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2 2008 Department of Philosophy, Brigham Young University Printed in the United States of America

3 APORIA A STUDENT JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY volume 18 number 1 spring 2008 Brigham Young University Provo, Utah

4 APORIA a student journal of philosophy Editor Jandon Mitchell Associate Editors Michael Barber Liam Brown Jason Hills Clark Jones Brian Wayment Faculty Advisor Dr. David Jensen Aporia is published twice yearly by the Department of Philosophy at Brigham Young University and is dedicated to recognizing exemplary philosophical work at the undergraduate level. The spring issue includes the winning essays of the annual David H. Yarn Philosophical Essay Competition, which is open to BYU undergraduates only, along with other outstanding philosophical essays submitted by undergraduate philosophy students from around the world. The winners of the Yarn Competition are selected by a faculty committee independent of the Aporia staff, who make all other publishing decisions. The fall issue is published online and consists of essays selected by the Aporia staff. Submissions are welcome from all undergraduate students, both at BYU and elsewhere. The Aporia staff is especially grateful to those whose support makes this journal possible. Special thanks go to Dr. David Jensen, our faculty advisor, and to Dr. Daniel Graham, chair of the Department of Philosophy. Aporia is funded by a generous contribution from the David H. Yarn Endowment. Those wishing to contribute to this fund may do so by contacting the BYU Department of Philosophy. Opinions expressed in Aporia are those of the respective authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Aporia staff, the Department of Philosophy, or Brigham Young University and its sponsor, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. For past issues, more information about the journal, and submission requirements, visit our website at:

5 APORIA A Student Journal of Philosophy brigham young universit y volume 18 number 1 spring 2008 Why Prefer a System of Desires? Ja s o n A. Hills 1 A Defense of a Monadological Analysis in Leibniz s Middle Years 13 Kelly Glover Objects and Identity in Time Cassian Choucair 29 Perceptual Episodes Do Not Have Intentional Content 41 Jennifer Jhun Charles Hartshorne and the Ontological Argument 57 Joshua Ernst Modal Agnosticism Megan Blomfield 67

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7 Aporia vol. 18 no Why Prefer a System of Desires? Ja s o n A. Hills In his paper Internal Reasons, Michael Smith argues that the internalism requirement on a theory of reasons involves what a fully rational version of an agent would desire that his real-world counterpart do. Smith agrees with most aspects of the account of internal reasons given by Bernard Williams in Internal and External Reasons, but expands Williams account of deliberation to include making our desires systematically justifiable. With this addition to deliberation, he argues contra Williams that the internal reasons view is non-relativistic in the demands it makes on agents. I will argue, however, that making our desires systematically justifiable is not a necessary component of rational deliberation. Williams on Internal Reasons A reason statement is a statement about what an agent should do in a particular circumstance. An internal reason statement is a reason statement which holds only if the agent has some motive or desire which will be served by his acting in that particular way (Williams 101). Using this definition, Williams argues that internal reasons must relate to the contents of an agent s subjective motivational set (102), sometimes abbreviated as simply S. Williams explains that the subjective motivational set of an agent is not limited to what we ordinarily term desires, but can contain such things as dispositions of evaluation, patterns of emotional reaction, personal loyalties, and various projects as well (105). Williams proposes a very basic, sub-humean model for how internal reasons might work: for some agent A, A has a reason to ϕ iff A has some desire the satisfaction of which will be served by his ϕ-ing (101). To this Jason A. Hills is a senior studying philosophy at Brigham Young University. His interests include philosophy of language, logic, and philosophy of mathematics. This essay won first place in the 2008 David H. Yarn Essay Contest.

8 2 Ja s o n A. Hills simple formulation, Williams offers four refinements. As Smith is primarily concerned with the last refinement, I will only briefly mention the others. Williams first refinement actually comes from the sub-humean model: An internal reason statement is falsified by the absence of some appropriate element from [an agent s subjective motivational set] (102). Williams makes a second refinement as he considers false beliefs. It is possible for an agent to have desires based upon false beliefs, or to make mistakes about the means necessary to satisfy a desire. For example, an agent might see a bottle of gasoline and think it is a bottle of gin. Perhaps the agent is thirsty and would like to drink the contents of the bottle (or thinks drinking the contents of the bottle will satisfy his thirst). The agent s mistaken belief may explain why he would drink the stuff in the bottle, but we would not say that an agent has a reason to drink the gasoline. So, an agent s desire does not give a reason for action if that desire is based upon a false belief, nor will an agent s false beliefs about the means to satisfy a desire give a reason for action (Williams 103). Williams third refinement follows from the second. As we see, it is possible for an agent to falsely believe that he has an internal reason to ϕ when he actually has no reason to do so. It is also possible for an agent to be unaware of some reason which actually holds for him (103). Williams gives a fourth refinement: an agent who engages in deliberation can discover internal reasons which hold for him. Although Williams does not define deliberation, it seems to include a number of rational processes. He states: A clear example of practical reasoning is that leading to the conclusion that one has reason to ϕ because ϕ-ing would be the most convenient, economical, pleasant, etc. way of satisfying some element in S, and this of course is controlled by other elements in S, if not necessarily in a very clear or determinate way. But there are much wider possibilities for deliberation, such as: thinking how the satisfaction of elements in S can be combined, e.g. by time-ordering; where there is some irresoluble conflict among the elements of S, considering which one attaches most weight to... or, again, finding constitutive solutions, such as deciding what would make for an entertaining evening, granted that one wants entertainment. (104) This array of rational processes not only allows an agent to discover what reasons hold for him, but can actually alter the contents of an agent s subjective motivational set. Desires can be lost through deliberation. For example,

