The Impact of a Trinitarian Concept of Personhood on Post- birth Abortion (Infanticide) 1

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1 The Impact of a Trinitarian Concept of Personhood on Post- birth Abortion (Infanticide) 1 Introduction On February 23, 2012, Dr Alberto Giubilini and Dr Francesca Minerva s paper After- birth abortion: why should the baby live? appeared in the Journal of Medical Ethics online. 2 It subsequently caused a stir in the media for its academic advocacy of the possibility of post- birth abortion (which, despite the authors attempts to rationalise the use of such a euphemism, is better known as infanticide ). Such an argument is not new or even recent. Well- known ethicist and academic Peter Singer pursued the idea of post- birth abortion in his Practical Ethics (1979) 3 and later in a co- authored book with Helga Kuhse Should the Baby Live (1985). 4 Singer provides the basis for such a move in his clear differentiation of person and being. Giubilini and Minerva, in turn, draw on Singer s work to form their views on post- birth abortion. 6 Definitions and criteria for personhood and being, then, are at the very heart of this debate. In this paper, I will set out Singer s views of personhood and being and his argument for infanticide. Next, I will likewise assess the constructions of personhood and being in Giubilini and Minerva s article. Finally, going to a trinitarian basis, I will argue for a different view of personhood and being - a person as a being- in- communion with other persons - that challenges directly Singer s, and Giubilini and Minerva s views and the conclusions drawn from those views. 1 I am indebted to Pastor Murray Cambell, Dr Andrew Moody, and fellow SRC members Dr Trisha Prentice, Dr Justin Denholm, Rev d Mark Hood, and Rev d Dr Stephen Ames for their insightful comments and criticisms of previous drafts. Any faults of the paper, however, are entirely mine! 2 Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva, After- birth abortion: why should the baby live?, J. Med Ethics (2012): 1-4; retrieved from ethics/category/jme/ on March 11, Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambride: Cambridge University Press: 1979). 43 Helga Peter Singer, Kuhse and Practical Peter Ethics Singer, (Cambride: Should the Cambridge Baby Live? (Oxford: University Oxford Press: University 1979). Press: 1985). 4 Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer, Should the Baby Live? (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1985). 6 Compare Giubilini and Minerva s criteria for personhood of being able to experience harm and ability to focus on the future, including making plans (2012: 1, 2) with Singer s criteria of rational, self- conscious, desiring and plan- making (Hymers provides a neat summary of Singer s four criteria for personhood in Not a Modest Proposal, 127). 1

2 Singer on Human Being and Personhood 7 As mentioned above, Singer follows Locke s distinction of human being and personhood Central to Locke s view of person is the intelligence, reason, and understanding attributable to human persons that distinguishes human persons from other animals. Singer follows Locke in defining a person as a rational self- conscious being aware of its past and future. 9 Where Singer differs from Locke is in his argument that protection is due not to beings - even human beings (as per Locke) - but to persons. 10 And this departure from Locke is all- important for Singer s argument that infanticide is not necessarily unethical. How, then, does Singer define personhood? Hymer neatly summarises Singer s four marks of personhood as: 11 (i) A rational and self- conscious being, aware of itself as a extended body existing over an extended time period (ii) (iii) (iv) A desiring and plan- making being A desiring being that desires to continue living; and, An autonomous being. The very last point - autonomy - appears to draw in at least points (i) and (ii), and in many cases (iii) also. To be overly reductionistic of Singer s view, autonomy, therefore, is integral to his understanding of personhood. Hence, we would do well to address Singer s division of person from being in the human being, and also to what extent Singer s criterion of automony is a useful or realistic for definition of personhood. Singer s four marks lead him to conclude that a newborn (or even an infant) may be, to some extent, a desiring being (i.e., desiring nourishment etc). But a newborn is certainly not a self- conscious being, aware of itself as an extended body existing over an extended period of time, or an autonomous being. Therefore, a newborn (or infant) is not a person. A newborn may 7 In what follows, I will follow Hymers summary of Singer s views. 9 Hymers, Not a Modest Proposal, Hymers, Not a Modest Proposal, 127. Through his distinction of person from being, Singer is able to argue for such things as non- human persons. Addressing this issue is not my concern here, and will be incidentally and implicitly critiqued in my suggestions about a trinitarian approach to human personhood and being. 11 Hymer, Not a Modest Proposal, 127,

