LITTLE STALIN /A ~ ~ [h/a~ ~ A\ ~!A 00 iiyf J. STALIN SIXPENCE NET

Transcription

1 LITTLE STALIN LIBRARY /A ~ ~ [h/a~ ~ A\ [ro@ ~!A 00 iiyf J. STALIN SIXPENCE NET

2

3 & CLASS AND PARTY

4 Books by the same author: LENINISM THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL AND COLONIAL QUESTION THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION (WITH V.I. LENIN} Editor: HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR IN THE U.S.S.R.

5 NOTES OF A DELEGATE & CLASS AND PARTY BY J. STALIN LONDON LAWRENCE & WISHART LTD.

6 First Published I 94I ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Printed in England at The Curwen Press, Plaistow, E. I 3 (T. U. all departments)

7 CONTENTS page PuBLISHER's NoTE. 7 ( i ) The London Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Party. 10 Composition of the Congress I I ( ii) Agenda. Report of the Central Committee. Report of the Duma Group I4 (iii) The Non-Proletarian Parties. 20 ( iv) A Labour Congress 27 CLASS AND PARTY The Proletarian Class and the Proletarian Party 35

8 LITTLE STALIN LIBRARY I Foundations of Leninism. I/- 2 Notes of a Delegate, and Class and Party. 6d. (Other titles in preparation) LITTLE LENI~ LIBRARY I The Teachings of Karl Marx. 9d. 2 The Vvar and the Second International. 6d. 3 Socialism and War. 6d. 4 What is to be Done? 2/- 5 The Paris Commune. I/- 6 The Revolution of I905. I/- 7 Religion. I/- 8 Letters from Mar. 9d. 9 The Task of the Proletariat. 9d. Io The April Conference. I/- I I The Threatening Catastrophe and How to Avert It. I/ I 2 Will the Bolsheviks Maintain Power? 9d. I 3 On the Eve of October. 9d. 14 State and Revolution. I/- I5 Imperialism. I/6 16 'Left Wing' Communism. I/- I7 Two Tactics of Social Democracy. I/6 18 The Proletarian Revolution and Kautsky the Renegade. I/6 I 9 The Deception of the People. 6d. 20 \Var and the \Yorkers. 6d. 2 I Lenin and Stalin on Youth. 9d. 22 Opportunism and Social Chauvinism. 6d.

9 PUBLISHER'S NOTE T HE first of the two articles here printed for the first time in English, Notes of a Delegate, was written shortly after the Fifth (London) Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, held in May, 1907, and was first published in June and July of that year in the first two numbers of the Bolshevik newspaper Bakinsky Proletary (Baku Proletarian). The article was signed Koba Ivanovich and ended with the note:' To be continued.' But, owing to the arrest and exile of the author by the tsarist authorities, it was never finished. The London Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., of \vhich this article is a revie,v, met at a moment \vhen tsardom, having recovered from the blows of the First Russian Revolution, had passed from the defensive to the offensive against the working class and the revolutionary forces of the country generally. The new situation made it incumbent on the R.S.D.L.P. to sum up the results of the Bolsheviks' theoretical, organizational and tactical struggle against Menshevism-and against Trotskyism, which was nothing but a variety of Menshevism-and to define the future course of development of the working-class movement in Russia. This was done at the Fifth (London) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. After the split that had taken place at the Second Congress of the Party in 1903, the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks only formally continued to constitute one party; actually they resembled two different parties, which \vere in acute conflict with each other on every fundamental issue of the revolution. ' The Bolsheviks took as their course the extension of the revolution, the overthrow of tsardom by armed uprising, the hegemony of the working class, the isolation of the Constitutional Democratic bourgeoisie, an alliance with the peasantry, the formation of a provisional revolutionary government consisting of representatives of the workers and peasants, the victorious completion of the revolution. The Mensheviks, on the contrary, took as their course the liquidation of the revolution. Instead of overthrowing tsardom by uprising, they proposed to reform and [ 7 ]

10 PUBLISHER,S NOTE "improve" it; instead of the hegemony of the proletariat, they proposed the hegemony of the liberal bourgeoisie; instead of an alliance with the peasantry, they proposed an alliance with the Constitutional-Democratic bourgeoisie; instead of a provisional revolutionary government, they proposed a State Duma as the centre of the" revolutionary forces" of the country.' (History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [Bolsheviks], p. 95.) The whole course of the First Russian Revolution had completely confirmed the correctness of the Bolshevik line and the erroneousness of the Menshevik line. Nevertheless, at the London Congress, these two lines-the revolutionary Marxist line of the Bolsheviks and the bourgeoisliberal line of the Mensheviks-again came into collision on every issue. During this struggle at the congress, Trotsky endeavoured to patch together a Centrist, i.e. semi-menshevik, group of his own, but he secured no following and, as Stalin says, remained a 'superfluous ornament'. On every important item of the agenda, and in particular on the question of policy towards the non-proletarian parties, which, as Lenin said, was 'the real source of practically every, and certainly of every essential, difference and division on questions of the practical policy of the proletariat and the Russian revolution' (Collected Works, Vol. XI, Russ. ed., p. 271), the Bolshevik line was approved by a majority of the Congress. The Fifth (London) Congress marked a big victory for the Bolsheviks in the working-class movement. It was, in fact, a step towards the actual union of the Party under the banner of revolutionary Social-Democracy, i.e. Bolshevism. The victory gained in 1907 by the Bolsheviks over the Mensheviks-those vehicles of bourgeois influence among the working class-was an essential condition for the preservation of the unity of the working class and for paving the way to its complete victory over its enemies in The second article, The Proletarian Class and the Proletarian Party, was written earlier and published in 1905 in the Georgian [ 8 ]

