Moral Responsibilities and Extreme Poverty: Rethinking Our Affluent Lifestyle

Transcription

1 1 Moral Responsibilities and Extreme Poverty: Rethinking Our Affluent Lifestyle Introduction: Approximately 1.5 billion people one-quarter of all human beings alive today live below the international poverty line million people experience malnourishment. 114 million children do not attend elementary school. Each year, 10.8 million children die under the age of five due to malnourishment and preventable diseases. 1.2 billion people do not have access to improved water sources. 2.4 billion lack access to adequate sanitation. Extreme poverty is by far the number-one cause of human misery. In 1998, approximately 1.3 million deaths resulted from war, homicides, and violence, while starvation and preventable diseases claimed 18 times that; deaths due to poverty-related causes, such as malnutrition and diseases that can be prevented or cured cheaply, account for one-third of all human deaths. 2 And the problem is only worsening; according to philosopher Thomas Pogge, The number of persons who are poor rose from 1.2 billion in 1987 to 1.5 billion [in 1999] and, if recent trends persist, will reach 1.9 billion by Much philosophical, economic, and political debate has ensued over whether the disparity between affluent nations and impoverished nations engenders moral obligations for individuals to act. While it is possible that institutions have moral responsibilities to alleviate extreme poverty, here I am primarily concerned with the responsibilities of affluent individuals 3 for several reasons: first, we are able to alter our individual behaviors, if morally required, immediately in response to the urgency of the suffering and death caused by extreme poverty, whereas changes within institutional settings are

2 2 often gradual and more complex; and second, to avoid hypocrisy, we should ask what responsibilities we have before pointing to others to change. Some, such as Garret Hardin, Herschel Elliot, and Rudiger Bittner, argue that we do not have a moral obligation to alleviate extreme poverty. Hardin and Elliot argue that giving aid results in more harm than good, arguing that the earth is like a lifeboat with limited resources, First, we must recognize the limited capacity of any lifeboat. For example, a nation's land has a limited capacity to support a population and as the current energy crisis has shown us, in some ways we have already exceeded the carrying capacity of our land (593). Bittner argues that world hunger is a political problem and cannot be adequately addressed as a moral issue (27). Others argue that we do have a strong moral obligation to give aid to those in impoverished nations; yet they disagree on how much we are morally obligated to sacrifice. Peter Singer, Jonathon Glover and Peter Unger argue that we are morally obligated to give away most of [our] financially valuable assets, and much of [our] income 4 in effort to alleviate extreme poverty. 5 While Mylan Engel and Raziel Abelson, agree that we should give, they reject the high standards proposed by Singer, Glover, and Unger. Abelson argues that due to our moral obligations to those who are emotionally close, we are not morally obligated to give as much as Singer, Glover, and Unger demand, arguing instead I am willing to meet them partway, by conceding that we can and should give more than we usually do to worthy philanthropic causes like famine relief and Amnesty International, while still maintaining that we owe more to intimates than to strangers (39). In an attempt to convince his audience that they should give aid, Engel argues that we are obligated to give only a small amount of aid to

3 3 those living in extreme poverty: If you can help reduce the amount of unnecessary suffering in the world with minimal effort on your part, with no risk to yourself or others, with no noticeable reduction in your standards of living or the standard of living of your dependents, and without thereby failing to fulfill any other more pressing obligation, then you ought to do so (432). Yet, each of these arguments is limited. The goal of this paper is to synthesize and build upon previously made arguments to provide a cohesive and compelling argument outlining why we are morally obligated to alleviate extreme poverty and how we should fulfill this obligation. Influenced by virtue ethics, I argue that individuals of affluent nations have a moral obligation to alleviate poverty that includes giving a significant 6 portion of our income to poverty-relief organizations and changing our habits of consumption in a salient 7 way. To reach this conclusion, I argue that extreme poverty is a moral issue, someone should do something to alleviate extreme poverty, and, more specifically, affluent individuals are obligated to alleviate extreme poverty. The first step to providing a compelling case for why we are morally obligated to alleviate the burdens experienced by those in extreme poverty is to show that the issue of extreme poverty is of moral concern. Bittner argues that world hunger is not a moral issue because, he claims, 1) morality concerns only those who are close to us and 2) world hunger is not imputable and morality does not deal with situations in which there is no identifiable cause or agent whom is responsible. Bittner first argues that moral obligations are restricted to those who are close to us. As those who are affected by world hunger are not close to us, Bittner concludes that there is no viable moral understanding of world hunger (27). Bittner does not give specific criteria for the term close, but

