) <dukkhanupassans>\ 19 asaranato / saranan (not a refuge) <dukkhanupassani>', 20 rittato / arittaih (devoid) <anattanupassans>\ 21 tucchato / atuccham (h.q\\o'ff) <anattanupassans>\ 22 sum a t o / paramasumaib (empty) <anattanupassans>\ 23 anattato / p a ramattham (not-self) <ajiattanupassani>-, 24 adinavato / anadinavam (a disadvantage) <dukkhanupassans>-, 25 viparinamadhammo / aviparinamadhammam (of a nature of change) <aniccmupassans>\ 26 asarakato / saraiii (lacking an essence) <anattanupassana>\ 27 aghamulato / anaghamulatam (the root of m isfortune) <dukkhanupassana>] 28 vadhakato/ a v a dhakam (murderous) <dukkhanupassans>\ 29 vibhavato / avibhavarii (destruction) <aniccanupassan^\ 30 sasavato / anasavam (with-cankers) <dukkhanupassan3>-, 31 sankhatoato / asankhatam (constructed) <aiiiccanupassans>] 32 m a ramisatn / nirsmifsam (a prey to the evil tempted-god) <dukkhanupassani>] 33 jatidhammato / ajatam (of the nature of birth) <dxikkhanupassans>\ 34 jaradhammato / ajsiram (aging) <dukkhanupassans>\ 35 byadhidhammato /abyadhi (grie^ <dukkhanupassani>; 36 m a r a n a d h a m m a t o / a m a t a m (a nature of i e ) <aaiccanupassaiis>-, 37 sokadhammato / asokam (sorrow) <dukkhanupassans>-, 38 paridevadhammato / aparidevaih (lamentation) <dukkhanupassan3>\ 39 upayasadhammato / anupayasam (despair) <dukkhanupassani>\ 40 samkilesikadhammato / asaihkiettbain (defflement) <dukkbanupassans>. See, B h ikkh u Nanamoli, The Path of Discrimination {Padsambbidamaggd), P T S. 1977, pp ; P. H arvey, Selfless Mind, pp

96 p an cakkhan dhe dukkhatn p assan to anulo m ikam khan tirii p atilab h ati. p ancannaiii khandhanam nirodho aiikharh n ib b an an ti p assa n to sam m attaniyam arii okkam ati. (P e rce iv in g the five k h a n d h a s as su ffe rin g one obtains the gentle and forbearing disposition. P e rce ivin g the ce ssa tio n of the five khandhas as bhssful nibbana, one e n te r the rig h t method.)"* paiicakkh and he anattato p assan to anulom ikam khan tim p atilab h ati. pancannam khandhanam nirodho p aram attham n ib bananti p assan to sam m attaniyam arii okkam ati. (P erceivin g the five k h a n d h a s as im p erm an en t one obtains the gentle and forbearing disposition. P erce ivin g the cessation of the five khandhas as the u ltim ate m ean in g and nibbana, one en te rs the right method.)^' It is obvious that the ordinary p erson s n a tu ra l q u alities are q u alified as im p erm anent, suffering and not-self, and the q u ality of the one w ho h as overcom e su ch sam saric existence, th a t is, the q u ality of nibbana is explain e d by the w ords of perm anent and bliss and 'paramattha. It is im p o rtan t to note th at the w ords 'niccd and sukha are used in opposition to anicca and dukkhd, but in case ovanatta, its opposite q uah ty is represented not by the w o rd 'atti, b u t by the w ord par a m a t t h a. In the Nikayas, the condition in w h ich the n ature of im p erm an ence and suffering are overcome is u su a lly nam ed by su ch negative expressions as nibbana, nirodha etc. However, especially in the texts com piled later, w e find the sam e described by the positive term s, though the num ber of su ch exam p le s is 46 Ps. vol.2, p

97 co m p aratively sm all. T h is tendency o f descrip tio n h a s becom e m ore p ro m in en t in the A b h i d h a m m a texts. ^ We ca n find som e m ore examples'* in w h ich the w ords nicca and sukba are used as the a n tith e sis s to anicca an d dukkha, or u sed a s a n expressions for a state of nibbana, however, in case of anatta, th e re is no exam ple in the Nikayaa w hich sp eaks atta a s a n a n tith e sis ovanatta. It m ay be worth mentioning, in passing, the statem en t in the A b b i d h a r m a - mahavibhasa-s^tra {A-p i-ta-mo ta p i-p o-sha-lun, tra n sla te d into C h in e se by Hsuan-tsang, only C hinese version is availab le). It m entions the follow ing view s: the view regarding im perm anent as perm anent, the view reg ard ing p erm an e n t a s im perm anent, the view reg ard ing suffering as bliss, the view reg ard in g b liss as suffering, the v iew reg ard in g pure a s im pure, the view reg ard ing im pure as pure, and the view reg ard ing not-self as self. H ere; it is notable th at the view regarding se lf as not s e lf is not a t a ll m entioned. A s the question w h y the view regarding s e lf as not-self is not m entioned, the a n sw e r of the text is th a t the se lf does not exist. We know here a n absolute negation concerning att very clearly stated. Ps. vol.2, p ^ S. Mori, ibid. p He also states: Those positive words nicca and s u k h a have came to be used as the antitheses to the words anicca, d u k k h a, w hich had been used in m any places in the Nikiyas to denote the quality of saihsaric condition th at is opposite to nibbana. Some of the examples which mentioned the state of nibbana by w ay of positive expressions are; eternal (asankhataih-dukkbftnimhhft-fntfifiatarii) <Vimana-vattbu, 16 Sirima-vaggha, p.l7>; Nibbana is the highest b liss {nibbanam p a r a m a m sukhaw) <Dhp.204>. Nd2. p. 166, commenting the phrase nibbanapadamaccutaiii in Sn.1086, explains: eternal peace means im perm anent, stable, eternal and not subject to change {accutan ti niccaib dbuvaih sassatam aviparinamadhammairis. ^ Taisho. vol27, p. 38ff 331

98 5-3-5 The question on 'sabbe dhrmms anatts (1) W e are concerned, in th is section, w ith a stock p h rase sabbe d h a m m a anatta, w h ich som etim es appears together w ith the p h ra se s sabbe sankhara anicca and/or sabbe sankhara dukkha. T h e se three have been la te r regarded as im p o rtant m a rk s for B u d d h ists in order to show a p e cu lia rity of B u d d h a s teaching. It w as observed in the preceding sections th a t the origin of th is stock passage w as not very old, and th a t it w as form ulated a t a la te r stag e of developm ent observable in form ing the doctrine of anicca-dukkha-anatta in the p assag e s of the Nikayas!"'^ Th e frequency of the p hrase sabbe d h a m m a anatta is not g reater in the Nikayas as com pared to the 'anatta teach in g given by the other forms. Now the question is w h en anatta w as taught in th is form o f sabbe d h a m m a anatta, w hat the word anatta intended to m e a n ^ D oes anatta m ean an absolute negation or a relative negation? Is there an y difference in a purport of the teaching, between one taught by this passage and one taught by other form s w h ich we have observed in the preceding sections? 51 H. Nakamiura, Self a n d No-Self [Jiga to Mugs^, pp A. H irakaw a, D ham m a Taught in the Phrase sabbe d h a m m a anatta [Shoho M u g a no Hoi^, p.407. Th e phrase sabbe d h a m m a anatta is given in the following contexts in the Nikayas: (D sabbe sankhara anicca, sabbe sankhara d ukkha, sabbe d h a m m a anatta, Dhp ; Therag ; N d l. pp , 235, 245, 272, 283, 456; Ps. vol.1, p.4; Ps. vol.2, sabbe sankhara anicca, sabbe d h a m m a anatta, M N.9 (vol.1, pp.288, 230); SN.voL3, pp sa dhatu dhmmatthitata dhammaniyamata. sabbe d h a m m a anatti, A N.vo Ll, p.286, sabbasankhare aniccato samanupassanto... sabbasankhare dukkhato... s a b b a d h a m m e anattato samanupassanto..., AN.voL3, pp P T S D. (p.22) explains the meaning oi anatta in the phrase sabbe d h a m m a anatta as an adjective, which means w ithout a soul, depending on the statem ent in Vin.vol.5, p.86, SN.vol.3, p.l3 3 and SN.vol.4, p.38; 401. A Critical Pali Dictionary (voll.part,4), as a example for usage of the nominative case anatta, states: it is used w ith a plu ral subject in the tilakkhana-formula, but in Com m entaries, alternatively used as a Z>aAi/vnZi«;ompound. B P S. Encyclopaedia of Buddhism translates this 332

99 O p in io n s are divided among sch o la rs concerning the in te rp re ta tio n o f the p h rase sabbe d h a m m a anatta. T h e points of co n tro versies w h en w e try to u n d e rsta n d the p hrase are: In th is p h rase, w h a t does the w rods sabbe d h a m m a m ean? W hy the word d h a m m a is used only w h en the m a rk about anatta is m entioned, nevertheless the w ord 'sankhara is u sed w h en the m a rk s about anicca an d d ukk h a are m entioned? Is there a n y difference betw een them, if so, w h a t is the reason to be used w ith d istin ctio n? W. R a h u la points out the difference betw een sabbe d h a m m a a n d sabbe sankhara w ith reference to the three m a rk s stated in D h p T h e term sankhara denotes the F iv e Aggregates, a ll conditioned, interdependent, relative things and states, both p h y sical and m ental. I f the th ird verse said: A ll sankhara (conditioned thing s) are w ithout se lf, th e n one m ight th in k that, although conditioned thing s are w ithout s e lf yet th e re m ay be a S e lf outside conditioned thing s, outside the F iv e Aggregates. I t is in order to avoid m isunderstanding th a t the term d h a m m a is used in the th ird verse. T h e term d h a m m a is m uch w id er th a n saihkhara. T h e re is no term in B u d d h ist term inology w ider th a n d h a m m a. It in clud es not only conditioned things and states, but also the non-conditioned, the A bsolute, Nirvana!"^ phrase as a ll things are net-self (voll, p,570). W. Rahula, ibid. p LB. H orner takes a sim ila r view stating that: A s a category, d h a m m a is wider than sankhara, for it includes the uncompounded nibbana. {The Collection of the Middle Length Sayings, VoL3, p.l07, footnote, 1. C f, also J.R Remon, ibid. p.213). A sim ilar explanation is given in Encyclopaedia of B u d d h i s m (BPS), vol.1, pp Cf. H. Saddhatissa, Buddhist Ethics, pp.23-26; P. Harvey, A n Introduction to Buddhism Teaching, History, a n d Practices,p

