THE CONCEPT OF MAN IN THE WRITINGS OF MARSILIO FICINO AND PICO DELLA MIRANDOLA

Transcription

1 THE CONCEPT OF MAN IN THE WRITINGS OF MARSILIO FICINO AND PICO DELLA MIRANDOLA GRAHAM J. BURNS A generation before the publication of Ficino's Theologia Platonica (1474), Leon Battista Alberti had praised the tranquillity of ideal family life in a book in which he described the perfect country house.1 Likening the life of the family to that of man in the city, he insists that the dwelling be healthy and "not deficient in any of the conveniences that conduce to the repose, tranquillity, or delicacy of life...."2 Alberti's engaging plan for a house that would provide a graceful physical setting for the three generations of a gentleman's family, will serve as appropriately as any impressionistic example to indicate a change in the quality of life that would be reflected in a new emphasis on the dignity of man and the worth of human life. Philosophy works slowly, sometimes influencing, sometimes reflecting the society from which it originates. The historian of intellectual history must use its documents literary and philosophical as evidence of men's responses to metaphysical questions posed by the life of the time. The philosophical writings of Ficino and Pico, with their generous appraisal of man, and his relation to God, appear as a literature of consent, a coherent philosophical justification not merely of the vaguer aspirations of the earlier literary humanists, but of a putative assumption that the world yields to individual human personality and initiative. A confident emphasis on the autonomy of the individual may well indicate a life-affirmation rather different in kind from that of the so-called late medieval period, a period too easily characterised as a time of withdrawal. The marked preoccupation with the idea of death had, as Huizinga has shown, obsessed an earlier generation, who might have remembered the Great Plague with a shudder. By the mid-century the life of the city or contado had made possible for some the realisation of Alberti's idyll, but certain of the earlier tensions remained to colour the philosophies of Ficino and Pico when they came to answer the perennial questions: what is the nature of man? and to what end should he direct his energies? Their answers were emphatic enough: if man was now with a new confidence "writ large", his obligations remained to a God who donated his capacities, and who would be denied at man's own moral risk.3 In his essay on the nature of early humanism,4 Paul Oskar Kristeller has indicated the slow development of this attitude. Defining the term `humanism' by reference to its origins, Kristeller shows that the early humanists were primarily concerned with an educational and cultural programme centred on the classics, and deriving from an earlier rhetorical tradition a new emphasis on style and correctness.' By the first half of the fifteenth century, the studia humanitatis comprised a clearly defined cycle of scholarly disciplines, including not merely the standard Latin classics, but also to a lesser extent works of the Greek authors, and involving a generally more comprehensive interest in ancient literature than previously.' It was perhaps inevitable that this broad literary and educational movement should not remain as a mere technical exercise in the precise imitation of the style of the admired classics. While there was undoubtedly an element of sterile pedantry among many of its exponents, there was also a gradual and sometimes 45

2 46 THE CONCEPT OF MAN IN FICINO AND PICO self-conscious assimilation of the classical world outlook. Pressed for a justification of their studies, they could answer that a knowledge of the spirit (and indeed the very cadence) of the classics was conducive to the formation of a desirable human being. Significantly enough, the studia humanitatis contained one philosophical discipline, that of morals,7 while its other elements, including history and poetry, had an obvious and direct human reference. Paulus Vergerius' De Ingenuis Moribus (c.1395),8 addressed to Ubertius of Carrara on the education of the latter's son in "the grave and liberal arts", classically indicates the basic humanistic interest in the ethical and personal qualities assumed to be engendered by the programme of the studia humanitatis. As such, it is worth quoting at length: We call those studies liberal which are worthy of a free man; those studies by which we attain and practise virtue and wisdom; that education which calls forth, trains and develops those highest gifts of body and mind which ennoble man, and which are rightly judged to rank next in dignity to virtue alone. For to a vulgar temper, gain and pleasure are the one aim of existence; to a lofty nature, moral worth and fame. It is, then, of the highest importance that even from infancy this aim, this effort, should constantly be kept alive in growing minds.9 Petrarch, who in an unsystematic way often foreshadows many of the interests of a later humanism, presents in On His Own Ignorance,10 an enthusiastic and often open-eyed commendation of the classics, particularly of Virgil and Cicero. Further, he professes to despise the study of logic and natural philosophy." In a tract shot through with arrogance and a too-protesting piety, he often returns to the idea that the proper study of man is man: "He who wants to be safe in praising the entire man must see, examine and estimate the entire man." 12 Petrarch was not a philosopher; nor were the so-called civic humanists who came after him, transferring to the active life his vision of a morally admirable man grounded on the knowledge of human nature as discerned by the great writers of a somehow more authentic ancient past. These civic humanists did not share an organised system13 of ideas; their humanism was nothing more than a prevailing sentiment that man was morally and culturally educable, and that the means for this task were at hand in those Latin and Greek texts then being made available in (generally) scrupulous editions. Bruni, writing to a youth, makes explicit the deeper moral concern that surely underlies the very selection of the elements of the studia humanitatis in the first place: "Let your application have a two-fold end," he writes, "the one the knowledge of letters, the other an understanding of those things which pertain to life and manners, which, on that account are called studia humanitatis, because they equip and perfect the man."14 Bruni, like Petrarch, professes to prefer moral philosophy to physics, claiming that speculations in the natural sciences were "occupying themselves with extraneous matters, and neglecting the pertinent."15 And Salutati, as dedicated to the classics as anyone, nevertheless clearly separates the end from the means to the extent that he sees the possibility of the establishment of a social science. 16 In his De Nobilitate Legum et Medicinae he gladly leaves to others speculations concerning the natural world, provided that he was left with the science of all things human: the natural sciences in general, he claims, are concerned with mere things whereas what are important are the things of man, his laws and inter-relationships.17 Machiavelli would later be impelled by circumstances to take up Salutati's hint, but here we need only note the basic idealism and optimism underlying the conception and purpose of the studia humanitatis programme. Man is deemed to be educable in the art of being a human being and to be worth the effort: he is potentially improvable and no man can measure potentiality.

