:z :z C") U1... ("") Vl c... (1) ::::0 c: ::::r ::3 3: I. w--s -s 0 0 ::::0. (.)1:::, o- :z. ~ :::, n ("") :z 1.0 r- c.. :z C")

Transcription

1 The copyright laws of the United States (Title 17, U.S. Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. If a user makes a request for, or later uses a photocopy or reproduction (including handwritten copies) for purposes in excess of fair use, that user may be liable for copyright infringement. Users are advised to obtain permission from the copyright owner before any re-use of this material. Use of this material is for private, non-commercial, and educational purposes; additional reprints and further distribution is prohibited. Copies are not for resale. All other rights reserved. For further information, contact Director, Hoover Institution Library and Archives, Stanford University, Stanford, CA Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. University. "C... -j """1 (/) C") ::J:., CllJ::::r... c: c: 0 0""0... ~ OJ rrl (/) --'(l)vl... c... (/) -j n... G) ("") (/)... Vl -j..... ::;, r-.. m g.,... --':Z rom,... ~ :z ::J: :e:: <~-s )>-j rrl g.,... -j ::J: :z I...o.Q.. ::c: rrl -j.. - :a -...o. o Vl 0 -<... Vl -< ::3 Vl... rrl ::::0 I o-sn "C :zn )> n ::3 7' -s -s (/) ::J: A :::J 3: C) Vl ~ ::::r ::3 3: I... 3:(1) c.. 3: rrl ""Tl a-... (1)... :z :z ~ :::, n ("") ::::0 lq... rrl ::J: r- (1) ::::0 c: :z 1.0 r- c.. :z C") (.)1:::, o- :z - ~ I (1) ~ C")... :z g., "C :e:: -j rrl ::;,-s )> ::J: c..o :::0 rrl lo :::0... -s :::J IT'I c: (l)llj z :z --'3... (1) VI -j n j rrl g., ~ IT'I 0 Vl...,...a CD CD ~ IT'I,... I g.,-.... N m~ -sw... o- :: = "C Vl ("")"0 c.. :z (/) ""Tl ~... c )> (/). -s g.,... n ~0 (1) 0 :z OJ lo......, c..... C") c: ::::r 00 I rrl ("")... ::3::3... g., rrl ::::0 A 1.0 g., )> c... -< 1.0 ~"""1 c.. )> U ("") Vl c... w--s -s 0 0 ::::0

2 Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. University. For 22 years after the UN was founded, the government that calls itself the Republic of China, which is quartered in Taiwan, occupied the permanent Chinese seat in the Security Council of the United Nations. Then came Resolution 2758 in the fall of The ROC was ousted and the Peking government, which calls itself the People's Republic of China, took over. After 22 years of isolation, the ROC Taiwanese government now seeks reentry into the UN. Here in New York to plead his case is Dr. Jason Hu. Dr. Hu is the director-general of the information office of the ROC. He was a guest of this program a couple of years ago when we broadcast from Taipei. Dr. Hu was born in China but attended college in the United States and received his doctorate from Oxford. He has taught at several American universities before returning to Taipei. With us to discuss the question is Dr. Henry Kissinger, who was of course national security adviser to President Richard Nixon when the ROC were kicked out of the UN on the eve of Mr. Nixon's visit to China. There is a story there of great interest told in Dr. Kissinger ' s eloquent memoirs. I should like to begin by asking Dr. Hu: How can the United Nations accept your government, given that it claims sovereignty over Mainland China? Ever since 1991 I think we have been pragmatic enough to announce that we do not at this moment control mainland China. What we are trying to tell the world is that under this One China principle, to which everybody has expressed support, we think that China is at this moment divided. The reality is that there are two parts within that one China and none of each party exercises jurisdiction over the other. And therefore we need to be represented in the UN. And the fact that here are divided nations that were represented in the past, obviously in the case of Germany, didn't really impact or create problems for the unification in the end. So at this moment we are saying that 21 million people in Taiwan do not have proper representation in any of the important international government organizations and it would not harm the international community. And it would also meet the needs of our dignity and needs for us to be reinvolved. Well, before we pursue that question, isn't there this difference between Germany--West Germany and East Germany--and your government and mainland China's, which is: 1