100 T h is in terp retatio n can be derived from the statem e n ts in the Parivara, the Visuddhimagga^^ and other A b h i d h a m m a lite ratu re. T h e Parivara, the la te s t o f the Vinayapitaka states clearly th a t even nibbana is desig nated as anatta decisively.^ D epending on the descriptions in su ch texts, 'sabbe d h a m m a in question should be understood to in clu d e both the conditioned things a n d the non-condoned things such as nibbana. H ere, w e have to note th at su ch in terp retatio n of the conditioned and non-conditioned things w as e n th u sia stic a lly discussed in A b h i d h a m m a B u d d h ism, an d th a t form ulation of th is idea seem s to be the latest in the Nikayas (or b etter to sa y in e a rly Abhidh a m m a ). Therefore, it is questionable w h eth er the w ords sabbe d h a m m a w as chosen w ith clear intention to in clude the non-conditioned things w h en the p h rase began to be used. L a te r I s h a ll try to give m ore detailed account of th is point. L e t us, for the moment, see an opposite in terp retatio n on the p h rase sabbe d h a m m a. J.P. Rem on understands sabbe d h a m m a as the things into w hich nibbana is not included. He points out as follows: T e x tu a l evidence is certain ly ag ain st the in clu sio n of nibbana am ong the d h a m m a s branded as not-self in the dictum, sabbe d h a m m a anatta, and therefore the scope of the anatta doctrine is not different here form the scope attributed to it in a ll the contexts review ed before."" H e gives exam ples from the Nikayas tellin g th a t the word d h a m m a m eans ^ Vism. p.513. ^ anicca sabbe saiikhara dukkhanatta ca sankhata, nibban ceva pahnatti anatta iti nicchaya{vinaya, Parivara, vol.5, p. 132). 334

101 conditioned things. * A n d states th a t the w ord ' d h a m m d u sed in the p h ra se sabbe d h a m m a anatta is sam e in m ean in g w ith d h a m m d m eanin g the conditioned things, in w hich nibbana is not included. R em o n sta te s th a t there w a s the confluence of two opposite cu rre n ts in the co nsideration of nibbana a s anatta, su ch as found in Parivara. T h e first one comes firom the o rig in a l source th a t m akes use of im perm anence, p a in an d being not-self, a s m otives for rejection, for detachm ent and for u ltim ate liberation. T h e second is the ideological environm ent w here the doctrine of absolute anatta is considered uncontrovertibly and becomes the subject of sophisticated philosophizing. I sh a ll agree w ith statem ent of R em on w h en he says: I t m ay be sa id th a t in the o rig in al Nikayan spirit, anatta is posited as a m eans for d etachm ent and u ltim ate liberation, w hile in the la te r sp irit anatta, and th at absolute, is posited as a n ideological end in itse lf to w h ich everyth in g else should be subservient'.^ B u t I cannot bring m yself to accept h is sa y in g th at the o rig in a l Nikayaa spoke sabbe d h a m m a anatta w ith the in ten tio n th a t nibbana is not in cluded in d h a m m a. T h o u g h we find the notions o f the conditioned th ing s a n d the nonconditioned things even in the texts of e a rly Buddhism, it does not seem reasonable to support th at the unconditioned things are contained in the category of d h a m m a w ith the sam e k in d of intention w ith th at of A b id h am ic philosophy. W hen we p ay attention to the contexts in w hich the 'sabbe d h a m m a J.P. Remon, Self and N o n self in Early Buddhism, p.221. H e depends on the following suttaa to support his idea; Therig ; SN.X X X V.80 (vol.4,p.50); A N.V I (vol.3, p.444) etc. According to those examples, he points out: I f regarding to these d h a m m a a [conditioned we say, sabbe d h a m m a anatta, it is obvious that mbbaba cannot be included in sabbe dhamma, as nibbana can in no w ay be said to be conditioned (J.P. Remon, ibid.p.212). J.P. Remon, ibid. p

102 anatti is taught w ith the other m a rk s, it m ay be sa id th a t both the p h ra se s, sabbe d h a m m a and sabbe sankhara m ean co ncretely the sam e th in g s su ch a s the five khandhas, w hich were freq u ently m entioned in order to e x p la in the doctrine of anicca-dukkha-anatta in the Nikayas. T h e statem ent in M N.3 5, the Culasacchara Sutta is good evidence to show th is understanding. rupam, bhikkhave, aniccarii, vedana anicca, sam a anicca, sankhara anicca, vinnanam aniccam. ruparii, b h ikkh ave, anatta, vedana anatta, saiiiia anatta, sankhara anatta, viimanam anatta. sabbe sankhara anicca, sabbe d h am m a an atta ti. {Bhikkhm, m aterial form is im p erm anent, feeling is im p erm an ent, perception is im perm anent, form ation is im p erm anent, and co nsciousness is im perm anent. Bhikkhus, m a te ria l form is not-self, feeling is not-self, perception is not-self, form ation is not-self, and consciousness is not-self. A ll form ations are im perm anent, au th in g s is n ot-self Concerning the p hrases s a b b a m aniccam, s a b b a m dukkhaiii and s a b b a m anatta (SN.XXXV.43-45), the word sabba is explained as each of the six groups of six. In SN.X X X V.23, the word 'sabba is explained to be the six in te rn a l sense fields and the six external sense fields. It seem s Ukely that the two w ords sankhara an d 'd h a m m a \i2a been used, at th e ir first stage of the development, w ithout cle a r distinction in the m ean in g w hen the teaching of the three m a rk s w as given. B ecause they both m ean co n cretely the five khandhas, etc., a n d w e ca n also find the exam p les in the MN.35 (vol.l, p.228); SN.XXII.90 (vol.3, p. 132). S N vol4, p

103 Nikayas w h ich explain the-teaching oi'anatta w ith reg ard to sabbe sankbara^^ O n the d octrinal development of the anatta teaching, the p h en o m enal th ing s expressed by the notion of the k h a n d h a s h ad cam e to be described b y more ab stract words, d h a m m a or sankhara. In th is connection, we have to understan d the p h rase sabbe d h a m m a anatta as one of the developed form s of not-self doctrine. H ere, two im portant points are to be noted. F irs tly, observed in the light of w hat the statem ent w an ts to convey, it can be sa id th at the p h rase sabbe d h a m m a anatta seem s to be the sam e as the not-self doctrine w e have observed so far. T h is point w ill be supported by the fact that, as the teaching of not-self show n by the single w ord anatta is rep eated ly accom panied by disgusting for suffering {nibbmdati du k k h ^ so also the teaching o f sabbe d h a m m a anatta. Secondly, we ca n su rm ise th a t a new m eaning w as added to the w ord anatta in the p hrase sabbe d h a m m a anatta as a fu rth e r h isto rica l developm ent and a new m eaning w a s furtherm ore expanded at the tim e of the A b h i d h a m m a Uterature, to m ean a n absolute negation of atta. T h is is a point on w h ich we sh a ll m ake observations in the next chapter. T h ere is a fu rth er point th at needs to be discussed. I f the two p h rase sabbesaiikhiresu aniccanupassi viharahi, anicce dukkhassanni dukkhe anattasannl pahanasanni viragasanni nirodhasannl ti <SN.LV.3, vol.5, p.345>; s a b b a d h a m m e s u anodhim karitva anattasahnam upatthapetum (establish the awareness of not-self as regards all formations without exception) <AN.vol.3, p.444>; sabbe sankhara anicca ti sotavadhanam, tampajananapanna sutamaye ffanan. sabbe snkhara dukkha t i sabbe sankhara anatta ti... ( a ll formations are im perm anent is the attention, the knowledge to know it is a consisting in learning, all formations are suffering i s... a ll formations are not-self is...< P s.v o Ll, p.4> [But P TS.C D -R om s edition read sabbe d h a m m a anatta. V IP I s edition, and B u d sir edition also read d h a m m a for sankhard]. Some of Chinese A g a m a s show its original sentences were sabbe sankhara anatta, for examples, the verse in Fa-chu-ching corresponding to the D h a m m a p a d a, 2 1% <Taisho. vol4, 569b>, Ekottaragama, 26-8; 26-9; 42-4 <Taisho. vol2, pp. 639a; 640b; 749a> (See, S. Mori, ibid. p J.P. Remon, ibid. pp ). Jikido Tjikasaki states that there is no statem ent in early Buddhism w hich definitely speaks the unconditioned things are not se lf. He supposes that sabbe d h a m m a originally means the sam e things w ith sabbe sankhari, (J. T alasaki, O n 337

