Does Deduction really rest on a more secure epistemological footing than Induction?


 Jean Hancock
 10 months ago
 Views:
Transcription
1 Does Deduction really rest on a more secure epistemological footing than Induction? We argue that, if deduction is taken to at least include classical logic (CL, henceforth), justifying CL  and thus deduction altogether  by means of showing that it preserves truth faces problems analogous to Hume s Problem of Induction. First, we refute the claim that CL needs no justification, and then show that such justification cannot be satisfactorily provided either deductively or inductively. Inductive attempts fail because they cannot establish that CL is truthpreserving, whereas deductive ones cannot avoid circularity. Ergo, deduction cannot be justified, and is therefore, at best, as epistemically secure as induction. Most of our knowledge of the world is inductive: we observe certain regularities in nature  for instance, all observed F s have been G s  and infer from them general laws  e.g., all F s are G s. Such inferences are to be distinguished from deductive ones, which are standardly regarded as nonampliative 1 and truthpreserving: valid deductive arguments are deemed to always lead from true premises to true conclusions [7], [8]. Per contra, inductive arguments are defeasible: their conclusion is supported, but not strictly entailed, by the premises, and adding new premises may well invalidate previously drawn conclusions. Accordingly, inductive inferences seem to lack the especially secure epistemological status which deduction purportedly enjoys. We then need independent grounds to determine which, if any, of our inductive inferences are warranted and how. Any attempt at providing such justification, however, seems to fail because of what is known as Hume s Problem of Induction [5], [6], which can be sketched as follows. Any inference is warranted either deductively or inductively. Consider the first option. Inductive arguments are not deductively valid, for, in inductive arguments, the negation of the conclusion is logically consistent with the premises. So, a deductive justification of induction would require additional premises  e.g., If all observed F s have been G s, then all F s are G s, the inclusion of which would be warranted only if we already knew that induction were truth 1 The conclusion says nothing which was not already in the premises. 1
2 preserving [2], [8]. On the other hand, an inductive justification of induction would run into a vicious circle, for it would employ the very same reasoning at stake to solve the riddle [2], [5], [6]. Hence, no justification of induction seems to be at hand. Some  notably, Popper [7]  have therefore claimed that induction should be abandoned altogether (at least within the context of scientific inquiry), in favour of an exclusively deductive method. But what justifies this faith in deductive reasoning? At a closer look, any attempts at justifying deduction seem to incur into problems analogous to those derived for induction. First, any such justification can be either deductive or inductive. Yet, as we clarify later, a deductive justification would be circular, whereas an inductive one would fail to satisfy the truthpreservation requirement, for one would be at best entitled to claim that deduction usually leads from true premises to true conclusions. After all, if induction is not truthpreserving, an inductive argument cannot conclusively establish that deduction is. This is the Problem of Deduction [2]. Next, we consider, and dismiss, some putative solutions to it. While there is no universal consensus over the precise meaning of deduction, it appears there are at least certain inferences that are considered unambiguously deductively valid 2 (e.g., instantiations of modus ponens [1], [2]). Following [2], we can advance two different notions of deductive validity: (i) An argument A 1,...A n 1 = A n is (isemantically 3 ) deductively valid IFF it is impossible, when the premises A 1,...A n 1 are true, that the conclusion A n be false; (ii) Let L D be a formal system. Then, an argument A 1,...A n 1 A n is (syntactically) deductively valid in L D IFF the conclusion A n is derivable from the premises A 1,...A n 1, and the axioms of L D, if any, in virtue of the rules of inference of L D. It seems to trivially follow from (i) that deductively valid arguments are truthpreserving. Hence, some might argue that deduction, by definition, needs no justification: truthpreservation supplies the desired warrant [2]. Then, if we upheld (i), there would be no problem of justification. Yet, this solution is epistemically vacuous: it solves the problem of justifying deduction at the price of not knowing which inferences are deductively valid, or if any deductively valid inferences exist at all [2]. This is because the old problem of justifying deduction reappears in a new form: how do we know that any particular unambiguously deductive inference that we deem truthpreserving is indeed deductive in the sense of (i), and thus genuinely truthpreserving? After all, (i) does not provide 2 Consider how often we define inductive arguments by contrasting them with arguments which we already consider deductively valid [10], [8]. 3 The term isemantic is introduced to avoid confusion with the technical meaning of semantic validity in the modeltheoretic sense. The difference between these notions will be discussed later. 2