11 PUBLISHER'S NOTE newspaper Proletariatis Brdzola (Proletarian Struggle). It is included in this volume because it has a direct bearing on the nature of the split, referred to above, that took place at the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. in 1903, and shows how clearly Stalin had understood the significance, for the whole future of the Party, of the organizational issue involved. The reader who wishes to follow up this fundamentally important question of the split between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, which found its first expression at the Second Congress, is referred to The History of the C.P.S. U.[ B.], pp , and to Lenin's work One Step Forward, Two Steps Back, now ( 1941) published in English for the first time in full. [ 9 ]

12 I THE LONDON CONGRESS OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY The London Congress has ended. Contrary to the expectations of liberal hacks like Bergezhky and Kuskova, the Congress did not,lead to a split, but to the closer am~lgamation of the Party, the closer union of the foremost workers of.all Russia into one indivisible party. It was an all-russian Unity Congress in the true sense of the \vord; for this was the first time that our Polish, Bundist and Lettish comrades were represented so very widely and fully; it was the first time they took an active part in the work of a Party Congress, and, consequently, it was the first time they bound up the destiny of their organizations so very intimately with the destiny of the whole Party. In this respect the London Congress helped considerably to further the unification and consolidation of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. That is the first important result of the London Congress. But it does not exhaust the significance of the London Congress. The fact is that, contrary to the wishes of the above-mentioned liberal hacks, the Congress ended in a victory for ' Bolshevism', a victory of revolutionary Social-Democracy over 'Menshevism', the opportunist wing of our Party. Everybody is aware, of course, of our differences over the role of the various classes and parties in our revolution and what should be our attitude towards them. Everybody is also aware that, in a number of its actions and utterances, the official Party centre, a Menshevik one in its very composition, was at variance with our Party as a whole. Recall, for example, the slogan issued by the Central Committee demanding a responsible Cadet Ministry at the time of the First Duma, a slogan which was rejected by the Party; recall the slogan issued by this same Central Committee after th~ dispersal of the First Duma demanding the 'resumption of the Duma session', which was also rejected by the Party; recall the wellknown appeal of the Central Committee for a general strike tn [ 10 ]

13 connection with the dispersal of the First Duma, which was likewise rejected by the Party... It was necessary to put an end to this abnormal state of affairs. And in order to do so it was necessary to take stock of the virtual victories won by the Party over the opportunist Central Committee, victories with which the history of the internal development of our Party throughout the course of the past year is replete. And the London Congress did, in fact, take stock of these victories of the revolutionary Social-Democrats, and, consolidating their victory, adopted the tactics of the revolutionary Social-Democrats. From henceforward, therefore, the Party will pursue a strictly class policy of the socialist proletariat. The red banner of the proletariat will no longer be lowered before the liberal spellbinders. Intellectualist vacillation, so unbecoming to the proletariat, has received a mortal blow. That is the second, and no less important, result of the London Congress of our Party. The actual unification of the advanced workers of all Russia into a single All-Russian Party under the banner of revolutionary Social-Democracy-that is the significance of the London Congress, that is its general character. Let us now proceed to a more detailed account of the Congress. COMPOSITION OF THE CONGRESS The Congress was attended by some 330 delegates, of whom 302, representing over I so,ooo Party members, had full voting rights, while the remainder attended in a deliberative capacity. The division of the delegates (counting only those with voting rights) according to factions \Vas roughly as follows: 92 Bolsheviks, 85 Mensheviks, 54 Bundists, 45 Poles and 26 Letts. If we take the social status of the delegates (worker or nonworker), the Congress presented the following picture: I I 6 manual workers; 24 office workers and shop assistants; the remainder nonworkers. The proportion of manual workers in each faction was as follows: Bolshevik faction, 38 (36 per cent); Menshevik faction, 30 (3I per cent); Poles, 27 (6I per cent); Letts, I2 (40 per cent); [ I I )

14 Bundists, 9 (15 per cent). As to professional revolutionaries, they were divided according to faction as follows: Bolshevik faction, 18 (r7 per cent); Menshevik faction, 22 (22 per cent); Poles, 5 (11 per cent); Letts, 2 (6 per cent); Bundists, 9 (15 per cent). We were all 'astonished' at these statistics. How was that? The Mensheviks had raised such a howl about the intellectualist composition of our Party, had never tired of abusing the Bolsheviks as intellectuals, had threatened to drive all the intellectuals out of the Party, had always treated the professional revolutionaries with scorn-and now it turned out that there were far fewer workers in their faction than among the ' intellectual' Bolsheviks! It appeared that they had far more professional revolutionaries than the Bolsheviks! But we explained the howls of the Mensheviks on the principle that 'a man cries out about what hurts him most'... Even more interesting are the figures of the composition of the Congress from the standpoint of the 'territorial distribution' of the delegates. It appeared that the large groups of Menshevik delegates came chiefly from peasant and artisan districts: Guria (9 delegates), Tiflis (ro delegates), the 'Spilka', the Little Russian peasant organization (12 delegates, I think), the Bund (the overwhelming majority of whose delegates were Mensheviks), and, as an exception, the Donetz Basin ( 7 delegates). On the other hand the large groups of Bolshevik delegates came exclusively from the big industrial districts: St. Petersburg (12 delegates), Moscow (13 or 14 delegates), the Urals ( 2 I delegates), I vanovo-voznesensk (I I delegates) and Poland (45 delegates). Obviously, the tactics of the Bolsheviks are the tactics of the proletarians in big industry, the tactics of those areas where the class contradictions are especially clear and the class struggle especially acute. Bolshevism is the tactics of the real proletarians. On the other hand, it is no less obvious that the tactics of the Mensheviks are primarily the tactics of the handicraft workers and peasant semi-proletarians, the tactics of those areas where the class contradictions are not quite clear and the class struggle is masked. Menshevism is the tactics of the semi-bourgeois elements among the proletariat. So say the figures. [ I2 ]