3 Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. University. Theirs was a separation brought on by war, yours by civil war--so that you have a kind of ambiguity here that the Germanies or the Koreas, for instance, didn't have? Is that not correct? Quite right, sir. Because you cannot find two cases exactly the same. Of course the German cases and the Korean cases will not be the same as our cases. But what I was trying to say is that if people say that we are trying to get in and then that would perhaps produce two Chinas or permanent separation, that's what I was trying to say. When you have perhaps two entities under the One China principle, that does not necessarily mean it would never be reunified again. That's what I was trying to say-- Well, Dr.-- --by using the case of Germany. Let me ask Dr. Kissinger this question. In your view, is the question proposed by Dr. Hu something that gets adjudicated with referenc.e to protocol or with reference to politics? DR. KISSINGER: I understand Dr. Hu's point of view, and I can understand that a Taiwanese representative of the Republic of Taiwan would hold-- China. The Republic of China. DR. KISSINGER: The Republic of China. Sorry. That's all right. DR. KISSINGER: --would hold this point of view. I have to look at it from the U.S. point of view. From the U.S. point of view, four American presidents of two parties have stated that they recognize only one China, and that they would do nothing to promote two Chinas. This was done even by so conservative a president as President Reagan-- President Nixon, President Carter, President Reagan, and President Bush. So I believe that what Mr. Hu is proposing is something that should be negotiated first between Beijing and Taipei. The United States has absolutely no reason to oppose it. The United States would have every reason to support it if there is some prior understanding between the two- between-- 2

4 DR. KISSINGER: The two governments. --the two governments in China. Is that in prospect, Dr. Hu? DR. KISSINGER: And I if can make just one more point, the German case was only settled after the two German governments-- Agreed. DR. KISSINGER: --had come to some agreement-- Yes, yes. DR. KISSINGER: --and had agreed between themselves, and then it was also supported by the United States. Yes. I agree entirely to what Dr. Kissinger was saying, but let me repeat again that our wish to be reinvolved in the United Nations does not violate the One China Principle in any way, as I have stated already. We're going in, hopefully, to receive and achieve an international status that is really vital for our own survival and development prior to reunification of one China. But at this moment China is divided, and there is-- Why is it vital? Why is it vital? I mean, you've been terribly isolated in the past. Yes. practically-- Twenty years ago people wouldn't talk to you Yes, that's right. --except me and Dr. Kissinger. A dirty word. [laughter] That's right. But since then the vibrancy of your own economy and your extraordinary reestablishment of democracy have made you a powerful country. Why does membership in the United Nations mean so much to you? 3

5 Yes. Two things, sir. First, the fact that we have been able to do all right in the past without being positively or actively involved in the international organizations does not mean that in the future, when the world may be becoming more smaller and interdependent perhaps, with the World Trade Organization being formed, more interactions, that would also guarantee our future prosperity. In other words, we have been able to do this, being isolated in the past. But we worry that perhaps in the future when everybody else is in the party, we are the only one left alone. While they are making decisions, important international decisions, we are not being considered, and you know, people at home jokingly said, "What do you want us to do? You want us to fail our economy so we are more qualified to be admitted into the UN?" I mean, we are now being accused of being too successful so we don't need the U.N. But the fact of the matter is our people feel very frustrated when we are not treated with perhaps fairness when we travel. You do not know perhaps-- DR. KISSINGER: Let me say-- No, one thing-- Yes. We tried to give $2 million U.S. dollars as an impartial aid to the refugees in Rwanda, and that was turned down-- Sounds like Yale. --because we are not a U.N. member. You know, how would our people feel? Well, let me ask Dr. Kissinger this. After the ouster of Taiwan, the Taiwan Relations Act was passed in the House and Senate, and it said in effect to mainland China: Don't try to occupy Taiwan, because we are not going to let it happen. Now, do you interpret that act as extending such protections as Taiwan would need in the event of its diplomatic isolation, as Dr. Hu fears? DR. KISSINGER: Starting with the first visit in China and even in the Shanghai Communique, the United States stated its conviction that unification of China should be achieved by peaceful means. And in every subsequent American