4 4 affirms that if he were to draw out specific criteria, those experiencing world hunger would come out on the not close side (28). Bittner s second argument is that world hunger is not imputable, and thus cannot be a moral issue, but rather must be relegated as a political concern. 8 He claims that nothing of even moderate political significance is done in our day by just one or a few individual actors The outcome, therefore, is not clearly anybody s doing in particular (30). Bittner claims that we do not have a clear understanding of who brought about world hunger or who is bringing it about, and thus it cannot be assigned moral weight or addressed in moral terms. Bittner s argument that we do not have moral obligations to give aid to those in impoverished nations because they are not close to us is not convincing for several reasons. First, one could argue that in our new globalized era, we are close to those living in distant nations; we are highly dependent upon people in other nations and our actions here have consequences for people living there. Bittner anticipates that one could argue that we are, in fact, close to those living in distant nations as the current state of the world brings people closer through economic, political, and social exchange. Bittner responds that this is not what he means by close, explaining that we do not experience life with those who suffer from world hunger; there is really no cosmopolis, no city of the world, if by a city we mean the place of a shared life (29). Yet, even if Bittner is correct, 9 one could still argue that despite the lack of proximity to those in distant nations, we still have moral obligations toward them. We have moral obligations to refrain from harming other human beings, regardless of their closeness to us. It is morally wrong to send off and detonate weapons that kill innocent distant civilians, even if these civilians are faceless and nameless individuals living thousands of miles away from us. Perhaps

5 5 what Bittner means is that we have different of moral obligations for those who are close to us and those who are distant. If such a difference existed, our obligations to those in distant nations would not be non-existent, but rather of a different nature. 10 Thus, it appears that Bittner s argument concerning the proximity to us of those in distant nations does not support the argument that extreme global poverty is not a moral issue. 11 While Bittner may be correct in his claim that world hunger cannot easily be attributed to the specific actions of specific individuals, it does not necessarily follow that the issue of world poverty is not of moral concern. One could argue that instead of concluding that world hunger is not a moral issue, we should look to principles other than imputability to guide our moral judgment. In Distributing Responsibilities, David Miller examines four different principles of moral judgment: causation, moral responsibility, capacity, and community. 12 Upon examination of these four principles, Miller acknowledges that none of them are adequate on their own for distributing remedial responsibilities. Thus, he concludes that an acceptable theory of remedial responsibility would combine all four principles into one mutli-principle theory in which we should simply look to see which principle or principles apply in a particular case, and if we find that more than one applies, we should weigh their respective strengths (464, 466, 467). Miller calls this approach the connection theory, meaning that each of the four principles provides a way to identify the remedial connection between an agent and a harmed individual (469). Miller argues that by providing multiple criteria through the connection theory, it is ensured that there is always some agent who can be assigned responsibility for remedying P s condition (471).

6 6 Thus, while Bittner may be correct that it is difficult, if not impossible, 13 to attribute the situation of world poverty to specific individuals, implying that the principle of causation is not helpful here, there are still other principles that may offer guidance for who is morally responsible to alleviate extreme poverty, such as the principle of moral responsibility, the principle of capacity, and the principle of community. For example, while we may not know who pushed a drowning child into the lake, we can still look to other principles to determine who is morally responsible to jump in and save the youngster. 14 I do not intend to flesh out each of the principles here, Miller provides an indepth analysis of each principle in his essay, but rather I hope to show that moral responsibility is not solely dependent upon causation, and thus Bittner s claim that we cannot determine the specific responsible parties of world poverty does not necessarily imply that world poverty is not of moral concern. Bittner s two premises, that we do not have moral obligations to those who are not close and we do not have moral obligations for situations that are not imputable, prove to be unconvincing reasons for why the issue of world poverty should be relegated as a political, rather than moral, issue. As world poverty involves harm and suffering of other human beings, regardless of their distance to us or the catalysts of the problem, and proves to be a moral issue, many moral questions arise about what should be done and by who to alleviate such suffering and remedy such harms. Someone Should do Something to Alleviate Extreme Poverty While those who have written on alleviating extreme poverty often disagree on who should give and how much should be given, most agree that the moral seriousness

7 7 and urgency of extreme poverty indicate that someone should to something to alleviate world poverty. Even Bittner claims that world hunger is important and should be addressed as a political concern (31). As Mylan Engel claims, in Hunger, Duty, and Ecology: What we Owe to Starving Humans, most of us believe that human suffering is a bad thing, agreeing that it is bad when an innocent [person] suffers a slow painful death from starvation (430). Furthermore, we agree that human suffering should be alleviated or ended, and thus it follows that a moral obligation for someone to do something to alleviate extreme poverty exists. Yet, some reject this claim. Herschel Elliot, in A General Statement of the Tragedy of the Commons, argues that while extreme poverty may be a moral issue, there is no moral obligation to assist those suffering from extreme poverty because doing so brings about more harms than if we were to let these people die. Because human consumption and waste is beginning to exceed Earth s finite biosystem, Elliot argues that we are morally obligated to control the human population in order to minimize these environmental pressures and destruction. Controlling human population, according to Elliot, includes allowing those to die in impoverished nations. Elliot claims that those who follow humanitarian ethics in effort to save human lives actually contribute to the pressure on the earth: Thus severally and in conjunction, people from the selfish individualists who seek to maximize personal wealth to the most self-sacrificing altruists who devote their entire lives to the elimination of inequality, injustice, and human suffering all work together to take more land, more water, more fuels, and biological resources away from all other living things (6).