3 experience pain and suffering, and hence is entitled to the kind of ethical consideration that human persons owe to all beings capable of experiencing pain and suffering - mitigating such pain and suffering as much as possible, except when there are competing interests of persons over non- person beings at play. That is, the good, or the alleviation of pain/suffering of a person takes precedence over the good, or the alleviation of pain/suffering of a non- person. 12 Thus, on the basis of all four marks, Singer concludes that a newborn is not a person, and that the grounds for not killing persons do not apply to newborn infants. 13 Giubilini and Minerva on Being and Personhood Giubilini and Minerva also follow Singer s division of person and human being, and proceed to apply such definitions to the possibility of post- birth abortion (infanticide). Like Singer, Giubilini and Minerva define the personhood of an infant in such a way that, although a human being, the infant is not a person. In a modification of Singer s point (iii) of the four marks, a person, according to Giubilini and Minerva, is a subject of a moral right to life, an individual who is capable of attributing to her own existence some (at least) basic value such that being deprived of existence represents a loss to her. 14 Key to Giubilini and Minerva s understanding of person is the ability of a human being to attribute value to one s life. It entails a person s necessary awareness of the possible harm and the significant truncation of this individual s future aims if its life were to be withdrawn by another (i.e., if it were killed). 15 Such a construction of person demands that such a being has developed a concrete understanding of itself as a person, with a future and a past, and who can suffer harm, particuarly harm if that person s future aims are cut short by medical intervention to end its life. An infant, it is argued, does not meet the criterion of a developed self- awareness and a developed sense of harm, since it is not sufficiently mentally or psychologically capable to do so. 12 Cf. Hymer, Not a Modest Proposal, 129, Singer, Practical Ethics, 124; cited in Hymer, Not a Modest Proposal, Giubilini and Minerva, Post- Birth Abortion, 2. I find the use of the feminine pronoun her throughout Giubilini and Minerva s discussion repugnant in light of the vast numbers of aborted female foetuses and infanticide of female new- borns in various parts of the world. Despite the alternate use of him and her in articles being an academic protocol for some, given the topic under discussion is abortion and infanticide, it is very telling and distasteful that the authors and/or editors chose persist in using her! 15 Giubilini and Minerva, Post- Birth Abortion, 2. 3

4 Thus, Giubilini and Minerva have a much more self- consciously developmental view of personhood than Singer s four marks (although it is implied in Singer s four marks - particularly an awareness of extension of body over extension of time). Given that it is difficult to determine the psychological developmental stages at which an infant becomes self- aware - and self- aware enough to understand pain, harm, future, and to construct aims - then it becomes notoriously difficult to determine when an infant transitions from a human being to a person- al human being. Giubilini and Minerva themselves acknowledge such a difficulty: Our point here is that [...] it is hard to exactly determine when a subject starts or ceases to be a person. 16 For Giubilini and Minerva, based on such a developmental view of self- awareness and awareness of a future, an infant is only a potential person. Such an infant shares potentiality of personhood with a foetus, and therefore has the moral equivalence of a foetus. 17 Hence, in all conditions where a foetus may be aborted, an infant likewise might be aborted (killed). 18 That is, Giubilini and Minerva draw on Singer s competing interests of persons versus non- persons to argue: killing a newborn could be ethically permissible in all the circumstances where abortion would be. Such circumstances include cases where the newborn has the potential to have an (at least) acceptable life, but the well- being of the family is at risk. 19 There are a number of points Singer s, and Giubilini and Minerva s separation of person from being might be questioned. Does the psychological- developmental view of person over being provide the kind of robust definition of person that Singer, and Giubilini and Minerva rely on so heavily in their respective arguments? Given that each human being develops physically and (for most) mentally, and goes through different stages throughout life, 20 can any neat line of development be drawn where an infant moves from non- person to person? Ought awareness of possible harm to be a condition at all for determining personhood? Arguably, a sleeping, anaethestised or pharmacologically euphoric person might be killed and not be aware of the harm done to him/her. And what level of awareness is required? What happens when awareness is reduced anywhere on the continuum from fully aware to utterly unaware by stroke, acquired brain injury, illness, disease or other means? There is a 16 Giubilini and Minerva, Post- Birth Abortion, Giubilini and Minerva, Post- Birth Abortion, Giubilini and Minerva, Post- Birth Abortion, Giubilini and Minerva, Post- Birth Abortion, See, for example, the developmental philosophies of Erik Erickson and Jean Piaget. 4