104 sabbe saakhara and sabbe d h a m m a, in the e a rly stag es of developm ent, m ean s b a sica lly the sam e things, viz. the five k h a n d h a s to w h ich one attach es o n eself stro n g ly or the sam saric existence o f the o rd in a ry m an, th en w h y is th e re a difference o f the words. T h a t is to sa y sankhara for anicca and d h a m m a for anatta^ W e have no definite inform ation on th is question, but here I s h a ll see an im p o rtan t statem ent w hich w ill be a h in t to know the difference resp onsib le for different wording. Th e following is a su m m a ry of explan atio n given by S. M ori on th is point. Im p erm an ence is a concept w h ich rep re sen ts dyn am ic m ovem ent, w h ile not- s e lf is a concept w hich represents a sta tic one. T h e w ords 'sankhara and paticcasamuppada represent d yn am ic m ovem ent but saakhata and 'pticcasamuppawia represent the static one. So the w ord sankhara is in keeping w ith the teaching of anicca and sankhata th at w ith teaching anatta. T h en, w h y the word d h a m m a w a s used for anatta? T h e re are u sages lik e san k h a t a - d h a mm a and p ticcasamuppanna-dhamma Cttiv.3-90; A N.vo l.2, p.34; A N.vol.3, p.35; Therag.422; SN.vo l.2, pp.25-27), but no usage of pticcasamuppada-dhamma or s a n k h a r a - d h a m m a. And, there m ight be a tacit understanding among the bhikkhus th a t anatta h ad no b asis in the doctrine of dependent-origination, so the w ord d h a m m a w as p referred to p a c c a s a m u p p a n n a. Though sankhata and pticcasamuppanna are sta tic concept, they have a relation w ith the teachin g of dependent-origination, so the w ord d h a m m d w as adopted for the teach in g oi anatta.^'^ the P hrase sabbe d h a m m a anatta [shohou muga kou], pp ). 338

105 L e t m e sum m arize the m ain p oints th a t have been m ade in th is sectio n concerning the not-self doctrine rep re sen te d by the p h rase sabbe d h a m m a anatta. cd It is a late phase in the h isto ry o f d o ctrin al developm ent th a t the n o t-self concept is presented by the p h rase sabbe d h a m m a anatta. :i)t h e phrase 'sabbe d h a m m a originawy seem s to have m eant the sam e a s the five khandhas or sam saric existence of the m an. 3) T h e p h rase sabbe d h a m m a, a t the beginning, m ay not have a big difference fi*om the p hrase sabbe sahkhara in th e ir m ean in g w hen they w ere used to explain the three m arls. H ow ever, we have to adm it the p o ssib ility th a t a new m eaning w as added to the word anatta at the time the p h rase sabbe d h a m m a anatta w as form ed. (2) Then, w hat sort of a new m eaning, can we suppose, the w ord anatta obtained w hen the stock phrase sabbe d h a m m a anatta took a firm hold am ong Nikayan B u d d h ists? H ere, for exam ple, is a passage from A N.lII (vol. 1, p. 286), w here we can see the anatta doctrine show n by p hrase sabbe d h a m m a anatta, w h ich is proclaim ed to be one of the u n iv e rsa l propositions. T h e text read s as follows: uppada va, bhikkhave, tathagatanarii anuppada va tathagatanam thitava sa dhatu dham m atthitata dham m an iyam ata. sabbe dham m a anatta. ta m S. Mori, ibid. pp

106 tathagato abhisam bujjhati abhisam eti. abhisam b ujjh itva abhisam etva a cik k h a ti deseti panfiapeti patthapeti v iv a ra ti v ib h a ja ti u ttan ikaro ti - sabbe dham m a anatta ti. (Bhikkhus, w h e th e r o r not there is the a risin g o f the tathagata, sabbe d h a m m a anatta, th is p ro p erty stands - th is re g u la rity o f the D h a m m a, th is orderhness of the D h a m m a. T h e tathagata directly a w a k e n s to that, b re ak s through to that. D ire ctly aw aken in g and breaking th ro u g h to that, he declare it, sets it forth, re v e a ls it, explain s it, m akes it p la in a n d says, sabbe d h a m m a anatta). [Before th is statem ent, the sam e explan atio n is given w ith regard to sabbe sankhara anicca a n d sabbe sankhara dukkha.] T h is passage bears a strik in g resem b lance to the stock p assag e w h ich ex p lain s the theory of paticcasamuppada.^ Therefore, it can be sa id th a t the com piler h ad only apphed this stock p assag e of paticcasamuppada for the ex p lan atio n oi sabbe d h a m m a anatta. W e sh o uld pay attention to the fact th a t anatta w a s understood here as a u n iv e rsa l proposition. T h e origin of th is style oi anatta teaching m ay not be old, because it appears in A N, and it is tau g h t by usin g the p h rase sabbe d h a m m a in a pigeonholed text. H ere, we sh o uld m a rk the one big change about the not-self doctrine so fa r as the history of B u d d h ism is concerned. T h e doctrine, as we have observed so far, o rig in ally and b asically, 63 S N.X II.2 0 (vol.2, p.25). The paticcasamuppada is usually, in the Nikayas, classified into the category of the u n iversal proposition {dhammd). O n the other hand, the teaching of anicca, dukkha, anatta, and the four noble truths are ra re ly be classified into this category, they are most tim es called as the truth (sacca, tatha, bhut^. There seems to be clear difference between the two: a universal proposition and the tru th in the Buddhist context. S. M ori exam ines about w hat the words sacca, bhuta, tatha, tathata, tathatta, tathiya, tattha, tacchd m ean in the Nikayas, and about w hat is exhorted to be perceived as it really is {yatha-bhutam) in order to m ake clear the notion of the truth in early Buddhism. Then he reports: The four noble truth; the teaching about anicca, dukkha and anatts, teaching of em ancipation etc. are classified into this category. B u t paticcasamuppada is rare to belong to this category (S. Mori, ibid. pp ). 340

107 w a s rep resen ted as a teaching of the relatio n betw een the s e lf an d the khandhas, not ontologically but subjectively, a s the recognition of the s e lf a s th is is not m ine, th is I am not, th is is not m y se lf etc. (3) S in ce in the Nikayas, we do not come across a n y c le a r explan atio n o f the p h rase 'sabbe d h a m m a anatta, th is let u s see some of the ex p lan atio n s given by co m m entarial literature. It w ill help u s to clarify the h isto rica l developm ent concerning the teaching of anatta. F irs tly, we s h a ll consider w h a t the com m entaries say about the phrase sabbe d h a m m a anatta in the Syutu-yo-kyou {ttimus), C h in ese translatio n of the Udana-varga {Sarvastivadin sutra. Solem n U tte ra n ce s of the Buddha). It m entions the four m arks, viz. im perm anence, suffering, void and not-self A s for the p h rase a ll form ations are not-seu (the o rig in al form is supposed to be sarvasaihkharab anatmanaji), the explan atio n in the Sutyu-yo-kyou is as follows: T h e p h rase all formations are not-self is used because of the absence of desire or w ish, because o f not h a v in g one s free w ill, and bacaus of havin g no substance. ^ The Dhammapada-atthakatM, com m enting on the verse 279, explain s as fouows. tatth a sabbe dham m ati pancakkhandha eva adhippeta. an attati m ajiyantu ma O n this point, J.P. Remon comments: Num erous are the statem ents that proclaim the anatta doctrine by means of universal propositions, w hich doubtless had also their share in establishing in the m inds of future generations of Buddhists the doctrine of absolute anatta (Self and N o n self in Early Buddhism, p.209). Taisho. vol4, pp.682c-683a. Jikido Takasa k i supposes that the original Sanskrit phrases: akamakaritvat,'ava^avartana or asvamikd, and 'asard respectively (Jikido Takasaki, ibid. p. 185). 341

108 m iyantu ti vase vatteturh na sa k k a ti avasavattanatth en a anatta attasuiina assam ika an issarati attho. (^sabbe d h a m m a m eans the five khandhas. anatta m eans not being able to be in h is pow er to sa y do not become old, do not die. A ccording to the absence of a fi'ee w ill, thev a re not-self. ijlm ean s void, not being owner, w ithout a p erso n al creato r.)^ In the Patisambhidamagga, as w e have a lread y observed, the forty typ es of q u a h tie s are classified into each group of the three m arks. In those statem ents, the q u ah ty classified into the aw aren e ss of n ot-self are para, ritta, tuccha, sunna, anatta and asara.^' W h at should be noted here is th at the w ords sunna and asara axe used for the explanation o f anatta. It m eans that, at the tim e w hen these suttas w ere compiled, anatta h a s a m ean in g of the absence of substance. along w ith its original m eaning o f n o t-self. [C onclusion of this section] W hen the word anatta cam e to be used in a stock p h rase sabbe d h a m m a anatta as a n u n iversal proposition, a s la w of the existence w h ich reg ard less of tathagatas existence, the nature o f the subjective relatio n of the s e lf to the kh a ndhas (for exam ple, that one sh o uld not regard the kh a n d h a s as the selo had been w eakened. In addition, the objective a n a ly sis of the n atu re of existence w as em phasized. Here, we should adm it one of the cau ses that change the o rig in al m eaning of the not-self into the la te r in terp retatio n of no-self, i.e. the negation of the self in absolute way. A n d the w ord atta in anatta cam e to m ean not only ju st a se lf but also any objective existin g concepts, su ch o&jiva, puggala. 66 D h p A vol3, p

109 Sara which is of the nature of being eternal or substantial j Anatta taught in relatio n w ith pow er of spontaneous m astery (1) In some texts, atta and anatta are taught in the following w ay; I f som ething is atta, then it should have a power o f doing everyth in g as it w ishes. A good exam ple of th is type is the statem ent in the Anattalakkhanasutta^ Rupam b h ikkh ave anatta, rupafi ca h idarii b h ikkh ave atta ab h avissa, n a jddarii rupaiii abadhaya sariivatteyya, lab bhetha ca rupa evam me ruparh hotu, evam me rupam ma ahositi. (M aterial form, bhikkhus,, is not atta, if, bhikkjius, m a te ria l form were atta, then it w ould not be subject to afehction an d one sh o uld be able to say of m aterial form, let m y m a te ria l form be su ch and such, let m y m a teria l form be not su ch an d su ch.) Y a sm a ca kho b hikkh ave rupam anatta tasm a rupam abadhaya saiiivattati, na ca lab b h ati rupe evarii me rupam hotu, evarii me rupam ma ahositi. {Bhikkhus, sin ce m a te ria l form is, indeed, not atta, it is subject to affliction a n d one 67 Ps.voL2, pp Vinaya, Mahavagga, vol.1, pp ; SN.vol.3, p We can know the Sanskrit version of this text from E. Waldschmidt s book. D a s Catusparisatsutra, TeU III. S It reads as follows: rupih bhiksavo natma. rupan ced atma syan na rupam abadhaya duhkhaya samvartteta. labbyeta ca rupasyai vam m e rupam bhavatv evam m a bhud iti. yasmat tarhi bhiksavo rupam anatma tasmad rupam abadhaya duhkhaya samvartate. na ca labhyate rupasyai vam jme rupam bhavatv evam m a bhud iti. Com pared w ith the Pali version, the word duhkhayd is appended after the word abadhayd in the Sanskrit version (c Ju n k iti Im anisi, The Concepts of A t m a n in the Anatma-vadd (1), pp.44-45). 343