3 THE CONCEPT OF MAN IN FICINO AND PICO 47 We are not far from an explicit statement of human dignity, based on man's infinite capacities, his ability to dominate nature, and to change himself as he wills, as a concomitant of his reason. From Vergerius' recommendation of the virtues of liberal studies, to the belief of Salutati and Bruni that man as an individual, and in society, is in himself a worthy object of study, there is a change of perspective indicating a more self-conscious (if still unsystematised) humanism. Petrarch, ambivalently attached to the contemplative life of scholarly withdrawal, had thought that much of human nature could be discerned in the vicarious observation afforded by the classics. A later generation had developed a more profound historical perspective, assimilating not merely the ethical precepts of antiquity, benefiting not merely from the disciplines of a classical education, but absorbing something of the spirit of the Roman classics, and applying it to their own time. No doubt country houses were built after Alberti's model (he got it from Hadrian), and if the turbulent political life of Florence could daily dispel any notion of a return to a classicism roseate in the pages of the poets, the dream might be real enough.18 In the selection of a tradition each age in a sense endorses its own values. A revaluation of man, taking into account his achievements in the arts, his stature as measured by the "humanists" of antiquity, and sensing an unfathomed potentiality, would find in an anthropocentric Christianity and an idealistic Platonism, two elements from which a satisfying metaphysic could be constructed. Marsilio Ficino and, to a lesser extent, Pico Della Mirandola, attempted this task although Pico did not specifically claim to be a platonist. He was, as we shall see, in some areas closer to a conservative scholastic tradition than Ficino. Basic to any such undertaking is an examination of the nature of man, for from this must proceed the answers to the perennial question of the ultimate goal of human existence. To the problem of the nature of man, Ficino and Pico posit similar explanations, but both contain apparent logical inconsistencies. These are in themselves interesting, for they indicate how difficult was the task of combining a basically early Christian outlook19 with other idealistic and esoteric elements, chosen to reinforce this. In his Theologia Platonica (1474) Ficino postulates five orders of being; the transcendent God and Angel are in the highest place, and body and quality are in the lowest 2 Arguing in platonic fashion, Ficino adduces the existence of the soul, defined by its necessary place as a third or intermediary essence. Both God and Body are extremes in nature, and absolutely unlike each other, while quality is always in a state of flux. There must therefore be a middle essence, "a kind of link between them,"21 which "binds together the higher and the lower." 22 It is both unchanged and changing "an appropriate mean."23 By virtue of its central position it can partake of the qualities above and below it in the hierarchy of being, and is self-aware,24 being endowed with the capacity for reason.25 Assuming that the human being is a microcosm, Ficino goes on to apply this general ontological principle to the universe at large, not, it seems, with any cosmological interest, but in order to provide a large enough theatre for his conception of man as dominator of nature, and as Maker. Thus, the soul of man becomes "the centre of nature, the middle part of all that is, the chain of the world, the face of all, and the knot and bond of the universe."26 Ficino goes on to imply a freedom of moral choice by allowing the soul to range up or down the hierarchical ladder: "it (the soul) ascends to higher things by a certain natural instinct, and similarly it descends to lower things."27 Both the

4 48 THE CONCEPT OF MAN IN FICINO AND PICO idea of a hierarchy of being and of freedom of choice preceding an act of will are common to both Christianity and Platonism. Finally, in his ethics, Ficino again insists upon the liberty of the individual. There are, he contends, three guides to the moral life: reason, experience and authority. Man's liberty lies in his capacity for judgment. Error in itself is a proof that man possesses this liberty of choice.28 Disregarding the dubiously defined "error" here, it is clear that Ficino wishes to accord to man considerable autonomy. However, in Five Questions Concerning the Mind written two years after the Theologia Platonica, Ficino introduces a logically crippling addition to his system, that of the "natural appetite" of the soul. In this theory the observed order of being results from an inherent impetus in the essence characteristic of each species to proceed towards a particular end identified with the good of that species.29 As dependent upon essence every natural progression is ultimately derived from. God, the "primum" of that species.3 Thus man is an essential creature, and he is in nature. His liberty is paradoxically circumscribed by his unique humanity for it is insisted that man's reason (which, in the analysis of the nature of the third essence, is an aspect of the nature of the free-ranging soul) in reality generally inhibits the earthly attainment of final perfection because of its ambivalent attachment to the senses and the divine. By the sophistic device of here separating the attribute of reason from the autonomous soul, Ficino can go on to postulate a logically necessary afterlife in which his general ontological principle will prevail.31 Liberty, then, for Ficino's man, does not reside in his undefined nature. Much of the dignity of man, as we shall see, consists in his versatility, and Ficino celebrates his achievements. But it is also conceded that man has a will, 32 and if the idea of the will in itself implies an invulnerable freedom,33 this liberty for Ficino consists more in a capacity to demonstrate perfect love in the manner of Christ (or Socrates?).34 By love the individual wins his way to God,35 for love permeating all life is a kind of activity for Ficino. We shall return to this theme with Pico. Pico, in his De hominis dignitate ratio, expressly rejects, among others, Ficino's belief that man is an intermediary between creatures.3fi For Pico, man is the crowning achievement of creation, whose intellect alone can comprehend some idea of the unity of the world, the multiplicity and grandeur of God's design.37 