9 Why Prefer a System of Desires? 3 upon discovering that a desire was based upon a false belief, an agent might no longer feel the pull of that desire. Similarly, new desires can be formed. For example, upon reflection, an agent may realize he prefers chess to checkers, given that the former allows for greater variety in play. But in all cases of deliberation, we deliberate from our existing subjective motivational set the formation of any desire must be related to previous desires. This fact leads to a relativistic account of internal reasons. We can imagine cases where an agent s subjective motivational set is so constituted as to preclude using deliberation to arrive at some particular desire (e.g., the desire to help others, the desire to join the military). If an agent does not have the relevant desire for ϕ-ing, and cannot get the desire through deliberation, then the agent cannot have a reason to ϕ. For example, if an agent lacks a desire to donate to charitable organizations, and cannot deliberate to such a desire, then he simply has no reason moral or otherwise to donate to such organizations. So, the reasons which hold for one person in a particular instance would not necessarily hold for another person in the same circumstances. Smith on Being Fully Rational According to Smith, philosophers such as Bernard Williams suggest that there is some connection between what an agent has a reason to do in a particular circumstance and what he would do if he were fully rational (109). Smith s account of being fully rational largely resembles Williams view of internal reasons. Indeed, he agrees with Williams that for an agent to be fully rational the following conditions must be met (112): (i) The agent must have no false beliefs. (ii) The agent must have all relevant true beliefs. 1 (iii) The agent must deliberate correctly. That said, Smith also notes some weaknesses of Williams theory. For example, Williams view cannot necessarily deal with the effects of emotions like anger unless some such constraint is supposed to be presupposed by condition (iii), the condition of correct deliberation (113). But Smith is more concerned with what he considers a greater failing of Williams view. Williams account of deliberation leaves out a very important role of our 1 Although Smith insists on this, it is not entirely clear that Williams requires anything more than that the agent have no relevant false beliefs. Of course, that position may or may not be equivalent to having all relevant true beliefs. But either way, we can at least treat (ii) as an additional refinement proposed by Smith, if not as one that would be welcomed by Williams.

10 4 Ja s o n A. Hills deliberative processes: to find out if our desires are systematically justifiable and as far as possible to make them so (Smith 114). Smith writes: What do I mean when I say that we sometimes deliberate by trying to find out whether our desires, as a whole, are systematically justifiable? I mean just that we can try to decide whether or not some particular underived desire that we have or might have is a desire to do something that is itself non-derivatively desirable, and that we do this in a certain characteristic way: namely, by trying to integrate the object of that desire into a more coherent and unified desiderative profile and evaluative outlook. (114) We can imagine a large number of independent, underived elements in our subjective motivational set. Some of these elements might have general application (e.g., a love of cats), while some might have a very specific application (e.g., a fondness for my sister s bearded dragon). This act of deliberation can be seen as giving structure to these elements by reducing particular desires to more general ones. Similarly, when we find ad hoc desires that simply cannot be systematized we will be inclined to discard them (Smith 115). All of these deliberative acts are directed toward a more coherent and unified set of desires. Smith believes that ideally these sorts of deliberative, systematizing acts will result in some convergence in fundamental, general desires held by people. Or, more accurately, Smith argues that part of being a rational creature engaging in systematic justification is attempting to systematize desires in such a way that they will converge. He writes: All possible rational creatures would desire alike as regards what is to be done in the various circumstances they might face because this is, inter alia, what defines them to be rational. Part of the task of coming up with a maximally coherent and unified set of desires is coming up with a set that would be converged upon by other rational creatures who too are trying to come up with a maximally coherent and unified set of desires. (118) This account would give non-relativistic internal reasons, and Smith holds that such an account is more plausible than any relativistic account (such as the one offered by Bernard Williams). It is not my concern to oppose Smith s later arguments regarding Williams account, so I will not detail them here. Rather, I wish to argue that systematic justification is not a necessary feature of rational deliberation.