6 declaration, including the China Relations Act, which I think happened in the Carter Administration, that conviction was asserted, and therefore the United States certainly would oppose the use of force in the settlement of the Taiwan issue. My view is not that Taiwan should not be in the United Nations. My view is that that issue should be faced after some discussions between Beijing and Taipei. I believe also that Jiang Zemin, the president of China, in February made a speech on which it would possible to build unless there are some Chinese formulations in that eluded my lessdeveloped brain, because he said that China did not want to have Chinese fight each other, that Taiwan could have its own diplomatic representation, its own military force, so long as some formula could be found to recognize that there was one China. And in a number of international institutions, the Asian Development Bank and a number of other places. The Olympic Games, a formula has been found by which Taiwan participated as a clear entity-- Entity, that's right. DR. KISSINGER: --and yet the principle of One China was recognized. I believe that a more constructive approach would be for the United States to encourage China and Taiwan to settle that issue and then for the Republic of China to enter the United Nations the way the two Germanies did. DR. KISSINGER: Dr. Hu, is-- And my impression is that it is achievable. Is this possible-- No, this is not possible. --or is this simply a dialectical or certainly an improbability. Is it a dialectical impossibility-- Actually it is not possible at this moment, the way we see it. Dr. Kissinger mentions the Olympic Committee, the ADB, but in all these cases--in the case of the International Olympic Committee, in the case of the Asian Development Bank, in the case of APAC, and in the case of GATT, which is going to happen--in all these cases, where Peking and Taipei are both perhaps member units, we have to fight very hard to secure enough international support. It didn't happen as a result of our direct negotiation or communication or talking 5

7 with Peking and then reached consensus. We have to secure enough international support, and then, sadly admitting, our Chinese own brothers then decided there is no way they could stop us, then they say: Okay, you come in, but you have to be called Chinese Taipei or Taiwan Comma; China or Taiwan bracket whatever, and then they fiddle with names. We pragmatically have to accept whatever that was agreed. But it didn't really work whenever we first start talking to them. This is why we need enough international support and where there is enough international consensus, then we talk to them. And also it is not our intention trying to drag everybody in. It may seem that we are trying to drag the Americans in. No, it is not our intention. What we are trying to do is that-- You know, people say they remain neutral. The Chinese should solve it yourselves. You should talk to Peking and solve your UN problem. But, you know, all the major countries in the world are supporting Beijing's position. They recognize Beijing, they accept Beijing's UN policy, they don't want us to get in. How do you think we can work? I mean-- Well, you've got-- --is that neutrality or is that not neutrality? You've got 22 countries that recognize Taiwan has a hundred-- Twenty-nine now. Twenty-nine? Twenty-nine. You've been hard at work. [laughter] We have to. And 100 that recognize Peking. Now, are we talking about the same kind of thing that prevented the restoration of the Bourbon Monarchy in France in the 19th century, that they wouldn't permit a particular flag that had Jacobinical traces? Yes. Or are you saying that it is more than that, 6