5 certain level of absurdity to asking such questions: does a human being in any one of these conditions, previously meeting the criteria for personhood, slowly or suddenly move to non- personhood? What legal or ethical category should we apply to someone at those various stages of a new state of being - a previous- person- on- the- way- to- non- personhood, or previous- person- now- non- person? Further, isn t favouring competing interests of human persons over human non- persons just another way of advocating entire self- interest of persons? As a corollary of the previous question: Given that in other realms of ethics and law, we rightly criticise the abuse of power in hierarchical human relationships, aren t these arguments a supreme form of an abuse of power of human persons over human non- persons? And, is Singer s appeal to autonomy as definitive as Singer s four marks make it out to be? A Trinitarian- based Understanding of Human Personhood and Being The starting point for a Christian view of human personhood and being must be the Trinitarian nature of God s being and the personhood of three persons of the Trinity, since human beings are created in the image of God. 21 In this section, I will set out a brief understanding of the trinitarian being of God as being- in- communion- of- persons ( being- in- communion or being- in- relation ). I will argue that humanity, as the image of God, 22 also shares a somewhat analogous being- in- communion- of- persons (henceforth described as 21 Even if we allow for the evolution of humanity, we must admit that the Scriptures present God as choosing Adam and Eve specially from all creation to bear God s image. 22 A wideranging discussion of the nature of the image of God is beyond the scope of this paper. See Anthony A. Hoekema s Created in God s Image (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986; repr. 1994), , for a good, although now slightly dated, discussion of the image of God. Hoekema argues that image or likeness in Gen 1:26-28 indicates humanity was created to mirror God and to represent God (1994: 67; emphasis original). Hoekema continues, When one looks at a human being, one ought to see in him or her a certain reflection of God. Another way of putting this is to say that in man God is to become visible on earth (1994: 67). When it comes to representation, Hoekema uses the analogy of Nebuchadnezzar setting up an idol of himself in far corners of his realm to represent him and be worshipped like people would worship Nebuchadnezzar himself in person. Hoekema uses the analogy to describe how humanity functions to represent God, and further employs the metaphor of an ambassador. Representation, then, includes representing the authority of God, the interests of God, and God s purposes, will and love (1994: 67-68). Interestingly, Hoekema includes the human body as part of our way of imaging God (1994: 68). Importantly, as we will discuss briefly below, emphasising these aspects of the image of God in addition to being- in- communion moves us beyond defining person by certain set of attributes (e.g., capacity to communicate or a certain level of brain function or consciousness). 5

6 being- in- relation ). 23 Thus, I will argue that personhood is not individualistic (as per Singer s autonomy ), but mutually conditioning - human persons shape and define other human persons (for good or ill). Finally, on the basis of this definition of human personhood derived from trinitarian theology, I will conclude that Singer s, Giubilini and Minerva s concept of person is severely lacking. As a consequence, not only will I conclude that post- birth abortion is spurious, but will suggest that a trinitarian- based view of personhood may challenge abortion (reversing the direction of Giubilini and Minerva s application of the moral equivalence of an infant and a foetus). A) Trinity, Being, and Person in God: Being- in- communion- of- persons In the history of trinitarian thought, the early church over a few centuries fought and won successive battles over the divinity of Christ and the Spirit. What came out of those historic theological battles was the formulation of the Trinity of One God in three persons - implicit in the Nicene Creed, but more explicitly stated in the Athanasian Creed, and various Anglican formularies. However, with this formulation of One God, three persons came problems. One of those problems was how the oneness of the being of God was more truly his essence, and this oneness in God s essence was more important than, and kept together, the relations of God s persons. A problem particularly pertinent in our age is the similarity of personality to person. If we equate person with personality, then we reduce the persons of the trinity to something approaching different faces /expressions of the one God. That is, God just appears as father when he needs to, then son, then spirit - they are just different personalities of God (this is known as the heresy of modalism). Conversely, if we allow the distinction of the persons to dominate, then we end up with three separate gods (a heresy known as tri- theism). The problematic nature of the formulation of One Being, three persons is 23 I see a distinction between being- in- communion and being- in- relation in God. Being- in- communion in God also implies mutual indwelling in the one being of God (as formulations of perichoresis and homoousios attempt to capture), which human beings do not share with each other. Being- in- communion is a wider term encompassing being- in- relation ; and being- in- relation has the advantage of emphasising the concept of relationship. Nevertheless, I will argue that human beings are still beings- in- communion and beings- in- relation ; and I will use these two terms synonymously with respect to humanity s being and personhood, even though being- in- communion implies the important Christian concept of a deeper spiritual communion brought about by faith in, and union with Christ by the Spirit. For simplicity, then, below I will adopt being- in- relation with respect to humanity. 6

