This interview was conducted with Virginius Dabney, on March 12, 1974i by Jack Bass and Walter DeVries, transcribed by Jean Pruner.

Transcription

1 Interview number A-0204 in the Southern Oral History Program Collection (#4007) at The Southern Historical Collection, The Louis Round Wilson Special Collections Library, UNC-Chapel Hill. This interview was conducted with Virginius Dabney, on March 12, 1974i by Jack Bass and Walter DeVries, transcribed by Jean Pruner. Bass: Well, in Key's book, he referred to Virginia, I think, as a museum piece. Dabney: Yeah. J.B.: And there have been a lot of changes in Virginia politics since that time. How do you see the major changes in what has transpired in Virginia since then and where do you see it now? I know in your book you refer to it as now the New Dominion. Dabney: Well, I think most of my ideas are in the book, as far as that goes. And in response to your question, I think there is a total trans formation in view of the fact the Byrd machine is completely obliterated. The poll tax has been abolished. The whole political climate has changed. There is a totally different group in control. The Republicans are much stronger. The mass of voters, the underprivileged and the blacks and the so-called poor whites are voting in larger numbers, too. So it's a sort of chaotic situation. You can't tell from one election to the next what's going to happen. Of course, Henry Howe11 came very close to being elected the last time and may be... may well be elected next time. I just don't know. There is a great deal of sentiment in favor of him and also a great deal of sentiment against him and I just don't know which one h adds up to the most votes and it's a pretty tight squeeze J.B.: What do you think has been the impact of Henry Howell? Dabney: I think it's of some push the general situation to the left and actually with as many voters as he has behind him demanding this and that, it's bound to have effect on those in office, even though

2 he didn't get in. J.B.: If you go back to the period of massive resistance and the mood of that time and then the aftermath of that, both in terms of the Godwin administration as part of that aftermath, the constitutional reform that grew out of that, the commitment to education that Virginia now has as a result of the new constitution, was there a feeling... do you detect that there was a feeling on the part of political leadership during that period that they had made a mistake? Dabney: With respect to massive resistance? J.B.: Yes, sir. Dabney: Certainly some of themthought so. Others thought it was a way to buy time, that. they couldn't acquiesce in this drastic change in every type of racial relationship in such a short period and they had... they felt that they had somehow to stall it off for a while. Someone like Lindsay Lemmon, for example, knew all the time that it wasn't going to stand out the legislation and he made some bad mistakes in getting to the final working out of the thing, but he came down the right side in the end. And Mills Godwin, of course, went a complete reversal of his position and is the first to admit that. He frankly says he couldn't have stayed in office and satisfied Virginia during that period unless he had been massively resisted. And that's true. He couldn't have. Whether you think that's admirable or not, it was a realistic political fact that he couldn't have done anything else and I doubt if he wanted to. When the thing first started, I think he at that time had been going along so many years with the Byrd machine and with the general idea of... of operating under the system that had been in operation that he just did not favor changing until he saw the things that were happening and the necessity for doing it and

3 {He{ t page 3 where Virginia was in A of states, how backward Virginia was in education and welfare and health and all those things. He just finally waked up to the fact and I admire him for it. Admitted that he was wrong and pulled the whole thing around, turned the whole state around, got the constitution amended and really got Virginia out of the rut we were in. J.3.: How do evaluate Godwin as a governor? Dabney: Extremely high. Because of what he did. I think to have done the things he did, to have gotten the community colleges going, to have amended the constitution, to permit general obligation bonds. We had this preposterous block on the situation which Senior Harry Byrd was entirely responsible for that you couldn't issue bonds at all. I'm sure you know that. And to get that thing alone broken was a big accomplishment and is a secret of a lot of the progress that has been made. J.B.: There are some who contend that Governor Godwin soitght of rode in on a crest of a wave ready to break to make progress in Virginia and he just... and he rode it in, rode it very well in his programs, but does that deal shortly with him? Does that fail to give him proper credit? Babney: I think so. I think that's probably the Richmond Mercury's point of view. Have you talked to them? J.B.: No. Dabney: The weekly paper that is very anti-godwin and very liberal and I've talked to them about it. I told them I thought they were unfair to him. And they have modified their position to some extent. But I think they think he's sort of a political accident and don't give him much credit for anything which I don't think is right. It took a lot of guts for him to buck the Byrd machine, which when he started out was very much