8 that it's a problem of realpolitik? I guess what I am asking you is, if you were to accept a nominalist change in your name for these purposes, would that satisfy you or would that be simply refused on the grounds of pride? Sir, are we talking about the general thing as a return to the international community or are we talking about-- We're talking about the UN. --the United Nations as such? Yes, we're talking about the UN. Well, at this moment we are being very reasonable and modest. What we really want at this moment is the establishment of a study committee by the UN to study the question of the nonrepresentation of the 21 million people that need to be represented in the international organizations. We're not saying anything. that, do you? Dr. Kissinger, you don't have a problem with We're just asking for a study committee. DR. KISSINGER: If I were conducting U.S. policy or advising on U.S. policy, I would be very, very sympathetic to a dialogue between Beijing and Taipei, and I would strongly encourage it, and I would let both sides know that our good will is related to this. I would not want to get the United States into a position of confrontation with Beijing when we have problems with Japan, when we have unsettled conditions in Russia and other parts of Asia. We went to Beijing not because we loved the system, originally, but because we thought it was needed in the American national interest. I agree. I agree. DR. KISSINGER: So we should always calibrate it, but certainly a dialogue between Beijing and Taipei is highly desireable. A study commission, it depends-- The problem is, both Chinese sides are extraordinarily clever-- [laughter] We're not as clever as you are, sir. 7

9 DR. KISSINGER: I once said to the Communist Chinese Prime Minister, Zhou Enlai, he said to me, "You are a very intelligent man," and I said, "By this you mean by Western standards; by Chinese standards you think I am of average intelligence." He didn't say, "Oh, no, you're smart even by -" [laughter] No, by Chinese standards you are also intelligent. [laughter] I'll make your day. I'll make your day. DR. KISSINGER: You made my day. Anyway, I want to make sure that there are not some arcane formulas which are difficult for us to grasp which drive the other side right up the wall- No. DR. KISSINGER: --and which are designed for that purpose. I happen to believe that a solution is possible, and not just from a position of total neutrality, because I think Beijing is realistic and it realizes that this issue cannot be left hanging forever. Well, let me ask this question--a technical question. Does the veto authority of mainland China in the Security Council extend to vetoing a proposed commission of the kind you are talking about, or is that simply up to the General Secretary? I think these were defeated twice last year and the year before. Defeated where? Defeated, I think, in the steering committee or the agenda committee, whatever it is. So-- agenda. It didn't even become a live agenda, an item on the It was moved by-- But a veto was not exercised, obviously. No, it was not necessary then. It hasn't even reached that stage. Our friends, some of the member states of the UN, only proposed--i think it was 14 or 18, you know, 8

10 proposed the establishment of a study committee--that's all we ask for. We're not talking about names, formulas, dates. How do you account for its defeat at the administrative level? Was it pressure from China, from mainland China? Well, obviously. I mean a lot of people spoke against it. DR. KISSINGER: The question, does the study commission imply-- What is it supposed to study, the modalities of entry or whether it should endeavor-- How-- The question, this obvious question of the lack of representation of the 21 million people in Taiwan-- DR. KISSINGER: Yes, but it already presupposes that there will be an entry, that the only question to be studied would be the modality. Not necessarily. It could be a long list of options from a certain kind of status to a certain kind of status. We are very careful. We are not even making public these options because we know someone would make sure that when it does become a live item on the agenda, if we say these are our options, someone will make sure that we start from the bottom and work our way down. Would you accept observer status? So we will not say anything now. or-- Would you accept observer status like the PLO Sir, you are asking me to do just what I said I wouldn't do now. [laughter] You know, because I just cannot do that. We've learned our lesson--bitter lessons in the past. We are actually nice people. We want to make friends with the world, even with Dr. Kissinger, you can see that. [laughter] So are we asking too much to be just a member of the United Nations--a very important organization, as you know. Well, Peking obviously does think you're asking too much, and since they are the most formidable obstacle to 9

11 your getting back in, we have to weigh their motives and their authority, right? What are their motives? This is what Dr. Kissinger said. This is what he said. DR. KISSINGER: Just a minute. I want it made clear, based on a comment of Mr. Hu. I am not even remotely unfriendly to Taiwan. I didn't say you-- DR. KISSINGER: I have to look at this from the fundamental issue of the United States, its position in Asia, its relationship to all the other countries, and the role of the country that has a 1,200,000,000 population. And I would like to navigate this crisis by the United States maintaining good relations with Beijing and using these good relations to protect the ability of the people in Taiwan to lead their own lives, which has been my consistent position this is the only issue here. And I believe, as I said before, that this issue can be resolved between Beijing and Taipei without a confrontation between the United States and Beijing. That's the only difference-- I agree. I agree. DR. KISSINGER: --between us. Many of these modalities you are talking about I think can be worked out. DR. HO: Yes, there was a time that a lot of decisions had to be made, adjustments in policy had to be made in the past. But there also comes to a time at this moment when people say that one billion people should not be ignored by that important international organization. It was right. But now also this country of one million people should not be ignored by the same token, and we are also trying hard to talk to them. Retrospectively, you are saying mainland China should have been recognized before it was? Well, this is a decision for the countries, you know, the United States and other countries, to decide, isn't it? I didn't ask you that. 10

12 Now it seems that one has to be realistic. They are there. They need to be reckoned with as a major factor in the international relations. We have no problem with that. But we just don't want to be victimized by the bilateral confederation between a major power and their relationship with mainland China. Let it be too parallel lines, not a triangle over which we are always victimized. DR. KISSINGER: And the only difference between Mr. Hu and myself is: Should this be imposed on Beijing by pressure from the outside or should it be encouraged in Beijing by discussion? And I believe that discussion is-- Important. DR. KISSINGER: --the better way, and in the end probably the more effective way. We are trying. I haven't had a chance to explain that we have been trying to talk to the people in mainland China for about three years now. Just last week an important talk was held. We are trying to nourish a better atmosphere. We do not want to be hostile to anybody. This country of one million people in Taiwan, and we do not want to be confrontational with anybody, even mainland China. We want to have a good relationship. We are at this moment number two largest investors in mainland China. We want to see it change. You try, and what happens? They don't return the mail? Or how do they rebuff you? Well, at this moment we think they are not being realistic in the sense that they will never treat us as an equal in any talks. And it is very difficult to move on if you are not even given the basic standing as an equal in any bilateral exchanges. And there are some stalemates, problems perhaps, that need to be solved. After all, we have been separated for 45 years. Under whose auspices do you conduct those negotiations with them that you have conducted having to do, for instance, with permitting Taiwanese to visit mainland China--six million people have. And if they refuse to talk to you as a result of these obstacles, how do you accomplish talk at that level? Through Switzerland or through-- 11

13 "'. Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. University. No, no. --Singapore, through Hong Kong? No, no. These were all dealt with between Beijing and Taipei directly. No third party was ever involved. And if we are not getting much in return, we just have to try patiently, you know, and go on trying. That's all. If there is no concrete agreement that can be reached, at least you maintain the door open and let's settle it next time. I think Dr. Kissinger-- Well, what is the role of Washington in accelerating that communion of forces, of wills? What can President Clinton do to help Taiwan out in approaching Peking to discuss these questions? We are trying to make people in Peking understand that we do need a proper room in the international community. And if any foreign leaders can help us to also help Peking to understand us, you know--because the fact that they are trying to isolate us in the international community tends to alienate a lot of people in Taiwan. So-- DR. KISSINGER: To answer your question, Mr. Buckley, it's a very tricky, sensitive point. If we say how can we help Taiwan out, if we say this to Beijing, there will be no less activity or whatever, because they look at Taiwan as a province of China and they don't admit our status in adjudicating the integrity, as they see it, of China. On the other hand, in the context of a strong U.S.-Chinese relationships, in the context of a common assessment of the international situation-- Fifteen seconds. DR. KISSINGER: --if we explained the necessity of better relations within the Taiwan Strait, I think we would be listened to. And that is the role I think we can play. I have no problem with that. Thank you, Dr. Hu, Dr. Kissinger, ladies and gentlemen. We'll be back. 12