7 exemplified in Singer s, Giubilini and Minerva s separation of being from person in humanity. In an attempt to overcome the difficulties of the formulation of One God, three persons, theological formulations have sought to capture how the relationship between the persons of the Trinity arises at the same time as the being of God. 24 In other words, a new way of conceiving of the being of God was sought in God s persons and relations; that is, God s being is constituted in the way that God s persons relate - the thing that makes God, God is the way God s oneness of being is expressed in the relations of the three persons. As systematic theologian John Thompson comments: [T]he unity of the Trinity is basically related to the being in communion of the three persons. The unity of God is thus neither in being nor in persons a such but in the being of God as expressed in the persons who in themselves and in their interrelatedness constitute the divine Trinity. 25 In addition, the unity of God is demonstrated in history and creation in the way that each of the persons- in- relationship take part in the distinctive work of the others. The Father creates through the Son and by the Spirit. The Spirit applies the knowledge of the Father through the Son. The Son acts to redeem humanity in the sacrifice of himself in accordance with the Father s will and in the power of the Spirit of the Father and the Son. Each person of the Trinity, then, indwells the others as distinct, divine persons, and in this mutual- indwelling (perichoresis) God is one. However, traditional formulations of the Trinity have also seen an order in the relationship of the persons of the Trinity: the Father is the ultimate source as the unbegotten, the Son is with and comes from the Father by way of generation, and the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. 26 The Nicene Creed captures these points thus: 24 It s absurd to talk about the being of God and time before God s creation of time. It s a metaphor which tries to capture the unity of God s being, his persons, and the relations of the persons before time. Logically, God s being, persons and relations arise together, as will be argued. 25 John Thompson, Modern Trinitarian Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), Thompson, Modern Trinitarian Perspectives,

8 We believe in one God the Father, the Almighty [...] We believe in one Lord, Jesus Christ, the only Son of God, eternally begotten of the Father, God from God, Light from Light, true God from true God, begotten, not made, of one Being with the Father. [...] We believe in the Holy Spirit, the Lord, the giver of life, who proceeds from the Father and the Son. With the Father and the Son he is worshipped and glorified. 27 Once again, drawing on Thompson: [t]he Father gives being to the Son, but in this the Son is not simply passive; he responds in receiving and accepting in obedience. Likewise Son and Spirit are bound together in mutually receiving from the Father. 28 Although there is order, there is also reciprocity. The difference ( otherness ) of the persons of the Trinity is drawn together in another form of unity - a unity of love. The Father loves the Son and the Son loves the Father in the bond of love - the Spirit. In other words, in the very being of God is a unity of self- giving of the persons in love to the other - a mutual exchange of love. 29 What this all implies is that the persons of the Trinity cannot be seen as individualistically as a separate centre of consciousness apart from the others. Rather, the persons are only personal in relationship and communion with each other. The persons- in- relationship of God 27 An Australian Prayer Book (1978), 139. Italics mine. 28 Thompson, Modern Trinitarian Perspectives, 145. Rev Dr Kevin Giles protests against such an order - albeit a particular conception of order ( functional/relational subordination ) - in the eternal being of God, preferring to see the order as restricted to God s relationship to, and work in creation and redemption. At the same time, however, Rev Dr Giles wants to retain the order represented in the unbegotten (Father)/ begotten (Son) formulation of the Nicene Creed. 29 Thompson, Modern Trinitarian Perspectives, 147. The phrase is G. F. O Hanlon s, cited by Thompson,