15 And the reason is not far to seek: you cannot seriously talk to the workers of Lodz, Moscow or I vanovo-voznesensk of blocs with the very liberal bourgeoisie whose members are waging such a fierce struggle against them, every now and again ' punishing' them by retail dismissals and wholesale lockouts-there Menshevism will never meet with sympathy; what is wanted there is Bolshevism, the tactics of irreconcilable proletarian class struggle. And, on the contrary, it is extremely difficult to instil the idea of the class struggle into the minds of the peasants of Guria or the artisans of Shklovsk, say, who do not experience the acute and systematic blows of the class struggle, and who, therefore, willingly consent to any agreement against the 'common enemy '-there Bolshevism is not \Van ted for the time being; what is wanted there is Menshevism, for the whole atmosphere is imbued with agreements and compromises. No less interesting was the composition of the Congress from the standpoint of nationality. The statistics show that the majority of the Menshevik faction consisted of Jews (not counting the Bundists, of course), followed by Georgians, and then Russians. On the other hand the overwhelming majbrity of the Bolshevik faction consisted of Russians, followed by Jews (not counting the Poles and Letts, of course), then Georgians, etc. One of the Bolsheviks (Comrade Alexinsky, I think it was) jokingly remarked in this connection that the Mensheviks are a Jewish faction, and the Bolsheviks a true Russian faction, and it, therefore, would not be amiss if we, the Bolsheviks, organized a pogrom in the Party. And this composition of the factions is not difficult to explain: the chief centres of Bolshevism are the big industrial districts, the purely Russian districts, with the exception of Poland, whereas the Menshevik districts, being districts where small production prevails, are at the same time the districts of the Jews, the Georgians, etc. As regards the trends to be observed at the Congress, it should be remarked that the formal division of the Congress into five factions (Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, Poles, etc.) retained a certain amount of validity, although inconsiderable, to be sure, only as long as questions of principle (the question of the non-proletarian [ IJ )

16 parties, of a labour congress, etc.) did not come up for discussion. As soon as questions of principle arose the formal grouping was virtually discarded, and when a vote was taken the Congress, as a rule, divided into two: into Bolsheviks and l\1ensheviks. The socalled Centre, or Marsh, was not in evidence at the Congress. Trotsky was a 'superfluous ornament'. All the Poles definitely sided with the Bolsheviks. The vast majority of the Letts supported the Bolsheviks just as definitely. The Bund, the overwhelming majority of whose delegates always supported the Mensheviks, formally pursued a policy which was ambiguous in the extreme, provoking smiles on one side and irritation on the other. Comrade Rosa Luxemburg described the policy of the Bund with masterly skill when she said that it was not the policy of a mature political organization that was out to influence the masses, but the policy of a huckster who was constantly on the look-out for a bargain, but who constantly refrained from purchasing in the hope that sugar, say, might be cheaper to-morrow. Of the Bundists, only eight or ten supported the Bolsheviks, and not always at that. On the whole the preponderance, and, moreover, a fairly large preponderance, was ori the side of the Bolsheviks. Thus the Congress was a Bolshevik Congress, although not altogether sharply defined. Of the resolutions moved by the l\1ensheviks, only the one on partisan actions was adopted, and that quite by chance: the Bolsheviks for this once did not accept battle, or, rather, were not inclined to fight it to a finish, simply from the desire to 'let the Mensheviks have the satisfaction once at least... ' II AGENDA. REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE REPORT OF THE DUMA GROUP From the standpoint of the political trends at the Congress, its labours may be divided into two parts. First part: discussion of formal questions, such as the Congress agenda, the reports of the Central Committee and the report of the [ 14 ]

17 Duma group; questions of a profound political significance, but involving, or made to involve, the 'honour' of some faction or other, the idea of 'not giving offence' to some faction or other, or 'not causing a split'-and called formal questions for that reason. This part of the Congress was the most stormy, and consumed the most time. The reason for this was that considerations of principle were forced into the background by ' ethical' considerations (' not to give offence'), and, consequently, a strictly defined grouping was not in evidence, it was difficult to guess at once ' who would get the upper hand', and the factions, with the hope of winning over the ' correct neutrals', launched into a furious struggle for predominance. Second part: debates on questions of principle, such as the question of non-proletarian parties, of a labour congress, etc. Here 'ethical' considerations did not arise, the groupings were quite definite, based on strictly defined trends of principle, the alignment of forces among the factions at once became clear, and, accordingly, this part of the Congress was the most tranquil and fruitful-dear proof of the fact that adherence to principles in debates is the best guarantee that the work of a Congress will be fruitful and tranquil. Let us now briefly describe the first part of the work of the Congress. After Comrade Plekhanov's opening speech, in which he spoke of the necessity of concluding agreements with the 'progressive elements' of bourgeois society 'from case to case', the Congress elected a Presidium of five persons (one from each faction) and a Credentials Commission, and then proceeded to adopt the agenda. It is significant that at this Congress, as at last year's Unity Congress, the Mensheviks vehemently opposed the motion of the Bolsheviks to include in the agenda an appraisal of the current political situation and a discussion of the class aims of the proletariat in our revolution. Is the revolution on the upgrade or on the downgrade, and, correspondingly, is it to be 'liquidated' or carried to a finish? What are the class aims of the proletariat in our revolution \vhich sharply distinguish it from the other classes of _ Russian society?-these are questions which our Menshevik friends fear. They flee from them as shadows before the sun; they do not

