Warren. Warren s Strategy. Inherent Value. Strong Animal Rights. Strategy is to argue that Regan s strong animals rights position is not persuasive

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1 Warren Warren s Strategy A Critique of Regan s Animal Rights Theory Strategy is to argue that Regan s strong animals rights position is not persuasive She argues that one ought to accept a weak animal rights position There are...compelling realities which sometimes require that we kill animals for reasons which could not justify the killing of persons. (91) 1 2 Strong Animal Rights Inherent Value Regan argues that subjects-of-a-life have inherent value Regan s Strong Animal Rights position: all normal mammals over a year old have the same basic moral rights; non-human mammals have the same basic rights as humans Normal, mature mammals are sentient, have psychological identity, and other mental capacities Normal, mature mammals are subjects-of-a-life They can be harmed or benefited Notion of inherent value developed in opposition to utilitarianism Utilitarianism undermines the value of each individual when calculating the overall benefit to other individuals of any particular action Subjects-of-a-life have value independent of how an individual or others value that being s life Inherent value does not come in degrees Regan rejects the idea that moral worth depends on the possession of one or more virtuous traits (intelligence, autonomy, etc.) 3 4

2 Subjects-of-a-Life Have Strong Moral Rights Warren s Problems With Regan s Strong Animal Rights Position Respect Principle: since all subjects-of-a-life have equal inherent value, respect for that inherent value demands treating all beings as ends and not merely means Harm Principle: we have a duty to not harm beings who have inherent value Moral Rights: for Regan, the Respect and Harm Principles give rise to moral rights 1. Problem defining inherent value 2. Problem determining which animals are subjects-of-a-life Moral rights generate duties not only to refrain from inflicting harm upon beings with inherent value but also to come to their aid when they are threatened by other moral agents. (92) Problem Defining Inherent Value What Is Inherent Value? Inherent value defined negatively It is not based on the value any individual or others might place on the agent s life It is not based on sentience or any other mental capacity (e.g., intelligence) It is not applicable to anything but an individual Warren does not think Regan has given a definition It appears to be a mysterious, non-natural property that is postulated to avoid the absurdities of utilitarianism But why is it a postulate that subjects-of-a-life have inherent value? If the inherent value of a being is completely independent of the value that it or anyone else places upon its experiences, then why does the fact that it has certain sorts of experiences constitute evidence that it has inherent value? (92) What is inherent value if this is what it is not? Seems Regan should say that all sentient beings have inherent value, not just normal mammals 7 8

3 Connection Between Inherent Value and Moral Rights? 2. Problem Determining Which Animals Are Subjects-of-a-Life Without a positive account of inherent value, Warren finds it difficult to understand the connection between inherent value and moral rights Regan s Two Categories of Living Things 1. Those with inherent value and moral rights Inherent value is one thing, moral rights another mountains might be inherently valuable but have no moral rights 2. Those without inherent value and no moral rights What about birds (and fish, reptiles, insects, etc.)? In short, the concept of inherent value seems to create at least as many problems as it solves. If inherent value is based on some natural property, then why not try to identify that property and explain its moral significance, without appealing to inherent value? And if it is not based on any natural property, then why should we believe in it? (92) According to this division, birds have no inherent value even though they are smarter and more mentally sophisticated than many mammals How is it that birds are not subjects-of-a-life when some rudimentary mammals are? 9 10 Regan s Benefit-of-the-Doubt Principle Warren s View on Human Rights And Animal Rights Regan s theory cannot deal with many different animal types, most of which are exactly what must be addressed in any adequate theory of animal rights Both humans and animals have... To deal with these less than clear cases, Regan employs a benefit-of-the-doubt principle... the right to pursue certain satisfactions and to not be prevented from pursuing those satisfactions If one is not sure of a being is a subject-of-a-life, assume it is... the right to not be subjected to unnecessary pain and suffering in virtue of their capacity for sentience But, where does one draw the line as to which animals are to receive the benefit of the doubt before I harm them (e.g., mosquitoes)?... and, the right to not be killed without good reason (96) 11 12

4 Human Rights Are Stronger Than Animal Rights Equal Moral Status While Warren thinks both humans and animals have moral rights, human rights are stronger than animal rights Rationality is a difference that makes a moral difference in weighing the rights of humans and animals Why is rationality morally relevant?...it is morally relevant insofar as it provides greater possibilities for cooperation and for the nonviolent resolution of problems...because we are potentially more dangerous and less predictable than wolves, we need an articulated system of morality to regulate our conduct. (94) To be workable in the long term, human morality must recognize that all humans have equal moral status It is sufficient for moral equality that normal humans be capable of good enough reasoning to determine how to act in a way that respects the moral rights of other humans Why not extend moral equality to nonhuman animals? Because humans are not able to reason with animals to solve problems and conflicts Moral Equality of Infants and Mentally Incompetent Why Talk of Animal Rights? Warren admits that infants and mentally incompetent are not rational and don t possess equal moral rights to normal, adult humans Why attribute rights to animals if animals are not the moral equals of rational humans? But, she thinks there are strong emotional and practical reasons for moral protections of those who don t have equal moral rights to normal, adult humans Warren thinks we are justified in attributing moral rights to animals, in addition to their capacity for sentience, purely on practical grounds Infancy and mental incompetence are human conditions which each of us has or might experience. Thus, we feel justified in extending moral protections to infants and mentally incompetent, but not to nonhuman animals which lack rational capacities. Arguments prohibiting the cruelty of animals are not likely to persuade humans to be kind to animals Denying animals have rights can be seen as an opportunity to do whatever we like. Attributing animals rights may motivate humans to protest animal cruelty

5 Moral Rights and Sentience Warren s Argument Warren thinks moral rights can only be meaningfully attributed to sentient beings Only sentient beings can be harmed or benefited in ways that matter to them; only sentient beings can prefer or like/dislike what happens to them 1. Moral rights are protections designed to protect rights holders from harms or to provide them with benefits which matter to them. 2. Only beings capable of sentience can be harmed or benefited in ways which matter to them So, sentient beings have moral rights. 4. Humans and many nonhuman animals are sentient beings. 5. So, humans and many nonhuman animals have moral rights. Rights of sentient beings are not equal Some sentient beings rights outweigh the rights of other sentient beings The strength of the reasons required to override the rights of a non-human organism varies, depending upon among other things the probability that it is sentient and (if it is clearly sentient) its probable degree of mental sophistication... (96) 6. Being able to recognize and act upon another s moral rights allows for greater possibilities for moral cooperation and for morally acceptable means of conflict resolution. 7. The rights of those who have these capacities to recognize and act upon another s moral rights are stronger than the rights of those who do not have such capacities. 8. Being able to recognize and act upon another s moral rights requires rationality in addition to sentience. 9. Humans are rational beings. 10. Therefore, the rights of humans are stronger than the rights of nonhuman animals