11 Why Prefer a System of Desires? 5 Varieties of Systematic Justification: Non-contradiction The term systematic justification, as ordinarily used, seems to have two senses. The first sense deals with avoiding conflict among our various desires and is suggested by analogy with systems of theoretical reasoning we avoid contradictions in our reasoning, and we should similarly avoid them in our desires. 2 The second sense deals with placing, where possible, specific desires under more general desires, thereby giving greater unity and coherence to our system of desires. This sense too may be suggested by analogy to theoretical reasoning a scientific theory which gives a unified account for a number of phenomena is generally considered more satisfactory than a collection of unrelated explanations of events. The first sense of systematic justification is accommodated by Williams view of deliberation. We might imagine a conflict of desires; for example, I want to do my homework tonight, but I also want to play Scrabble. As Williams notes, I have various deliberative options to resolve the conflicts time-ordering, assigning relative weights to desires, etc. but no matter which way I actually do it, the conflict is resolved. In this particular case, I would probably assign greater weight to my desire to do homework, and forgo Scrabble for the evening. One might object that both desires are still present in my subjective motivational set, and they are still in conflict I have simply chosen one action over the other. This may be the case, for example, if I still want to play Scrabble despite having chosen to do my homework. But I would reply that although both desires are present and pull me different ways (to speak figuratively), they are not contradictory the analogy to theoretical reasoning simply does not hold here. But why would the analogy seem persuasive? Well, contradictory beliefs cannot both be true, and contradictory desires cannot both be satisfied this resemblance might suggest other similarities. Contradictory beliefs are damaging because they prevent correct thinking (and at least one of the beliefs is false); but contradictory desires? They do not prevent correct desiring nor acting: I do my homework despite the conflicting desire to play Scrabble. Perhaps, if Williams theory did not provide a means for me to choose one desire over the other, then we could call the desires contradictory, as their conflict would prevent my choice and action. But as things are, my desire to play Scrabble is at worst a nuisance, given that I will not satisfy the desire this evening. Still, one might insist that as long as two desires cannot both be satisfied, they are contradictory, and that it would be preferable to have only 2 To be fair, Smith does not really deal with this first sense of systematic justification. I only treat it in order to show that when Smith speaks about unity and coherence in a system of desires, he cannot be using these terms to mean free from contradictions.

12 6 Ja s o n A. Hills one of them. In this example, it may be preferable to have only one desire it would probably be easier to do homework if I were not tempted to play a board game. But this is not always the case. For example, suppose an agent has five dollars. A representative of the Red Cross approaches him at the same time as someone from the March of Dimes. The agent desires to donate five dollars to each organization, but he cannot, for he does not have ten dollars. Engaging in deliberation, the agent might donate to one organization or the other (by assigning greater weight to one of them); he might even donate some portion of the five dollars to each, etc. But suppose that he decided to give all the money to the Red Cross. Would it be preferable for him to not desire to give five dollars to the March of Dimes? It seems that it is not: if we have any preference, we would say that it is better that he desire to give fully to both, even if he cannot do so. The same is true for any other decision he would have made. And the same might be true for my example above maybe it is not a bad thing that I still desire to play Scrabble. For example, it might reflect laudable interest in socializing with friends. This highlights an additional problem with calling this sort of conflict a contradiction. Conflicts of desire arise easily, even in a system such as Smith s. Take the desire to donate to charity I presume that this would be one of the desires that Smith s variety of a perfectly rational being would have. As seen above, this desire easily leads to a conflict, given that we can only donate a finite amount. Similar conflicts arise from other general desires, especially when we consider them together: the desire for leisure, the desire to raise a family, the desire to help others, the desire to succeed in one s career, etc. Often the satisfaction of one will leave the others to some degree unsatisfied. But we should not be anxious to be rid of the others in these cases. These conflicts of desire arise far too often in normal practical reasoning for us to consider them analogous to contradictions in theoretical reasoning. Varieties of Systematic Justification: Generalization Let us consider the second, stronger sense of systematic justification, which deals with placing specific desires under more general desires. I find it difficult to imagine significant cases where I would just happen to possess all the elements of a more general set, thus allowing me to generalize. I also suspect that in most cases where the particular elements required for generalization are all present, this is only because the general element was already present. Let me illustrate these claims with examples dealing with the elements of preference in the subjective motivational set. For example, I might find both Mrs. Jones and Mr. Jones agreeable (so I have reasons to spend time with them), and therefore be able to

13 Why Prefer a System of Desires? 7 generalize to finding the Joneses agreeable. But this sort of case has a very limited scope: it can only occur when I am familiar with all members of the set in question. Moreover, it does not seem to really add anything new to my subjective motivational set; nor does it add anything to my reasons for action which was not already present when I regarded the persons individually. If this is what is meant by generalization, then Williams view of deliberation should be able to produce the same results. The majority of cases, however, would probably look something more like what follows. I happen to like greyhounds, poodles, and Chihuahuas, and a great number of similar things. This suggests that I can generalize to say that I like dogs. But can I? Must I? Strictly on the basis of rationality? If there is some antecedent preference, then it might be the case that I can make this generalization as I become aware of the antecedent preference ( You like furry things, don t you? And things that lick you, right? Yes. Well, then you ll like all dogs, because they re all furry and will lick you! ). But again, this is not a case of subsuming underived desires under a more general desire. Also, this sort of generalization could easily be accomplished by Williams model of deliberation. What we need, if we are to get results different from those Williams provides, is a case where there are independent, underived preferences, but which preferences can be generalized in such a way as to create a new desire with results different than those which would follow from the antecedent desires alone. In the dog example, we need a case where I just happen to like greyhounds, poodles, and Chihuahuas and not for some general reason, that they are cuddly or soft or faithful or anything else from which I should derive my preference. I like them I simply like them and that s the way I am. Or, perhaps a slightly weaker condition is enough for Smith s view I like them, but I like each for a different reason: greyhounds because they are strong, poodles because they are elegant, and Chihuahuas because they can fit in a purse. In this sort of scenario, I may very well deliberate to the more generalized I love dogs, and this general desire does give results different from the antecedent desires taken on their own it is a more inclusive preference, dealing also with species which I have not yet met (species which may not be strong, elegant, nor purse-sized). And had I not made the generalizing step, there might have been some member or group of members of the set with whom I have not yet made acquaintance, but which I would have disliked say, for example, Scottish terriers. So, generalizing in this manner can give a different result than if rationality did not require that the agent systematize his desires where possible. I said that I may very well deliberate to the generalized desire, but this is not strong enough for Smith. If his argument is to hold, it must