18 want to expose the roots of our disagreements to the light of day. Why? Because profound disagreement over these questions prevails within the Menshevik faction itself, and because Menshevism is not an integral trend but an agglomeration of trends, imperceptible during the factional struggle against Bolshevism, but at once rising to the surface when our tactics in the current political situation are discussed from the standpoint of principles. The Mensheviks are averse to disclosing this inherent weakness of their faction. The Bolsheviks were aware of that, and in order to have the discussion centred more on questions of principle they insisted on including the above-mentioned questions in the agenda. The Mensheviks, realizing that if questions of principle were raised it would mean their downfall, became obdurate and gave the 'correct comrades' to understand that they would 'take offence'-and the question of the current situation, etc., was not included in the agenda. In the end the following agenda was adopted: report of the Central Committee; report of the Duma Group; attitude towards non-proletarian parties; the Duma; a labour congress; the trade unions; partisan actions; crises; lockouts and unemployment; the Stuttgart International Congress; organizational questions. The chief speakers on the report of the Central Committee were Comrade Martov (on behalf of the Mensheviks) and Comrade R yadovoy (on behalf of the Bolsheviks). Martov' s report was, properly speaking, not a report in which events were seriously analysed, but a heart-to-heart talk explaining how the innocent Central Committee had set about leading the Party and then the Duma Group, and how the 'terrible' Bolsheviks kept pestering it with their principles and hampering its actions. The slogans of the Central Committee demanding a responsible Cadet Ministry, the 'resumption of the Duma session', etc., etc., slogans which the Party rejected, were justified by Martov on the grounds that the moment was so vague, and that no other slogans could have been advanced during a period of lull. The Central Committee's unfortunate appeal for a general strike, and then for scattered actions, ( 16 )

19 immediately after the dispersal of the First Duma, was justified by Martov again on the grounds of the vagueness of the situation and the impossibility of precisely gauging the mood of the masses. He said very little about the part played by the Central Committee in splitting the St. Petersburg organization. But, on the other hand, he said too much about the conference of military and combatant organizations which had been called on the initiative of a group of Bolsheviks, and which, in Martov's opinion, caused disruption and anarchy in the Party organizations. Martov concluded his report with an appeal to the Congress to bear in mind the difficult conditions in which the direction of the Party had to be effected in view of the complexity and intricacy of the situation, and not to judge the Central Committee too severely. Evidently, Martov himself realized that there were grave sins to the Central Committee's account. Comrade Ryadovoy's report was of an entirely different character. In his opinion, it was the duty of the Party Central Committee (1) to advocate and carry out the Party programme; (z) to give effect to the tactical instructions it had received from the Party Congress; (3) to preserve the integrity of the Party; (4) to co-ordinate the practical work of the Party. But the Central Committee did not fulfil any of these duties. Instead of advocating and carrying out the programme of the Party, the Central Committee, in connection with the agrarian statement of the First Duma, instructed the Social-Democratic group in the Duma, in order to preserve unity among the opposition and to win over the Cadets, not to move the inclusion in the Duma statement of the point contained in our agrarian programme demanding the confiscation of all the land (of the landlords), but merely to confine themselves to announcing their demand for the alienation of the land, without stating whether it was to be with compensation or without. Just think, the Central Committee of the Party proposed to discard this highly important clause of the Party programme on the confiscation of the land! The Central Committee was violating the Party programme! The Central Committee a violator of the programme-can you imagine anything more disgraceful? To proceed. Instead of carrying out even the instructions of the [ 17 ]

20 Unity Congress; instead of systematically intensifying the Party struggle v:ithin the Duma with the object of lending greater consciousness to the class struggle outside the Duma; instead of pursuing an independent and strictly class proletarian policy; the Central Committee issued slogans demanding a responsible Cadet Ministry, the 'resumption of the Duma session', 'a Duma as opposed to a camarilla', etc., etc., slogans calculated to tone down the Party struggle in the Duma, to gloss over the class antagonisms outside the Duma, to obliterate every distinction between the militant policy of the proletariat and the compromising policy of the liberal bourgeoisie, and to adapt the former to the latter. And when one of the members of the editorial board of the Central Organ, and hence of the Central Committee, Comrade Plekhanov, went even farther along the lines of compromise with the Cadets and proposed that the Party should enter into a bloc with the liberal bourgeoisie, discarding the demand for a Constituent Assembly and advancing the demand for a 'fully empowered Duma', a demand acceptable to the liberal bourgeoisie, the Central Committee, far from protesting against this action of Comrade Plekhanov's, which \vas a disgrace to the Party, even assented to it, without daring, however, to announce its assent officially. That is how the Central Committee of the Party violated the elementary demand for an independent proletarian class policy and the decisions of the Unity Congress! A Central Committee which obscures the class-consciousness of the proletariat; a Central Committee which subjugates the policy of the proletariat to the policy of the liberal bourgeoisie; a Central Committee which lowers the banner of the proletariat before the Cadet liberal charlatans-that is the pass the Menshevik opportunists have brought us to! \V e will not mention the fact that, far from preserving the unity and discipline of the Party, the Central Committee systematically violated them and took the initiative in causing a split in the St. Petersburg organization. Nor do we wish to dwell on the fact that the Central Committee did not co-ordinate the work of the Party-that is clear enough as it is. ( 18 )

21 How are we to explain all this-all these mistakes of the Central Committee? Not, of course, by the fact that 'terrible' people had entrenched themselves in the Central Committee, but by the fact that Menshevism, which then predominated on the Central Committee, is incapable of leading the Party and has suffered complete bankruptcy as a political trend. Regarded from this angle, the whole history of the Central Committee is the history of the failure of Menshevism. And when our Menshevik friends reproach us and say that we 'hampered' the Central Committee, kept on 'pestering' it, and so on and so forth, the only reply we can give to these moralizing comrades is: 'Yes, comrades, we did " hamper" the Central Committee in violating our programme, we did" hamper" it in adapting the tactics of the proletariat to the tastes of the liberal bourgeoisie; and what is more we shall continue to hamper it in future, for that is our sacred duty... ' That is roughly what Comrade Ryadovoy said. It became clear from the debate that the majority of the comrades, including even several Bundists, supported Comrade Ryadovoy's view. And if the resolution of the Bolsheviks pointing out the mistakes of the Central Committee was not carried after all, it was only because comrades were strongly influenced by the consideration of 'not causing a split'. Of course, the 1\Ienshevik resolution expressing confidence in the Central Committee was not carried either. What was carried was just a decision to pass to next business without giving any appraisal of the activities of the Central Committee.... The debate on the report of the Duma group was, generally speaking, nothing but a repetition of the debate on the previous question. That is quite understandable: the Duma group acted under the direct guidance of the Central Committee, and, naturally, any criticism or defence of the Central Committee \vas at the same time a criticism or defence of the Duma Group. Very interesting were the remarks of the second reporter, Comrade Alexinsky (the first reporter was Comrade Tsereteli), who said that the slogan of the Duma group-which consisted mainly of [ 19 ]