110 cannot s a y of m aterial form, le t m y m a te ria l form be su ch and such, le t m y m a te ria l form be not such and su ch.) [P a ra lle l ex p lan atio n is h eld w ith respect to each of the other khandbas.] T h e n comes the stock passage o f the dialogue about the teaching o f anicca- dukkha-anatta and it is said about every k h a n d h a th at this is not m ine, th is I am not, th is is not my se lf, and that the le arn e d d iscip les who see thus get d isg u sted w ith the khandhas and are u ltim ately detached and em ancipated. W h a t the p assage m akes clear is: m aterial form is su b ject to affliction because it is not atta. O ne is not able to say let m y m a te ria l form be th u s, let m y m a te ria l form not be th u s because m aterial form is not atta. I f m a te ria l form is atta, he is sh o u ld be able to say let m y m aterial form be thus, let m y m a te ria l form not be thus', an d then m a te ria l form w ill not be subject to affliction. T h a t m a te ria l form is atta m eans th at one is able to m ake m a te ria l form ju s t as he w a n ts have. I f I w ere ven tu re to p ick up the m eaning of the w ord 'atta from th is sentence, it ca n be sa id here th at the word atta m eans one s n a tu re or having the power to m ake thing s as one w ants them to be, or to control as p er one s wish. E. Conze, introducing this sutta, states that the formula is m anifestly intended as a guide to meditation and not as a basis for speculation {Buddhist Thought in India, p. 37). J.P. Remon states: The text refers to the essential freedom and spontaneous self-possession that the pure self is expected to have. Ontologically, the khandhas follow the rule of necessity imposed on them by th e ir previous conditions. The se lf cannot interfere there. A visual sensation, for instance, arises w hen au the necessary conditions have been realized, and the se lf cannot do any thing at that stage to stop the corresponding visu al sensation to arise or to make any objective change in the characteristics of such sensation. O n the m oral level, the se lf can exercise his mastery, w hich is not an easy one, over the sam saric factors of individuality and even make them stop together, attaining to complete isolate from them in emancipation {Self a n d Non-self in early Buddhism, p. 225). E. K a n a k u ra interprets this statement: E a ch of the five khandhas m aking an individual existence are beyond his power of mastery. In that sense, it m ay be said that they are not atta {Thought of Selfin Indian Philosophy, p. 193). P au l Horsh, as one of the answ ers to w hat atman meant for the Buddha and his disciples, states that the concept of atman 344

111 I f the statem ent of anatta in the Anattalakkhanasutta is reaso n ed by syllogism s, the m ajor prem ise is th a t m a te ria l form of being atta sh o u ld be om nipotent and can do anjrthing as it w ish e s or can control a n y th in g as it w a n ts to. A m inor prem ise is th at the five khandhae, are subject to affliction a n d one m ight not get the chance of saying in reg ard to the khandhas, let m y khandhas, be thus, let m y khandhas not be th u s. T h is m inor prem ise is re a lis tic a lly a self-evident tru th for the b h i k k h m because they could see th a t everyone fa lls ill. Therefore, the bhikkhus can u n d erstand w h a t the B u d d h a explained. B u t, it is difficult to decide the basis from w h ich the m ajo r prem ise w as derived. In o th er words, w h a t w as the source of the attas n a tu re of the om nipotent in the context of the Anattalakkhanasutta. T h e follow ing three hypotheses are possible: X T h e B u d d h a h im self recognized su ch n atu re of atta through h is m ed itatio n and aw aren ess. 2) The Buddha refereed to the w ord atta w h ich had been understood generally as having such nature by the philosophers of the Upanisads o r o th er schools p re valent at his time. T h e B u d d h a did not adm it an existence of su ch atta, but he m entioned such atta as a n expedient for m akin g the bhikkhus u n d e rstan d the true m eaning of anatta teaching, or exhort the bhikkhus to concentrate on the profitable p ractice for a ch ie v in g nibbana. It is notew orthy th at the state m e n t in the C h in ese versio n o f the Anattalakkhanasutta p resents d ifferen t exp lan atio n. T h e Saihyukta-agama had been pregnant w ith the m eaning of spiritual [particularly, anim istic], unchanging, without falling Ul, and absolutely autonomous nature (B ased on the translation by M. Saigusa, Principal Thoughts of Early Buddhism, vol.1, p. 177). P. H arvey, exam ining the Anattaleikkanasutta, states about the nature of the se lf in this context: if it were truly self, it would not tend to sickness and it w ould be totally controllable at wiu and Th e Buddha argued that anything that subject to change, anything not autonomous and totally controllable by its own w ishes, anything subject to the disharmony of suffering, could not be such a perfect true se lf (P. Harvey, A n Introduction to Buddhism - Teaching, history, a n d practice -, p. 51). 345

112 {Tsa a-han-ching, 2, Taisho.vol.2, p.7 b-c) re a d s as follows: I f m a te ria l form is atta, one m ight not get the ch ance of sa y in g about m a te ria l form, let m y m aterial form be thus, let it not be th u s. S in ce m a te ria l form is, indeed, not atta, it is subject to afloiction, th e n su fferin g arises, an d one ca n sa y of m a teria l form, le t my m a te ria l form be su ch and such, let m y m a te ria l form be not su ch and such. It w ill be clear from the above sta te m e n t in the Saihyukta-agama th a t it w a s in opposition to w h at w as said in the Anattalakkhanasutta. W h en w e try to m ake th is sentence sound plausible, we sh o u ld in terp re t it in the follow ing m anner; I f m a teria l form were atta, it is im p ossib le to m ake it change a s one w ish e s because atta is ete rn al existence w ith o u t an y change. I f m a te ria l form is atta, I w ill not able to introduce a n y change in the m a te ria l form b ecause it is e te rn a l and as such is not subject to change. B e ca u se m a te ria l form is not atta, we see m a te ria l form being subject to sickn e ss an d suffering. I f we try to find the sentence in the Pali Nikayas w h ich seem s to im p ly the sam e intention as that of the Saihyukta-agama, the sentence in S N.X X IL 9 7 can be cited, though the words atta or a m ttadx^ not uggd th e re. E tta k a m ce pi b h ikkh u rupam a b h a v issa niccam d huvam sa ssa ta iii aviparinam adham m arh, na y id a m b rahm acariyavaso p am ayeth a The following texts give the sam e explanation as given in the Anattalakkhanasutta:. Mahavastu, vol.3, p.335; Dharmaguptaka-vinaya {Ssu-fen^lu E9 5 ^ # ), 32, Taisho. vol.22, p.789a; Butu-pon-gyo-syu-kyo 34, Taisho.voL3, p.813b; Konponsetu-issai-ubu^binaya-hasouji 6, Taisho.vol.24, p. 128b. 346

113 sam m ad u kkh akkhayaya. Y asm a ca kho b h ik k h u e tta k a m p i ruparii n a tth i niccarii dhuvam sassatam aviparinam ad ham m am, tasm a b ra h m a cariy a v aso p am a yati sam m ad u kkh akkhayaya. {Bhikkhu, if there w ere m a te ria l form w h ich is even as little as th is p in ch of d u st and w h ich is p erm an e n t, stable, durable, not subject to change and e te rn a l lik e a ll th ing s p erm an ent, the practice o f the Life of P u rity for the com plete extinction of d u k k h a w ould not have appeared. B h ik kh u, it is b ecause there is no m a te ria l form w h ich is even as little as this pinch of dust and w h ich is p erm an en t, stable, d u rable, not subject to change and ete rn al lik e a ll thing s perm anent, th at the p ractice of the L ife of P u rity for the com plete extinctio n of suffering h a s appeared.'^ [In S N.X X II.9 6, the sam e teaching is given by u sin g the w ord attabhavapatilabhd (obtainm g one s own nature).'^ In the context of the C h in ese version, the w ord anatta m ean s th a t th e re is not su ch p erm anent own nature. B u t, in the Pali Nikayaa, the neg ation o f the p erm an ent own n ature is not tau g h t by u sing the w ord 'anatta. T h e y are S N.X X II.9 7 (vol.3, p. 147). See, also in SN.X X II.98. D ictionary reads: assumption of an existence, becoming reborn as an individ ual (P TSD. p. 23): obtaining a reincarnation, coming into existence (PTSD.p.398); the becoming reborn as an individual (C P S D. p.99). The Com m entary to SN. explains it as pa^addha-attabhavd (SNA. vol2, p. 324). DN.voLS, p. 231 mentions the four w ays of getting new personality {attbhava-pa^abha), new se lf in another existence. In D N.vo l.l, p. 195, the word 'atta-padlabha appears, w hich is glossed in D N A as attabhava-patilabhd. R. Gombrich translates attabhava-pa^abho n atthi as one does not acquire a self. In addition, he points out as fouows: I suspect that the Buddha is here alluding to the Vedic doctrine. T h is is made the more Ukely, it seem s to me, by the somewhat aw kw ard phraseology of the Pali. The se lf in Pali is u su ally atta, but here the word used is attabhava, w hich commonly means the body, or rath er the person, in a particular h fe... But if the words are alluding to a doctrine about creating a physical existence in the next world, an existence w hich is in some sense the sam e as one s present self, the use of this vocabulary becomes transparent { H o w B u d dhism Began, 1996, p.41). So the word atta in it seem s to stand for the connecting lin k between in the current existence and in a different one (See, J.P. Remon, ibid. p. 147). Grounded on su ch a sam saric m eaning of the word, I translate 347