4 in being. It disintegrated right after that but it didn't do it when he went into office. J.B.: Well, was it... how much of it was a man, in this case Godwin, being the man with a good sense of political feel in where political movement is heading and seeing change and moving with it? Dabney: I think that's true. I think he... in part it was his leadership and part his sensing of what was necessary and what was coming and he got in line with it, one part or the other. Just... I'd say an analogy would be when Harry Byrd, Sr., went in as governor. And I'm sure you know he was regarded as a very progressive as regards his governorship. When, as a governor, he changed the constitution, too. And simplified and saved a lot of money and streamlined the whole thing. Got the first anti-lynching lav/ passed in the United States of any consequence. Took on... had a terrific row with two big corporations. Harry Byrd of having taken on Standard Oil and the whole oil people and telephone both and licked them both. Terrif: fight. And so he saw that anti-machine people were getting it up and were going to take over if he didn't get, you know, on the ball and reform the governorship and the constitution and put in reforms and show some progressive tendencies. Well, you can say how do you treat anybody's whether motives. I don't know / his motives were altogether right or not but anyhow he did the right thing and did many useful things while he was governor. And he and Godwin I'd say were the two best governors of modern timesf in Virginia. J.B.: How do you characterize the second Godwin administration based on the limited time, he has been back in office? What type of an administration does it appear that it is going to be?

5 page 5 Dabney: I'd say that it's probably going to be anticlimactic because there isn't so much for him to do, which I believe he realizes. I haven't had a chance to talk to him since he got in, or much before he got in so I don't know. But my impression is that he was so violently opposed to Henry Howell that he ran largely to keep Henry Howe11 out, and at some sacrifice. I don't think he was itching to be governor again, except insofar as he could hold Virginia in line with the things he had put in before as governor and in order to keep; Howell from doing a lot of things that he thought would be very damaging. For example, he thought that Howell's policies would... would slow down Virginia's industrial progress enormously. Thinks Howell was... would be anti... regarded as anti-business and anti-industry all over the United States and, you sbv,, Howell has attacked the insurance companies, attacked the utilities very.. very roughly. And he keeps on attacking them. Keep the big boys honest is his slogan. So he has an image of being anti certainly big business and, in general, business. He say! I don't know how many people feel that he is or isn't but certainly a lot of the big industrialists who would be bringing in... moving into Virginia would think Howell was anti big business. J.B.: Do you think that the view of Godwin is shared widely in the financial and business community in Richmond and in Virginia? Dabney: The view of Godwin as a friend of business? J.B.: No, the view of Godwin of what would be the result of a Howell administration. Dabney: Yes, I think so. Yeah. Certainly all of them are lined up behind Godwin as a result. I don't know if he had... He had one

6 page 6 big businessman here in Richmond and the labor unions. They put up most of the money. Sidney Lewis, you know about him I guess. J.B.: Right. Have you talked to any of the industrial developers as to how they perceive that, whether they have the same perception that they would have this sort of difficulty? Dabney: Mo, I haven't. I haven't talked to them. All I know is in the campaign, it was almost a 100$ business behind Godwin. J.B.: Right. Who would be the most knowledgeable man in Virginia on industrial development? Dabney: By industrial development now you mean in developing industrial sites for industry? J.B.: Well, just in the whole realm of attracting industry to Virginia. Dabney: I should think the man at the state agency that looks after that. Name is Holmes, 3d Holmes. J.B.: Ed Holmes? Dabney: Um-hm. I think it's H-o-l-m-e, I believe. The State Bureau of Industrial Development, something like that. I can get you he exact name in the phone book, get the phone number, too. J.B.: Do you see the possibility of conditions ever in Virginia again being such that one man could achieve the level of political dominance that Harry Byrd, Sr. did? Dabney: No, I don't. Not with the poll tax gone. That was the basis of it. That and the rural courthouses. The combination was just kept everything under control in a big way. But the urbanization has taken the courthouses away from their dominance with so many more people in the cities and suburbs. So the whole thing has just moved out from under Byrd or anybody like him.

7 page 7 J.B.: In Virginia, say a year ago, when the Howell and Godwin race began to be shaping up, was it perceived at that time to be as close as it w ultimately was? Dabney: Yes, I thought Howell might win. I thought it was very close. At one time I think the polls showed him ahead. J.B.: I recall reading, oh, about a year ago, the Republicans in Virginia at least were making noises about winning, being in the governor^ office and perhaps even controlling the legislature. Dabney: Well, they're a long way from controlling the legislature, as you J.B.: Right. Do you see Watergate as having any significant effect on the growth of the Republican party in Virginia? Dabney: I think it would have some. I don't know how much. 2very time I see j... I was just reading yesterday that sort oi a cross in every part of the country what was uppermost in their minds and Watergate was most anywhere, but... and energy and gas and inflation were the things they were worried about most. But Watergate certainly is a factor and I should think certainly it couldn't do anything but harm. J.B.: The question I wanted to ask you pertains to Virginia only indirectly but it's... has some significance, a direct significance here and it's strictly an opinion, but you're in a position to exercise judgment and have an informed opinion, and that is, considering the mood at the time immediately following the Supreme Court decision in Brown vs. Board of Education in 1954 where the immediate response was perhaps more moderate than it later became, and the question was really brought up to

8 page 8 6/Kt i me in South Carolina >.. was that if James F. Burns, who at that time was governor of South Carolina, after a rather distinguished career nationally as well as having served on the Supreme Court, with his prestige, both regionally and nationally, if he taken a lead in attempting to develop political thought at that time and this was a decision that, much as we m;ay not like it, is going to remain the law of the land and what we must do is try and develop a strategy to implement it with the least amount of dis ruption. What do you think would have been the response in Virginia? Dabney: I don't know whether anything could have moved Harry Byrd. He was just adamant on that. He was awfully unreasonable about it. I mean, he just wouldn't listen to anybody and after a commission was appointed by his own legislature and governor rendered a recommendation for token integration, he just blew the roof off and wouldn't have it and forced the chairman to reverse his position and most of the commission Lr* 3* \ l^i-k A«*t). He just was... just had a completely closed mind on that 3 and I don't believe 8w?fts or anybody else could have changed it. I think be could have influenced. J.B.: If he had influenced other people, would it have made any difference here? Byrd? Dabney: Not until Byrd just found he got overridden, as he finally did. He never would agree to anything. He was sorry that ' A didn't to jail and all that business. J.B.: He was that emphatic. Did he really... did he really believe that ultimately he could turn... reverse the thoughts of the state? Dabney: Well, he felt that we ought to make a last ditch stand in every direction and not give an inch unless we were completely overwhelmed,

9 page 9 apparently. That's the way he behaved and talked. And he never was reconciled to what happened at all. J.B.: But in what he said, was there any indication he felt he could ultimately win or was it just that he felt he should go down fighting? Dabney: Well, he put it this way, as I recall it. Virginia is the keystone to this whole fight and as long as we hold out we can win. But if we lose, if we give in, the whole thing is going to collapse. That was his general point of view. J.B.: It was sort of that way from beginning to end? Dabney: Yeah. I went up to see him with the publisher of the Times and News Leader and Jack Kilpatrick and several others when it got to the point where we knew there had to be a change of direction on this whole business. It was impossible to keep on with this massive resistance, which I never was for anyhow. But the publisher of the paper was and he was pretty nearly as adamant as Byrd but he saw that there wasn't any possibility of going any further with it. So we went up there to see Byrd J.B.: This was after the schools were closed in Norfolk and other cities? Dabney: Yeah. Yeah, and that this couldn't go on and that the papers were going to change their positions. He wouldn't agree that that was a a good idea at all. He was just very J.B.: The... on that particular issue, was editorial policy one set by the publisher. Dabney: Yeah. He felt extremely stronly about it, almost as much as Burns, I think. J.B.: Nhat convinced him to change? Dabney: Just the impracticality of going on any longer. The courts had ruled this was unconstitutional and there wasn't any way to beat it.