14 8 Ja s o n A. Hills be shown that all fully rational beings would deliberate to that desire in other words, there should be something about rationality which brings persons to generalization in these sorts of circumstances. So I ask, must a fully rational person deliberate from those antecedent preferences to the more generalized form? While it is probably true that many rational persons would make the generalization, this fact has nothing to do with their rationality, per se. The problem is similar to that of generalizing universal truth based upon empirical experience of particulars many cases of induction do not seem to be required by logic or rationality alone. Rational persons need not make the generalization if they are not so inclined. Indeed, many such generalizations are later seen to be unfounded. For example, although empirical experience long suggested that all swans were white, this generalization was later found to be false and it would be odd, to say the least, if we insisted that rationality required Europeans to make the false generalization that all swans are white, only to find that this was false. Similarly, although one might have affection for every species of dog that one has met, rationality does not require that we generalize this affection for all dogs. Why then, do many but not all rational agents choose to generalize their affection in some of these situations? It seems to be because of their beliefs regarding generalization and when to apply it. But they cannot have arrived at absolute certitude regarding these beliefs or in other words, these beliefs are not dictated by rationality alone. An individual might generalize, if so inclined, for that is not contrary to reason; but the individual might also choose not to generalize. It is not irrational to use induction in some cases but not others. So, a person can be fully rational and yet refrain from generalizing at all or in particular instances. This seems right. Smith writes that exhibiting coherence and unity is partially constitutive of having a systematically justified, and so rationally preferable, set of desires, just as exhibiting coherence and unity is partially constitutive of having a systematically justified, and so rationally preferable, set of beliefs (115). But why should we value coherence and unity? If by these terms we only mean non- contradiction, then his statement is correct, but not terribly illuminating for, unlike beliefs, desires cannot be contradictory. Similarly, if we only value coherence and unity instrumentally, insofar as they promote non-contradiction in both theoretical and practical reasoning, then, once again, that statement is correct. But if this is all that Smith means by coherence and unity, then let us note that Williams deliberation can resolve cases of debilitating contradiction. To make his argument strong enough for a non-relativistic account of internal reasons, Smith must take coherence and unity to mean

15 Why Prefer a System of Desires? 9 something more than simply non-contradiction. They must represent some value which will require that we subsume specifics under generals where we can. This value will prefer whenever possible to give a single, underlying desire behind our many reasons for action rather than multiple desires. There are analogous values in theoretical reasoning, such as one which prefers a monistic cosmology to a pluralistic one, or prefers reducing the electromagnetic and weak nuclear forces to a single electro-weak force. But in these other fields, it is by no means clear that a rational person must assent to valuing that reduction simply because it is a reduction. Indeed, especially in the example of cosmology, a rational person could just as well value a view which does not reduce existence to one thing (or type of thing). The point is that not all rational persons need be theoretical systematizers. The same holds for practical reasoning: not all rational persons need be practical systematizers. Although Smith himself may value coherence and unity in this stronger sense (and we might as well, if we so desire), we can still be rational without valuing them in that way. An agent can rationally have ad hoc beliefs, provided they do not contradict the agent s other beliefs. Similarly, an agent can rationally have ad hoc desires, provided the agent has some means for resolving conflicts with other desires. In conclusion, Williams account of deliberation can provide coherence and unity in the weaker sense that is, it can avoid self-contradiction and motivational incapacity. And although it does not require the stronger kind of coherence and unity, a rational person need not value that sort of coherence and unity. Therefore, there can be fully rational persons who nonetheless fail to deliberate in the systematizing manner that Smith requires for his arguments about the non-relativity of reasons.

16 Works Cited Smith, Michael. Internal Reasons. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1995): Williams, Bernard. Internal and External Reasons. Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1981.