8 8 Thus, we are not morally obligated to act to prevent suffering caused by extreme poverty, according to Elliot; in fact, we are morally obligated to not act to alleviate those suffering in distant nations as doing so brings about more harm than good. Garret Hardin, whom Elliot writes in defense of, also argues that there is no moral obligation to alleviate extreme poverty in distant nations. In, The Case Against Helping the Poor, Hardin compares the earth to a lifeboat in which the rich are sitting in and the poor are struggling to climb aboard. Hardin argues that if we start letting people into our boat, which has a minimum capacity that is already near full, the boat will become overcrowded and sink, resulting in everyone, rich and poor, drowning. Even if we did pull some poor swimmers into our lifeboat, Hardin argues, the lifeboat would be quickly overpopulated and sink in the near future, thus costing more lives than would be lost in the present. In comparison to giving aid, Hardin and Elliot argue, if we save those who are starving now, they will have many more children, as the birth rates of underdeveloped countries are high, and then these children will not be able to be fed and even more people will be starving in the future. While Hardin specifically refers to International Humanitarian Aid organizations, such as a potential World Food Bank or the Food for Peace program of the 1960s and 70s, his overall message pertains to all. He concludes that those in impoverished nations (struggling to survive in the dark sea) should not be rescued by those in affluent nations (those already in the lifeboat); thus institutions, and one could infer individuals, should not give humanitarian aid to those in distant countries. While Elliot and Hardin raise valid concerns about limited resources, such concerns do not support the claim that we are not obligated to give aid to those that would otherwise die in other nations. In fact, as I will show, it is possible to give aid

9 9 without overburdening the earth. First, we can give aid without overburdening the environment because studies of trends on birth rates and gross national product show that as living-standards within a nation increase, birth rates decrease. 15. Elliot and Hardin s concern that saving those living in extreme poverty will lead to more births and therefore more deaths in the future is not supported; in fact, if we gave aid to other nations and increased their living standards, we would expect to see a decrease in population growth while at the same time saving millions of lives. In addition, while saving more lives within impoverished nations may potentially increase the demand on the earth s system of resources, this demand can be countered by a decrease in affluent nations consumption. In A Special Moment in History: The Challenge of Overpopulation and Overconsumption, Bill McKibben claims that the average American consumes more energy per day than the average human being, consuming at least six times more calories. 16 Thus, any increase in demands on the earth s resources brought about by aiding those in starving nations can easily be countered by a slight decrease in the consumption habits of those in affluent nations. If we look at the earth s finite system in this way, in which we can counter increased demands by decreasing demands elsewhere, we see that Elliot and Hardin s concerns about giving aid to others can be addressed and resolved, thus eliminating their claim that we should not alleviate extreme poverty. Finally, Elliot and Hardin s concerns of increased pressure on the earth due to increased population size can be addressed by endorsing specific types of aid. Concerns of population growth should not deter us from giving aid, but rather lead us to reconsider what type of aid we are giving to those in impoverished nations, as Singer suggests, Instead of food handouts, it may be better to give aid that leads to a slowing of

10 10 population growth. This may mean agricultural assistance for the rural poor, or assistance with education, or the provision of contraceptive services (240). Thus, as Hardin and Elliot s concern of overpopulation can be resolved, appeal to the potential problems raised by giving aid does not justify the argument that we should not give and the argument that someone should do something to alleviate extreme poverty is not rejected. 17 Affluent Individuals Obligation to Alleviate Extreme Poverty Once we have established that someone must do something to alleviate extreme poverty, the question follows: who should do something? While there may be many equally correct answers to this question, I am specifically concerned with arguing that individuals of affluent nations, those like you and me who live in wealthy nations and have our basic needs secured and live well above the international poverty line, 18 must do something to alleviate extreme poverty. One may object that affluent individuals do not have a moral obligation to help those in extreme poverty, but rather those countries in extreme poverty should be responsible for their own people. While governments, organizations, and individuals in impoverished nations may have specific obligations to those within their own political and cultural boundaries, they alone cannot alleviate the burdens of extreme poverty. The Human Development Report 2003 emphasizes the need of a Millennium Development Compact 19 because structural impediments, such as widespread disease, geographic isolation, fragile ecologies, overdependence on primary commodity exports, and rapid population growth, keep poor countries trapped in poverty, with low or negative economic growth (italics added, 17). Impoverished countries oftentimes lack the necessary tools for escaping poverty and face numerous economic,