114 taught, in a different form, w ithout u sin g the w ord 'anatta. T h e m eanin g o f the atta in the statem en t of the Pali Nikayas h a s a trace o f su b jective feature, b u t in the C h in e se version of the Anattalakkhanasutta, it is taught w ith an objective or ontological im pucation. W e have to d istin g u ish the id eas betw een the negation of su b sta n tia l concept w hich exists e te rn a lly w ith o u t an y change, fix>m the negation of one s desire to regard som ething as su b sta n tia l. It seem s to be th a t these id eas w ere originally separated c le a rly from each other in e a rly B u d d h ism, but la te r they w ere m ixed up and w ere rep resented by the one term anatta. F o r in stan ce, in A b h i d h a m m a h te ratu re, the w ord anatta is explained as the negation of atta, puggala and satta a ll of w h ich exist w ith o u t an y change.'^ (2) x\s fu rth e r exam ples of the usage of atta and anatta in relatio n to the pow er of m astery, let us consider another statem en t in the Nikayas w h ich w ill be h elp ful to clarify the intention of th is type of teaching. In the Samanna-Phala- sutta, w e notice the following statem en t. Se^ yatha p i m aha-raja puriso daso a ssa anattadhino paradhino na y e n a kamarii gamo. So aparen a sam ayena tam ha dasabya m ucce>ya attadhino aparadhino b hujjisso yen a kamariigamo. T a s sa evarh assa; aharii kho pubbe d ^ o ahosiiii an attadhino paradhino na yena kam arii gamo, so m h i e ta ra h i tam ha dasabya it as obtaining one s own nature in th is context. It can be said, though it is no more th a n a conjecture in this point, that the objects of the negation by the word anatta have been changed: to cunging to to regard eternally a eternal subject ->a eternal existence. A kira H irkaw a states th at it is difficult to determine which statement w as the o rig in al It seems questionable to hold that atta in this sentence as A t m a n taught in the Upanisa<h. Rather, atta in question should be understood as the s e lf w hich held instinctively by the ord in ary 348

115 m utto attadhino aparahino bhujisso yen a kamcuii gamo ti. So tato-nidanarh la b h eth a pamojjam adhigaccheyya som anassam. (Now suppose th a t a m an is a slave, not subject to him self, su b ject to others, u n ab le to go w here he lik es. A s tim e passes, he eventually is rele ased from th a t slavery, subject to h im s e lf not subject to others, freed, able to go w here he likes. T h e thought w ould occur to him, Before, I w as a sla v e... Now I am released from th a t slavery, subject to m yself not subject to others, freed, able to go w here I lik e. B e cau se of th at he would experience joy and happiness.) T h e w ord adhina m eans subject or dependent, so the w ord 'a t t M h i n d m ean s subject to oneself, gain h is independence or dependent (only) upon oneself. O n the other hand, the w ord anattidhina m ean s w ith o u t independence, not subject to h im s e lf, not h is own m a ste r an d is synonym of subject to others, subservient to o th ers, dependent on others (paradhina). H ere, a m an who is not subject to h im se lf (anattadhlna) is com pared to a slave who is unable to go a n jw h e re he likes. A n d the sutta explain s th a t one who is a slave in th at m anner is the p erson who does not abandon h is re stle ssn e ss and w o rry {uddhacca-kukkucca),"^ w h ich is one of the five person (A k ira H irakaw a, ibid. pp ). See also S. Mori, ibid. pp DN. vol.1, pp We can find a sim ilar teaching in the verses of the Nikayas, for example, Sn which read as follows; The independent [man] does not tremble, and the dependent holding on existence in one way or in another, does not overcome saihsara. Looking upon this as m isery [and seeing] great danger in things you depend upon, let bhikkhu'na.nder about independent, not holding [on anything], thougtful. {Anissito na calati, nissito ca upadiyaiii, itthabhavannathabhavaih samsaram nativattati. E t a m adinavaih natva: Nissayesu m a b a b b b a y a m, anissito anupadano sato bhikkhu paribbaje ti.) P T S D. p.30; CPD. p In the commentary, a slave compared to not abandoning restless and w orry is explained by a parable. A slave, even when playing at a festival, m ay be told: There is some urgent task for you to do. Go there quickly! I f you do not go, I wiu cut off your hands and feet, your ears or your nose! Th u s he goes quickly and does not get 349

116 h in d ran ces (panca nivaranmi)?" T h e id e a l is to abandon su ch a hin d ran ce. T h e sutta states, Abandoning re stle ssn e ss a n d worry, he d w ells a t ease w ith in him self, w ith a peaceful mind; he p u rifie s h is m ind from re stle ssn e ss and w o rry. '* A s long as a monk does not perceive the d isappearan ce o f the five h ind ran ces, he feels as if he w ere in debt, in sickn e ss, in bonds, in slavery, on a desert journey. B u t w hen he perceives the disappearan ce o f the five h in d rances, it is as if he w ere fi-eed from debt, fi*om sickn e ss, from bonds, fi-om slavery, from the p e rils of the desert. (3) A n o th er exam ple is the state m e n t in the CuJasaccaka-Sutta, in w h ich S accak a, a Nigantha s son, held w rong notion regard ing atta, sta tin g th at each of the five khand h a s is atta, and h is v ie w w as denounced by the B u d d h a. In the context of B u d d h a s disputing, attas n a tu re o f m astery w as refereed in o rd er to m ake h im realize his contradictory sta te m e n t on the notion of atta. S a c c a k a s view on atta can be sum m arized by the follow ing sentence: to enjoy the beginning, middle, or end of the festival. For w hat reason? Because he is subservient to others. Sim ilarly, w hen one who is unskilled in the Vinaya has entered the forest for seclusion, he m ay incur some minor disciphnary offence. Then he has to abandon his seclusion and approach a m aster of the Vinaya to purify his moral discipline. Thus he does not get to enjoy the happiness of seclusion. W hy? Because he has been overcome by restlessness and worry. Thus restlessness and w orry should be regarded as slavery (DNA. vol.1, p.214. Cf. The Discourse of the Fruits of Recluseship, tr. by B h ik kh u Bodhi, B P S. p. 145). " The five hindrances are: sensuality (kamachandsl), lu-wlu {abhijjha-vyapadd), torpor of m ind or body {thina-middha), w orry (uddhacca-kukku<xa) and w avering {vicikiccha). uddhaccakukkuccam pahaya anuddhato viharati, ajjhattam vupasantacitto uddhaccakukkucca cittarb parisadhed (DN.vol.1, p.71). Here the other four sim iles are mentioned, w hich are compared to the other four hindrances respectively: a man who had taken a roan to develop his business; a m an who was HI, suffering, terribly sick, w ith no appetite and w eak in body; a m an who is bound in prison; and a m an who is traveling through the desert where food was scarce and danger abound (DN.vol.1, p p.72-73). 350

117 Ruparh me atta, vedana me atta, sanna me atta, sankhara m e atta, vinnanaiii me atta. (M a te ria l form is my self, feeling is m y self, perception is m y self, form ation is m y self, consciousness is m y self.) H e ex p lain s his view: J u st as seed s an d p lan ts depend upon the e a rth for th e ir growth, and ju st as stren u o u s w o rks dependent upon the earth, a person h a s m a te ria l form as atta, and he produces m erit or dem erits b ased upon m a te ria l form {rupattayarh purisapuggalcp^* rupe patitthaya punnarii va a p u M a i h va pasavati).^^ [The sam e is repeated of a ll the o ther khandhas.] Th en, the B u d d h a a sk ed him a question w hich contains a sim ile. W h at do you th in k A ggivessan a? W ould a head-anointed noble king, for exam ple, K in g P asen ad i of K o s a la or K in g A ja tasa ttu V ed eh iputta of M ag ah a, exercise the power in his own re a lm to execute those w ho should be executed, to fine those who should be fined, and to b an ish those who sh o uld be b an ish ed? A g givesana rephes, yes. In addition, he states the reason w h y the kin g w ould exercise the power. H e sa y s: B ecau se even these com m unities and societies as the V ajjians and M au ian s exercise the pow er in th e ir own re a lm to execute those who should be executed, to fine those who sh ould be fined, and to b a n ish those should be banished, so a ll the m ore so sh ould a head-anointed noble rupatti y a m purisapuggald is explained in the Com m entary as person who dwells in holding that m aterial form is se lf (M NA.vol.2, p. 274). M N.35 (vol.1, p. 230). 351

118 kin g su ch as K in g P asen ad i of K o s a la or K in g A jatasattu V ed eh ip u tta of M agad ha. L iste n in t to his statem ent, the B u d d h a gives a question as to the n a tu re of atta held by Aggivesana. Taiti kirn maiinasi, aggivessana, yarn tvaiti evairi vad esi ruparii m e atta ti, v a tta ti te tasmirh rupe vaso - evarh me ruparii hotu, evarh me rupaiii ma ahosi ti? (W hat do you thm k A g g ivessa n a? W hen you sa y thus: M a te ria l form is m y atta, do you exercise a n y su ch pow er over th at m a teria l form as to say: L e t m y m aterial form be th u s; let m y m a te ria l form not be th u s.)*' W hen th is is said, Saccaka ca n not say an y thing. T h e B u d d h a a s k s him the sam e question repeatedly, so th a t S a ccak a ends up answ ering, No, M a ste r G o tam a. ^ T h e Buddha critically p oints out th at w h at he (Saccaka) sa id before does not agree w ith w hat he (S a cca ka) sa id afterw ards, and th at th ere is a contradiction in his statem ents. Th erefore, the B u d d h a begins to teach the anicca-dukkha-anatta teaching in a form of dialogue applying it to each of the five khandhsis, and concludes by the follow ing stock passage. H ere, Aggivessa, any kind of m a te ria l form w hatever, w h eth er past, future, or present, in te rn a l or external, gross or subtle, in ferio r or superior, far o r n e a r - M N.35 (vol.l, p.231). The Buddha s suggesting is that the aggregates are not self because they lack one of the essential characteristics of selfhood - being susceptible to the exercise of mastery. W hat cannot come under my m astery or perfect control cannot be identified as my self (Nanamoli, The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha, p. 1226). The Buddha s way of convincing depends on the realistic fact w hich they can experience in their actual life (the scene seen so vividly in daily life), not depends on the logical appropriateness on a level of m etaphysical thinking. Th is statem ent shows the luck of the power to be a m aster of self, because of which, Saccaka ends up adm itting the contradiction between the realistic fact and his view on self. 352