22 Mensheviks-calling for unity of the opposition in the Duma, disapproving of anything that might split the opposition and insisting on the necessity of joining forces with the Cadets-that Menshevik slogan, as Comrade Alexinsky put it-suffered a complete fiasco in the Duma; for on major questions, such as the budget, the army, etc., the Cadets were at one with Stolypin, _and the Menshevik Social-Democrats had to fight shoulder to shoulder with the peasant deputies against the government and the Cadets. The Mensheviks were, in fact, obliged to admit the collapse of their position and to carry out in the Duma the Bolshevik slogan, which pointed to the necessity of securing the support of the peasant deputies in a struggle against the Rights and the Cadets. No less interesting was the remark of the Polish comrades to the effect that it was impermissible on the part of the Duma group to attend joint meetings with the Narodowtsi, those Polish Black Hundreds, who had time and again engineered, and were still engineering, massacres of socialists in Poland. To this, two leaders of the Caucasian Mensheviks, one after the other, replied that the important thing for the Duma Group was not what a party did at home, but how it conducted itself in the Duma; and the Narodowtsi were conducting themselves in the Duma in a more or less liberal spirit. It followed that the character of parties was to be determined not by what they do outside the Duma, but by what they say inside the Duma. Opportunism could go no farther... The majority of the speakers agreed with Comrade Alexinsky's view; nevertheless, no resolution was adopted on this question either-again from considerations of 'not giving offence'. The Congress deferred the question of a resolution and passed to next business. ' III THE NON-PROLETARIAN PARTIES From formal questions we now pass to questions of principle, the questions over which we disagree. Our disagreements over tactics concern the probable course and issue of our revolution and the role of the various classes and parties J [ 20 ]

23 r of Russian society in that revolution. That our revolution is a bourgeois revolution, that it must end with the destruction of the feudal system, not the capitalist system, and that it can be consummated only by a democratic republic, are points on which, I think, everybody in our Party agrees. Further, that our revolution is, in the main, on the upgrade and not on the downgrade, and that our task is not to 'liquidate' it, but to carry it to a finish-on that, too, all are agreed, at least formally, for the Mensheviks as a faction have never yet proclaimed anything to the contrary. But how is our revolution to be carried to a finish? What is the role of the proletariat, of the peasantry, of the liberal bourgeoisie in that revolution? What combination of belligerent forces is required to carry the present revolution to a finish? Whom are we to ally ourselves with, whom are we to fight, etc., etc.? That is where our differences begin. The l\.1enshevik Opinion. Inasmuch as our revolution is a bourgeois revolution, only the bourgeoisie can be its leader. The bourgeoisie was the leader of the Great French Revolution, it was the leader of the revolutions in the other European states-hence it should be the leader of our Russian revolution. The proletariat is the principal fighting force in the revolution, but it should follow the bourgeoisie and push it forward. The peasantry is also a revolutionary force, but it has too many reactionary features, and the proletariat will therefore have far less occasion to act in conjunction with it than with the liberal democratic bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie is a more reliable ally of the proletariat than the peasantry. All the belligerent forces should rally around the liberal democratic bourgeoisie as their leader. Consequently, our attitude towards the bourgeois parties should not be determined by the revolutionary principle: together with the peasantry, against the government and the liberal bourgeoisie, with the proletariat at the head-but by the opportunist principle: together with the whole opposition, against the government, with the liberal bourgeoisie at the head. Hence the tactics of agreements with the liberals. Such is the opinion of the Mensheviks. The Bolshevik Opinion. Our revolution is a bourgeois revolution, it is true; but that does not mean that our liberal bourgeoisie will [ 21 ].

24 be its leader. The French bourgeoisie was the leader of the French Revolution in the eighteenth century. But why? Because the French proletariat was 'veak; it did not act independently; it did not put forward its own class demands; it was neither class-conscious nor organized; it followed in the tail of the bourgeoisie, and the bourgeoisie used it as a weapon for its own bourgeois aims. As you see, the bourgeoisie in those days did not need an ally in the shape of a monarchical power against the proletariat-the proletariat was itself its ally and servitor-and, consequently, it could be revolutionary, and even head the revolution. But the case is entirely different here in Russia. The Russian proletariat cannot be called weak by any means: for several years already it has been acting quite independently, putting forward its own class demands; it is sufficiently armed with class-consciousness to understand its own interests: it is united by its own party; it has the strongest party in Russia, a party with its own programme and tactical and organizational principles; led by that party, it has already gained a number of brilliant victories over the bourgeoisie.... Can the proletariat content itself with the role of a tailpiece of the liberal bourgeoisie, with the role of a miserable weapon of the liberal bourgeoisie? Can it and should it follow the liberal bourgeoisie and make it its leader? Can it be anything but the leader of the revolution? Just see what is going on in the camp of our liberal bourgeoisie; our bourgeoisie, scared by the revolutionary spirit of the proletariat, instead of leading the revolution, is flinging itself into the embrace of the counter-revolutionaries, entering into an alliance with them against the proletariat. And its party, the Cadet party, is openly, in the sight of the whole world, entering into agreements with Stolypin,.voting for the budget and the army in the interests of tsardom and against the interests of a people's revolution. Is it not clear that the Russian liberal bourgeoisie is an anti-revolutionary force, against which the most ruthless warfare must be waged? And was not Comrade Kautsky right when he said that wherever the proletariat acts independently the bourgeoisie ceases to be revolutionary?. And so we find that the Russian liberal bourgeoisie is antirevolutionary; it cannot be the motive force, and therefore still less [ 22 ]