3 any reasons to think that isemantically valid arguments include any specific class of arguments we might want to justify (e.g., those sanctioned by a classical consequence relation, or otherwise specified by some formal system L D ). But this seems to be the question that any satisfactory justification of deduction should address [2]. The same issue can be seen more directly if we adopt definition (ii). Here, L D is a formal system codifying those inferences that we call deductive. Then, the problem of the justification of deduction is, again, that of explaining why deductively valid inferences in the syntactic sense of (ii) should be considered truthpreserving. This is the question we shall tackle throughout this paper. It remains, however, to specify which formal inference systems might be substituted for L D. This is not straightforward, given the vagueness of the term deduction. Yet, if anything, CL appears to be a suitable candidate: using CL as an inference method seems to be a clearcut instance of deductive reasoning in the sense of (ii)  so much seems to be granted, or implicitly assumed, in most of the relevant literature [2], [4], [7], [10]. We then assume that deduction stands for some class of formalised inference systems (L D1, L D2,...) at least including CL. Next, we address the issue of whether CL is indeed truthpreserving  and thus warranted. This is because, if deduction at least includes CL, a justification of deduction should be a justification of CL, too. Note, however, that there is no a priori reason why our arguments could not also hold for suitably formalised inference systems other than CL. Now that we restricted the focus on CL, one might immediately retort that soundness and completeness theorems for CL provide a vindication of the correspondence between isemantic and syntactic validity [3]: by showing that the definition of syntactic validity coincides with the modeltheoretic one 4, one can endow deductive inferences with warrant via their being truthpreserving. Yet, this objection mistakenly presumes the equivalence between (i) and the modeltheoretic definition of deductive validity for CL. Such equivalence is, again, just the one we wish to ascertain: isemantic validity is an informal notion which bears no straightforward resemblance with the technical characterisation of modeltheoretic validity. In model theory, the validity of an inference depends on various mathematical properties of interpretation functions and their domains. So, whether modeltheoretically valid arguments are truthpreserving crucially depends on whether we can justifiably discriminate between those properties of domains/interpretations which hold and those which do not. 4 A model is a structure M, such that M = d, I, where d is the domain of M, and I is an interpretation function which assigns, to each nonlogical terms of L, an element in d. We then define the relation of satisfaction between an interpretation function and the formulae of L: an interpretation I satisfies a formula ϕ (in symbols, I = ϕ) IFF ϕ under interpretation I holds in d. Then, an argument Σ, α in the formal language L is modeltheoretically valid IFF there is no interpretation which satisfies each element of Σ and fails to satisfy α. We then write: Σ = α [9]. 3
4 But any mathematical argument as to whether any such properties hold  e.g., whether a given interpreted formula holds in a domain  will itself be formulated within CL. We are then back where we started: all we can assert is that modeltheoretic validity coincides with isemantic validity IFF arguments sanctioned by CL are truthpreserving. Then, CL does indeed need an independent justification. Since justifying CL amounts to showing it is truthpreserving, most attempts at providing such justification hinge on the idea that we might still somehow avoid circularity when employing CL to justify itself. We will therefore bypass inductive justificatory attempts, for induction simply cannot establish the truthpreservation requirement. Yet, we will briefly return to the possibility of justifying deduction inductively at the end of the paper, when suggesting the questionability of the truthpreservation requirement. First, let us consider the possibility that inference rules might be employed at the metalevel to justify themselves at the objectlanguage level. The inference rule from A, A B infer B (modus ponens) in the objectlanguage, for instance, might be warranted at the metalevel because, given the truthtable for, we know that if A is true and A B is true, then B must be true, too. This latter argument is clearly an instance of modus ponens itself  we could even rewrite it as: suppose C ( A is true and A B is true). If C, then D (if [ A is true and A B is true], then B is true). Therefore, D ( B is true) [2]. Yet, the warrant problem invariably reappears up the ladder of metalanguages, for what entitled us to employ modus ponens at the metalevel in the first place? 5 One might reply that it was modus ponens at the metametalevel, but it is now clear that this strategy would lead to a hopeless infinite regress, in which the warrant of each step could be challenged. Moreover, one can show this solution renders inference rules which we do not consider classically valid justified, as well. Consider, for instance, the rule from A B, B infer A (modus morons). We can once more construct an argument based on modus morons in the metalanguage to justify the rule at the objectlanguage level: assume B and A B are true. Then D (If A B is true, then B is true). If C, then D (if A is true, then [if A B is true, then B is true]). Therefore, C ( A is true) [2]. The last step of this argument clearly employs modus morons. Hence, one could equally well justify CLinvalid inference rules in the objectlanguage through CLinvalid arguments in the metalanguage, thereby invalidating this selfsupporting strategy. Perhaps, one might instead construct a justificationchain of metaarguments, each of which justified by a higherlevel one, to warrant CLinferences formulated in the objectlanguage. Such arguments could be expressed equally well in 5 Given our previous discussion of model theory, one could even ask what justified our definition of the truthtable for in the first place. 4