119 a disciple of m ine sees a ll m a teria l form as it a ctu a lly is w ith in sig h t w isd o m thus: T h is is not m ine, this I am not, th is is not m y self. '* [S im ila rly w ith reg ard to the rest of the khandhas.'l It m ay be useful to look more closely at som e of the im p ortant featu res of th is teaching, paying attention to the context in w h ich the notion o f atta w ith the pow er of m astery is referred by the B uddha. i) H ere, S accaka (in the dialogue, he w as called as A ggivessa by h is clan nam e, A ggivessana) is described a s a person who is a debater and a clever sp e a k e r and one who w as regarded by m an y as a saint.* H e, w ith com plete self-confidence on the ability of debating, tried to confute the B uddha. W e have to note th a t S accaka m ust have kn o w n m any k in d s of p hilosophical sy ste m s p erta in in g to atta taught by the p hilosophers at the tim e of the Buddha. A n d the Buddha also ce rta in ly knew these philosophical view s through h is contact w ith these philosophical th in k ers, though the B u d d h a did not agree w ith them. T h e Buddha used h is know ledge of th e ir system s in order to prove th at th e ir view s were false by m ean of m akin g an opponent to re a liz e the M N.vol.1, p.234. Th is sentence is uttered by the Buddha to explain how a disciple practices. And, after this explanation, the Buddha explains in the same w ay how an arahat practices, stating that see a ll rupa as it actually is w ith proper of wisdom thus this is not mine, this I am not, this is not m y se lf, and through not cunging he is liberated. Here it is notable that the sentence through not chnging he is liberated is added in the case of the explanation for the arahat. (M N.vol.1, p.235). According to the Commentary, Saccaka was the son of Nigantha {Jaiii) parents who were both skilled in philosophical debate. H e had learned a thousand doctrines firom his parents and m any more philosophical system s from others. In the discussion, he is referred to by his clan name, Aggivessana (MNA. Nanamoh, The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha, p. 1226). M N.36, the Mahasaccaka Sutta describes Saccaka as a debater and cleaver speaker regarded by many as a saint. H e w ants to discredit the Buddha, the D h a m m a and the Sanghd (M N.voLl, p.237). It also mentions that Saccaka had the experiences of debating w ith the six heretic thinkers, Purana-Kassapa, M akkh ah - Gkjsara, A jita-kesakam bala, Pakudha-K accayana, Sanjaya-Belatthiputta and 353

120 contradiction regarding th eir view s on atta. It is im p o rtant to note th a t the B u d d h a m entioned the attas natu re of m a ste ry only in a case w hen he criticized som eone who held w rong notion o f atta, not in a case w h en he explain the anicca-dukkha-anatta doctrine. 3) Lo o kin g at this sutta from the view poin t of plot developm ent, there seem to be three im portant points: (1) S a c c a k a w as a sk ille d in p h ilo so phical d ebate r H e h ad learn ed m any philosophical view s, an d w as proud of them. (2) S a c c a k a had h eard the B u d d h a s doctrine about anicca-dukkha-anatta, and announced th at he w ould refute the doctrine o f the B u d d h a. (3) T h e B u d d h a m ade him realize th a t the view of atta held by h im is w rong by show ing its self- contradictoriness. A t this, S a ccak a becam e sile n t, w h ich show s th at S a c c a k a becam e read y to Listen to the teaching of the B u d d h a. (4) Th en, the B u d d h a began to ex p lain his teaching of anicca-dukkha-anatta one by one. It sh o uld be noted th a t the atta w ith a power of m astery w as refereed on the process of m aking h im reahze his (Saccaka s) contradictory view s on atta, and also change his m ind strongly attached to the w rong view into the m in d ready to liste n to w h at the B u d d h a would say. It is quite possible that, w h en the B u d d h a m entioned som ething as anatta, in the context of debating w ith the heretic th in kers, the word anatta w as understood by them as m eaning o f la ck of su ch power of m astery in the s e lf T h u s the word atta cam e to be understood as concept w h ich had su ch a pow er or a n atu re of m astery over Nigantha-Nataputta (MN.voL pp ). 354

121 (4) T h e CuUaniddesa, w hich belongs to the la test p a rt of the Sutta Pitaka^^ com m ents in d etail on the w ords suhnato lokaih avekkhassd ap p earin g in S n. l l l 9. I t m entions th a t the five k h a n d b a s are anatta b ecause of not h avin g the pow er of spontaneous m astery, and suggests seein g the w orld as void by two w ays, w h ich are: by w ay of discernm ent of not havin g control over o n eself {a vasiyapa va tta -sallakkhana vasena) (2) by w a y of regarding a ll form ations as void (tuccha -sahkhara -saman upassana vasenaf^ To explain the w ay of discernm ent of not havin g control over oneself, it is said th at the pow er is not acquired in m a te ria l form {rupe vaso n a labbbati) [The sam e is repeated of a ll the other khandbas.] T h e n each of the five k b a n d h a s is explained as anatta, statin g that if m a te ria l form w ere atti, then it w ould not be subject to affliction and one should be able to sa y of m a te ria l form, let m y m a te ria l form be such and such, let m y m a te ria l form be not su ch and s u c h... (T h is sentence of the CuUaniddesa is the quotation fi-om S N.III.v o l.3, p.660- T h e n the sam e teaching w ith SN. vol.2, p.64f. w as given. To ex p lain the w ay of regarding a ll form ations as void, it is said th a t the e sse n tia l is not acquired in m aterial form {rupe saro n a labbbati). [The sam e is repeated of au the other khandbas.] T h e detailed explanation on the n a tu re of E ^ n a i L a i H azra, Pali Language a n d Literature, vol.1, pp.316. G.P. M akakasekera, Encyclopaedia of Buddhism, I, p. 67. Nd2. p.246. Th e word 'avasiyapavatta is difficult to interpret, then here I 355

122 Sara is given as follows: rupam assaraiii nissaraih sarapagatarii niccasarasaren a va su k h a sa rasa re n a va a ttasarasaren a va niccena va d h u vena va sa ssa te n a va avip arin am ad ham m en a va. (M aterial form is not being essen tial, is not h a v in g essence, and is w ithout essence because of not being e sse n tia l of perm anent, of not being e sse n tia l of happiness, of not being e ssen tia l of atta, of [not being] perm anent, of [not being] stable, of [not being] eternal, and of [not being] stead fastn ess concerning dhamma.)^'^ [The sam e is repeated of a ll the other khandhas.] T h e n atu re of not being e sse n tia l is com pared w ith a hollow s ta lk [like a th a t of w ate r lily] (naja), the casto r oil p lan t (eranda), the glam orous fig trees (udumbara), w hite shrub {setagaccha), tree Butea frondosa ipalibhaddaka), a heap o f foam {pbenapinda), w ater bubble {udakapubbula), a m irage {maiici), the tru n k of the p lan tain tree (kadah k k h andha), and m agic (maya).^ T h e text also gives the explan atio n of seeing the w orld as void in the six w ays, the ten w ays, and the twelve ways. ' Next, the text quotes the statem ent o f not yours (na tumhakd) in SN. X X X V. 101 (vol.4, pp.81-82) etc. It is also said that: T h e re is not anything w hich one can sa y as I, m ine or I a m. In th is w ay too, one sees the w orld as void (yampissa taiii hoti ahanti va m a m a n t i va asmiti va, tampi tassa na hoti ti. e v a m p i s u m a t o lokarh avekkhati)^^ Now, we sh o uld notice the w ay of negation, th a t is, the object to be negated. H ere, the understand it as avasavattand. Nd2. p Nd2. pp "I Nd2. pp Nd2. p

123 false recognition influenced by attach m e n t h ad been consid ered objectively, th a t is to sa y w h a t w as at first negated firom a subjective point o f view w a s co n sid ered in a n objective way. To explain it fiirth e r the subjective w a s rep laced b y the objective. T h is is a sh ift from su b jective to objective w h ich is the sp e c ia lty o f A b h i d h a m m a psychology. L e t u s su m m a rize the m ain p o in ts th a t h a v e been m ade in th is text. sunnato lokam avekkhassu = :D rupe vaso n a labbhati... rupe saro na labbhati... vasa = the power to control oneself, pow er of spontaneous mastery ^ sira = the core or the solid in terio r o f an yth in g, w h ich is e sse n tia l for the existence, perm anent, hap pin ess, and ete rn al H ere, the two statem ents, rupe vaso n a labbhati, rupe saro n a labbhati a.te given the sam e value for the exposition ovsuiina. Th o u gh th e w ord 'anatta is used only in the case of (I), it is notable th a t the negation of vaso is p ut in the sam e category for the explanation of sunna as negation o f sara. Th e difference of the m eaning of atta betw een the Anattalakkhana sutta and its corresponding C h inese text the Saihyukta-agama {Tsa a-han-chin^, w h ich is referred to in the previous section, ca n be explained a s atta m ean in g the V Vas m eans to be eager, to desire, and be found of. It m ay be said that the eagerness w hich is the base of the power {vasa) is derived form the subjective elem ent of the man, man s desire or hope. Does it arise fix>m w hether the eagerness that is influenced by defilement (that should be avoided), or from the hope for the reahty w hich is eternal (that should search for)? Alternatively, should the vasd in question be understood as neutral in value, w hich means vaguely power of the m astery? 357