25 the leader of the revolution; it is a sworn enemy of the revolution, and it must be stubbornly fought. The only leader of our revolution interested in and capable of leading the revolutionary forces of Russia in storming the tsarist autocracy is the proletariat. Only the proletariat will rally the revolutionary elements of the country, and only the proletariat will carry our revolution to a finish. The task of the Social-Democrats is to do everything in their power to train the proletariat for the role of leader of the revolution. That is the substance of the Bolshevik view. In ans wer to the question-who, then, can be a reliable ally of the proletariat in carrying our revolution to a finish?-the Bolsheviks say that the only more or less reliable and powerful ally of the proletariat is the revolutionary peasantry. It is not the treacherous liberal bourgeoisie, but the revolutionary peasantry that will march with the proletariat against all the buttresses of feudalism. Accordingly, our attitude towards the bourgeois parties should be determined by the principle: together with the revolutionary peasantry, against tsardom and the liberal bourgeoisie, with the proletariat at the head. Hence the necessity of resisting the hegemony (leadership) of the Cadet bourgeoisie, and hence the impermissibility of agreements with the Cadets. Such is the opinion of the Bolsheviks. It was around these two positions that the speeches of the reporters, Lenin and Martynov, and of all the other speakers revolved. Comrade Martynov expressed the view of the lviensheviks in all its 'profundity' when he categorically denied the feasibility of the hegemony of the proletariat, and just as categorically defended the idea of a bloc with the Cadets. The overwhelming majority of the other speakers expressed themselves in the spirit of the Bolshevik position. Particularly interesting were the speeches of Comrade Rosa Luxemburg, who conveyed to the Congress the greetings of the German Social-Democrats, and who explained the views of our German comrades regarding our differences. (We here combine the [ 23 ]

26 two speeches she made at different times.) Fully agreeing with the Bolsheviks on the question of the role of the proletariat as the leader of the revolution, of the role of the liberal bourgeoisie as an anti-revolutionary force, etc., etc., Rosa Luxemburg criticised the Menshevik leaders, Plekhanov and Axelrod, calling them opportunists and comparing their position with that of the J auresists in France. I know, she said, that the Bolsheviks have their faults, their idiosyncracies, that they are excessively obdurate. But I fully understand them and justify them: one cannot be anything but obdurate at the sight of the amorphous, jelly-like mass of l\1enshevik opportunism. We observed a similar excessive obduracy in the case of the Guesdists in France, whose leader, Comrade Guesde, in a wellkno\vn election poster, declared: 'Let no bourgeois vote for me, for in parliament I will defend only the interests of the proletarians against all the bourgeois!' But in spite of this, in spite of vehement outbreaks of this kind, \Ve German Social-Democrats have always supported the Guesdists in their struggle against the traitors to Marxism, the J auresists. The same must be said of the Bolsheviks, whom we German Social-Democrats will support in their struggle against the opportunist Mensheviks.... That, roughly, is what Comrade Rosa Luxemburg said. Even more interesting is the famous letter sent to the Congress by the Central Committee of the German Social-Democratic Party and read by Rosa Luxemburg. It is interesting because, by advising the Party to combat liberalism, and by acknowledging the special role of the Russian proletariat as the leader of the Russian revolution, it thereby acknowledged all the fundamental precepts of Bolshevism. This made it clear that the German Social-Democratic Party, the best-tested and most revolutionary in Europe, plainly and openly supports the Bolsheviks, as true lvlarxists, in their struggle against the traitors to Marxism, the Mensheviks. Interesting also were certain passages in the speech of Comrade Tyszko, representing the Polish delegation on the Presidium. Both factions, Comrade Tyszko said, assure us that they firmly stand by the Marxist view. And not everybody will find it easy to determine

27 which of them, after all, does stand by the Marxist view, the Bolsheviks or the Mensheviks.... He was interrupted by cries from several Mensheviks on the 'Left'. 'It is we who stand by the Marxist view! '-' No, comrades, ' Tyszko retorted, ' you do not stand by, but lie down on the Marxist view: for your helplessness in leading the class struggle of the proletariat, the fact that you are able to learn off by heart the great words of the great Marx, but unable to apply them in practice, all goes to show that you do not stand by, but lie down on the Marxist view.' That was a masterly hit. And, indeed, we have only to take the following fact. The Mensheviks often say that the task of the Social-Democrats always and everywhere is to convert the proletariat into an independent political force. Is that true? Absolutely! Those are the great words of Marx, and they should always be borne in mind by every Marxist. But how do our friends the Mensheviks put them into practice? Are they really helping to separate the proletariat from the surrounding mass of bourgeois elements into an independent class? Are they rallying the revolutionary elements around the proletariat, and are they training the proletariat for the role of leader of the revolution? The facts show that the Mensheviks are doing nothing of the kind. Quite the contrary: the Mensheviks are advising the proletariat to enter more often into agreements with the liberal bourgeoisie, and therefore are not helping to separate the proletariat into an independent class, but to blend it with the bourgeoisie; the Mensheviks are advising the proletariat to renounce the role of leader of the revolution, to surrender this role to the bourgeoisie, and to follow the bourgeoisie-and therefore are not helping to convert the proletariat into an independent political force, but into a tailpiece of the bourgeoisie... In other words, the Mensheviks are doing the very opposite of what they would do if they proceeded from the correct Marxist position. Yes, Comrade Tyszko was right when he said that the Mensheviks do not stand by, but lie down on the lviarxist view.... On the conclusion of the debate, two resolutions were moved: one by the Mensheviks and the other by the Bolsheviks. The [ 25 ]