Man is assigned no place in the celestial hierarchy. He is placed outside of it, in the privileged position of an observer. His reason, if not of the extent of God's, is of the same nature. Accordingly, Godlike and "constrained by no limits" he can define his own nature because of his "freedom of choice". A moulder of himself, he can fashion his being in "whatever shape thou shalt prefer."38 Pico has God say to Adam: "Neither a fixed abode nor a form that is thine alone nor any function peculiar to thyself have we given thee. "39 Commentators, including Ernst Cassirer,40 tend to succumb to the bewitchment of the language here, perhaps sensing that it proclaims Pico as the most ecstatic of the "firstborn among the sons of modern Europe".41 The very energy of the passage may, in fact, convey Pico's emotional commitment to the idea of the dignity of man, but if this is the case, it is (as with Ficino) more in the nature of celebration than philosophical exposition. Others of Pico's works must be contended with to form a truer idea of his concept of man. Taken out of the context of the Oratio the speech to Adam would label Pico as the first existential philosopher. Man is said to choose his essence as a free act: he is not subject to the realm of process, and a connection is established

5 THE CONCEPT OF MAN IN FICINO AND PICO 49 between "human nature" (which, for Pico to be consistent, should not exist), and human action the latter being defined by the former.42 A careful reading of the Oratio, however, convinces that liberty, for Pico, was not an end in itself; nor can man achieve whatever he desires through his own power. Liberty, in fact, is a condition granted that man may accomplish the religious task assigned to him of re-uniting himself and the world to the creator.43 His religion is, in fact, orthodox Christianity: Man cannot be joined to God except through Christ... through Him men can be made the sons of God. If that which we say is true, namely that extremes cannot be united except through a mean. Let them note this diligently who say that they believe in Christ, and yet think that a common religion or whatever religion one happens to be born in is sufficient to obtain salvation. Let them believe not me, nor the reasons themselves, but John but Paul, but Christ who says: "I am the door, and he who entereth not by Me is a thief and a robber."44 This is from the Heptaplus, written in 1489, at the most only three years after the Oratio. (It is difficult to establish any convincing periodisation for the thought and work of Pico, since all the works fall within eight years ( ). The basic Thomist doctrine of essence and existence, which is used in the Conclusiones of 1486, is elaborated in De ente et uno45 written two years before Pico's death.) The Oratio does not exclude the concept of divine grace or affirm the so-called autonomy of man in any such way as some scholars have suggested. Pico's freedom is not existential in the important sense that man becomes the measure of all things, as the only index available. Cassirer and others have stated or implied that Pico has "liberated man from all dependence on the divine will,"46 or that man "owes his moral character to himself."47 Such a viewpoint cannot be maintained before Pico's own statements. His universe is fulsome with God, and man's privileged position carries with it an obligation to seek that which is good. His very humanity, in fact, is dependent upon this.48 Pico stresses that the "highest liberality of the Father must not be abused";49 man is "obliged" to take "advantage" of his liberty. There will be disaster if he fails, and the whole world would be "filled with confusion."50 It seems important at this stage to insist on the essential conservatism of Pico's philosophy.51 Pico remained within the broad scholastic tradition, modifying it with renewed emphases, but still seeing man's highest destiny in relation to a cosmic religious function. It is possible to adduce from the Heptaplus alone statement after statement proclaiming man's obligation to, and dependence upon, Divine grace in the attainment of full human stature.52 If we are to claim Pico as a representative Renaissance man,53 we should read his comments on the dignity of man in the deeply religious contexts he provided. There does not seem to be any fundamental difference between the ontologies of Ficino and Pico. The freedom they denote to man is truly the Christian freedom of moral choice; the polarities of good and evil are still of a "received" order as schematised in the Scholastic concept (of earlier derivation) of a hierarchy of values ascending to the Godhead. Ficino's man has the generous advantage of an instinctive impetus towards perfection. Both philosophers tend to reduce matters of faith to rational arguments, primarily by providing ontological justification for man's proclaimed religious function. There was nothing very new in this, but in stressing the importance of reason and experience, capacities uniquely human, in fulfilling this role, they were arguably in tune with the temper of the time. Ficino's ethics acknowledge reason, experience and authority as the guides to the moral life.b4 An element of pragmatism is introduced in his acceptance

6 50 THE CONCEPT OF MAN IN FICINO AND PICO of error as proof of the liberty of choice. With the help of philosophy, Pico's man can span the gap that separates man from God. In the Oratio he bases his philosophical programme dedicated to this purpose on the three Delphic principles. 