124 pow er of m astery over som ething b eing the s im ila r to vasa, an d atta m e a n in g one s ow n perm anent nature being s im ila r to sara. O n e p o ssib ility is to a ssu m e th a t there w as certain confusion b etw een the pow er o f m a ste ry and th e one s own p erm an ent n atu re w hen the text w a s com piled. W e h a v e a lre a d y re fe rre d to the fact that the word anatta h a s been developed to m ean the negation o f the e te rn a l existences such like atta, jiva, puggala etc. 1 th in k th a t th is m a y be one of the tu rnin g points in the h isto ry o f the d o ctrin al developm ent. T h e term anatta y/)ach. m eant relative negation cam e to m ean the absolute negation, and the not-self turned into no-self. T h is is a point to w h ich we sh au re tu rn later Anatta as the nature of existence an d its perception T h e w ord 'anatta appears som etim es in a se rie s of other w ords (in te n tio n a l synonym s) su ch as sunna, para, etc. L e t m e see som e exam ples. (1) S N.X II.6 6 (vol.2, p ) Ye h i keci bhikkhave atitam addhanam sam ana va brahm ana va yarn loke piyaruparh satarupam tarn niccato addakkhurti su khato ad d akkhum attato addakkhurii arogyato addakkhum khem ato ad d akkhum te tanhaih vaddhesurh. Ye tanham vaddhesurh te upadhim vaddhesurh, ye upadhitii vaddhesuiii te dukkharii vaddhesurh, ye dukkharh vaddhesurh te n a parim uccirhsu jatiya ja ra y a m aranena sokehi p arid eveh i d u k k h e h i dom anassehi u p ayasehi n a parim uccirhsu dukkhasm a ti vadam i. (BbikkJius, w h a tever sarnanas and brahmanas in the past regarded a n y p le a sa n t an d agreeable m a te ria l form a s perm anent, regarded it as p leasant, regarded it as the self, reg arded it as 358

125 h ealth, regarded it as security, a ll o f th em cau sed atta ch m e n t to in cre a se. T h o se who caused attachm ent to in cre a se m ade sa m sa ric ad h eren ce to grow. T h o se who made sam saric ad h eren ce to grow in cre a se d p ain. T h o se w ho in creased p ain w ere not freed from b irth, old age, su ffe rin g...) [T hen, concerning the samanas and b r a h m a n ^ in the future a n d in th is w orld, the sam e explanation w as given. each of the other khandhas. P a r a lle l explan atio n s are h eld w ith resp ect to T h e n, ju s t the opposite is sa id to the s a m a n ^ and b r a h m a n ^ who perceive su ch rupa as aniccato, dukkhato, anattato, rogato, an d bhayato.] (2) M N.74 (vol. 1, p. 500) D i g h a n a k h a Sutta ayaih kho panaggivessana, kayo rupi catum ahabhutiko m atapettikasam b havo odanakum m asup acayo aniccucchadanaparim addanabhedanavid dhariisanad ham m o, aniccato dukkhato rogato gandato sallato aghato abadhato parato palokato su M a to anattato sam anupassitabbo. tassim arh kayaiii...sa m a n u p a ssa to yo kayasm irh kayachando kayasneho kayanvayata sa p ah iyati. (A ggivessana, th is body m ade of m aterial form, consisting of the four great elem ents, m ade up o f a m other and father, nurtured on rice and porridge, w h ich is su b ject to the n atu re of im perm anence, being w o rn and rubbed away, to d isso lu tio n an d disintegration. It should be regarded as im perm anent, as suffering, as disease, as a tumor, as a dart, as calam ity, as affliction, as alien, as disintegrating, as void, and as not-self. H e who cle a rly sees th u s,...h e abandons attachm ent to the body, the cra vin g after the body, and the cra v in g w h ich h a s the body as its basis.) 359

126 (3) M N.6 4 (vol. 1, p.435) M a ha-maluhkya sutta In th is s u t t a, the B uddha teaches the p a th to the abandonm ent o f the five lo w er fetters iprambhagiyani samyojanani). so yad eva tatth a hoti rupagataih vedanagataiii saiinagatam san kharag atam vinnanagataiii te dham m e aniccato d u k k h ato rogato gandato sa lla to aghato abadhato parato palokato sunnato an attato sa m a n u p a ssa ti. so teh i d h a m m e h i cittaih pativapeti. so tehi d h am m ehi cittarh pativapetva am ataya dhatuya cittarh u p asam h a ra ti.- etam santam etaih panitarii yad id aih sabbasarikharasam atho sabbupadhipatinissaggo tanhakkhayo virago nirodho nibbanan ti. (He soundly perceives the phenom ena of m a te ria l form, feeling, perception, form ations and consciousness as im p erm an ent, a s sufifering, a s a disease, a s a tum or, as a dart, a s a calam ity, as an affliction, as a lie n, as disintegrating, as void, and as not-self.** H e keeps h is m in d tu rn e d a w a y from those states and directs it tow ard s the death less elem ent thus: th is is the peaceful. T h is is the subum e, th at is, the s tillin g o f a ll form ations, the re lin q u ish in g of a ll attachm ent, the d estruction of craving, d ispassio n. In this sutta, we see the sentences w hich show the fact that the other sects try to confute the teaching of the Buddha. It is mentioned that the w anderers of other sects confute the bbikkhus with the sim ile of the infant. Th e sim ile of the infant means: Fo r young tender infant lying prone does not even have the notion personahty, so how could personality view lies w ithin him. To this confutation, the Buddha s explanation is that the underlying tendency {anusaya^ to personahty view lies w ithin him. [The sam e explanation is made for the other four lower fetters] (M N.64, v o L l, pp ). Here, two terms, impermanent and disintegration, show the characteristic of impermanence. And three terms, alien, void and not self^ show the characteristic of not self. The rem aining six terms, suffering etc., show the characteristic of suffering, {tattha aniccato, palokatoti, dvihi padebi aniccalakkhsmam kathitam, dukkhatoti-adhi chahi dukkhalakkhanam, parato sunnato anattatoti tibi anattalakkhanam) <MNA.vol.3, p. 146>. 360

127 cessation, Nibbina We notice, anatti is included into the ten k in d s of the n a tu re o f existence (khandhas) w hich one should know in order to abandon h is a tta ch m e n t T h e abandonm ent of attach m ent is exp lain ed here psychologically a s keep in g h is m ind tu rn aw ay from such sta te s as anicca, dukkha, rogato...anatta, and changing the direction of m ind tow ard s the d eath less elem en ts {amata dhatii), w h ich are explained as the peaceful, the sublim e, the sth ling of a ll form ations, the reu nquishing of a ll attachm ent, the destruction of craving, d ispassio n, cessation, an d Nibbana. Th ese ten kinds of the n a tu re of the existence are also m entioned in S N.X X II (vol2, pp ),^' A N. IV (vol. 2, p.l2 8 ) and A N.IX (vol.4, p.423, 424, 425). T h is group of ten epithets seem s to be a fin a l product o f these series, w h ich h a s been developed from the m ost b asic group of the anicca-dukkha-anatta by adding to them the new m em bers su ch as sunna, para etc. T h en, it ca n be said th at the anatta doctrine appearin g in a se rie s of su ch w ords is one of the developed form s of the anicca-dukkha-anatta teaching. ^ «M N.64vol.l, p In this sutta, Sariputta says that a virtuous bhikkhu should give proper attention to the five khandhas w hich are the objects of chnging as in ten w ays of nature. Cf. S. Mori, ibid. p.355; pp , and J.P. Remon, ibid. pp The verses of the Nikayas, for example, the Suttanipata 50-51, explain the nature of the existence (an individual hum an existence) in the unsophisticated way: Sen su al pleasures are indeed various, sweet and delightful, and upset the m ind by their illusions. Seeing the unhealthy resu lts of sensual pleasures let one w ander alone like a unicorn s horn. These [sensual pleasures] are the cause of calam ity, danger, disease, a dart and a fear to me. Observing this danger resulting fi-om sensu al pleasures let one hve alone Hke a unicorn s horn. {Kama hi citra m a d h u r a m a n o r a m a viruparupena mathenti cittaih; adlnavam kamagunesu disva, eko care khaggavisanakappo. Itica gsindo ca upaddavo ca rogo ca sallah ca bhayan ca m etaih, etaiii bhayaiii kamagunesu disva, eko care khaggavisanakappo) We can sa y that these statem ents in the Suttanipata are one of the original forms from w hich those series of statem ent in the prose p art of the Nikayas, have derived. Moreover, it 361

128 S im ila r exam ples are num erous. In S N.X X III (vol.3, p ), to e x p lain about five khandhas, the tw elve q u a lities are m entioned, v iz., mara, m a r a d h a m m a, anicca, aniccadhamma, dukkha, d h u k k h a d h a m m a, anatta, anattadhamma, k h a y a d h a m m a, v a y a d h a m m a, s a m u d a y a d h a m m a, an d n irodhahamma. Moreover, in S N.X X X V (vol.4, pp.28-29), a ll th in g s {sabbam) are explained to be aniccam, dukkham, anatta,^'^ abhinrieyyaih, parinneyyaih, pahatabbaiii, sacchikatabbaiti, abhinhaparinneyyam, upaddutaih, a n d upassatthaih. (B) T h e w ord anatta appears in a form o f perception anattasasna, together w ith o th er types of perception su ch a s aniccasanha, dukkhasanna, etc. (1) D N.1 6 (vol.2, p.79) Mahaparinibbana-suttanta Y avakivaii ca b h ikkhave bhikkhu an icca-sam am bhavessanti, a n a tta -sam a ih bhavessanti, asubha-saiiiiam bhavessanti, adinava-saiinarri b havessanti, pahana-saim arh bhavessanti, viraga-saniiam bhavessanti, nirodha-saiiiiarh b havessanti, vuddhi yeva b h ik kh ave bhikkhunarh patikankha no p arih an i. (Bhikkhus, as long as bhikkhus develop the perception of im p erm anence, of not-self, of im purity, of the danger, of overcom e, of dispassion, of cessatio n, they m ay be expected to prosper an d not decline.) should be noted that the word atta or antta is not used in the unsophisticated form of the sentence. There the one s individual existence is explained w ith the sim ple words w hich are self-evident truth according to one s actual experience in the world. ^ See, also SN.XXIII.23-34, (vol.3, pp ). sab b a m bhikkhave anatta. 362