17 Works Consulted Clark, Philip. Velleman s Autonomism. Ethics 111 (2001): Cordner, Christopher. Ethical Necessity and Internal Reasons. Philosophy 76 (2001): Hollis, Martin. Jim and the Indians. Analysis 43 (1983): Hooker, Brad. Williams Argument Against External Reasons. Analysis 47 (1987): Korsgaard, Christine M. Skepticism About Practical Reason. The Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986): McDowell, John. Might There Be External Reasons? Mind, Value and Reality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, Millgram, Elijah. Williams Argument Against External Reasons. Noûs 30 (1996): Quinn, Warren. Putting Rationality in its Place. Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral Theory: Essays in Honour of Philippa Foot. Oxford: Clarendon Press, Taylor, Craig. Moral Incapacity. Philosophy 70 (1995): Velleman, J. David. The Possibility of Practical Reason. Ethics 106 (1996): Wiland, Eric. Good Advice and Rational Action. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2000):

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19 Aporia vol. 18 no A Defense of a Monadological Analysis in Leibniz s Middle Years Kelly Glover Ph i l o s o p h e r s commonly read The Monadology as a confident assertion of Leibniz s views about the foundations of his metaphysics. Most agree that during his later years, Leibniz holds that only monads are ultimately real substances. 1 His confidence about what qualifies as a substance is somewhat lacking, however, in texts written in the 1680s and 1690s. As a result, giving an explanation of the foundations of his middleyears metaphysics has become one of the most widely contested projects in contemporary Leibniz scholarship. The traditional view is that Leibniz endorses a monadological theory and characterizes only monads as ultimately real substances (Adams; Sleigh). Recently, however, many scholars have suggested that he endorses a corporeal substance theory and qualifies corporeal substances as ultimately real substances (Garber; Levey). I will present a new argument in support of the traditional view by drawing a parallel between the underlying motivations of Leibniz s metaphysical project and the foundational concerns typically associated with Agrippan skepticism. 2 For the purposes of this discussion I will call the underlying methodological principles embodied by the Agrippan mode of criticism Agrippan Foundational Principles or AFPs for short. 1 This point is contested by some scholars. For example, see Hartz s Why Corporeal Substances Keep Popping Up in Leibniz s Later Philosophy and Phemister s Corporeal Substances and the Discourse on Metaphysics. 2 For inspiring my interest in the relevance of Agrippan skepticism, I am indebted to Paul Franks and his book All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism in German Idealism. Kelly Glover recently completed her Honors BA at the University of Toronto where she specialized in philosophy. In the fall of 2008, she will be starting a PhD program at the University of California, Berkeley. Her philosophical interests include, but are not limited to, early modern philosophy (especially Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza, and Kant), epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of language.

20 14 Kelly Glover Conspicuously conscious of certain rules that cannot be broken, Leibniz employs the AFPs to criticize other metaphysicians of his day. Charity, I argue, requires that Leibniz not be seen as breaking these rules himself. This sanctions the move from a philosophical point to an interpretative one. Assuming that Leibniz was consistently applying the AFPs to his metaphysics in his middle years, a powerful case can be made for the claim that he would have been compelled to reject the corporeal substance theory and to endorse a monadological analysis. The Intractable Debate Though it is explicit that substances constitute the foundation of Leibniz s metaphysics, the scholarly literature is divided with respect to how exactly to understand his views of substance and, more specifically, what qualifies as a substance. 3 Those who attribute the monadological theory to Leibniz claim that he characterizes only monads as individual substances. Monads, composed of primary matter and further substantial forms, are simple, indivisible, unified, mind or soul-like entities. I will note that during his middle years, Leibniz does not use the term monad. This observation, however, is incon sequential to the attribution of the views in question. As I understand it, the term substantial form in texts from Leibniz s middle years is extensionally equivalent to the term monad in later-leibniz. For brevity, I use these terms interchangeably. 4 Those who attribute the monadological theory to Leibniz claim that he holds an idealistic or phenomenalistic view of the universe. The consequence of such a view is that reality is ultimately all mental and immaterial; matter is not fundamentally real. Corporeal substances (e.g., human beings understood as composites of matter and substantial form) are distinguished from other bodies insofar as their unity is on a firmer footing. Like all bodies, however, corporeal substances are phenomenal and not fundamentally real. This means that talk about the properties of corporeal substances, such as extension, motion, or shape, ultimately reduces to talk about the properties of monads. On this view, only monads qualify as fundamental substances. 3 In this discussion, I follow Sleigh (98 103). 4 Using these terms interchangeably does not amount to begging the question. Leibniz, in his middle years, characterizes substantial forms as simple, indivisible, unified, mind or soul-like entities. Later-Leibniz characterizes monads in the same way. It will make no difference to my argument whether I refer to these entities as monads or as substantial forms : whether Leibniz includes monads (or substantial forms) in his system is not at issue here both the monadological and the corporeal substance theory qualify monads (or substantial forms) as substances. At issue is whether Leibniz includes only monads (or substantial forms) in his system. See Sleigh (98 103).