11 11 social, political, and physical occlusions. Because of this and for reasons I will expand upon shortly, I conclude that affluent individuals do in fact have an obligation to do something to alleviate extreme poverty. To address concerns and arguments of other philosophers, understand why we may have moral obligation to those in extreme poverty, and further define how we can fulfill these obligations, I have found the principle of the golden mean from the theory of virtue ethics to be insightful. The theory of virtue ethics holds that the proper function, or purpose, of human 20 life is to live in accordance with the best and most complete virtues or excellence (191) Virtue pertains to excellence of the soul (or mind), not simply excellence of the body (197), and can be divided into two types of virtue: intellectual and moral (198). Intellectual virtues include theoretical wisdom, understanding, and practical wisdom; moral virtues include generosity and self-control. When speaking of a person s character, we refer to the moral virtues. Here, I am primarily concerned with moral virtue, as I am arguing for a moral obligation. To live in accordance with virtue implies more than just possessing virtuous characteristics, For a characteristic may exist without producing any good result, as for example, in a man who is asleep or incapacitated in some other respect (193). To live in accordance with virtue requires that humans engage in actions that conform to virtue (193). Moral virtue is developed by habit; in the same way we learn bad habits through repeated action, we must learn and master virtuous habits through repeated action (199). Thus, to fulfill our human purpose is to strive, through repeated virtuous action, to become a virtuous person. To determine what constitutes a virtuous action we must look for the mean of moral qualities, as the nature of moral qualities is such that they are destroyed by defect

12 12 and by excess (200). To illustrate this claim, Aristotle provides an analogy of strength and health, excess as well as deficiency of physical exercise destroys our strength, and similarly, too much and too little food and drink destroys our health; the proportionate amount, however, produces, increases, and preserves it (italics added, 200). Aristotle claims every continuous entity, including characteristics and actions, has a median which is a point equidistant from both extremes (203). For example, in feelings of fear and confidence, courage is the median between recklessness (an excess of confidence and complete deficiency of fear) and cowardliness (an excess of fear and deficiency in confidence) (205). The extremes are vices and the medians are virtues. To become virtuous individuals, we must avoid the excess and deficiency of characteristics and actions and instead aim for the median (207). 21 Keeping this principle of the median in mind, as well as previous arguments, let us examine arguments for why and how we should alleviate extreme poverty in distant nations. First, as many have previously argued, we are obligated to act to alleviate extreme poverty because we have the capacity to do so (Singer, 230; Abelson, 39; Miller, 460; Engel, 433). If an agent has the ability to help someone and chooses not to do so, that agent is oftentimes judged as morally flawed. If an agent walked by a pond and saw a small child drowning, and the agent happened to have a life-ring in her hands which she could easily throw to the drowning child, she would be morally obligated to attempt to save the child by at least throwing out the life-ring. In this scenario, the agent has the capacity to save another human life without bringing about risk to herself or others; she simply has to toss the ring to the child. The moral obligation of this situation may differ from the moral obligation of a situation in which the agent did not have the life-ring and

13 13 swimming in to save the child may have endangered the agent s well-being, and therefore the agent s capacity to help or get help, for example if the agent did not have the ability to swim. Virtue not only requires that we move to the midpoint of two extremes, but also that we act at the right time, toward the right objects, toward the right people, for the right reason, and in the right manner (203). Thus in the case where one does not have the capacity to swim, we would understand that to act to save the child would be reckless and foolish, and thus the agent would not be excessive or deficient in her inaction. Yet, in the situation where the agent does have the capacity to help, we can see that she should help the child, regardless of whether she caused or was in other ways responsible for the child s situation. In the case of extreme poverty, affluent individuals have the capacity to save those in the life-threatening situation of absolute poverty. A donation of 15 cents can be used to give a child living in extreme poverty a life-saving packet of oral rehydration salts and a donation of 25 cents could be used to give a child life-saving antibiotics for acute respiratory infection (Engel, 426). Each day, approximately 6,350 children die from the dehydrating effects of chronic diarrhea and another 6,350 die from acute respiratory infections. A donation of $10 per month, over the course of a year, would prevent 40 children from dying soon (Engel, 434). Those individuals in affluent nations clearly have the capacity to give at least 10 cents to save one life; in fact our lifestyle provides us with the capacity to give much much more. Just as we are morally obligated to save the drowning child, our capacity to help those in impoverished nations also results in moral obligation to do so.

14 14 Secondly, affluent individuals are now engaged in a new type of relationship with global strangers involving stronger connections and a larger community. Through new technologies, increased international trade, and increased mobility, we are now more connected than ever before to those who live across the world. We are highly dependent upon those living in other nations; most of our fruits and vegetables are grown in Southern and Central America, 22 most of our gasoline is produced by individuals in the Middle East and East Africa, 23 and most of our clothes are made by individuals in Southeast Asia. 24 Also, our media is full of stories about people in distant countries; we are aware of their daily widespread plight. More than ever are we connected to and interactive with, through economic and political institutions, other individuals in our global community. In addition to becoming economically interconnected to those in distant nations, we are also environmentally interconnected. We share the same air, water, and natural resources with those living in distant countries. Air pollution, rapid deforestation, unsafe water, and hazardous waste are not restrained by man-made borders that separate nations. For example, increased emissions of greenhouse gasses in the United States affects those in other countries just as much, and sometimes more, than those living here in the United States. While different geographic regions contain different ecosystems, they are all interconnected to create the larger global ecosystem of which we all rely upon and belong to. As we are economically and environmentally interconnected on a global scale, our actions affect more people living in other countries. As a consumer of global products, my purchasing affects producers in South and Central America, the Middle East