28 Bolshevik motion was adopted by a huge majority as the basis for the resolution. Then followed the amendments to the motion. About eighty amendments were moved. They mostly related to two points in the motion: the one on the proletariat as the leader of the revolution, and the other on the Cadets as an anti-revolutionary force. That was the most interesting part of the debate, for here the complexion of the factions was brought out in sharpest relief. The first amendment of importance was moved by Comrade l\-1artov. He demanded that the words, 'the proletariat as the leader' of the revolution be replaced by the words, 'the proletariat as the vanguard'. The reason he adduced \vas that the word 'vanguard' expresses the idea more precisely. Comrade Alexinsky rose to oppose him. He said that it was not a question of precise definiton, but of two diametrically opposite views expressed on this point: for 'vanguard' and 'leader' were two entirely different things. Being a vanguard meant fighting in the front ranks, occupying the positions under the heaviest fire, shedding one's blood; but at the same time it meant being led by others, in this case bythe bourgeois democrats, for a vanguard never leads the general struggle, but is always led itself. On the other hand, being a leader meant not only fighting in the front ranks, but also leading the general struggle, directing it towards the accomplishment of one's own aims. Vie Bolsheviks do not want the proletariat to be led by the bourgeois democrats; we want the proletariat itself to lead the whole struggle of the people and to direct it towards a democratic republic. In the end, Martov's amendment was defeated. All the other amendments of a similar tenor were likewise defeated. The second group of amendments was directed against the point on the Cadets. The Mensheviks proposed that the Cadets be not regarded as having already adopted the path of counter-revolution. But the Congress did not accept this proposal, and all amendments to this effect were rejected. Further, the Mensheviks proposed to permit in certain cases at least technical agreements with the Cadets. The Congress did not adopt this proposal either and rejected all amendments couched along these lines. [ 26 ]

29 Finally, the resolution was put to the vote in its final form: the result was 159 votes for the Bolshevik resolution and 104 against, the rest abstaining. The Congress adopted the Bolshevik resolution by a huge majority. Henceforward, the view of the Bolsheviks is the view of the Party. Furthermore, this vote had two important consequences. Firstly, it put an end to the formal and artificial division of the Congress into five factions (Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, Poles, Letts, and Bundists ), and inaugurated a new division, a division according to principle, namely, into Bolsheviks (including the Poles and the majority of the Letts) and Mensheviks (including nearly all the Bundists). Secondly, this vote provided the most exact statistics as to the number of working class delegates in the various factions: it was found that there were 77, not 38, workers in the Bolshevik faction (38, plus 27 Poles, plus 12 Letts), and 39, not 30, workers in the. Menshevik faction (30, plus 9 Bundists). The Menshevik faction turned out to be a faction of intellectuals. IV A LABOUR CONGRESS Before proceeding to describe the debate on the proposal for a labour congress, we must first acquaint ourselves with the history of this question. 1 The fact is that this question is highly confused and unclarified. Whereas on other points of difference there are already two sharply defined trends in our Party-the Bolshevik and the Menshevik-on the question of a labour congress we have not two, but a regular heap of trends of a highly unclarified and contradictory character. The Bolsheviks, to be sure, are unanimously 1 This is all the more necessary since our Menshevik friends who have ensconced themselves in the editorial offices of various bourgeois newspapers are spreading all sorts of fables about the past and present history of this question (see the article 'A Labour Congress' by a prominent Menshevik, published in the Tovarishch and reprinted in the Bakinsky Dyen). [ 27 ]

30 and definitely against a labour congress altogether. But among the Mensheviks, on the other hand, utter chaos and confusion reigns: they are divided into numerous groups, each of which sings its own tune, paying nb heed to the others. \Vhile the St. Petersburg Mensheviks, headed by Axelrod, propose calling a labour congress with the purpose of forming a party, the Moscow Mensheviks, headed by El, propose calling it not in the interests of a party, but with the purpose of forming a non-partizan' All-Russian Workers' League'. The Southern l\1ensheviks, led by Larin, go even farther and call for a labour congress with the purpose of forming, not a party, and not a '\Yorkers' League', but an even uider 'Labour League', to embrace, besides all the proletarian elements, the Socialist-Revolutionary, semi-bourgeois, 'Trudovik' elements as well. I will not mention other less influential groups and individuals, like the Odessa and Trans-Caspian groups, and like 'Brodyaga' and' Shura,' the imbecile' authors' of an absurd brochure. Such is the confusion reigning in the ranks of the Mensheviks. But how is a labour congress to be brought about; how is it to be organized; what is it to be timed for; who is to be invited to it and who is to take the initiative of convening it? On all these questions there is just as much confusion among the Mensheviks as on the aims of the congress. \Vhile some of them propose to connect the elections to the labour congress with the elections to the Duma, and thus organize the labour congress by 'direct action', others propose to rely on the 'connivance' of the government, or, if the \Vorst comes to the worst, to request its 'sanction'; while others still recommend sending the delegates abroad, even if there are three or four thousand of them, and hold the labour congress illegally there. While some of the Mensheviks propose to allow representation at the congress only to properly constituted workers' organizations, others advise inviting representatives from the entire proletariat, organized and unorganized, although it is not less than ten million strong. \Vhile some of the Mensheviks propose that the labour congress be convened on the initiative of the Social-Democratic Party, in conjunction with intellectuals, others advise discarding both the [ 28 ]