10 page 10 e Edward County situation, you knov jaw that there was nothing to ao out, acqui I don't believe ever did _ome commentators who suggested at least some of the leader in the Byrd organization saw this as a means of preserving the organization Dabney: That's right. Some of them said that and there never was a worse miscalculation. I think that had a good deal to do v/ith the disintegration J.B.: Did Byrd see it that way? Dabney: Apparently not. I don't know why. I don't know what he thought.. whether he thought that was a way to keep the machine in control or what. He was certainly set against doing anything to loosen up. I don't know what his motives were except that he was violently opposed to doing it. I never heard him say anything like that. This is a way to keep us in control twenty-five years. That's what somebody saidf one of the organization people. J.B.: Compared with Byrd, what has been the influence of Colgate Darden ive year era Dabney: Well, not nearly as great because, well, I would be more agreeable i 1 }&i^- Darden's views. They weren't the views that prevailed. Byrd had to modify his position on a good many things as time went on but not too much at that. Colgate was... well, he had ups and downs. He was very anti "ew Deal, for example. He was about as anti New Deal as anybody could be when he was in Congress, which was right at the beginning of his career. Then he became more liberal and he was opposed to all this massive resistance thing, but he didn't have the overall influence of Byrd, by any J.B.: One version I've heard is that the thing that really finally topped

11 page 11 over the massive resistance was the reaction of the business community in Norfolk. Dabney; Not in Norfolk. It was all over here in Richmond, more than Norfolk. Business community here, they had a meeting with Lindsay fl/mon who really was tending that way anyhow. They never did have any influence with Byrd apparently but everybody else saw that the jig was up and went along and made the best of it, including Lindsay. There was a meeting here in Richmond and business leaders from all over the state. J.B.: Did you attend it? Dabney: No. J.B.: Do you know what the gist of the message was? What Dabney: I think it was that it was hurting business, hurting Virginia, hurting our standing in the country, causing a lot of adverse criticism which could be avoided if we quit this massive resistance and get in line with the rest of the country. J.B.: After it was all over, was there any sort of a feeling of embarrass ment on the part of the political leadership that this course had been taken? Dabney: I don't know. I... J.B.: Or any sense of guilt, in a sense? Dabney: I think some of them felt that way. They felt they had to go along because of Byrd and didn't want to do it. Others felt they had bought time and that was the best thing to do, provided they quit... dropped the thing at the moment they did. Of course, the j was what dominated the state for generations after the Civil War. And Byrd always listened to them. They were the core, the hard core of the machine. And as long as they could swing all the weight that they did with the tight

12 page 12 organization that Byrd had and the limited electorate and all that and they had big committee chairmanships in the legislature and so forth. As long as they could swing all that weight they had terrific influence with Byrd and, of course, the SourUf' «C was the most anti-integrationist section so onc they were knocked loose from their dominant position that made a big difference. J.B.: Do you think that the impact of blacks participating in the political process has been as much of a force for change as urbanization? Dabney: The impact of what? J.B.: The impact of blacks participating in the political process. Dabney: I think both of them have been very influential. The urbanization has been a gradual thing and even it's not clearly dominant... that part of the state is not clearly dominant in the legislature. It's a pretty even thing I think as between urban and rural still. But the trend is all toward the urban. The blacks, of course, are becoming more and more influential all the time, voting in large numbers. They're probably going to take over Richmond in the next few years, gain the mayoralty. And it's a very serious situation here because the annexation has been blocked by the courts. You probably know about that. And if we lose that, I think that would be pretty tragic if we do because I can't see how this argument about diluting the black vote can be carried to ridiculous extremes. To me you can't just never think of any vote but the black vote. The city has got to exist and to grow and if all white people are going to move out, which they are doing. Not all of them but steadily moving to the county, several counties, and the city is not growing at all and the black population is increasing all the time. It seems to me that's a pretty important and more important than diluting the black vote, the vote as they put it. The black vote is practically Wonder how much do they expect to have.

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