15 15 and East Africa, and Southeast Asia. As a consumer of global resources, my consumption affects the environment of those living near and far. Our actions have consequences for others living in distant nations and we are causally responsible for these consequences, regardless of where they take place. For example, if I put a bomb on a plane that detonates 15,000 miles away and kills complete strangers, I am responsible for the consequences of my action. If our actions bring economic and environmental harm to those in distant nations and we remain unconcerned about the pain and suffering inflicted upon those distant individuals, it seems that we would be engaging in the vice of brutish behavior. 25 In contrast, to act virtuously would be to show compassion for those in distant nations and act in ways that do not bring harm to our fellow community members. As individuals of affluent nations have the capacity to help, are part of a new globalized community in which our actions affect those in distant nations, and would be morally vicious to fail to act, they must act to alleviate extreme poverty. We Must Give a Significant Portion of our Income To fulfill our obligation to alleviate extreme poverty, we, affluent individuals, must give a significant portion 26 of our income to organizations that work to mitigate the suffering experienced by those in extreme poverty. As noted previously, many agree that we have an obligation to give aid to those living in extreme poverty, though they differ on the appropriate amount. In contrast to previous arguments, I propose that we need to give a significant portion of our income, meaning not too much, as is proposed by Singer, Unger, and Glover, nor too little, as is proposed by Engel and Abelson. First, the standard proposed by Singer, Unger and Glover is problematic because it is excessive. This standard is identified as the standard of marginal utility, Singer

16 16 presents this standard in his argument, it follows that I and everyone else in similar circumstances ought to give as much as possible, that is, at least up to the point at which by giving more one would begin to cause serious suffering for oneself and one's dependents - perhaps even beyond this point to the point of marginal utility, at which by giving more one would cause oneself and one's dependents as much suffering as one would prevent in Bengal. 27 Those who endorse the standard of marginal utility argue that we must give most of our wealth to those living in extreme poverty if we are to escape moral guilt. Peter Unger writes, On pain of living a life that s seriously immoral, a typical well-off person, like you and me, must give away most of her financially valuable assets, and much of her income, directing the funds to lessen efficiently the serious suffering of others (134). According to Jonathon Glover It is arguable that we would have to give money to fight starvation up to the point where we needed it more than those we were helping: perhaps to the point where we would die without it. For not to do so would be to allow more people to die and this would be like murder (93). This guideline is problematic because instead of showing concern and giving within the mean, Unger and Glover demand that we give an excess, to the point where we ourselves may almost need assistance. According to Aristotle, such excess, though perhaps well intentioned, does not constitute virtuous action. Aristotle describes the vices and virtues of money: With regard to giving and taking of money the mean is liberality, the excess and the defect prodigality and meanness. In these actions people exceed and fall short in contrary ways; the prodigal exceeds in spending and falls short in taking, while the mean man exceeds in taking and falls short in spending. With regard to money

17 17 there are also other dispositions- a mean, magnificence (for the magnificent man differs from the liberal man; the former deals with large sums, the latter with small ones), an excess, tastelessness and vulgarity, and a deficiency, niggardliness; these differ from the states opposed to liberality, and the mode of their difference will be stated later In giving, the two vices would be to give an excessively large amount or a deficiently small amount. To give an excessively large amount would be to give so much that we ourselves would be in need of assistance. While Singer, Glover, and Unger do not claim we should give so much that we ourselves need assistance, they do claim that we should give almost up to that point. Clearly, this large amount is not the median of giving because it is much closer to the line of excess than the midpoint. To give up to the point where we ourselves would need assistance would leave us in financially unstable conditions and increase the chances of us being unable to meet our basic needs, thus putting ourselves in potential danger of falling into poverty. For example, this happens often for those living in or near poverty in the United States. For those who live from pay-check to pay-check which seems to be what Singer, Glover, and Unger are endorsing small things, such as medical bills or a cut back in hours at work can push a person into poverty or homelessness. Furthermore, because of this potential harm, we cannot be considered morally guilty if we do not follow this standard. Perhaps it is morally problematic if we do not at least give something to those in extreme poverty, but we are not necessarily comparable to murders if we do not give most all. Because following the standard of marginal utility increases greatly the risk of being unable to meet our basic needs, this standard for giving is not desirable or satisfactory. To act in