21 A Defense of a Monadological Analysis in Leibniz s Middle Years 15 Proponents of the corporeal substance theory claim that Leibniz regards both corporeal substances and, in some respects, substantial forms as individual substances. On this view, corporeal substances are not phenomenal. They qualify as ultimately real, fundamental substances because there are truths about their modes (extension, motion, shape, etc.) that are not analyzable in terms of properties of substantial forms. Corporeal substances consist of aggregates of further corporeal substances, and this combination is unified into a single individual by a substantial form (of which there are infinitely many, each the form of some corporeal substance). There are also infinitely many extended things that are mere aggregates of corporeal substances. On this view, the entire created world is decomposable into created corporeal substances and their substantial forms. It might seem odd that the proponents of these competing theories propose such distinct interpretations of the foundations of Leibniz s metaphysics, especially given that they are interpreting the same texts. Leibniz s middle-years views of substance, however, are elusive precisely because the texts suggest both interpretations. While many passages in the Discourse on Metaphysics and the Correspondence with Arnauld seem to favor ascription of the corporeal substance theory, 5 there is also a significant number of passages suggesting that only monads are to be considered fundamental substances. 6 On what grounds, then, is one to decide which view to attribute to Leibniz? Agrippan Foundational Principles To decide which theory of substance to attribute to Leibniz, one must consider the crucial underlying question of the debate: what, according to Leibniz, makes up the ultimate constituents of the universe (that to which the entire created world is reducible)? The answer to this question will reveal whether he thinks that monads alone, or both corporeal substances and substantial forms, qualify as substances. 7 Thus the question is whether, 5 See, for an example, his October 9, 1687 letter to Arnauld: Man... is an entity endowed with a genuine unity conferred on him by his soul, notwithstanding the fact that a mass of his body is divided into organs, vessels, humors, spirits, and that the parts are undoubtedly full of an infinite number of other corporeal substances endowed with their own forms ( Correspondence with Arnauld 120). 6 See, for an example, Sleigh, who cites a passage from a draft of the Discourse: I agree that a particle of matter will never become a single being, speaking in metaphysical rigor, whatever soul is given to it, but it is the soul that is a true being (108). 7 Important to this discussion is a specific meaning of the term substance understood as substance in concreto. According to Robert Sleigh, In the seventeenth century, a theory telling us

22 16 Kelly Glover during his middle years, Leibniz holds that monads alone or both corporeal substances and monads constitute the foundation of the universe. In what follows, I suggest both a way of tackling this question and what I consider the most plausible answer. Leibniz s position about metaphysical foundations begins to emerge during his middle years. In the next section, I will argue that Leibniz s work reflects the underlying principles of the Agrippan mode of criticism (the AFPs). First, however, I will describe Agrippan skepticism and address two issues I anticipate to be points of contention: (1) how Agrippan skepticism, given that it addresses epistemic concerns, can be extended to the metaphysical domain, and (2) why, epistemology aside, Agrippan Foundational Principles should be read into Leibniz s project at all. Essentially, Agrippan skepticism is a dialectical strategy applied to individual theoretical claims to show, in agreement with ancient skepticism, that no such claim is ever justified. The aim is to show that all efforts to justify a claim will lead either to arbitrary supposition, vicious circularity, or an infinite regress. 8 These three ills comprise what has come to be called the Agrippan trilemma. 9 To make clear the Agrippan mode of criticism, I will outline the basic structure of an argument between an Agrippan skeptic and a dogmatist. The dogmatist puts forth some claim P and the skeptic claims that P is not justified, either because of diversity of opinion (i.e., there are plausible alternatives to P), or relativity of opinion (i.e., P is relative only to the context of the dogmatist). The dogmatist must then provide an argument to show that P is the only plausible option and not merely subjective to context. The skeptic will then argue that the justification for P leads to arbitrary supposition, to vicious circularity, or to an infinite regress. A justification involving arbitrary supposition is a proof that, in order to provide support for its conclusion, appeals to some random, illogical reason. A justification containing vicious circularity is a proof that either appeals to a premise that states the conclusion or in some way presupposes the truth of the conclusion. A justification involving an infinite regress what were the substances in concreto was a theory about the ultimate furniture of the universe. Substances in concreto, with their properties, were taken to constitute the base on which every other fact about the universe supervened (98). Substances in concreto, then, are the ultimate constituents of the universe. 8 For a description, see Empiricus (72 75). (Note: Sextus does not credit Agrippa with the modes of skepticism: this attribution comes from Diogenes Laertius.) For further discussion, see Barnes (37 39). 9 Agrippa is associated with five modes: discrepancy, relativity, infinite regress, circularity, and arbitrary presupposition. Following Franks (see footnote 2), I focus on the three latter modes, which compose the trilemma and which aim to show that the reasoning process cannot be completed in a satisfactory way.