55 Moral philosophy, with its injunction "nothing in excess", will subdue the discord between spirit and flesh.56 Natural philosophy will lead to self-knowledge, "for, he who knows himself, in himself knows all things."57 Theology will provide a supra-rational insight into the true nature of things,58 co-ordinating, substantiating by revelation, the knowledge of man and man's relation to God derived from philosophy. Philosophy for Pico and Ficino was a preparation for religion. The concept of man in their philosophies did not posit a new ethic of autonomous moral responsibility. Nor did it provide the educational humanists with a philosophical justification for taking human values as the measure of all things Pico's man is not lonely in an alienated universe, tormented by anguish because freedom implies that he must invent his own values. The western world would wait another four hundred years for its "disinherited minds", the stoics without a tradition, to build a philosophy of man not from optimism but from their despairs. The much vaunted "freedom" of these renaissance philosophers is, in reality, a strikingly-presented reassertion of the fundamental Christian doctrine of freewill, combined with a memorable celebration of human initiative, skill and universality. Knowledge to Bruni and Salutati was not an end in itself; learning was justified, as we have seen, because it could instruct the individual in moral worth and virtue. To Petrarch, however, its connections with religion were, ostensibly at least, rather more immediate.59 For Ficino and for Pico, all knowledge had a human reference, but the truths they sought were about man's ultimate relation to God. That is, they were religious truths. Neither of them created cosmologies, and their interest in natural science was only engaged in those areas where it was deemed to impinge upon the human being in an "authentic" magic that might serve man's ends by providing some control over the laws of nature." Both Ficino and Pico read very widely, and as a result of the "revival of learning" they had access to a much wider and more reliable range of sources than their predecessors. Both were proficient in languages, and received a scholastic training,61 which, apart from leaving a demonstrable imprint on their habit of mind, provided for the task of synthesis a dialectical method and a ready vocabulary. Syncretism became a "habit of mind" to these men who were aware that Saint Augustine had recommended that Christians accept those teachings of Plato that were compatible with their religion.62 As scholars, they knew, too, that the Christian religion was itself the product of a thousand years of a gradual accretion of ideas which eventually became dogma. Kristeller, in an interesting study,63 has shown the scholastic nature of Ficino's training at the University of Florence and the wide scope of his sources. In the same article, there is a discussion of some important recently discovered documents from the earlier and later periods of Ficino's career which reveal the life-long influence of Plotinian metaphysics.64 Ficino made constant use of the Orphic texts, but it is notable that he never wished to publish the Latin translations he had made of these and the works of Proclus.65 His avowed aim, as leader of the Platonic Academy in Florence, was, of course, the reconciliation of the Platonic and Christian philosophies. Ficino's reticence in publishing the pagan texts may merely indicate caution; it may also serve as a warning to those

7 THE CONCEPT OF MAN IN FICINO AND PICO 51 scholars who, in studying the genesis of a philosophical system, fail to distinguish between those sources which exert an active influence and those which serve passively as texts for reference or corroborative evidence.66 To Ficino, the Orphic texts, interesting in themselves, were not central to his life work. Ficino, a Christian,67 almost certainly saw the role of learning and knowledge in a light similar to that of the earlier humanists, but whereas Salutati, for example, had still believed Divine grace to be a necessary requisite for understanding,ó8 Ficino contended that the Platonic discourses were divinely inspired 6s By example and precept he conferred upon learning even higher status and autonomy. Without seriously compromising his Christian position,70 he made of Platonism with its inherent idealism, flexibility and emphasis on rational demonstration of the supra-rational a congenial mode in which to discuss the problems of the humanists in a manner satisfying to the temper of the age. Christian truths could be derived from first principles, revelation substantiated by reason: the perenniality and omnipresence of truth could be discerned in pagan as well as Christian texts. For Pico, no source and no period had a monopoly of truth and all traditions and literatures contained moments of insight. He did not conceive of a vague "perennial philosophy" underlying all religions but contended that some parts of all religions and philosophies may be true.7' This is not really a process of syncretism, although it involved the study of esoteric literatures. One of the most famous passages of the Oratio confirms this: I... have so prepared myself that, pledged to the doctrines of no man, I have ranged through all the masters of Philosophy, investigated all books, and come to know all schools.. And let no man condemn me for coming as a friend whithersoever the tempest bear me... And surely it is the part of a narrow mind to have confined itself within a single Porch or Academy.72 Pico's words, part of a challenge to a public disputation, again should not be taken out of the context of his works as a whole. Pico may not have been pledged to the doctrines of Christianity, but they are nevertheless central to his thought. His very commitment to Christian thought here seems to be taken for granted: he was, after all, inviting scholars to discuss his theses at a time when heresies of a too overt kind were still not tolerated. He could not have expected that four of the nine hundred propositions would be condemned. Pearl Kibre has confirmed the breadth of Pico's reading and interests.73 These included Greek and Latin philosophy, prose and poetry, vernacular poetry, Arabian philosophy, the writings of the Christian Fathers, the Orphic Hymns, books on magic, and Hebrew mystical literature. In De ente et uno Pico maintained that the multiplicity of beings in creation were in reality all the one. 74 (This notion in itself would negate the idea of a perfect human autonomy.) To his theory of knowledge it provided a basis for what Cassirer has called "symbolic thought."75 Pico sees the Many rather as expressions or Images of the One. Only in this mediate and symbolic way can the absolutely one and unconditioned manifest itself to human knowledge.76 Veridical knowledge will therefore be cryptic. Metaphysics and the sciences are merely symbols of the divine underlying truth. This doctrine may well have been related to the Averroistic notion of the "unity of the intellect", or alternatively, it may show the influence of Nicholas of Cusa, whom Pico professedly admired. 77 Nicholas of Cusa had seen mathematics as exemplifying an aspect of divinity not different in kind from knowledge known to God. The relevance of this to the theme of the dignity of man is clear enough. Man, Godlike in his intellect, is the only creature capable of discerning, even mediately, the nature of divinity.

8 52 THE CONCEPT OF MAN IN FICINO AND PICO Only to the intellect is disclosed the truly universal. To the classical idea that man is in God, Pico contends that God, too, is in man. Speculative thought, as we have seen, becomes a necessary prelude to veridical knowledge of God. Pico did not see God in "the bright light of the empirical world" (Cassirer); he was convinced that God "must be seized in the obscure depths of the human soul" (Pico). The metaphor, the intuitively apprehended image, the ancient truth hidden in riddle, were all mediate manifestations of the completely unknowable.78 The only way to direct union with God, for Pico, as for Ficino, was by love. Only by the agency of love can the enormous gap between man and God be finally bridged. Love, the erotic contemplation of the One, the Good and Beautiful, is the goal of human existence. To these philosophers love is synonymous with God and the platonic Idea of the Good. Both men expressly state this identification.79 Love, for Ficino, is the central fact of the world: There is no denying the fact that love is in everything, and penetrates through everything. Therefore, let us certainly fear this great God, because He is everywhere,. dwelling in the inner life of everything like a great lord from whose power we cannot escape.80 And at another point he says: Wherefore, all parts of the world, because they are the works of one artist, the parts of one creation, like each other in life and essence, are bound to each other by a certain mutual affection so that it may justly be said that love is a perpetual knot and binder of the world, the immovable support of its parts and the firm foundation of the whole creation.81 And for Pico, love is finally the most potent agent in the "flight to God",82 although, as always, it is in the context associated with reason, self-knowledge and willed direction: While we are in the body we are able to love God better than we can know or describe Him. In loving there is for us more profit, and less labour, the more we obey this tendency.83 Consciously directed by the intellect and impelled by the will, union in perfect love with God is the consummation of human existence. Man's dignity chiefly consists in his ability consciously to achieve this for himself. As so often, the concept is Christian in essence, but with overtones of the platonic ideal of reciprocal love between individuals,s4 and the aspiration of the soul to contemplate again the Form of the Good. And it is precisely at this crucial point that Ficino and Pico disagree most violently a disagreement that was to cause the historical rift between them.86 Both Pico and Ficino hold that God permeates the world He transcends. He is both beyond and within the creation.86 Ficino, consistent with his stress on self-awareness in man's desire for perfection (desideris con cognitione) envisages this as a reversion to God. Restored to his immanent virtue, man should find himself truly at last in God.S7 Ficino envisages an almost intellectual experience: he speaks of "enjoying" or "experiencing" God. It is still a volative process, entirely consistent with Ficino's activistic ideal of the religious life. Pico,. on the other hand, takes the Orphic paradox (that the highest mysteries transcend the understanding and must be "apprehended" in the "light of ignorance") to its logical conclusion. In mystical union with God, man must surrender himself to a state of unknowing, and approach the Divine in "the blindness of selfdestruction". A reciprocal response to the strength of God's love is impossible. The final end of human activity is self-annihilation.88 The dispute was more than a verbal quibbling over the description of Deity. Throughout Ficino's metaphysic there is a definite emphasis on self-awareness

9 THE CONCEPT OF MAN IN FICINO AND PICO 53 as the unique and Godlike attribute of human love. Pico, on the other hand, sees the love of man for God more simply as a natural corollary of knowledge of Him (gained through Philosophy and Theology). The ascent to the Godhead is by way of moral choices. Love would proceed from this as man approaches in conduct the nature of God: The best precept then, which this discussion can give us, seems to be that, if we wish to be happy, we ought to imitate the most happy and blessed of all beings, God, by establishing in ourselves unity, truth, and goodness.89 Ficino's disappointment with Pico's "recalcitrance" is apparent in his lament: "Oh, that the admirable youth had carefully considered these propositions and arguments before venturing forth with such confidence against his teacher, and declaring himself so firmly against the opinions of the Platonists."90 If we are to find in their respective teleologies a reflection of the attitudes of Ficino and Pico towards individuality and self-awareness as Renaissance men, it is to Ficino we must look for the most striking affirmation of the activisitic religious life. But, as religious men immersed in the problems of their age, there is in both philosophers a celebration of human life in all its dimensions and facets. * * * The period of the Renaissance, it is now generally agreed, was not antireligious, but an examination of any of its well-known philosophies convinces us readily enough that it was not dogmatic. Our subject here has been the "concept of man" in two Renaissance philosophers, and as far as systematic philosophies can be observed in their works, they emerge as presenting orthodox views calculated to explain and justify man's capacity for initiative, action and invention. Turning aside from the more sterile arguments of scholasticism, they revived Saint Augustine's insistence on the place of man in the study of philosophy,9' and the