18 18 such a way is excessive and far from the median of giving and thus is not a compelling argument for how much we ought to give. Engel and Abelson are also critical of the demanding standard proposed by Singer, Unger, and Glover, though for different reasons than the vice of excessive giving. Engel claims that such demanding standards are not compelling enough to motivate people to act, and thus he proposes a more plausible principle: Other things being equal, if you can prevent an innocent person from dying with minimal effort, with no noticeable reduction in your standard of living or the standard of living of your dependents, with no risk to yourself or others, and without thereby failing to fulfill any other more pressing obligation, then you ought to do so (432). Clearly, this claim asks very little of us. Specifically, Engel argues that we must give approximately 2% of our annual income to famine-relief organizations, as doing so would reduce suffering and cause no noticeable difference to our standard of living. Engel claims that this modest principle is sufficient and appealing because those who hold common beliefs, such as human suffering is bad and a decent person would help someone who was suffering, must accept this principle on the grounds of consistency. Abelson finds the demands of Singer, Unger, and Glover problematic because they do not take into account the special obligations we have to those who are close to us. He claims that most of us could afford to sacrifice luxuries in effort to relieve world suffering, though if we don t, we are not to be considered murderers, as is argued by Unger, Glover, and others. Though he claims that the demanding utilitarian argument to give to the standard of marginal utility is overblown, Abelson argues that we can and should give more to strangers through international organizations, but still maintains that

19 19 we have stronger obligations to those of higher emotional closeness, and therefore should not sacrifice what we owe to the latter to help the former. While the standards proposed by Singer, Unger, and Glover are problematic, the standards of giving proposed by Engel and Abelson are also problematic. In contrast to the vice of Singer, Unger, and Glover s excessive demand, the standards proposed by Engel and Abelson are deficient; they require too little of us and allow us to continue to engage in our greedy, and thus vicious, ways. Aristotle characterizes the deficiency of giving money as the vice of meanness and selfishness. While Engel and Abelson recognize that we have a large capacity to help those in impoverished nations, they argue that we are not obligated to give so much that our standard of living would significantly change; if an agent were to give more, he would be exceeding his moral obligations. 28 This emphasis on maintaining our living standard is problematic because it leads Engel and Abelson to greedily limit the amount that we should give. While we may have the capacity to give 10 percent, 20 percent, or even 50 percent of our income, Engel only advocates 1-2 percent while Abelson simply encourages us to give more than we currently do, which may still be a small amount. Giving such amounts, though potentially helpful to some, is still stingy. In the same way that Singer, Glover, and Unger approach the excessive vice of giving too much, Engel and Abelson approach the deficient vice of giving nothing at all. In contrast to proponents of giving most all of our income and proponents of giving only a small amount, I argue that we are morally obligated to give not a small, nor large amount, but rather a significant amount. To give a significant amount means that we give more than would be unnoticeable to us, but less than would put ourselves on the

20 20 edge of poverty. For example, as a college student with a very small income, perhaps if I gave 20 percent of my income, I would be on the edge of poverty, but I could give one percent of my income with no noticeable change in my standard of living. Either of these would be near extreme, and thus not the appropriate amount to give. Thus, I would conclude that I should give 10 percent of my income, which would be a significant amount. But, the intermediate amount will differ for each individual. This is why I do not say we are all obligated to give X percent our income. Instead, I argue that we should all give a significant portion, which may slightly differ from individual to individual. Aristotle explains that the intermediate is not the same for all, and therefore we cannot set objective standards: if ten pounds are too much for a particular person to eat and two too little, it does not follow that the trainer will order six pounds; for this also is perhaps too much for the person who is to take it, or too little- too little for Milo, too much for the beginner in athletic exercises. The same is true of running and wrestling. Thus a master of any art avoids excess and defect, but seeks the intermediate and chooses this- the intermediate not in the object but relatively to us. Perhaps to some, a significant portion of income is 40 percent; to others, a significant portion may be 5 percent. For example, while I conclude that 10 percent is the significant portion that I could give, a billionaire, like Bill Gates the world s richest man would still be greedy if he only gave 10 percent of his income. If Bill gates gave 10 percent of his income, he would have $45 billion remaining and most likely notice no

21 21 change to his standard of living. Thus, giving 10 percent for someone like Bill Gates would be deficient while for myself it would be the median. In short, to fulfill our obligation to alleviate extreme poverty we must give a significant portion of our income to poverty-relief organizations because we would be morally excessive to give most all of our wealth and would be morally deficient to give little to none. Thus, the appropriate mean for giving is to give to the extent that we notice a significant change in our lifestyle, but also not so much that we ourselves are almost insecure in our meeting our basic needs. We are Morally Obligated to Change Our Consumption Habits While we are morally obligated to give financial aid to those living in extreme poverty to fulfill our moral obligation to alleviate extreme poverty, giving aid alone will not alleviate extreme poverty if we continue to consume in an affluent manner. Thus, we are also obligated to change our habits of consumption in a salient way. While we will inevitably decrease the amount we consume if we give aid, it is also necessary that we change the way we consume in addition to the amount we consume. Previous arguments for our moral obligations to alleviate extreme poverty have so far been incomplete as they lack analysis of the inherent problems of our consumption. Again, referring to the golden mean, virtue ethics compels us to consume in moderation, avoiding extremes. Our environmental and health problems show that we are consuming an excess of what is needed for good individual as well as environmental health. Numerous affluent individuals, for example those in America, suffer from health problems which largely result from excess consumption of food. Harms to the