23 A Defense of a Monadological Analysis in Leibniz s Middle Years 17 results from the requirement that all premises in a proof have to be, themselves, justified. Each premise requires a further premise to justify it; the justifying premise requires a further premise to justify it, and so on, ad infinitum. A justification implicated as containing arbitrariness, vicious circularity or an infinite regress will not qualify as satisfactory. The Agrippan skeptic prevails if he or she shows that the claim lacks justification. Epistemic concerns with giving complete justifications can parallel concerns with giving satisfactory metaphysical accounts of foundations. In this extension of Agrippan skepticism, I follow Paul Franks. Although his focus is not on Leibnizian metaphysics, he emphasizes the general point that the basic structure of Agrippan skepticism can be extended to the metaphysical domain. According to Franks, The Agrippan trilemma is often discussed as if it were an exclusively epistemological topic.... But in fact the trilemma can arise whenever what is at stake is the nature of reasons, which need not only be reasons why someone believes something, but may also be reasons why... something is the something it is. (20) Suggesting an understanding of Agrippan style argumentation that is neutral between epistemic and ontic reasons, Franks talks of grounds, including metaphysical grounds (20). 10 This broad conception of grounding motivates an extended understanding of Agrippan argumentative strategies applied to domains or reasoning. The idea is that the Agrippan strategy can be extended to challenge answers to why questions, whether they be epistemic ( How do you know? ) or metaphysical ( How did this come to be? ). Skepticism about epistemic grounding (i.e., about reasons and justification) can be extended to concerns about the coherence of theories of metaphysical grounding (i.e., about what the world is fundamentally made up of ). According to the principles embodied by the Agrippan strategy (the AFPs), grounding cannot be arbitrary, circular, or lead to an infinite regress. Understood in this broad sense, the AFPs can be extended to challenge whether any metaphysical account can be properly grounded. The worry in the metaphysical domain is not that reasons are subject to doubt and thus that complete justification is impossible. The worry is that definitions of substance are objectionable and thus so too is the metaphysical account of what underlies the stuff in the world. Substances, then, are to a metaphysical account as the grounds of a belief are to the belief itself. Thus the restrictions that the AFPs impose on metaphysical grounding apply to any proper account of substance. 10 Franks says that metaphysical grounding may be conceived as escaping in the Leibnizian tradition, is conceived in order to escape the Agrippan Trilemma (20).

24 18 Kelly Glover One might argue that it is not clear how arbitrariness, vicious circularity and infinite regress would be problematic in metaphysics. It might be argued by a theist, for example, that we must arbitrarily presuppose the existence of God in order to reach the conclusion that the world is intelligible. The theist might even present this as an unproblematic assumption for which no additional argument is necessary. There is no reason to see ills of this kind, however, as more pernicious in the epistemic case than in other cases (and, for example in the preceding case, which involves a metaphysical claim). Ills of this kind are problematic for any explanation. Explanations are judged as satisfactory or unsatisfactory. It is fair to assume that, to be deemed satisfactory, an explanation (regardless of its content) must meet certain conditions, including justificatory conditions. If any explanation involves arbitrariness, circularity, or infinite regress, then it fails to meet such conditions and is therefore unsatisfactory. One might still resist the idea that Leibniz is concerned with epistemology or Agrippan skepticism at all. 11 My thesis, however, is not that Leibniz was focused on epistemology or even directly engaging with Agrippan skepticism. My thesis rests on the idea that the same methodological principles (AFPs) that moved Agrippan skepticism also moved Leibniz, but in the realm of metaphysics. These AFPs (although not labeled as such, and perhaps not even explicitly linked to Agrippa) certainly would have been salient in the era in which Leibniz wrote. These are indeed principles which Leibniz s entire body of philosophy seems to employ. Whatever may be said about Leibniz s epistemological concerns, his work reflects these underlying AFPs. I will make lucid the parallel between Leibniz s metaphysical concerns and the general philosophical concerns underlying Agrippan skepticism by elaborating on first, Leibniz s position with respect to substance and metaphysical foundations; and second, his endorsement of the AFPs. A Leibnizian Endorsement of the AFPs The aim of Leibniz s metaphysics mirrors the aim of the dogmatist s attempt to escape the Agrippan trilemma. The aim of the dogmatist is to 11 I note, however, that several points can be made in response. First, as R.H. Popkin has argued, Leibniz had robust epistemological concerns. Popkin notes that three of Leibniz s correspondents (Simon Foucher, Bishop Pierre-Daniel Huet, and Pierre Bayle) were leading skeptics of the time and several of [Leibniz s] most famous presentations of philosophy were published as answers to the skeptics or to deal with problems they had presented to him (262). Moreover, Popkin observes that Leibniz s Specimen Dynamicum was an attempt to answer the ancient skeptic, Sextus Empiricus (268). Given that Sextus discusses the five tropes, it is likely that concerns with Agrippan skepticism were available to Leibniz. It is also worth noting that Descartes, in his Meditations, explicitly expresses concerns with skepticism and grounding. Leibniz might well have been influenced by such motivations of the Cartesian project.