129 T h is is an exam ple w hich is called the sevenfold perception. A l s o the fivefold perception, the sixfold perception, the ninefold perception and the tenfold perception appear in the prose p art o f the Nikayas, esp e cially a t m an y p la ces in the Anguttara Nikaya} ~ T h e se sevenfold perceptions are given as one of the conditions le a d in g to w elfare. T h e six lists of the seven [six] conditions w h ich le ad to w elfa re a re explained in the Maha-Parinibbana-suttanta (from p ara.6 to para. 11 in ch a p te r I, vol.2. p p.76-80), and the above sentence in w h ich the perception o f n o t-self is includ ed is given in the list of the five. T h e first list teaches seven k in d s o f id e a l conditions fi'om m oral point of view for exam ple, to assem ble fi*equently; to appoint no new rule and not to abolish the existin g ones; to show respect to w ard s the eld er bhikkhu, etc. -, the second also teaches id eal condition of the b h i k k h u for exam ple, not to dehght in activities, talk, sleep, and com pany; not to harbor, not to have bad friends, etc -. T h e la te r lists are ex p lan atio n s of more dogm atic. Therefore, as G.C. Pande points o u t, it seem s reasonable to support th a t the la te r lists w ere added as su p plem en tary teachings. T h is is good evidence to The fouowing texts mention the sevenfold perceptions: DN. 16 vol.2, p.79; D N.33 vol.3, p253; DN.34 vol.3, p.383; AN.voL4, p.46; A N.vol.4, pp.46-53; A N.vol.4, p p p sd. p.670. B PSD. pp Such perceptions have not classified in the groups depending on the numbers in the strict sense of the word. They som etim es differ according to the texts in Pali and the corresponding Chinese translations (S. Mori, ibid. p. 319). A N.V I (vol4, p. 46) mentions the fouowing seven perceptions: asubhasanna, maranasaniia, ihare patikulasanfia, sabbaloke SLnabhiratasanna, aniccasanna, anicce dukkhasanna, a n d dukkhe anattasanna. AN. IX (vol4, p. 384) says the ninefold perceptions (pahanasama and viragasahna are added to the seven). A N.X (vol.5, p. 105) and A N.X (vol.5, pp ) say the tenfold perceptions in w hich nirodha-sanna is added as the tenth. G.C. Pande, Studies in the Origins of Buddhism, p He states: The lists appear to have been successively added m erely in order to enhance their prestige, w ith the result that we have now a veritable cascade of them. H. Nakamiura states that probably only the first seven conditions were originally taught in order to teach the morahty, because those seven morauties are taught individually in other places of the Nikayas (For example, AN. V II, 20. See, H. Nakam ura, Gotama Buddha, vol2, p.85). 363

130 show th at the not-self teaching in the form o f anattasanaa w a s form ed re la tiv e ly at la te r stag e in the history of doctrin al developm ent. (2 )A N.IX (vol.4, p.353) asubha bhavetabba ragassa pahanaya, m etta bhavetabba byapadassa p ahanaya, anapanassati bhavetabba vitakkupacch edaya, aniccasaiiiia bhavetabba asm im anasam ugghataya. aniccasaim ino, b h ik kh ave, an attasaniia santhati. anattasafifii asm im anasam ugghataiii papunati dittheva dham m e n ib b anan ti. (H e should develop [contem plation of] the u n a ttractive so as to abandon lu st. H e should develop good w ill so as to abandon ill wiu. H e sh o uld develop m in dfu ln ess of in and out b reath in g so a s to cut off destru ctive th in k in g. H e should develop the perception of im p erm an ence so as to uproot the conceit, I am. F o r a m onk perceiving im p erm an en ce, the perception of n o t-self is m ade firm. One perceiving not-self a tta in s the uprooting of the conceit I am, th at is, nibbana in the here and now.) (3) A N.V I (vol. 3, p.447) assadaditthiya pahanaya aniccasafma bhavetabba attanuditthiya p ahanaya anattasanna bhavetabba, micchaditthiya pah anaya sam m aditthi bhavetabba. (F o r rem oval of the view of gratification, the perception of im p erm an ence should be developed. F o r rem o val of the view of one self, the p erception of not-self should be developed. F o r rem o val of the w rong view, the rig h t view should be developed.) See, also AN.IX (vol4, p.354). 364

131 (4 )A N.V II(v o l.4, p.53) d u k k h e anattasanna, b h ikkh ave, bhavita b ah u likata m ahap p h ala h o ti m ahanisatiisa amatogadha am atap ariyo sana ti, iti kho panetarii vnttaih. kincetarh paticca vuttarh? d u k k h e an attasan nap ariciten a, b h ik k h a v e, b h ik kh u n o cetasa bahulaih vih a ra to im asm in ca savinnanake kaye b ah id d h a ca sab b an im ittesu ahankaram am ahkaram anapagatam m anasaih hoti vid h asam atikkan tam santam su vim u ttam. (The perception of n o t-self in w h a t is painful, w hen fostered and m ade to grow, is of great fruit, plu n ged into the deathless, having the d eath le ss a s its ultim ate goal. T h is h a s been so said, w h y h as it been so said? T h e m in d o f a bhikkhu who dw ells w ith the m ind fu ll of the aw areness of n ot-self in w h a t is p ain fu l is freed from the conceit expressed by I and m ine w ith re la tio n to th is consciousness-inform ed body and in a ll extern al signs; h avin g su rp a sse d a ll conceit, [his m in d is] pacified, freed...) (5) S N.LV.3 (vol.5, p. 345) Id h a tvam Dighavu sabbesankharesu aniccanupassi vih arah i, anicce dukkhasaiiiii dukkhe anattasaiiiii p ah a n asam i virag asam i nirodhasaniii ti. Evarii h i te Dighavu sik k h ita b b a n ti. (H e re in Dighavu, you sh ould dw ell regarding im perm anence in a ll com pound things, aw are of p ain in w h a t is im perm anent, aw are of non-self in w h a t is painful, aw are of detachm ent, aw are of cessation. T h u s, Digbhavu, you should tra in yourself.). T h e teaching of perceiving som ething a s not-self frequently stated in the se v e ra l expressions had been condensed in the w ord anattasanna as a te ch n ical 365

132 term, on the process of the com pilation o f the Nikayas. T h e w ord anattasanna seem s to have been formed re la tiv e ly n ew ly in the la te r h isto ry o f E a r ly B u d d h ism. T h e teaching contained in the term anattasanna can be found a t m an y p laces especially in the Anguttara Nikaya}^ W h at the p assa g e s m entioned above m akes clear is th a t 'anattasanna rela te s stro n g ly to the teaching of getting rid of the w rong notion o f I or s e lf {ahankara, m a m a n k a r a, a s m i m a n a and attanudi^i). Th ose who exercise the perception of anatta are sa id to be not fixed to (anodhiso). A N. X (vol.5, p. 109) explain s the p ercep tio n of anatta in a p ractical sense. katam a cananda, anattasam a? id hanand a, b h ik k h u a ram ag ato va rukkham ulagato va sufmagaragato va iti p atisa n cik kh a ti - ca k k h u anatta, rupa anatta, sotarh anatta sadda anatta, ghanarii anatta... iti im esu ch a su ajjh attikh ab ah ire su ayatanesu a n a tta n u p a ssi v ih a rati. ayam vuccatan an da, anattasafiiia. (H erein, Ananda, a bhik kh u, goes eith er to the forest, o r to the root of a tree, or to a lonely spot, reflects thus; the eye is not-self; the form s are not-self, the ear is not-self, sounds a re not-self, the sense of sm e ll is not- self,... T h u s he dw ells contem plating n o t-self in the sixfold sp here o f sense, in te rn a l as w ell as external. T h is is called, A nan d a, the perception o f not- self.) T h e w ord anattsansa app ears in the both sty le s: in the context in w h ic h it It is said that many of the suttas of the Anguttara Nikiya show the beginnings of the texts of the Abhidhamma. (K an ai L a i H azra, Pali Language a n d Literature, vol 1, pp.252). The lateness of the Anguttara Nikaya in the Nikayaa is discussed also in the following book: H. N akam ura, Socialldeasin Early B u d d h i a m [Gensi B u k k y o n o Syakai Sisdi, p

133 is taught w ith relation to the anicca & d u k k h a and in the context in w h ich it is taught w ith o u t any relation to them (used a ll by itself). J.P. R em on points o u t th at those exam ples used by all its e lf w ith o u t a n y logical relatio n to anicca and d u k k h a h ad a great sh are in the developm ent of the idea of absolute anatta. H e com pletely disagrees to such in terp retatio n o i anattasanna a s absolute negation w hich is often translated as the id ea of the absence of a n y so u l.^ ' A s R em on pointed out, it should be understood th a t 'anattasanna also m eans b a sica lly the sam e w ith the not-self doctrine rep resen ted by the w ay of the three negative p h rases, the four ontological negations, and the w ord 'anatta, as w e have observed in the preceding sections. H owever, it should be noted as a m a tte r of im portance th at there alw ays lu rked the possib ih ty th at the m eaning of the w ord anattasanna w ould be wrongly in terp reted as an absolute negation of atta. A n d it is also to be kept in m ind that w h a t the word 'atta of' attasanna cam e to m ean, in the process of its development, w a s som ething e tern al existin g objectively. J.P. Remon, pp Taking a statem ent in A N.III, the SaMasutta (vol.4, p.24) [= DN.16, the Mahaparinibbana Sutta (vol.2, p.79)] as one of the exam ples, he states; We m ay deem these to be transitional texts that by dint of the repetition were among the causes why later Buddhism, losing sight of the restrictions imposed on anatta by the early texts, came eventually to accept the doctrine of absolute anatta{z.v. Remon, ib id p.205). T.W. and C.A F. Rhys, Dialogues of the Buddha, II, p