22 22 environment also mainly result from our overconsumption of natural resources and overproduction of land. Some may object: if I decide to give aid to those in extreme poverty, why am I also morally obligated to change my consumption habits? Maria Mies explains that if those in affluent nations continue their habits of consumption it will be impossible to increase the living standards of others, thus making any aid that we give useless. As we know, the world is a finite biosystem. There is a limited amount of global resources and space; it would be impossible to raise the living standards of distant nations while continuing our current consumption habits because the world would quickly run out of resources and space. For example, If per-capita consumption of beef in China, currently only 4 kgs. per year, were to match the U.S.'s 45 kgs., and if the additional beef came from feedlots, this would take almost 350 million tons of grain, equivalent to the entire U.S. grain harvest. If China were to seek extra animal protein through seafood at the percapita level of Japan, it would need 100 million tons, more than today's entire ocean fish catch. If China were ever to match the U.S. for per-capita cars and oil consumption, it would need 80 million barrels of oil per day, whereas current global output is 65 million barrels per day (International Institute for Sustainable Development (Brown et al., 1999)). Thus, while we give aid to those in extreme poverty so that they may meet their basic needs and increase their standard of living, our affluent consumption habits will counter such efforts as we quickly deplete the world s resources. Yet, even if there were enough resources for everyone to live at a decent and adequate living standard, impoverished nations would still remain behind. The catchingup theory, explained by Mies, claims that impoverished nations can catch up to

23 23 developed nations if they correctly utilize certain social, political, and economic resources. Yet, Mies points out that catching-up is impossible because everyone is progressing; catching-up is a myth. If rich nations are at point B and poor nations are working for development from point A, by the time poor nations reach point B, affluent nations will be at point D. In other words, by the time impoverished nations gain access to the social, political, and economic resources of today, such resources will be useless because they will be archaic compared to the new and improved social, political, and economic resources in Northern countries. While we must change our consumption habits because not doing so will obviate our giving aid, we must also change our consumption habits because they currently bring harm to those in impoverished nations. Here, I mean that we must change the type of products we buy and be conscious in whom we are purchasing from more so than how much we are consuming. Our affluent lifestyle brings many harms to the environment, which in turn harms those living in impoverished nations. For example, during 1998, Americans, 5% of the global population, contributed 25% of the buildup of carbon dioxide in the global atmosphere. Our 270 million people accounted for more than the emissions of China's 1.2 billion people (cf. Dietz, 1995). At least 85 percent of iron and steel are consumed by the 20 percent richest of humankind. The average American consumes 115 times as much paper as the average Indian. And the average American consumes 230 times as much gasoline as the average Indian. Similarly, our affluent lifestyles bring harms to workers in under-developed nations. Many businesses from affluent countries rely upon the cheap labor of sweatshops in impoverished nations, enforcing abhorrent working conditions for workers who get

24 24 paid only a pocketful of change per day. Typical labor conditions for those working in U.S. run sweatshops include wages such as 41 cents an hour and $16.36 a week, Grueling mandatory 14 to 15.8-hour shifts, six and seven days a week, being forced to work 36 hours of overtime each week, but cheated of legal overtime pay; being housed in primitive dorms and fed food the workers describe as awful, being exposed to health hazards, such as plastic fumes that pervade the factory, and other conditions that violate workers and human rights. Many of us are aware of such environmental and economic conditions, yet remain disconnected from the situation. We may think, what can I do? I am not the manager or owner of such a factory. Or I do not cut down forests in Brazil. But, we are supporters of the system which brings about these harms. We purchase the products that are produced in other countries. If we did not purchase these products, the demand for them would be eliminated, and then such harms would not take place. If we only purchase products that are environmentally friendly and produced in safe and fair working environments, then companies that showed concern for the environment and workers would thrive and those that didn t would go out of business. In a lot of ways, consumers of affluent nations are currently responsible, though perhaps indirectly, for environmental and economic harms in other nations. As virtuous people, we would not want to cause harms to others and thus we would stop our actions that brought about such harms. Again, we have the capacity to do so; as consumers of global products, we have more power to change the situation than we may think. For example, according to the National Labor Committee If the American retailers paid only 25 cents more per garment, the total in Bangladesh would be $898 million- more than eight times current US aid.

25 25 If we are going to seriously help alleviate extreme poverty, we must do more than give monetary aid. We must also be considerate and aware of the way we consume and what the effects of our consumption are. Oftentimes, we are unknowingly supporting companies that intentionally harm those living in extreme poverty. As virtuous people, we would not support those harms and thus must consciously consume in ways that ensure that we are not encouraging the exploitation of people and the environment. Virtue ethics compels us to consume in moderation. The fact that our consumption results in harm only makes our obligation to change this habit of consumption more urgent and compelling. Conclusion The suffering of those in distant impoverished nations is severe and worsening. While some philosophers have attempted to guide us on how we should or shouldn t act to alleviate this suffering, each of the arguments so far presented is somewhat limited. Those who argue that we do not have a moral obligation to help those living in extreme poverty fail to recognize the existence of moral obligations to those who are distant from us or raise concerns, such as overpopulation, that can be sufficiently addressed through different means. Furthermore, keeping in mind the virtue of the golden mean, we see that the previous arguments presented to alleviate global poverty are extreme; these arguments are either excessive and potentially dangerous, such as those presented by Singer, Glover, and Unger, or deficient and greedy, such as those presented by Engel and Ableson. Here, I have argued that to alleviate the suffering experienced by those in distant impoverished nations, we must give a significant portion of our income, guided by the principle of the golden mean. Yet, giving monetary aid will not be sufficient for

26 26 significantly reducing the amount of suffering experienced; consumption habits of those in affluent nations will counter monetary efforts. Also affluent consumption currently results in harm to those living in distant nations and thus, as virtuous persons, we are required not only to give aid, but also to change the amount and type of products we consume. Individuals living in affluent nations have a large capacity to alleviate the suffering of others in distant nations. Upon rethinking our affluent lifestyle, we see that it engenders vices rather than virtues. According to Aristotle, we are to avoid vices, such as callousness and selfishness and instead strive to be compassionate and generous; it is apparent that we must change our affluent lifestyle. Yet, only when we are willing to make significant changes to our lives will we see significant changes for those who suffer most in the world.

27 27 Notes 1 Defined as that income or expenditure level below which a minimum, nutritionally adequate diet plus essential non-food requirements are not affordable. Pogge, Thomas. "Priorities of Global Justice." Metaphilosophy 32.1/2 (2001): 7 2 Ibid,. 9 3 While affluent individuals living in non-affluent countries may have responsibilities, I am specifically concerned with individuals of affluent nations. 4 Unger, Peter. Living High and Letting Die Other philosophers also endorse a similar position, though these three are most often referred to. 6 Significant portion is further defined elsewhere in this paper. 7 Salient way is further defined elsewhere in this paper. 8 Bittner defines imputable in a neutral sense, explaining Imputability here covers the smaller domain of those things which can readily, or perhaps unmistakably, be put down to some particular agents account (29). 9 Though I explain later that we are more connected than Bittner assumes (pg 15). 10 Abelson (Moral Distance, 35) gives a detailed discussion of the different nature of obligations for those who are distant and those whom we are emotionally close to. 11 Also, in response to an appeal to closeness, Peter Singer, in Practical Ethics argues it is difficult to see any sound moral justification for the view that distance, or community membership, makes a crucial difference to our moral obligations. He argues, for instance, that we would not endorse racial affinities, such as helping people of European origin before those of African origin. People s need for food has nothing to do with their race and it would be a violation of equal consideration to give preference to one group over the other. In the same way, Singer claims, favoring fellow citizens or those who are close to us in some way is unfair and unfounded. 12 The principle of causation holds that an agent that caused harm to another individual is responsible to some extent to remediate the harm. The principle of moral responsibility holds that an agent has responsibility to remediate harm if the agent intended the outcome, foresaw it, if his behavior violated some standard of reasonable care, and so forth (456). The principle of capacity holds that an agent has responsibility to remediate harm if the agent has the capacity to do so. And the principle of community holds that an agent has a responsibility to remediate harm if she has communal ties with the harmed individual 13 I will argue later in this paper that we can see how our past and present actions contribute to the situation of extreme poverty. Thus, Bittner s claim that we do not have a clear understanding of the contributing factors of world hunger is not persuasive. 14 The analogy of a drowning is popular within the discussion of moral responsibilities to alleviate extreme poverty. This analogy is present in the arguments of Singer (Practical Ethics, 229), Miller (Distributing Responsibilities, 461), Engel (Hunger, Duty, and Ecology, 432), and others. 15 A 1998 report on Population and the Environment published by the Congressional Quarterly Researcher explains that fertility rates have fallen in much of the world, especially where women have gained access to education and economic opportunities that make bearing large numbers of children less attractive (5). Singer further explains according to United Nations estimates, in 1965 the average woman in the third world gave birth to six children, and only 8 percent were using some form of contraception; by 1991 the average number of children had dropped to just below four, and more than half of women in the third world were taking contraceptive measures (240) 16 If we consider that the average individual living in extreme poverty consumes much less than the average modern human being, it becomes clear that the average American consumes a significant amount more than the average individual living in extreme poverty. If my consumption equals that of at least six individuals living in extreme poverty, I only have to decrease my consumption by a small percentage in order to compensate for the one life being saved. 17 One may still object to giving aid if the religious majority of a specific nation leads the particular nation to refuse aid designed to limit population growth, such as promotion of contraceptives. Singer acknowledges this objection and concludes that it may be acceptable to refuse aid to such nations, arguing we are not obligated to help when our help is guaranteed to fail. Yet, I disagree with Singer s conclusion and argue that there are still other ways in which we can promote population control without infringing