5 CL or some other suitably formalised systems we consider deductive. Both options, however, would succumb to the same counterarguments: (i) if the number of metaarguments available were finite, we could not avoid, along the chain, some selfsupporting ones, which we have just shown unwarranted; (ii) even if we had an infinite amount of employable metaarguments, each step in the justificationchain would need to be demonstrably truthpreserving to provide the previous steps with warrant. In other words, showing that an argument is truthpreserving itself requires a truthpreserving metaargument. In turn, any attempt at justifying these metaarguments by showing they are truthpreserving could not be inductive. It would necessarily rely on deductive arguments formulated in some formal system L D that we consider deductive (CL included). Then, this same reasoning should be iterated for any subsequent higherlevel argument, thus necessarily generating an infinite justificationchain. One might question whether such an infinite justificationchain can be constructed at all. If so, one might well have reasons to be wary of infinite justificationchains. And even endorsing them would leave one in an uncomfortable position: that of not conclusively knowing, at any point, whether one s accepted inferences are indeed truthpreserving. This is because the justificationchain we just discussed has a very particular structure. We do not have an infinite chain of propositions (...a i 1, a i, a), where each a i is a reason to accept a i+1, and hence justifies the acceptance of a ( argument A is truthpreserving ). This may in fact do, by infinitist standards. Our chain, instead, presents a serious difficulty, in that one cannot know whether any step from a i to a i+1 is ever warranted: any such step, in fact, itself requires an infinite justificationchain in which every step..., and so forth. Hence, we cannot determine whether any reason to accept any a i is indeed a reason. Why should anyone accept this as a valid justification? After all, if one endorsed an infinite justificationchain in which no single step is warranted, one could justify any infinite set of purportedly mutually supporting arguments, in particular circular chains (where A justifies B, B justifies A, etc.). Lastly, consider that this justificationchain is itself an argument aimed at showing that classically valid (or some other deductive) inferences are truthpreserving. Thus, even regarding it as providing a valid justification for CL would imply that we already considered it prima facie truthpreserving. And this is clearly circular, given our previous discussion. A noncircular, unproblematic deductive justification of CL and, accordingly, a deductive justification of deduction as a whole  whichever inference systems we may allow in that class beside CL  seem then impossible. We have then established that deduction, assumed to encompass at least CL, does not rest on a more secure epistemological footing than induction. Any attempts at justifying it by appealing to the notion of truthpreservation have been shown unsatisfactory: inductive justifications, by their very nature, are too weak to establish the truthpreservation requirement, while deductive ones cannot do so noncircularly. As a final remark, we notice that much of the 5
6 difficulties in justifying CL  and, perhaps, any method of inference as such  appear to stem precisely from the truthpreservation requirement, which might be too stringent. Moreover, if one were to abandon it, an inductive justification of CL would be at least conceivable. References [1] Carroll, L. (1895/1995). What the Tortoise said to Achilles, Mind, New Series, Vol. 104, No. 416: [2] Haack, S. (1976). The Justification of Deduction, Mind, New Series, Vol. 85, No. 337: [3] Haack, S. (1982). Dummett s Justification of Deduction, Mind, Vol. 95, No. 362: [4] Howson, C. and Urbach, P. (2006). Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach, Peru, Illinois: Carus Publishing. [5] Hume, D. (1777/1975). Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals, reprinted by L. A. Selby Bigge, Oxford: Clarendon Press. [6] Hume, David ( ). Treatise of Human Nature, edited by L. A. Selby Bigge, Oxford: Clarendon Press. [7] Popper, K. R. (1959). The Logic of Scientific Discovery, London: Hutchinson. [8] Salmon, W. C. (1967). The Foundations of Scientific Inference, Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press. [9] Shapiro, S. (2005). Logical Consequence, Proof Theory, and Model Theory, in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic, ch. 21, , New York: Oxford University Press, Inc. [10] Strawson, P. F. (1952/2000). The Justification of Induction, reprinted in Probability and Confirmation, , NY: Garland Publishing Inc. 6
Semantic Foundations for Deductive Methods
Semantic Foundations for Deductive Methods delineating the scope of deductive reason Roger Bishop Jones Abstract. The scope of deductive reason is considered. First a connection is discussed between the
More informationThe Problem of Induction and Popper s Deductivism
The Problem of Induction and Popper s Deductivism Issues: I. Problem of Induction II. Popper s rejection of induction III. Salmon s critique of deductivism 2 I. The problem of induction 1. Inductive vs.
More informationBoghossian & Harman on the analytic theory of the a priori
Boghossian & Harman on the analytic theory of the a priori PHIL 83104 November 2, 2011 Both Boghossian and Harman address themselves to the question of whether our a priori knowledge can be explained in
More informationSemantic Entailment and Natural Deduction
Semantic Entailment and Natural Deduction Alice Gao Lecture 6, September 26, 2017 Entailment 1/55 Learning goals Semantic entailment Define semantic entailment. Explain subtleties of semantic entailment.
More informationUnderstanding Truth Scott Soames Précis Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Volume LXV, No. 2, 2002
1 Symposium on Understanding Truth By Scott Soames Précis Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Volume LXV, No. 2, 2002 2 Precis of Understanding Truth Scott Soames Understanding Truth aims to illuminate
More informationIn Defense of Radical Empiricism. Joseph Benjamin Riegel. Chapel Hill 2006
In Defense of Radical Empiricism Joseph Benjamin Riegel A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
More informationInformalizing Formal Logic
Informalizing Formal Logic Antonis Kakas Department of Computer Science, University of Cyprus, Cyprus antonis@ucy.ac.cy Abstract. This paper discusses how the basic notions of formal logic can be expressed
More informationParadox of Deniability
1 Paradox of Deniability Massimiliano Carrara FISPPA Department, University of Padua, Italy Peking University, Beijing  6 November 2018 Introduction. The starting elements Suppose two speakers disagree
More informationConstructive Logic, Truth and Warranted Assertibility
Constructive Logic, Truth and Warranted Assertibility Greg Restall Department of Philosophy Macquarie University Version of May 20, 2000....................................................................