9 mutually condition what it means for each to be a unique person in relation to the other, albeit in different ways as Father, Son, and Spirit (as I outlined above). This person- in- relationship and/or person- in- communion defines the very being of God. What it means for God to be God is a communion of three persons in a mutually- loving, mutually- conditioning, and mutually- indwelling relationship. God s being, then, is being- in- communion ; it is being- in- relationship. 30 B) Human Being and Person: Being- in- communion/relation- of- persons i. Human as image of God, being- and- person This important presentation of the Trinity as being- in- communion and being- in- relation has significant implications for human personhood and being as image of God, and thus being- in- communion and being- in- relationship. Of course, the way in which human beings image God s being- in- communion and being- in- relationship differs importantly from the Trinitarian being. Human beings do not, for example, mutually indwell one another. 31 Human beings don t always exist in a communion of self- giving love (unfortunately). Not every human being is intimately and directly involved in mutually conditioning every other human being s personhood in a way that takes place in the Godhead. Further, our experience as human beings and persons is an embodied existence, which necessarily creates a space between, and differentiation of, individual human beings and persons from each other in a way that is simply not relevant in God s being- in- communion. And, most important of all, since the entrance of sin into our earthly existence, human beings are only ever most fully the image of God in union with the Image of God, Christ in the Spirit of the Father and the Son, and through whom we relate and worship the Father. Nevertheless, the creation and mutuality of the original couple as the image of God (Gen 1:26-28), establishes our being- in- communion and being- in- relationship as analogous to God s Being- in- communion/relations - our being- in- communion/relation is derived from God s Being- in- communion/relation. In other words, since God s being- in- communion necessarily involves the three persons in communion, being and person are indissolubly linked in God, and therefore in human personhood and being. To be human, then, is to be in personal 30 Thompson, Modern Trinitarian Perspectives, See note 23 above. 9

10 relation and communion with other humans. [Somewhere here I think there needs to something about being created in the image of God as persons means having the capacities for a personal relationship with God and this is what we are or the kind of being we are quite apart from how well the capacities are enacted.] Person and being ought not to be separated in the way that Singer, and Giubilini and Minerva do. Being and person arise together in humans: we are beings- in- relation- of- persons. More simply, we are not autonomous (contra Singer), but are relational, inter- person- al beings. Our personhood is mutually conditioned by other persons, even to the point of sourced in other persons, namely, biological parents (see further ii. below). The community (especially the immediate community of the family) is very much the source of the personhood of the infant, initially. But as the infant grows, there is much more mutually conditioning to personhood. That is, while an hierarchical conditioning of personhood exists, flowing from already existing persons (mother/parents) to foetuses/infants, over time a much more mutual conditioning of persons develops in the embodied- relation of mother- to- foetus/infant etc. This does not mean that an individual isolated from other human beings stops being a human person- being (as point ii. below will make clear). It simply means that such a person is unable to experience and express the full range of being- in- relation- of- persons. 32 If we are not to enter into the same difficulties as Singer, and Giubilini and Minerva in determining a point at which an infant (or foetus?) as a human being becomes a human person, then we must further define what personhood means with respect to being- in- relation- of- persons. ii. Personhood, bodied existence and relation Our bodied existence distinguishes humanity from God, but also means that we experience our being- in- relation- of- persons in a way that God does not - a bodily way. Our relations with others are bodily relations, not just psychological, verbal, or cognitive. Against Singer, and Giubilini and Minerva, then, personhood as being- in- relation must be understood much more widely than in psychological, verbal, cognitive, or developmental categories. The 32 It is indicative that such a human being, isolated from mutually conditioning relationships with other persons suffers both mental and physical degradation of that individual s humanity. I think here of a case of a child reared by wolves, or orphans that suffer such depravation of positive human interaction. 10

11 moment we understand our being- in- relation as an embodied- being- in- relation, then we must ask ourselves: What do we mean by relation, given relation occurs in an embodied state? Among the possibilities, three broad categories of embodied- relation immediately stand out: biological- physiological, psychological- developmental, and spiritual. It would appear that, provided a human being is in an embodied- relation in any of these three areas, that that embodied- relation is sufficient to establish the personhood of that human being as being- in- relation- of- persons. This is so because an embodied- relation is established, not by all, but only by any one of these areas of relationship; and one of the other areas may be demonstrably related to the others. Take the biological- physiological embodied- relation, for example. In the mother, a biological- physiological embodied relation is established between the mother and foetus in- utero. This biological- physiological embodied relation involves hormone changes, changes to physical appearance, the sharing of space, antibodies, nourishment etc. This biological- physiological embodied relation continues after the birth of the infant with the various post- partum biochemical and physiological changes that result, among other things. But with that establishment of a biological- physiological embodied relation also comes a psychological- developmental embodied relation. These pscyhological- developmental embodied relations might be positive, negative or neutral for any one mother and/or infant. But the character of the psychological- developmental embodied relation is not a factor in determining whether such an embodied relation exists! The embodied relation simply exists. Lest we restrict our embodied relation to the mother- foetus/mother- infant relation, there are other, more indirect, but nevertheless important, embodied relations surrounding the mother- foetus/mother- infant embodied relation. The father is also related biologically and, therefore, bodily, creating an embodied relation. Other embodied relations include wider family members, friends, acquaintances, doctors, nurses, midwives, allied health professionals, law- makers/lawyers, police, judges, social- workers, and strangers who inevitably take an interest (rightly or wrongly) in the mother- foetus/mother- infant embodied relation. 33 This most fundamental of biological- physiological embodied relation - the mother- foetus/mother- infant embodied relation - is, therefore, at the core of all human existence and personhood. 33 Pregnant women friends have frequently attested to strangers rubbing their stomachs, asking questions about due- dates etc! 11

12 Turning to psychological- developmental embodied relations: the mother- foetus/mother- infant embodied relation mutually conditions both mother and child such that there is development in both. But this embodied relation occurs in the context of a matrix of all other psychological- developmental embodied relations of other persons. For example, the mother- foetus/mother- infant embodied relation takes place in a community and a society that shapes thoughts and expectations about mother- child relations, that has its own set of (sometimes conflicting) expectations on a person in that community and society - including ethics surrounding how foetuses and infants ought to be treated and raised; hence the well- worn cliche that it takes a village to raise a child, not an individual/couple. Such a community and a society inevitably conditions the personhood of the child, and the child invariably also impacts the community s and society s view of itself as persons. 34 In contrast to Singer, then, such a psychological- developmental embodied relation goes against strict ideas of autonomy and proves autonomy not to be a particularly useful category in determining personhood. Having varying degrees of autonomy may be a good and useful mode of being- in- relation- of- persons. But autonomy is not an especially useful category for establishing personhood, since it implies that some, or all persons are independent of their embodied relations to other persons. The level of inter- dependence we experience in our daily lives would suggest that human persons are anything but autonomous, even at the most basic levels. We have explored the spiritual embodied relation briefly above, and will not explore it further here. Suffice to say, we worship God as fully human persons in our bodies only insofar as we are united with Christ by his Spirit - approaching the Father through the Son and in the power of the Spirit. And, in the resurrection of the dead, many Christians have rightly emphasised the importance of the bodily nature of the resurrection as vital to our future relation to God and other Christians who share in God s consummated kingdom. 34 Although I have restricted my comments here to the community s involvement in the psychological- developmental embodied- relation with the child, that mutuality may be extended to the biological- physiological realm of provision of food, contribution of wealth, payment of taxes that an infant person can be expected to contribute in the future. Further, on the psychological side alone, one may readily argue that infants contribute to a sense of purpose, a sense of joy, the identity of women as mothers and men as fathers, etc. 12

13 C) Conclusion We can confidently state, then, that an infant is involved in a matrix of embodied relations, and therefore is a being- in- relation- of- persons : that is, an infant is a person by dint of being a human being involved in a matrix of embodied- relations with other persons. Hence, Singer s, and Giubilini and Minerva s appeals to competing interests of persons (mothers/families) over non- persons (Singer) or potential- persons (Giubilini and Minerva) to establish a case for post- birth abortion (infanticide) are illegitimate on this model of person as a [human] being- in- relation- of- persons. For such embodied relations exist regardless of the character of those relations (i.e., whether they are good, bad, indifferent), meaning that a human being s personhood exists regardless of the character of the relations that determine that personhood. To invoke concepts of competing interests of parties in embodied relations is to invoke competing interests of persons who share the same ethical significance. Concepts of competing interests of one party over another may well be important factors in determining what to do with a new- born person, but they in no way establish a case for the destruction of the life of the new- born person on the basis that they are thought to be in an ethically inferior position to other persons as Singer s, and Giubilini and Minerva s views advocate It would be an interesting thought- experiment to tease out the implications of Giubilini and Minerva s view with reference to a five- year- old potential brother or sister to the new- born infant. Do the interests of the brother or sister as a person, rather than just mother or father, play a part in whether the non- person infant ought to be aborted or not? If not, why not? 13