SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY AS THE MODEL FOR LIBERAL LEARNING IN A POST-TRUTH AGE: PLATO S GORGIAS AS A CASE STUDY

Transcription

1 SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY AS THE MODEL FOR LIBERAL LEARNING IN A POST-TRUTH AGE: PLATO S GORGIAS AS A CASE STUDY Ted Vaggalis Drury University Delivered at the Seventeenth Annual Conversation on the Liberal Arts March 22 24, 2018 Westmont College, Santa Barbara, CA

2 Socratic Philosophy as the Model for Liberal Learning in a Post-Truth Age: Plato s Gorgias as a Case Study Presented by: Ted Vaggalis Drury University Presented at: Knowledge in Crisis: Liberal Learning in a Post-Truth Age Seventeenth Conference on the Liberal Arts Westmont College Santa Barbara, CA March 22-24, 2018

3 2 There is no question that we are living in a time where the idea of truth is under serious attack. Not even our academic institutions are able to remain free of the controversies surrounding the question of truth. Across society the traditional sources of truth are under attack. Religious authority is no longer able to claim the respect it once had. There is no authoritative interpretation of religion with which we can settle disputes. In the political realm one sees a similar lack of a basis for agreement. Partisanship precludes any attempt at reconciling differences in policy or law. With each new controversy the sides move further apart. This has spread to the sciences, as questions about objectivity in science arise because of the political consequences of such issues as creationism and climate change. In our debates everybody claims to have their own set of facts. There appears to be no basis for agreement. Our debates have the feel of a sudden intensification, and in living in the moment it can appear to us as a crisis that we have never seen before. But the truth is that such crises have been with us from time immemorial. Skepticism about the truth has been the twin of philosophy. American history is a story with a series of crises. From the ratification debates to debates about slavery that led to the Civil War. After the Civil War there were debates about civil rights, women s rights, and recently same-sex marriage. As a graduate student I recall the debates about the move from the modern to the post-modern. The post-modern called into question all claims to truth. It argues that those systems of thought that claimed to find the truth were nothing more than assertions of the will to power. In its wake I think we can locate what our conference theme refers to as the post-truth age. If we look at the nature of a democratic society, we might find clues for understanding why there we experience such radical questioning of the truth of things. Alexis de Tocqueville, at the beginning of his second volume of Democracy in America, notes that Americans have virtually

4 3 no interest in philosophy. They have created no school of philosophic thought; they do not care about the debates that rage throughout Europe, dividing scholars and peoples (DA 403). And yet it is clear that Americans possess a certain turn of mind, a way of proceeding to deal with matters, that exhibits all of the features of a philosophic method. Here is how he characterizes this peculiar way of thinking in America: To escape from the spirit of system, from the yoke of habits, from family maxims, from class opinions, and, up to a certain point, from national prejudices; to take tradition only as information, and current facts only as useful study for doing otherwise and better; to seek the reason for things by themselves and in themselves alone, to strive for a result without letting themselves be chained to means, and to see through the form to the foundation: these are the principal features that characterize what I shall call the philosophic method of the Americans (DA 403). But the most important aspect of this philosophic method is that it draws on the efforts of the individual and her reason (DA 403). This last point provides a point of focus for identifying this method. It is the method of Descartes. America is therefore the one country in the world where the precepts of Descartes are least studied and best followed. That should not be surprising (DA 403). What makes Descartes principles so fitted for Americans is that our social state is such that it has broken the bonds of tradition that unites generations with each other. People no longer consider tradition as a sufficient basis for justification. Other individuals no longer can have a hold on an individual. Each person is now her own authority. Each therefore withdraws narrowly into himself and claims to judge the world from there (DA 404). Tocqueville notes that in times of equality the penchant of each individual to blindly follow an individual or classis significantly diminished (DA 409). One feels oneself the equal of those who surround oneself. But then one is confronted with the spectacle of the vast numbers of

5 4 those in society. The individual then feels overwhelmed and weak. This leads to an almost unlimited trust in the judgment of the public (DA 409). One sides with the greatest number. The public therefore has a singular power among democratic peoples, the very idea of which aristocratic nations could not conceive. It does not persuade [one] of its beliefs, it imposes them and makes them penetrate souls by a sort of immense pressure of the minds of all on the intellect of each (DA 409). What Tocqueville has described are the conditions that give rise to the emergence of rhetoric in a democratic society. Having succumbed to the security of being part of the mass of members of a society, the individual readily accepts their standard for resolving all matters of debate the rise of a feeling of conviction. By relying on conviction, one no longer worries about the truth. One only needs the feeling of conviction to adjudicate for her what one should accept as the effective truth of things. Individuals will not necessarily come to the same conclusion. But all will be possessed of conviction. Each will have their truth. If the aim of this conference is to understand why we are in a post-truth age, we will have to understand what causes these debates about the possibility of truth. We can only do that if we examine rhetoric and how it manipulates our fears about the truth of things in order to disrupt our confidence in the traditional sources of truth. The best discussions of rhetoric and how it affects us can be found in Plato s dialogues. I have chosen to discuss Plato s Gorgias because it is, in my opinion, the best critique of rhetoric available to us. A study of Gorgias provides the resources we need to think about how to respond to the crisis of thought that we are part of today. Plato s Gorgias presents us with a dramatic portrayal of a conversation between Socrates and the sophist Gorgias, his protégé Polus, and an ambitious Athenian named Callicles. The subject of the conversation is rhetoric, what it is and what its effects are. The dialogue examines

6 5 the threat that rhetoric poses to a society, as well as the cure for it found in the philosophical life. Thus, it is also a defense of the philosophical life. The conversation is set in the house of Callicles, where many young Athenian men have gathered to hear Gorgias speak in order to see whether they might benefit from what he teaches. What follows is a brief summary of the dialogue, for those not acquainted with it. After the summary, I would like to discuss three crucial matters from the dialogue and how they bear on liberal learning. One thing that I do want to set out before taking up the dialogue is that I am going to take liberties with the meaning of the term philosophy. I would like for us to substitute the term liberal arts and sciences for philosophy. While I think our current sense of philosophy as a discipline that is part of the humanities is implicit in the term philosophy as Plato employs it, I think it also means something broader. It also refers to that range of disciplines that constitute the liberal arts, as that term is traditionally understood. (Write a note on the fact that philosophy at one time was not distinct from the other liberal arts.) The dialogue opens with Socrates and his friend, Chaerephon, arriving late. Gorgias has just completed his performance. Callicles meets them at the door, telling them that they are right on time for a war or battle (Gorgias). Callicles describes Gorgias performance as a wonderful display of his brilliance. Socrates is disappointed at missing it. But upon hearing that Socrates would like to converse with him, Gorgias agrees to speak with him. Of course, Socrates demands that it be in the question and answer format, no lengthy speeches, which is his customary request/demand. The reason for this is so that Socrates can question Gorgias about the claims he makes, especially in regard for what it is that he does and teaches. The conversation between Socrates and Gorgias focuses on clarifying the nature of rhetoric and how it affects people. Socrates questioning aims at separating rhetoric from the

7 6 other arts. When asked what rhetoric is, Gorgias answers that it is something of great benefit to human beings. It is about public speaking, being able to answer any and every question that someone asks you about. Socrates notes that other arts also use speech in order to convey to others what their respective art does. A doctor uses speech to explain medicine, a musician to speak about the making of tunes, and physical training uses it to explain how to treat the body. So, rhetoric is not just about all speeches. It is about the speeches one makes in the law courts and the assemblies on the subject of justice. If we pay careful attention to this line of questioning, we can see a familiar strategy of Socrates at work here. By separating rhetoric from the other arts, we can get a clear view of what it does and how it affects its audience. Gorgias tells us that rhetoric, when used in the courts and assemblies can persuade people on any subject, especially justice. If one needs to persuade a patient to take medicine or to have a surgery, he claims, then an orator is what is needed. The orator need not know anything about medicine (or law or justice), he possesses the speaking skills that will persuade anyone to do anything (458e). Gorgias is saying, then, that even though the orator does not know the subjectmatter under discussion, she can persuade a large gathering to agree to anything being discussed. Thus, the orator does not know anything substantive. She just is able to get the assent of those who do not know. In fact, no knowledge is necessary to succeed as an orator. Next, we take up the nature of persuasion. Socrates asks Gorgias if he believes in the distinction between learning and conviction, the former being what is essential to knowing and the latter producing belief without knowledge. Learning leads one to truth and conviction produces a belief that may or may not be true. The persuasion achieved by the orator is that of conviction, not knowledge (454c-e).

8 7 At this point, Socrates points out that if rhetoric can only produce conviction and not knowledge, then it can be used to persuade people of what is false or unjust. It begs the question as to whether the truth is of any importance. An orator could use her skills to argue for that which is unjust. Gorgias replies that while it is possible for an orator to use her skills in an unjust way, that an orator should never do that. Gorgias then explains that he teaches his students about justice and to use their skill in a just way. But Socrates points out that during the course of their conversation, Gorgias has admitted that orators do not possess any knowledge, which means that on occasion the orator will teach that which is unjust (461a). Socrates has caught Gorgias in a contradiction. Either the orator knows what is just or she doesn t. And it is clear from what Gorgias has said that the orator does not possess knowledge of the just and unjust. The orator simply is acquainted with the opinions of the city. At this point, Polus interrupts and takes up the argument with Socrates. He demands that Socrates answer the question as to what rhetoric is (462b). Socrates argues that rhetoric is a skill, gained from experience, that produces pleasure in the audience (462c-d). Socrates does so through a line of reasoning that reveals rhetoric to be a form of sycophancy. There are four sciences that serve the good of human beings. Two are for the maintenance of the body, medicine and physical training, while two are for the state and the soul, legislation and justice. These sciences have their opposites, which belong to what is called sycophancy. These forms of sycophancy are not capable of knowledge and therefore are not sciences. Instead, they are skills gained by experience. Cookery and fashion serve the pleasures of the body, while sophistry and rhetoric serve the pleasures of the state and soul. The point of the skill in each of these opposites is to say what is pleasing to a group of people or an individual, appealing to self-interest and vanity. It claims to know what is best but does not. The aim is to flatter and please regardless of

9 8 whether it is good or not. Of course, in the case of rhetoric, the ultimate aim of sycophancy is to serve the interests of the speaker ( ). Polus responds to Socrates by saying that orators are held in high esteem in cities, and that they have great power and can do what they please. This is what makes rhetoric so important as a skill. We should reflect on this point for a moment. Polus is ascribing a power to rhetoric that is like the power that one gets from the ring of Gyges, mentioned in Republic, book II. One is able to do and to get whatever one wants. This is what is said to be naturally good. Only those who are weak and unable to acquire this power would try to restrain those who can do them harm. In doing so they act contrary to nature. As evidence of this claim, Polus points to Achelous, the King of Macedonia. He acquired his throne by performing the worst crimes. As a result, he has the throne and power. He is happy because he can do what he wants (471a-d). One could add here, that Polus believes that Socrates also thinks that someone like Archelaus is happiest, but he is afraid to say so publicly. It is at this point that Socrates turns the conversation around. Polus believes that by showing us what everyone believes, he has been proven right. The truth, though, is that he has only shown us what people believe, not that they are right. To persuade a majority of people of a claim is not proving that it is true. And here we see what is so important about Socrates method of question and answer. When it comes to the truth, it is discovered only in a discussion with someone else, where the interlocutors as partners can tests the reasons and evidence given for a claim, to see if they are adequate to the subject-matter under discussion (472b-d). In this more intimate setting, the attention is on the subject-matter and not the interests of the interlocutors. To prove his point, Socrates takes up Polus claim that a tyrant like Archelaus is truly happy. He points out his view that to act unjustly is worse than to suffer injustice. In using this

10 9 Socratic doctrine, Socrates is then able to ask Polus about the judgments we make when we refer to something as good or bad, better or worse. Socrates notes that we make these judgments in terms of a standard (474dff.). By reminding Polus that in making these judgments we are referring to a standard, he tamed. He now agrees with Socrates that someone who gets away with crimes and does not pay the penalty, that such a person is truly bad. In fact, that person is worse off than anyone that the tyrant has caused to suffer. Like Gorgias, Polus too must concede that there is a need to refer to the good, that is, that which is right and wrong. In doing so, Polus view, that all of us act in order to gain advantage and power has been proven wrong. It is wrong whether Polus believes it to be or not. At this point, there is another interruption. Now Callicles engages Socrates. He thinks that Polus has succumbed to the very trap he accused Gorgias of falling into. He too was embarrassed to speak against the conventional morality (482c). Callicles intends to double down here. To press the case that Polus failed to carry though. Callicles argument is reminiscent of the view of justice presented by Glaucon and Adeimantus in Republic, book II. This argument is an appeal to what is right by nature (483a). By nature, all human beings act in terms of their own self-interests. Those that are strong enough to do so impose their will on others, take their goods from them or kill them outright. In this view, to be treated unjustly is worse than inflicting injustice on others. Inflicting injustice is only worse than being treated unjustly in terms of convention. Polus was wrong to concede to Socrates that inflicting injustice is worse than suffering injustice. The evidence for this can be seen in nature itself. In both the animal and the human world, those that are stronger have more than those that are weaker (483d). By nature, the stronger rule over the weak. Conventional morality requires that those who are strong be treated

11 10 with spells and bewitchment so that they uphold justice and see to it that all have things equally (484a). Callicles then goes on to indict philosophy, borrowing a scene from Euripides Antiope. Two brothers, Amphion and Zethus, are given the task of rescuing their mother. Zethus is the brother who is more worldly; a man of political action. He castigates his brother for focusing on music and philosophy, for living a life that is quiet and unable to achieve anything of significance. Callicles assumes the role of Zethus, as he tells Socrates that this activity of philosophy, of questioning others, it is unmanly (485d-486b). Like Amphion, Socrates is acting like an adolescent, paying no attention to the important things in life. If he is not careful, he will find himself in court being condemned by the jury. Callicles poses a real challenge to Socrates. When he responds, Socrates notes that if his soul was made of gold, Callicles would be a good test stone to prove the worth of his soul (486d). In response to Callicles, Socrates takes up the claim that the pursuit of the good is distinct from the pursuit of pleasure. The upshot is that this distinction undermines the claim that Callicles made that human beings by nature act unjustly. In a very long exchange of answers, Socrates comes to the point where he gets Callicles to agree that this distinction is true, and that these two ends have a practice and activity that allows one to achieve these respective ends (501d-e). Returning to something said to both Gorgias and Polus, Socrates reminds us that he said that cookery is not a science but a skill, and that medicine is a science. It is a science because it knows and can give an account of both the nature of the things it tends to and the reasons why it acts as it does (501a). Cookery, on the other hand, acts without reason, not considering whether what it is doing is good or harmful (501b). At this point, Callicles will no longer be a serious interlocutor. He disagrees strongly with the terms that Socrates has set here.

12 11 Callicles believes that the pleasant and the good are the same thing, even though earlier he agreed with Socrates that they are distinct. He believes that one must act according to nature, nature that is as he understands it, and it requires one to act unjustly. Callicles will not budge from this position. He is not going to make the same mistake that Gorgias and Polus made. At this point, the conversation effectively ends. Callicles will continue to play along with Socrates in order to let him finish the account he has begun. In the rest of the discussion, Socrates takes up the task of countering the view that human beings are by nature unjust. As part of this task, Socrates offers up an extensive summary of his exchange with Callicles (506c-507e). Two key conclusions from this summary are that the self-controlled soul is good, while the soul that lacks self-control is bad; and being self-controlled, the good soul would act justly, which leads to being blessed and happy (507c). The summary allows Socrates to attack the idea that human beings are by nature unjust. He argues that by nature things and people are ordered in terms of the good. As such, they are bound together by community, friendship, orderliness, selfcontrol and justice (508a). This, Socrates points out is known only through asking the kind of questions that Callicles calls unmanly. The summary is the basis, then, for testing the claims made by both Callicles and Socrates. It allows us to see which view best fit our sense of how things hang together. The dialogue frames for us the way in which to test these accounts of the nature of human beings and what the consequences of these argument are if we take them seriously. Socrates concludes the dialogue with a myth. It tells the story of a problem encountered by Zeus, Poseidon, and Pluto in terms of judging the dead and where to send them. The problem was that the dead, while still alive, were judged by the living, on the day that they were to die (523a). Because the judges knew who the dying were, bad judgments were made, and people

13 12 were showing up to places where they did not belong. Zeus solved the problem by first taking away from people knowledge of the day that they were to die; second people were to be judged when they were dead and stripped of all that they were in life; and finally, judges too would be dead and stripped (523e). Zeus made his own sons, Minos, Rhadamanthys and Aecus judges of the dead. The dead, being stripped are unrecognizable by the judges. The judges then look on the soul of the person and see how they have treated their souls. That way, even a great king will be judged according to the way that he lived his life. The myth, then, tells us why we must always act in terms of what is good (and right), making our souls capable of self-control and always able to respond in the appropriate way to the things that happen to us. Plato uses myth in order to supply philosophy with its own form of rhetoric. Myth as rhetoric does not aim at power or wealth. It aims at improving one s soul. During the course of his conversation with Callicles, it was pointed out that in practicing philosophy, Socrates was making himself vulnerable; that he would not be able to protect himself if he were ever brought in front of a jury. Socrates agreed that if he were ever brought before the jury he would not be able to persuade them to listen to him. He stated that his trial would be like a doctor having to defend himself against a prosecutor who was a chef, in front of a jury of children (521e). He would be forced to suffer injustice. But Socrates argued that he knows very well that such things might happen to him. Still, that does not relieve him of the responsibility to do what is right (521b-d). The myth provides the moment for us to reflect on the consequences of the views offered by Callicles and Socrates. Here is where we can see the way in which truth and falsity matter to the arguments we make. Rhetoric was born out of the impatience occasioned by those who did not have the desire to spend their lives in pursuit of wisdom. The discipline and commitment demanded by

14 13 philosophers meant that one had to spend one s entire life discussing a stream of endless questions. It was impossible to acquire knowledge in the short span of a human lifetime. Instead, rhetoric offered the alternative to pursue a different tack. This impatience gave rise to feelings of doubt and uncertainty in people. Rhetoric was successful because the orator knew how to exploit these feelings by playing on fears and suggesting a way to connect one s thoughts, which would instill a sense of pleasure that provided all the certainty one could want. One did not need to know anything. All one needed to do was to produce the sense of conviction in one s audience. The orator knew the value of this power because people were willing to pay plenty for this sense of conviction. Thus, conviction replaced learning. But the rise of rhetoric would not be possible without the extraordinary success of the arts and sciences. In Plato s day, Athens was a successful commercial democracy. It was open to innovations in knowledge, especially those that could be put to commercial use. By extending knowledge into various fields of research, knowledge was eventually compartmentalized. One no longer saw knowledge in terms of a unified set of specialized kinds of knowing. Each discipline was now guided by a set of particular interests. As such, no one needed that vision of a comprehensive knowledge that would provide legitimacy to its claims. This compartmentalization then fueled that sense of doubt and uncertainty that sophists and orators used skillfully to their advantage. This fragmenting of knowledge eventually was reflected in the religious and political life of the Greeks. The skill and competence achieved in the sciences weakened the claims of the religious traditions. One no longer saw them as sources of truth. Instead the poets, like Homer, came to be seen as the sources from which one could produce conviction. Hans-Georg Gadamer describes the age in these words:

15 14 It was the practice then to justify the whole of one s knowledge in any area by recourse to Homer (just as Christian writers justified their knowledge by recourse to the Bible). In addition, listening to poetry had often completely given way to fantastic allegorization and hairsplitting exegesis, and, given the dominance of the spoken word in the Greek world, a poetic formulation taken out of context as creed or maxim went from ear to the soul without the poet s overall intention defining and limiting its application (Gadamer 47). In the political realm, with so many people vying for power and honor, factional strife intensified. During the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides portrays how such conflicts eventually caused the downfall of Athens. It led to the overthrow of the democracy and the rule of the Thirty Tyrants, who were then thrown out by the democratic partisans. And it was then that Socrates was brought before the Athenian jury and condemned to death. In Gorgias, Plato has Socrates confront sophistry and rhetoric in order to make clear the threat that rhetoric posed if it was not challenged by a form of inquiry that could maintain the need for justifying and legitimating our knowledge claims. Socratic philosophy is that inquiry. Through its relentless questioning of all claims to knowing, it demanded that individuals test those claims in order to find those that could sustain agreement between the interlocutors. In the dialogue, Socrates uses the idea of justice to show why rhetoric fails to bring us knowledge. In the dialogue Gorgias claimed that he could teach anyone to speak on any subject, even if one were not acquainted with the subject under discussion. But he qualified his point by insisting that one must do so in a just manner. One cannot do whatever one wants. But Socrates points out that one would have to know what justice is in order to maintain that restraint. It is in regard to justice that Gorgias proves that he lacks understanding. He does not know what justice is and how it differs from skills like medicine, physical training or rhetoric. Justice stands in here for commitment to truth that is what restrains what we do when we engage in the pursuit of

16 15 knowledge. The subsequent discussions with Polus and Callicles show that rhetoric in fact recognizes no such need for justice and truth. As a skill, its only interest is in producing conviction, with or without knowledge. It seeks its own interests at the expense of justice or truth. But these two things are exactly what cannot be dispensed with in the search after truth. Both Polus and Callicles think that Gorgias was too embarrassed to state the truth, which is that the skill of rhetoric provides one with a power to do whatever one wants. Both make the comparison of the successful orator to that of the tyrant. And it is Callicles insistence on this that ultimately makes agreement with Socrates on the nature of rhetoric impossible. But this failure at the end of the dialogue does not mark a failure of Socratic philosophy. It shows the limits of any attempt to come to agreement. Learning is not compulsion; one cannot force one s view on others. This limit, though, is exactly what distinguishes the genuine search for truth from its competitors. Rhetoric, at least as practiced by Gorgias, Polus and Callicles, would allow one to compel others to believe what one said. The rules of rhetoric are not constraints to pursue the truth. These rules are for guaranteeing the success of the speaker. The lesson we should take from Socrates confrontation with rhetoric in Gorgias is that our situation is not unique. It has been a phenomenon that has been with us throughout human history. However, there is a way to combat this threat. It is the model of Socratic philosophy, which is found in the liberal arts and sciences that are the core part of university education today. Our classrooms are the right setting for us to show students how to reflect on what they believe, on what they are learning, and then to test those things to see what holds up in terms of the truth. Throughout this process students are taught those epistemic and ethical norms that should guide their inquiries, which in turn make coming to agreement possible. That there is no agreement ultimately on what the truth is, is beside the point. It is the effort of establishing the basis and

17 16 terms of agreement that is crucial. This is how you establish the spirit of community. And I would add, it is also learning to live with questions, to be open to the fact that there are matters that cannot be resolved, or questions that have no answer at present. One s time at the university is marked by the experience where students are exposed to a variety of experiences in knowing the world around us. It is what engenders the sense of wonder. General education curriculums provide the unifying threads that allow students to see their experience in terms of a whole, even if there is no comprehensive system of arts and sciences, ordered by a fundamental set of truths.

18 17 Works Cited Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Plato and the Poets in Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato. Translated and with an Introduction by P. Christopher Smith. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, Cited in the paper parenthetically as Gadamer, followed by page number. Plato. Gorgias, Menexenus, Protagoras. Edited by Malcolm Schofield, Translated by Tom Griffith. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, Gorgias is found on pp Cited in the paper parenthetically, using the traditional Stephanus page numbers. This edition is part of the Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought series. Tocqueville, Alexis de. Democracy in America. Translated, edited and with an introduction by Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, Cited in the paper parenthetically as DA, followed by page number.