More informationAyer and Quine on the a priori
Ayer and Quine on the a priori November 23, 2004 1 The problem of a priori knowledge Ayer s book is a defense of a thoroughgoing empiricism, not only about what is required for a belief to be justified
More informationPhilosophy Epistemology Topic 5 The Justification of Induction 1. Hume s Skeptical Challenge to Induction
Philosophy 5340  Epistemology Topic 5 The Justification of Induction 1. Hume s Skeptical Challenge to Induction In the section entitled Sceptical Doubts Concerning the Operations of the Understanding
More informationThe problems of induction in scientific inquiry: Challenges and solutions. Table of Contents 1.0 Introduction Defining induction...
The problems of induction in scientific inquiry: Challenges and solutions Table of Contents 1.0 Introduction... 2 2.0 Defining induction... 2 3.0 Induction versus deduction... 2 4.0 Hume's descriptive
More informationCan A Priori Justified Belief Be Extended Through Deduction? It is often assumed that if one deduces some proposition p from some premises
Can A Priori Justified Belief Be Extended Through Deduction? Introduction It is often assumed that if one deduces some proposition p from some premises which one knows a priori, in a series of individually
More informationModule 5. Knowledge Representation and Logic (Propositional Logic) Version 2 CSE IIT, Kharagpur
Module 5 Knowledge Representation and Logic (Propositional Logic) Lesson 12 Propositional Logic inference rules 5.5 Rules of Inference Here are some examples of sound rules of inference. Each can be shown
More informationIs Epistemic Probability Pascalian?
Is Epistemic Probability Pascalian? James B. Freeman Hunter College of The City University of New York ABSTRACT: What does it mean to say that if the premises of an argument are true, the conclusion is
More informationA Scientific RealismBased Probabilistic Approach to Popper's Problem of Confirmation
A Scientific RealismBased Probabilistic Approach to Popper's Problem of Confirmation Akinobu Harada ABSTRACT From the start of Popper s presentation of the problem about the way for confirmation of a
More informationIntersubstitutivity Principles and the Generalization Function of Truth. Anil Gupta University of Pittsburgh. Shawn Standefer University of Melbourne
Intersubstitutivity Principles and the Generalization Function of Truth Anil Gupta University of Pittsburgh Shawn Standefer University of Melbourne Abstract We offer a defense of one aspect of Paul Horwich
More informationTWO VERSIONS OF HUME S LAW
DISCUSSION NOTE BY CAMPBELL BROWN JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY DISCUSSION NOTE MAY 2015 URL: WWW.JESP.ORG COPYRIGHT CAMPBELL BROWN 2015 Two Versions of Hume s Law MORAL CONCLUSIONS CANNOT VALIDLY
More informationValidity of Inferences *
1 Validity of Inferences * When the systematic study of inferences began with Aristotle, there was in Greek culture already a flourishing argumentative practice with the purpose of supporting or grounding
More informationAN EPISTEMIC PARADOX. Byron KALDIS
AN EPISTEMIC PARADOX Byron KALDIS Consider the following statement made by R. Aron: "It can no doubt be maintained, in the spirit of philosophical exactness, that every historical fact is a construct,
More informationQuantificational logic and empty names
Quantificational logic and empty names Andrew Bacon 26th of March 2013 1 A Puzzle For Classical Quantificational Theory Empty Names: Consider the sentence 1. There is something identical to Pegasus On
More informationExercise Sets. KS Philosophical Logic: Modality, Conditionals Vagueness. Dirk Kindermann University of Graz July 2014
Exercise Sets KS Philosophical Logic: Modality, Conditionals Vagueness Dirk Kindermann University of Graz July 2014 1 Exercise Set 1 Propositional and Predicate Logic 1. Use Definition 1.1 (Handout I Propositional
More informationSemantics and the Justification of Deductive Inference
Semantics and the Justification of Deductive Inference Ebba Gullberg ebba.gullberg@philos.umu.se Sten Lindström sten.lindstrom@philos.umu.se Umeå University Abstract Is it possible to give a justification
More information5 A Modal Version of the
5 A Modal Version of the Ontological Argument E. J. L O W E Moreland, J. P.; Sweis, Khaldoun A.; Meister, Chad V., Jul 01, 2013, Debating Christian Theism The original version of the ontological argument
More informationSUPPOSITIONAL REASONING AND PERCEPTUAL JUSTIFICATION
SUPPOSITIONAL REASONING AND PERCEPTUAL JUSTIFICATION Stewart COHEN ABSTRACT: James Van Cleve raises some objections to my attempt to solve the bootstrapping problem for what I call basic justification
More informationLogic and Pragmatics: linear logic for inferential practice
Logic and Pragmatics: linear logic for inferential practice Daniele Porello danieleporello@gmail.com Institute for Logic, Language & Computation (ILLC) University of Amsterdam, Plantage Muidergracht 24
More informationEthical Consistency and the Logic of Ought
Ethical Consistency and the Logic of Ought Mathieu Beirlaen Ghent University In Ethical Consistency, Bernard Williams vindicated the possibility of moral conflicts; he proposed to consistently allow for
More informationIn Search of the Ontological Argument. Richard Oxenberg
1 In Search of the Ontological Argument Richard Oxenberg Abstract We can attend to the logic of Anselm's ontological argument, and amuse ourselves for a few hours unraveling its convoluted wordplay, or
More informationHUME, CAUSATION AND TWO ARGUMENTS CONCERNING GOD
HUME, CAUSATION AND TWO ARGUMENTS CONCERNING GOD JASON MEGILL Carroll College Abstract. In Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Hume (1779/1993) appeals to his account of causation (among other things)
More informationDoes the Skeptic Win? A Defense of Moore. I. Moorean Methodology. In A Proof of the External World, Moore argues as follows:
Does the Skeptic Win? A Defense of Moore I argue that Moore s famous response to the skeptic should be accepted even by the skeptic. My paper has three main stages. First, I will briefly outline G. E.
More informationIs Klein an infinitist about doxastic justification?
Philos Stud (2007) 134:19 24 DOI 10.1007/s1109800690165 ORIGINAL PAPER Is Klein an infinitist about doxastic justification? Michael Bergmann Published online: 7 March 2007 Ó Springer Science+Business
More informationFinite Reasons without Foundations
Finite Reasons without Foundations Ted Poston January 20, 2014 Abstract In this paper I develop a theory of reasons that has strong similarities to Peter Klein s infinitism. The view I develop, Framework
More informationEtchemendy, Tarski, and Logical Consequence 1 Jared Bates, University of Missouri Southwest Philosophy Review 15 (1999):
Etchemendy, Tarski, and Logical Consequence 1 Jared Bates, University of Missouri Southwest Philosophy Review 15 (1999): 47 54. Abstract: John Etchemendy (1990) has argued that Tarski's definition of logical
More informationPhilosophy 5340 Epistemology Topic 4: Skepticism. Part 1: The Scope of Skepticism and Two Main Types of Skeptical Argument
1. The Scope of Skepticism Philosophy 5340 Epistemology Topic 4: Skepticism Part 1: The Scope of Skepticism and Two Main Types of Skeptical Argument The scope of skeptical challenges can vary in a number
More informationCAN DEDUCTION BE JUSTIFIED? Drew KHLENTZOS
CAN DEDUCTION BE JUSTIFIED? Drew KHLENTZOS 1 The justification o f fundamental logical laws How can we be sure that our inferential practices are sound? Sceptics and naturalised epistemologists would join
More informationUC Berkeley, Philosophy 142, Spring 2016
Logical Consequence UC Berkeley, Philosophy 142, Spring 2016 John MacFarlane 1 Intuitive characterizations of consequence Modal: It is necessary (or apriori) that, if the premises are true, the conclusion
More informationPHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC AND LANGUAGE OVERVIEW LOGICAL CONSTANTS WEEK 5: MODELTHEORETIC CONSEQUENCE JONNY MCINTOSH
PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC AND LANGUAGE WEEK 5: MODELTHEORETIC CONSEQUENCE JONNY MCINTOSH OVERVIEW Last week, I discussed various strands of thought about the concept of LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE, introducing Tarski's
More informationClass #14: October 13 Gödel s Platonism
Philosophy 405: Knowledge, Truth and Mathematics Fall 2010 Hamilton College Russell Marcus Class #14: October 13 Gödel s Platonism I. The Continuum Hypothesis and Its Independence The continuum problem
More informationStudy Guides. Chapter 1  Basic Training
Study Guides Chapter 1  Basic Training Argument: A group of propositions is an argument when one or more of the propositions in the group is/are used to give evidence (or if you like, reasons, or grounds)
More informationReview of "The Tarskian Turn: Deflationism and Axiomatic Truth"
Essays in Philosophy Volume 13 Issue 2 Aesthetics and the Senses Article 19 August 2012 Review of "The Tarskian Turn: Deflationism and Axiomatic Truth" Matthew McKeon Michigan State University Follow this
More informationOn Priest on nonmonotonic and inductive logic
On Priest on nonmonotonic and inductive logic Greg Restall School of Historical and Philosophical Studies The University of Melbourne Parkville, 3010, Australia restall@unimelb.edu.au http://consequently.org/
More informationCan logical consequence be deflated?
Can logical consequence be deflated? Michael De University of Utrecht Department of Philosophy Utrecht, Netherlands mikejde@gmail.com in Insolubles and Consequences : essays in honour of Stephen Read,
More informationHas Nagel uncovered a form of idealism?
Has Nagel uncovered a form of idealism? Author: Terence Rajivan Edward, University of Manchester. Abstract. In the sixth chapter of The View from Nowhere, Thomas Nagel attempts to identify a form of idealism.
More informationROBUSTNESS AND THE NEW RIDDLE REVIVED. Adina L. Roskies
Ratio (new series) XXI 2 June 2008 0034 0006 ROBUSTNESS AND THE NEW RIDDLE REVIVED Adina L. Roskies Abstract The problem of induction is perennially important in epistemology and the philosophy of science.
More informationInstrumental reasoning* John Broome
Instrumental reasoning* John Broome For: Rationality, Rules and Structure, edited by Julian NidaRümelin and Wolfgang Spohn, Kluwer. * This paper was written while I was a visiting fellow at the Swedish
More informationA Priori Bootstrapping
A Priori Bootstrapping Ralph Wedgwood In this essay, I shall explore the problems that are raised by a certain traditional sceptical paradox. My conclusion, at the end of this essay, will be that the most
More informationA Solution to the Gettier Problem Keota Fields. the three traditional conditions for knowledge, have been discussed extensively in the
A Solution to the Gettier Problem Keota Fields Problem cases by Edmund Gettier 1 and others 2, intended to undermine the sufficiency of the three traditional conditions for knowledge, have been discussed
More informationAboutness and Justification
For a symposium on Imogen Dickie s book Fixing Reference to be published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Aboutness and Justification Dilip Ninan dilip.ninan@tufts.edu September 2016 Al believes
More informationRichard L. W. Clarke, Notes REASONING
1 REASONING Reasoning is, broadly speaking, the cognitive process of establishing reasons to justify beliefs, conclusions, actions or feelings. It also refers, more specifically, to the act or process
More informationVarieties of Apriority
S E V E N T H E X C U R S U S Varieties of Apriority T he notions of a priori knowledge and justification play a central role in this work. There are many ways in which one can understand the a priori,
More informationFrom Necessary Truth to Necessary Existence
Prequel for Section 4.2 of Defending the Correspondence Theory Published by PJP VII, 1 From Necessary Truth to Necessary Existence Abstract I introduce new details in an argument for necessarily existing
More informationA Problem for a DirectReference Theory of Belief Reports. Stephen Schiffer New York University
A Problem for a DirectReference Theory of Belief Reports Stephen Schiffer New York University The directreference theory of belief reports to which I allude is the one held by such theorists as Nathan
More informationScientific Method and Research Ethics Questions, Answers, and Evidence. Dr. C. D. McCoy
Scientific Method and Research Ethics 17.09 Questions, Answers, and Evidence Dr. C. D. McCoy Plan for Part 1: Deduction 1. Logic, Arguments, and Inference 1. Questions and Answers 2. Truth, Validity, and
More informationJustified Inference. Ralph Wedgwood
Justified Inference Ralph Wedgwood In this essay, I shall propose a general conception of the kind of inference that counts as justified or rational. This conception involves a version of the idea that
More informationComments on Truth at A World for Modal Propositions
Comments on Truth at A World for Modal Propositions Christopher Menzel Texas A&M University March 16, 2008 Since Arthur Prior first made us aware of the issue, a lot of philosophical thought has gone into
More informationBoghossian s Implicit Definition Template
Ben Baker ben.baker@btinternet.com Boghossian s Implicit Definition Template Abstract: In Boghossian's 1997 paper, 'Analyticity' he presented an account of a priori knowledge of basic logical principles
More informationKnowledge, Time, and the Problem of Logical Omniscience
Fundamenta Informaticae XX (2010) 1 18 1 IOS Press Knowledge, Time, and the Problem of Logical Omniscience RenJune Wang Computer Science CUNY Graduate Center 365 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10016 rwang@gc.cuny.edu
More informationResemblance Nominalism and counterparts
ANAL633 4/15/2003 2:40 PM Page 221 Resemblance Nominalism and counterparts Alexander Bird 1. Introduction In his (2002) Gonzalo RodriguezPereyra provides a powerful articulation of the claim that Resemblance
More informationBroad on Theological Arguments. I. The Ontological Argument
Broad on God Broad on Theological Arguments I. The Ontological Argument Sample Ontological Argument: Suppose that God is the most perfect or most excellent being. Consider two things: (1)An entity that
More informationNegative Introspection Is Mysterious
Negative Introspection Is Mysterious Abstract. The paper provides a short argument that negative introspection cannot be algorithmic. This result with respect to a principle of belief fits to what we know
More informationHaberdashers Aske s Boys School
1 Haberdashers Aske s Boys School Occasional Papers Series in the Humanities Occasional Paper Number Sixteen Are All Humans Persons? Ashna Ahmad Haberdashers Aske s Girls School March 2018 2 Haberdashers
More informationOntological Justification: From Appearance to Reality AnnaSofia Maurin (PhD 2002)
Ontological Justification: From Appearance to Reality AnnaSofia Maurin (PhD 2002) PROJECT SUMMARY The project aims to investigate the notion of justification in ontology. More specifically, one particular
More informationLogic I or Moving in on the Monkey & Bananas Problem
Logic I or Moving in on the Monkey & Bananas Problem We said that an agent receives percepts from its environment, and performs actions on that environment; and that the action sequence can be based on
More informationIs There Immediate Justification?
Is There Immediate Justification? I. James Pryor (and Goldman): Yes A. Justification i. I say that you have justification to believe P iff you are in a position where it would be epistemically appropriate
More informationInternational Phenomenological Society
International Phenomenological Society The Semantic Conception of Truth: and the Foundations of Semantics Author(s): Alfred Tarski Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Mar.,
More informationLogic is the study of the quality of arguments. An argument consists of a set of
Logic: Inductive Logic is the study of the quality of arguments. An argument consists of a set of premises and a conclusion. The quality of an argument depends on at least two factors: the truth of the
More informationEpistemological Foundations for Koons Cosmological Argument?
Epistemological Foundations for Koons Cosmological Argument? Koons (2008) argues for the very surprising conclusion that any exception to the principle of general causation [i.e., the principle that everything
More informationDraft of a paper to appear in C. Cellucci, E. Grosholz and I. Ippoliti (eds.), Logic and Knowledge, Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
Draft of a paper to appear in C. Cellucci, E. Grosholz and I. Ippoliti (eds.), Logic and Knowledge, Cambridge Scholars Publishing. CLASSIFYING AND JUSTIFYING INFERENCE RULES CARLO CELLUCCI SUMMARY: It
More informationSkepticism and Internalism
Skepticism and Internalism John Greco Abstract: This paper explores a familiar skeptical problematic and considers some strategies for responding to it. Section 1 reconstructs and disambiguates the skeptical
More informationInquiry and the Transmission of Knowledge
Inquiry and the Transmission of Knowledge Christoph Kelp 1. Many think that competent deduction is a way of extending one s knowledge. In particular, they think that the following captures this thought
More informationcomplete state of affairs and an infinite set of events in one go. Imagine the following scenarios:
1 2 EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY 3. We are in a physics laboratory and make the observation that all objects fall at a uniform Can we solve the problem of induction, and if not, to what extent is it
More informationScott Soames: Understanding Truth
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LXV, No. 2, September 2002 Scott Soames: Understanding Truth MAlTHEW MCGRATH Texas A & M University Scott Soames has written a valuable book. It is unmatched
More informationWilliams on Supervaluationism and Logical Revisionism
Williams on Supervaluationism and Logical Revisionism Nicholas K. Jones Noncitable draft: 26 02 2010. Final version appeared in: The Journal of Philosophy (2011) 108: 11: 633641 Central to discussion
More informationTestimony and Moral Understanding Anthony T. Flood, Ph.D. Introduction
24 Testimony and Moral Understanding Anthony T. Flood, Ph.D. Abstract: In this paper, I address Linda Zagzebski s analysis of the relation between moral testimony and understanding arguing that Aquinas
More informationCan Gödel s Incompleteness Theorem be a Ground for Dialetheism? *
논리연구 202(2017) pp. 241271 Can Gödel s Incompleteness Theorem be a Ground for Dialetheism? * 1) Seungrak Choi Abstract Dialetheism is the view that there exists a true contradiction. This paper ventures
More informationA Liar Paradox. Richard G. Heck, Jr. Brown University
A Liar Paradox Richard G. Heck, Jr. Brown University It is widely supposed nowadays that, whatever the right theory of truth may be, it needs to satisfy a principle sometimes known as transparency : Any
More informationExplanatory Indispensability and Deliberative Indispensability: Against Enoch s Analogy Alex Worsnip University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Explanatory Indispensability and Deliberative Indispensability: Against Enoch s Analogy Alex Worsnip University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Forthcoming in Thought please cite published version In
More informationTHE SEMANTIC REALISM OF STROUD S RESPONSE TO AUSTIN S ARGUMENT AGAINST SCEPTICISM
SKÉPSIS, ISSN 19814194, ANO VII, Nº 14, 2016, p. 3339. THE SEMANTIC REALISM OF STROUD S RESPONSE TO AUSTIN S ARGUMENT AGAINST SCEPTICISM ALEXANDRE N. MACHADO Universidade Federal do Paraná (UFPR) Email:
More informationLogic. A Primer with Addendum
Logic A Primer with Addendum The Currency of Philosophy Philosophy trades in arguments. An argument is a set of propositions some one of which is intended to be warranted or entailed by the others. The
More informationAll They Know: A Study in MultiAgent Autoepistemic Reasoning
All They Know: A Study in MultiAgent Autoepistemic Reasoning PRELIMINARY REPORT Gerhard Lakemeyer Institute of Computer Science III University of Bonn Romerstr. 164 5300 Bonn 1, Germany gerhard@cs.unibonn.de
More informationRemarks on a Foundationalist Theory of Truth. Anil Gupta University of Pittsburgh
For Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Remarks on a Foundationalist Theory of Truth Anil Gupta University of Pittsburgh I Tim Maudlin s Truth and Paradox offers a theory of truth that arises from
More informationGeneric truth and mixed conjunctions: some alternatives
Analysis Advance Access published June 15, 2009 Generic truth and mixed conjunctions: some alternatives AARON J. COTNOIR Christine Tappolet (2000) posed a problem for alethic pluralism: either deny the
More informationCan Negation be Defined in Terms of Incompatibility?
Can Negation be Defined in Terms of Incompatibility? Nils Kurbis 1 Abstract Every theory needs primitives. A primitive is a term that is not defined any further, but is used to define others. Thus primitives
More informationHorwich and the Liar
Horwich and the Liar Sergi Oms Sardans Logos, University of Barcelona 1 Horwich defends an epistemic account of vagueness according to which vague predicates have sharp boundaries which we are not capable
More informationArtificial Intelligence: Valid Arguments and Proof Systems. Prof. Deepak Khemani. Department of Computer Science and Engineering
Artificial Intelligence: Valid Arguments and Proof Systems Prof. Deepak Khemani Department of Computer Science and Engineering Indian Institute of Technology, Madras Module 02 Lecture  03 So in the last
More informationHume s Missing Shade of Blue as a Possible Key. to Certainty in Geometry
Hume s Missing Shade of Blue as a Possible Key to Certainty in Geometry Brian S. Derickson PH 506: Epistemology 10 November 2015 David Hume s epistemology is a radical form of empiricism. It states that
More informationPHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS & THE ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE
PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS & THE ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE Now, it is a defect of [natural] languages that expressions are possible within them, which, in their grammatical form, seemingly determined to designate
More informationIN DEFENCE OF CLOSURE
IN DEFENCE OF CLOSURE IN DEFENCE OF CLOSURE By RICHARD FELDMAN Closure principles for epistemic justification hold that one is justified in believing the logical consequences, perhaps of a specified sort,
More informationPutnam and the Contextually A Priori Gary Ebbs University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign
Forthcoming in Lewis E. Hahn and Randall E. Auxier, eds., The Philosophy of Hilary Putnam (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 2005) Putnam and the Contextually A Priori Gary Ebbs University of Illinois at
More informationBetween the Actual and the Trivial World
Organon F 23 (2) 2016: xxxxxx Between the Actual and the Trivial World MACIEJ SENDŁAK Institute of Philosophy. University of Szczecin Ul. Krakowska 7179. 71017 Szczecin. Poland maciej.sendlak@gmail.com
More informationDo we have knowledge of the external world?
Do we have knowledge of the external world? This book discusses the skeptical arguments presented in Descartes' Meditations 1 and 2, as well as how Descartes attempts to refute skepticism by building our
More informationTHE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION: AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL RESPONSE. Alan Robert Rhoda. BA, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, 1993
THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION: AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL RESPONSE BY Alan Robert Rhoda BA, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, 1993 MA, Fordham University, 1996 DISSERTATION SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
More informationEmpty Names and TwoValued Positive Free Logic
Empty Names and TwoValued Positive Free Logic 1 Introduction Zahra Ahmadianhosseini In order to tackle the problem of handling empty names in logic, Andrew Bacon (2013) takes on an approach based on positive
More informationKNOWING AGAINST THE ODDS
KNOWING AGAINST THE ODDS Cian Dorr, Jeremy Goodman, and John Hawthorne 1 Here is a compelling principle concerning our knowledge of coin flips: FAIR COINS: If you know that a coin is fair, and for all
More informationSkeptics and Unruly Connectives:
Skeptics and Unruly Connectives: A Defence of and Amendment to the NonFactualist Justification of Logic by Oliver Oxton A thesis presented to the University of Waterloo in fulfilment of the thesis requirement
More informationChoosing Rationally and Choosing Correctly *
Choosing Rationally and Choosing Correctly * Ralph Wedgwood 1 Two views of practical reason Suppose that you are faced with several different options (that is, several ways in which you might act in a
More informationPsillos s Defense of Scientific Realism
Luke Rinne 4/27/04 Psillos and Laudan Psillos s Defense of Scientific Realism In this paper, Psillos defends the IBE based no miracle argument (NMA) for scientific realism against two main objections,
More information1. Lukasiewicz s Logic
Bulletin of the Section of Logic Volume 29/3 (2000), pp. 115 124 Dale Jacquette AN INTERNAL DETERMINACY METATHEOREM FOR LUKASIEWICZ S AUSSAGENKALKÜLS Abstract An internal determinacy metatheorem is proved
More informationAction in Special Contexts
Part III Action in Special Contexts c36.indd 283 c36.indd 284 36 Rationality john broome Rationality as a Property and Rationality as a Source of Requirements The word rationality often refers to a property
More informationHow Do We Know Anything about Mathematics?  A Defence of Platonism
How Do We Know Anything about Mathematics?  A Defence of Platonism Majda Trobok University of Rijeka original scientific paper UDK: 141.131 1:51 510.21 ABSTRACT In this paper I will try to say something
More information