relationship of philosophy to religion. Like Augustine and the other Church Fathers, they revered the classics, seeing in poetry, history and moral philosophy the tools that would enable man to enhance, even regain in some sense, his capacities. The discussions were carried within the framework of an existing and elaborate set of ideas, a traditional terminology and method of argument. Methods of revelation were tested by the rational method, but the great ontological questions the nature of being, the nature of man and the soul, the possibility of a hereafter had always a clear reference to life. This was dramatically pointed up by Ficino and Pico in their memorable celebrations of man as Maker and lord of nature,92 his capacity for adaptation. Pico had even claimed for man a capacity for mutation,93 but it is unlikely that he meant much more than universality in Ficino's sense, and moral choice. The attempt to prove immortality itself proclaims a positive interest in man and his metaphysical position. Ficino's revamping of the Thomist doctrine of "natural appetite" in neoplatonic terms and his platonic theories of love gave a positive evaluation to the natural aspects of man, and while this may not have constituted a "transvaluation in the theory of morals,"94 there is ample evidence in the art and literature of the time to suggest that the strong anti-ascetic strain in Ficinian Neoplatonism accorded well with the social moeurs of the time if it did not actively influence them. Those commenators who read into Pico's Oratio and the third book of the Theologia Platonica (Ficino), definitive statements of man's autonomy and ethical

10 54 THE CONCEPT OF MAN IN FICINO AND PICO freedom, are guilty of a distortion of history that could be corrected by reference to other works of these authors (or closer scrutiny of the cited works themselves). Nevertheless, the emotional force and vigour of language with which Pico proclaims man's liberty is certainly more compelling than the evocation of the peace towards which this liberty should be directed. Ficino's man, "unable to bear any kind of slavery,"95 "ashamed to be defeated even in small matters," and "a master of all crafts,"96 is the only creature to endure physical discomfort and trouble, of his own free-will, in order that he might "amplify his eloquence and give proof of his power."97 In these passages we feel the quickening pulse-beat of an optimistic age, and if the concept of man is more restrained on closer examination, we can hardly doubt that the quality of life for some men (at least) of the time justified this heightened optimism. The span that here links metaphysics to the world of commerce and the commune is wide, and traverses tradition, the immediate historical background, and even the individual psychology of the philosophers. It is not possible to explore it here. We began with the repose of Alberti's country house as a symbol of Renaissance complacency, but the turbulent energies of the Italian quattrocento as a whole will stand as witness to the "Renaissance philosophy of man" before the shadows of the Reformation began to touch it, blurring its clear outlines and eventually demanding a revaluation. NOTES 1. J. Ross and M. McLaughlin (eds.), The Portable Renaissance Reader, New York, 1953, D Ibid., D "For if you see one abandoned to his appetites crawling on the ground, it is a plant and not a man you see; if you see one blinded by the vain illusion of imagery. delivered over to his senses, it is beast and not a man you see." Pico della Mirandola, De hominis dignitate Oratio, translated by Elizabeth Livermoore Forbes, in The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, ed. by Ernst Cassirer, Paul Oskar Kristeller and John Herman Randall, Jr., Chicago, 1948, p Pico's man, nominally free, enjoys a liberty qualified by a moral imperative. 4. Paul Oskar Kristeller, Renaissance Thought: the Classic, Scholastic, and Humanist Strains, Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1961, D Ibid. 6. Ibid., D Ibid., p Translation in W. H. Woodward, Vittorino da Feltre and Other Humanist Educators, Cambridge, 1897, DD Ibid., D Translation in The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, pp Ibid, p Ibid., p Kristeller, Renaissance Thought, D Quoted in H. O. Taylor, The Humanism of Italy, New York, 1962, p Quoted in N. Abbagnano, "Italian Renaissance Humanism," Cahiers D'histoire Mondiale, vol. no. 2, 1963, D , 16. Ibid., p. 272, for a discussion. 17. Ibid., p For example, see Boccaccio's letter to Jacopo Pizzinghe, c. 1370, Renaissance Reader, op. cit., p. 123 ; Leonardo Brunt's essay on Petrarca, ibid., p. 127 ; Lorenzo Valla's appraisal of his civilisation, c , ibid., D. 131, in which he speaks of a renaissance in all the arts. 19. Kristeller, in "The Scholastic Background of Marsilio Ficino," Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters, Rome, 1956, p. 38, has noticed the strongly medieval and scholastic character of Theologia Platonica of Ficino, particularly in the terminology and general method of arguing. 20. Theologia Platonica, Book III, Chapter II, translated by J. L. Burroughs, Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 5, 1944, pa Ibid., p Ibid., p Ibid. 24. Ibid., p Ficino here places the intellect, it seems, as an attribute of the soul, that is, it is an essential quality. In Five Questions Concerning the Mind (translated by J. L. Burroughs, The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, pp ), the intellect is made to inhibit the progression of the soul towards its natural perfection. The role of reason generally in Renaissance philosophy appears to be equivocal. 26. Theologia Platonica, p Ibid., n Theologica Platonica, quoted by S. R. Jayne in the introduction to a translation of Ficino's Commentary on Plato's Symposium, University of Missouri Studies, vol. xix, 1944, p Five Questions, p The same theory, but without its platonic embellishments, is stated

11 THE CONCEPT OF MAN IN FICINO AND PICO 55 succinctly by Thomas Aquinas. 30. Five Questions, D Ibid., p Ibid., p So argues Saint Augustine, who contends that the very existence of Biblical commandments predicates a freedom of will, an impossibility of coercion. See Etienne Gilsen, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, London, 1936, p Introduction by S. R. Jayne to Marsilio Ficino's Commentary on Plato's Symposium, p Ibid., p Op. cit., D Ibid, P Ibid. 39. Ibid., D E. Cassirer, "Pico della Mirandola: a Study in the History of Renaissance Ideas," Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 3, 1942, pi , J. Burckhardt, The Civilisation of the Renaissance in Italy, London, 1944, p Oratio, p Heptaplus, Book 5, from Avery Dulles, Princeps Concordiae, Harvard, 1941, p Quoted in ibid p. 127, from the Heptaplus. 45. Ibid., p Semprini, quoted in ibid., p Cassirer, op. cit., p Oratio, p Ibid. 50. Here is Pico on this theme: "Let man be emancipated from terrestrial things, let him incline towards those which are celestial for he is the bond and knot of celestial and terrestrial. Neither of these can have peace with the other unless man is at peace with himself, for he ratifies their peace and treaty in himself." Heptaplus, Book 5, quoted by Dulles, op. cit., p Pico received the first two years of his training in philosophy at Padua. Padua at this time had become the most important centre of a vital scholastic thought. The university at Padua was not merely Averroist, as is often claimed. This is shown by Dulles' examination of some of the doctrines of the teachers - Nicoletti Vernia and Elia del Medigo. Both of these men taught Pico - the latter travelled with Pico on his first trip to Florence. A professor of logic, he translated Hebrew texts to Pico, and was probably at least as great an influence on his thought as was Ficino. Concerning Pico's sympathy to the scholastic tradition (so different from the reaction we can observe in some of the earlier humanists), we may note that he was critical of the humanist preoccupation with only "classical" authors, and their sometimes obsessive interest in style. See his letter to Barbaro in "The Controversies of Pico della Mirandola and Ermolao Barbaro concerning the Relation of Philosophy and Rhetoric," Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 8, pp, For example: Pico stresses the absolute necessity that "we should be turned to things above, which is done through holy religion, through mysteries, through hymns, through vows, prayers and supplication, whence we seek strength for our infirmity. Nothing is as useful, as necessary as prayer. Through it we are enlightened by the light from above and made aware of our ignorance, until we say with the apostle, "Our sufficiency is in the Lord." Heptaplus, vol. 1, eh. 5, quoted by Dulles, op, cit., p In Heptaplus Pico is emphatic in condemning what he calls the sin of Lucifer - "the false pride" which leads man to believe that he can ascend into Heaven by his own power, He insists on the paradox of man's greatness in God, and man's misery without Him. Quoted by Dulles, op. cit., p Jayne in the introduction to Commentary on Plato's Symposium,, p Oratio, p Ibid., p Ibid. 58. Ibid. 59. See On His Own Ignorance. 60. Cassirer, op. cit., p Ficino was educated at the University of Florence in the Scholastic manner. See Kristeller, "The Scholastic Background of Marsilio Ficino," op. cit., p. 35f. 62. Ibid., p Ibid., P Ibid., p Ibid., p For example: much energy may have been expended needlessly on attempts to demonstrate the direct influence of the Cabbala on Pico's thought. Garin claims that the Cabbalistic content of Pico's work is not, in fact, large (Dulles, op. cit., p. 19). Probably Cassirer is correct in assuming that the Cabbala suggested to Pico the concept of knowledge which Cassirer has characterised as "symbolic knowledge" and "symbolic thought" - that fundamental truths present themselves in symbolic or cryptic form, akin to the working of the image in poetry or painting. 67. Ficino's Christianity is further attested to by the sermons he produced, the "vaguely edifying" (Kristeller) nature of some of his early writings, Kristeller has pointed to the similarity between the Florentine Platonic Academy, with its ideal of love and charity linking the members, and the lay religious organisations of an earlier period. Ficino regarded himself as a teacher. Kristeller, "The Lay Religious Tradition and Florentine Platonism," Renaissance Thought and Letters, p See the letter of Salutati in Charles E. Trinkaus, Adversity's Noblemen, New York, 1940, p J. L. Burroughs, in the introduction to Ficino's Five Questions Concerning the Mind, p Ficino's attitude is different from that of Saint Augustine who thought that some parts of Plato's philosophy may be true and useful to Christians, but regarded Plato purely as an ordinary, if gifted, man. 70. Ficino did tend to play down the doctrine of original sin. (See S. R. Jayne, introduction to Marsilio Ficino's Commentary on Plato's Symposium, p. 25). Perhaps significantly, I could find no mention of the doctrine in the works of either Ficino or Pico; presumably it is incompatible with the strong emphasis on man's privileged position in the scheme of things. Unlike Pico (emphatically in Heptaplus), Ficino, in his theory of "natural appetite," his stress on the power of reason, and, above all, love, seems to imply that man can attain to God in a state of innocence. Pico stresses the need for humility.

12 56 THE CONCEPT OF MAN IN FICINO AND PICO 71. Kristeller, introduction to Pico's Oratio, p Oratio, D Pearl Kibre, The Library of Pico della Mirandola, Columbia, Pico della Mirandola; Of Being and Unity, translated from the Latin with an introduction by V. H. Hamm, Milwaukee, Wis., 1943, p. 26. "That particularity which reduces each to one kind will assuredly be God. God is then, Being itself, the One Himself, The Good, and the true," ibid., p. 23. Pico, like Ficino, consistently identifies the platonic Idea of the Good, the goal of human existence, with the Judaic-Christian God. 75. Cassirer, op. cit., p, Ibid. '77. Although Pico planned a trip to see Nicholas of Cusa in Germany, it appears from Pearl Kibre's researches that Pico did not own his works. Pico's concept of "symbolic thought" is a similar idea to Nicholas' notion of the nature of mathematics as being not different in kind to the knowledge known to God. The Kibre evidence, however, suggests that Pico might have arrived at his position by an independent route. For an interesting and relevant discussion of the role of the pictorial image in the time of the Renaissance, see E. H. Gombrich; "Icons Symbolicae," Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, vol. 8, 1948, pip Pico, in De ente et uno, establishes God's identity with Being, His transcendence and immanence, but asserts that although man may comprehend His nature, he can never really know Him (emphasis mine), for there is an "infinite distance which separates Divinity from the capacity of our minds, He is incomprehensibly and infallibly above all that we can speak or think of as most perfect," op. cit., p. 23. Ficino holds a similar viewpoint. See his Commentary on Plato's Symposium, p. 22. This passage above also clearly illustrates the necessity for Pico to regard "human" knowledge as being in some way symbolic of a higher knowledge. 79. De ente et uno, p. 26 ; Commentary on Plato's Symposium, p Commentary on Plato's Symposium, p Ibid. 82. The metaphor occurs in De ente et uno, p Ibid, p The introduction of the Christian God into the notion of platonic love between individuals, produced with Ficino a charming definition of the nature of human friendship. "Thus, there are not only two friends," he writes, "but necessarily always three, two of them men and one God." Quoted by Wind, Pagan Mysteries in the Renaissance, London, 1958, p Wind, op. cit., p The doctrine is basic. See Ficino. Commentary on Plato's Symposium, p. 153 ; Pico ; De ente et uno, p. 23, 32f. 87. "Therefore at that place [shall be found] eternal life and the brightest light of knowledge, rest without change, a positive condition free from privation, tranquil and serene possession of all good, and everywhere perfect Joy." Ficino, Five Questions Concerning the Mind, p Pico's position here is virtually that of the "negative theology" of Dionysius the Areopagite, who had expressed the idea in ecstatic language ; the dialectical skill of Nicholas of Cusa has refined the notion to a "learned ignorance." While Pico's viewpoint may have been derived eclectically, it is consistent with his general philosophical conservatism. Most of the medieval scholastics had held that the best life was the contemplative. Pico on this point is close to the whole Christian mystical tradition, Here is Eckhart for comparison: "Thou must love God as Not-God, Not-Spirit, Not-Person, Not- Image, but as He is, a sheer, pure, absolute One, sundered from all two-ness, and in whom we must eternally sink from nothingness to nothingness." (emphasis mine). Quoted by Aldous Huxley, The Perenn'al Philosophy, London, 1946, p De ente et uno, p Quoted by Wind, op. cit., p. 67. Pico had contended that Ficino's failure to concede this point was a sign of "utter confusion." Quoted Wind, op. cit., D Kristeller, "Augustine and the Early Renaissance," Renaissance Thought and Letters, p Ficino, Theologia Platonica, p Oratio, p Wind, op. cit., p Theologia Platonica, p Ibid. 97. Ibid., p. 234.