25 A Defense of a Monadological Analysis in Leibniz s Middle Years 19 put forth a rational, complete, perhaps self-evident or self-justified first principle which acts as a foundation on which other claims can be justifiably made. One method of answering the Agrippan skeptic in the metaphysical domain is to posit an absolute ground with ultimate explanatory power. This is precisely what Leibniz seems to be after. This aim is reflected in his April 30, 1687 letter to Arnauld where Leibniz writes, As long as we do not discern what a complete being, or rather a substance, really is, we will never have something at which we can stop; [[and this is the only way of establishing solid and real principles]] (Philosophical Essays 90). Leibniz s very project, then, seems to reflect concerns with answering Agrippan worries about foundations. What is more, during his middle years, Leibniz employs the AFPs against his contemporaries. Let us consider each facet of the trilemma in isolation and explore the mirroring concerns expressed by Leibniz. Arbitrary Supposition During his middle years, Leibniz expresses his methodological commitments with respect to avoiding arbitrary supposition in a number of ways. I focus on his critique of occasionalism and his frequent appeals to an absolute, non-arbitrary grounding in the formulation of his own system. Leibniz expresses concerns with avoiding arbitrary supposition in his discussion of mind-body interaction where he criticizes occasionalism and introduces his pre-established harmony. Occasionalism also known as the way of assistance is the view that on the occasion of something happening in one s mind, God causes something to happen in one s body. Leibniz rejects this account precisely because it involves an arbitrary supposition. He says, This is to bring a deus ex machina into natural and everyday things, where reason says that God should intervene only in the way in which he concurs with all other natural things ( Third Explanation of the New System 192). Occasionalism, according to Leibniz, is not a natural resolution to a problem of mind-body interaction. It is unmotivated and ad hoc. We can discern from this criticism a commitment to avoiding arbitrary supposition in a metaphysical account. Leibniz, moreover, shows a concern with avoiding arbitrary supposition in the formulation of his own system. To ground his own system, he frequently appeals to an absolute, non-arbitrary ground consisting in God and created substances, both of which have explanatory power. Of particular importance are his early formulations of the principle of sufficient reason, as observed by Christia Mercer. According to Mercer, during

26 20 Kelly Glover Leibniz s middle years, he asserts that there is a complete ratio for everything (Leibniz s Metaphysics: Its Origins and Development 89). 12 This principle, Mercer says, is an articulation of Leibniz s fundamental commitment to the harmony and intelligibility of the world. Against the background of the notion of a complete ratio, the view seems to be that for everything in the world, there is a complete explanation of exactly why it and no other came about. (90) Leibniz s commitment to avoiding the arbitrary is contained in his commitment to the principle of sufficient reason. This principle, which essentially states that everything is what it is, and every event occurs as it does, for some sufficient reason, embodies a strong aversion to the arbitrary. Vicious Circularity If we consider the fundamental goal of Leibniz s metaphysical project, and also what vicious circularity would amount to in the metaphysical domain, then it becomes clear that Leibniz would have rejected vicious circularity in an explanation. His principle of sufficient reason suggests not only that he was concerned with avoiding arbitrary supposition, but also that he was concerned with evading vicious circularity. I will note that vicious circularity in any attempt to justify a claim is generally offensive. What I intend to show is that it would be especially offensive for Leibniz. Leibniz s metaphysical project, much like the projects of the other early modern rationalists, was motivated by a fundamental desire to make the world intelligible. With this goal in mind, Leibniz would certainly not have entertained vicious circularity in a metaphysical explanation. Here it is helpful to consider the distinction between the concept of an explanandum and the concept of an explanans. The former is what is being explained and the latter is what is doing the explaining. Consider the following explanandum: This is the best of all possible worlds. As discussed in the preceding section, Leibniz s principle of sufficient reason states that everything is what it is, and every event occurs as it does, for some sufficient reason. According to the principle of sufficient reason, there must be some explanans which acts as the sufficient reason for the explanandum, and explains why this is the best of all possible worlds and why it should not be otherwise. For Leibniz, the explanans would be that God always wills the best. It is because God always wills the best that this 12 Note that ratio is translated from Latin as account or reason.

27 A Defense of a Monadological Analysis in Leibniz s Middle Years 21 is the best of all possible worlds. Notice that this explanation would be viciously circular if the explanandum and explanans were the same. We would yield the following unsatisfying explanation: It is because this is the best of all possible worlds that this is the best of all possible worlds. The principle of sufficient reason is somewhat of a bridge between the explanandum and the explanans. It is because of the way the principle of sufficient reason is formulated that both concepts are needed. For the world to be intelligible, the sufficient reason (the explanans) cannot be identical to that which needs to be explained (the explanandum). If we suppose that Leibniz would have allowed vicious circularity in his metaphysical explanations, we also have to suppose that he would be willing to forfeit his goal of making the world intelligible. This would certainly be an uncharitable reading. Infinite Regress Leibniz s methodological commitment to avoiding infinite regress is revealed by his critique of the Cartesian conception of substance. More specifically, he shows this commitment by rejecting Cartesian matter on the grounds that matter consisting in mere extension is incoherent because it would be infinitely divisible. A substance for Leibniz needs to be a complete unity. Cartesian matter, in virtue of occurring as a being by aggregation, has no more unity, metaphysically speaking, than a slab of marble. Leibniz says: A slab of marble is perhaps only like a heap of stones, and so could never pass for a single substance, but only for an assemblage of many substances.... For imagine there were two stones, for example the diamond of the Grand Duke and that of the Great Mongul.... Even [if we] bring them into contact they will not be any more substantially united. ( Correspondence with Arnauld 115) According to Leibniz, then, anything that is essentially extended lacks unity. He argues that this is problematic for an account of substance. Leibniz s argument runs as follows. Cartesian matter is essentially extended, and since anything that is extended is infinitely divisible into parts, Cartesian matter is infinitely divisible into parts. Since it is a being by aggregation, Cartesian matter must derive its reality from its parts. Because it is infinitely divisible, however, Cartesian matter has no parts from which it can derive its reality. The matter will be divided into parts over and over again without ever hitting rock bottom. Leibniz says: