PHI 1500: Major Issues in Philosophy

Transcription

1 PHI 1500: Major Issues in Philosophy Session 19 April 16 th, 2015 Philosophy of Hume etc. 1

2 Ø We started last class by thinking about whether it is be*er to make decisions by: following your head (reasoning through your and going with what seems the most logical or following your heart (going with what feels like the best Epictetus (and other Stoics) believed that using your reason will always allow you to arrive at the best Today we will consider two sources which suggest that: - our emo@ons are always involved in our decision- making & ac@ons - our emo@ons help us to make good decisions & do the right ac@ons. 2

3 David Hume ( ): ScoOsh philosopher, historian, and essayist Like Locke, Hume was an empiricist who believed that all of our ideas come from experience. Of the Influencing MoCves from the Will (a chapter from A Trea9se of Human Nature) expresses Hume s sencmentalist outlook on human ac@on. he believes that we need to recognize the role that emo@ons play in guiding our decisions and ac@ons, and to recognize that reason plays a less prominent role than we might expect in determining how we behave. 3

4 Hume says, Nothing is more usual in philosophy, and even in common life, than to talk of the combat of passion and reason, - to give the preference to reason, - and assert that men are only so far virtuous as they conform themselves to its dictates. Every raconal creature, it is said, is obliged to regulate his accons by reason; and if any other mo@ve or principle challenge the direc@on of his conduct, he ought to oppose it be en@rely subdued, or at least brought to a conformity with that superior principle. On this method of thinking the greatest part of moral philosophy, ancient and modern, seems to be founded; nor is there [any opinion more popular] than this supposed pre- eminence of reason above passion. The eternity, invariableness, and divine origin of [reason] have been displayed to the best advantage: The blindness, unconstancy, and deceizulness of [passion] have been as strongly insisted on. (1) Ø Hume s goal is to show the fallacy of all this philosophy. 4

5 » Hume discusses two forms of reasoning: one which regards the abstract rela9ons of our ideas, one which regards those rela9ons of objects, of which experience only gives us informa9on (1) He argues that the first species of reasoning [i.e., abstract reasoning] alone is [never] the cause of any accon. As its proper province is the world of ideas, and as the will always places us in that of and [i.e., reasoning and using one s will] seem... to be totally removed from each other. (1) He illustrates this point with an example of a merchant who uses abstract mathema@cal reasoning to calculate how much he has traded with a client. His point is that coming up with this sum does not by itself mo@vate him to alter his behavior. In order to make use of this reasoning, the merchant must also have a desire to use that informa@on to maximize profits. 5

6 He also notes that we need reason to figure out how to a_ain what we desire and avoid what we do not want, but reason alone cannot mocvate us to act accordingly. It is obvious, that when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object, we feel a consequent emo@on of aversion or propensity, and are carried to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or sa@sfac@on. It is also obvious, that this emo@on rests not here, but making us cast our view on every side, comprehends whatever objects are connected with its original one by the rela9on of cause and effect. Here then reasoning takes place to discover this relacon; and according as our reasoning varies, our accons receive a subsequent variacon. But it is evident in this case that the impulse arises not from reason, but is only directed by it. (1) 6

7 According to Hume, we must use reason to figure out what causes will bring about effects we desire. E.g., if I want to eat a burrito, I must use reason to figure out that I can get a burrito at Chipotle, where the nearest Chipotle is, and how to get there. but knowing what causes bring about which effects is of no use if those rela@ons have no connec@on to our desires. It can never in the least concern us to know, that such objects are causes, and such others effects, if both the causes and effects be indifferent to us. Where the objects themselves do not affect us, their connec@on can never give them any influence; and it is plain, that as reason is nothing but the discovery of this connec@on, it cannot be by its means [alone] that the objects are able to affect us. (1-2) Ø Hume is arguing that using reason is necessary, but not sufficient for accon. One also needs passion to mo9vate one s ac9ons. 7

8 He also thinks we are mistaken when we talk of the combat of passion and of reason. Since reason alone can never produce any or give rise to I infer that the same faculty is as incapable of voli@on, or of the preference with any passion or (2)» Hume is saying that reason not only cannot by itself us to act, but also cannot counteract our to prevent us from He thinks that reasoning can t just cancel out feelings. At best, reasoning might lead us to choose a different course of ac@on to pursue or avoid something.. At any rate, he thinks that emocons are essen1al to mocvacng our accons, while our reason serves a suppor1ng role: Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them. (2) 8

9 Since he thinks & reason aren t really opposed to one another, he wants to clarify what we mean when we call emo@ons irra@onal or unreasonable. passions can be contrary to reason only so far as they are accompanied with some judgment or opinion. According to this principle,...it is only in two senses, that any affec@on can be called unreasonable. First, when a passion, such as hope or fear, grief or joy, despair or security, is founded on the supposicon or the existence of objects, which really do not exist. [E.g., it is unreasonable to be excited about or afraid of Santa Claus.] Secondly, when in exer@ng any passion in ac@on, we choose means insufficient for the designed end, and deceive ourselves in our judgment of causes and effects. (2) [e.g., it is unreasonable for us to expect to sa@sfy a desire for a cupcake by ea@ng at Chipotle.] 9

10 Ø Where a passion is neither founded on false supposi@ons, nor chooses means insufficient for the end, the understanding can neither jus@fy nor condemn it. (2) This claim leads to some surprising conclusions: It is not contrary to reason to prefer the destruc9on of the whole world to the scratching of my finger. It is not contrary to reason for me to choose my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of [a] person wholly unknown to me. It is as li_le contrary to reason to prefer even my own acknowledged lesser good to my greater, and have a more ardent affec@on for the former than the la_er. A trivial good may, from certain circumstances, produce a desire superior to what arises from the greatest and most valuable enjoyment (2) 10

11 The common error... has lain in ascribing the direccon of the will encrely to one of these principles [reason or emocon], and supposing the other to have no influence. Men oien act knowingly against their interest: For which reason [understanding] the greatest possible good does not always influence them. Men oien counteract a violent passion in prosecu@on of their interests and designs: It is not therefore the present uneasiness alone, which determines [their ac@ons]. In general we may observe, that both these principles operate on the will; and where they are contrary, that either of them prevails, according to the general character or present disposi@on of the person. What we call strength of mind, implies the prevalence of the calm passions above the violent; though we may easily observe, there is no man so constantly possessed of this virtue, as never on any occasion to yield to the solicita@ons of passion and desire. From these varia9ons of temper proceeds the great difficulty of deciding concerning the ac@ons and resolu@ons of men, where there is any contrariety of mo@ves and passions. (3-4) 11

12 To summarize Hume s view: Reason and emo@on are both necessary to guide our ac@ons, but emo@on is required to mo@vate our ac@ons, while reason plays a supplementary role of direc@ng our course of ac@on ( reason is... the slave of the passions ) This challenges the dominant view that reason should always rule over our emo@ons and keep them in check. Reason and emo@on are not opposed to one another. They play different roles for us, and there s no need to priori@ze one over the other at and in all contexts. 12

13 Hume s view about the importance of emo@ons in decision- making has been supported by contemporary psychology. Joachim Kreuger (and colleagues) describe some new research that highlight the nuanced role that emo@ons play in guiding our ac@ons. It is common to think that emocons interfere with raconal thinking. Modern dual- systems models of judgment & decision- making... endorse the antagonism between reason and emo9on. The ac@vi@es of one system are automa@c and oien emo@onal, whereas the ac@vi@es of the other are controlled and never emo@onal. The automa@c system gets things done quickly, but it is prone to error. The controlled system's mission is to keep a watchful eye and to make correc@ons when necessary. Like a watchful parent, this system reins in our impulses and overrides our snap judgments. 13

14 The struggle of reason against is an appealing image. But do emocons always lead us astray? Clearly, one of their is to guide us towards pleasure and away from pain. e.g., we have visceral of disgust to things that might make us sick, and of fear to things that threaten our safety. To succeed in gaining what is good and avoiding what is bad is difficult in an uncertain environment. We oien make decisions that resemble gambles. When we invest in a company, buy a new house, or get married, there is a chance that things won't work out as hoped. It's cri9cal that we're able to judge what risks are worth taking - and emocons can help us make those judgments. (1) 14

15 A few years ago, neurologist Antonio Damasio and his colleagues showed how negacve emocons can improve decisions involving risk. They devised a gambling task, in which players repeatedly selected cards from four decks. With each draw, they either gained or lost money. - Two of the decks were safe and advantageous; choosing them consistently would gradually accrue money over the course of the task. - The other two decks were riskier. Although the winning cards were worth more than the winning cards from the safe decks, the losing cards were so damaging that, if chosen repeatedly, the risky decks would eventually bankrupt the player. - The best strategy was to consistently choose from the safe decks. Damasio and colleagues found that par@cipants were ini@ally a_racted to the risky decks because of their large posi@ve payoffs. However, players soon retreated to the safer decks where they fared be_er in the long run. (1)» Par@cipants were able to accurately determine that the risky decks were dangerous, and changed their behavior accordingly.» How did they do it? 15

16 How did they figure out that playing it safe was bener? The answer came from a group of neurological pa9ents with damage to a brain region associated with emo@onal sensi@vity to reward & punishment (i.e, the orbitofrontal cortex). Though these pa@ents' cognicve reasoning was unimpaired, they could not experience the negacve emocons that normally accompany large losses. Like the unimpaired par@cipants, these pa@ents were ini@ally a_racted to the riskier decks, but because they failed to respond emo1onally to large losses, they never learned to avoid the risky gambles. (1-2) Ø Damasio has found that pa@ents with this condi@on, which prevents them from experiencing emo@onal responses to the prospects of gains & losses, are also deeply impaired in their ability to make quick, effec@ve decisions. video: h_ps:// 16

17 The lesson from the neurological pacents seems to be that we need emoconal cues to make good decisions, because cues indicate what is important to us, and which of our we prefer. Without cues, we have no to select any over another, even if we have thoroughly reasoned though all our Kreuger et al. clarify that there are some instances where seem to hinder our decision- making. They describe a study where par@cipants fear of the risk of losing their investments led them to lose money overall. In contrast, the neurological pa@ents who could not fear the risk of losing money were not encumbered by emo@on outperformed individuals experiencing the fear of loss. (2) They conclude that: the experience of nega@ve emo@ons can help and hurt decision- making; it all depends on the context. (2) 17

18 They recommend that we use different strategies in different contexts. [A] controlled, quanctacve approach is most useful for decisions with clear, measurable outcomes. Things get a bit murky, though, when we try to apply calculated reasoning to social decision- making. Many social situa@ons involve costs and benefits that are difficult to assess and compare. Consider the gambit of asking an a_rac@ve stranger out on a date. Being rejected is a type of loss (just as being accepted is a type of gain), but assigning numerical values to such outcomes may seem contrived or arbitrary. Likewise, we can assume that there is some probability of rejec@on, but how to come up with a specific value is not obvious. (2) 18

19 Understanding human choices in their natural context is harder than understanding the rules of a laboratory game. What's more, the way people respond to social situa@ons is somewhat subjec@ve and variable. The anxious and avoidant might respond to rejec@on more strongly than the emo@onally secure. In a world where something that is ra@onal for one person may be irra@onal (or even unfathomable) for another, prescribing a ra@onal or adap@ve response is difficult. Nevertheless, we can conclude that emo@ons give useful guidance whenever the environment fails to provide all the informa@on needed for thoughzul analysis. EmoCons are valuable because they make us act quickly and decisively. (3) 19