31 Party and the intellectuals and having the congress called only on the initiative of the workers themselves, without the intellectuals having any part in it. \Vhile some of the Mensheviks insist on the labour congress being convened immediately, others recommend postponing it for an indefinite period, for the time being doing nothing more than agitating for a labour congress. But what is to be done with the existing Social-Democratic Labour Party, 'vhich already for several years has been leading the struggle of the proletariat, \vhich has a membership of I so,ooo, which has already held five congresses, and so on and so forth? Are we to 'send it to the devil', and, if not, what are we to do with it? The unanimous reply to this of all the Mensheviks, from Axelrod to Larin, is that we have no proletarian party. 'The whole point is that we have no party', we were told by the l\1ensheviks at the congress; ' all we have is an organization of petty-bourgeois intellectuals', which must be replaced by a party with the help of a labour congress. That is what Comrade Axelrod, the reporter for the Mensheviks, declared at the Party Congress. But one moment, please! Does that mean that all those congresses of our Party, from the first (1898) to the last (I907), in the organization of which our l\ienshevik friends took so active a part, that all that tremendous expenditure of proletarian money and energy which \vas required to arrange the congresses and for which the Mensheviks are as much to blame as the Bolsheviks-that all this was nothing but sheer deceit and pharisaism? Does it mean that all those militant appeals of the Party to the proletariat, appeals which were signed by the Mensheviks too, that all those strikes and revolts of r 90 5, I go6 and 1907, which were led by the Party and often initiated by the Party, that all those victories of the proletariat led by our Party, that those thousands of proletarian victims who fell in the streets of St. Petersburg, Moscow, and other cities, who were immured in Siberia, or who perished in prison on behalf of the Party and under the banner of the Party-that all this was just a farce and sheer deceit? And does it mean that we have no party-that we have only an 'organization of petty-bourgeois intellectuals'? [ 29 ]

32 That, of course, would be a downright untruth, an outrageous and barefaced untruth. That, it is to be presumed, explains the boundless indignation evoked by the above-mentioned statement of Axelrod's among the St. Petersburg and Moscow working-class delegates. Leaping to their feet, they vigorously replied to Axelrod, the reporter: 'You are a bourgeois, you who sit abroad, not we. \V e are workers, and we have our Social-Democratic Party, which we will not allow to be degraded. '... But let us assume that a labour congress does take place: let us imagine that it has already taken place. Accordingly, the existing Social-Democratic Party has been consigned to the archives, a labour congress has been convened in one way or another, and at it we want to organize a '\Vorkers' League', or, it might be, a ' Labour League'. Well, what next? What programme will the Congress adopt? What will be the complexion of the labour congress? Some l\1ensheviks reply that the labour congress might adopt the Social-Democratic programme, with certain curtailments, of course; but they right away add that it might not adopt the Social Democratic programme, which, in their opinion, would not be much of a misfortune for the proletariat. Others reply more decidedly that inasmuch as our proletariat is strongly imbued with petty-bourgeois ambitions, in all likelihood the labour congress would not adopt a Social-Democratic programme, but a pettybourgeois democratic programme. At the labour congress the proletariat would lose the Social-Democratic programme, but in return it would gain a labour organization that would bind all the workers together in one league. That, for exal!lple, is what G. Cherevanin, the head of the Moscow Mensheviks, says (see Tactical Problems). And so the probable result of the labour congress would be a 'workers' league without a Social-Democratic programme'. That, at any rate, is what the Mensheviks themselves think. Evidently, although the Mensheviks disagree with each other on certain points as to the aims of the labour congress and the methods of convening it, they are agreed that 'we have no party, [ 30 ]

33 but only an. organization of petty-bourgeois intellectuals which should be consigned to the archives'.... Tha~ was the sum and substance of Axelrod's report. It became clear from Axelrod's report that agitation on behalf of a labour congress would inevitably reduce itself in practice to agitation against the Party, to a war on the Party. And the practical work of convening a labour congress would just as inevitably reduce itself to practical action making for the disruption and disintegration of our present Party. Yet the Mensheviks-through their reporter, as well as in the resolution they moved-requested the Congress to forbid agitation against the attempts to arrange a labour congress, that is, against attempts that would lead to the disruption of the Party. And it is an interesting thing that through the speeches of the Mensheviks (with the exception of that of Plekhanov, who, strictly speaking, said nothing about a labour congress at all) there ran like a crimson thread the slogans: Down with the Party! Down with Social-Democracy! \Ve want no Party! Hurrah for a non-social-democratic' Labour League'. These slogans \vere not announced by the speakers in so many words, but they could be detected in their speeches. It is not for nothing that all the bourgeois writers, from the syndicalists and Socialist-Revolutionaries to the Cadets and the Octobrists, are all ardently in favour of a labour congress; for they are all enemies of our Party, and the practical work of convening a labour congress might help considerably to weaken and disrupt the Party. How can they be expected not to welcome the' idea of a labour congress '? The Bolshevik speakers said something quite different. The Bolshevik reporter, Comrade Lindov, having briefly described the principal trends among the Mensheviks themselves, went on to explain the conditions which _had given rise to the idea of a labour congress. The agitation for a labour congress began in 1905, prior to the October days, when repression was rife. It ceased during the October and November days. With the resumption of the repressions in the following months, the agitation on behalf of a labour congress was revived. At the time of the First [ 31 ]

34 Duma, when comparative freedom prevailed, the agitation subsided. Then, after the dispersal of the Duma, it gained fresh momentum, and so on. The conclusion \vas clear: at times of comparative freedom, when the Party is able to e):pand freely, the agitation for the calling of a labour congress with the purpose of forming a 'broad non-partisan party' is naturally deprived of all favourable soil; and, on the contrary, in times of repression, when the flow of new members into the Party ceases and is succeeded by an ebb, the agitation for a labour congress, as an artificial means of broadening the narrow party, or replacing it by a 'broad nonpartisan' party, acquires a certain favourable soil. But it need scarcely be said that no artificial m~asures will be of any avail, for any real expansion of the Party demands political freedom, and not a labour congress, which would itself require political freedom. Further, taken concretely, the idea of a labour congress is false to the core, for it is not based on facts, but on the false promise that 'we have no party'. The fact of the matter is that we do have a party, a proletarian party, that it is loudly proclaiming its existence, that the enemies of the proletariat are feeling its effects very severely-as the Mensheviks themselves are well aware-and just because we already have such a party, the idea of a labour congress is false to the core. Of course, if we did not have a party, a party with over I so,ooo advanced proletarians in its ranks and leading hundreds of thousands of militants; if we were nothing but a small uninfluential band, as the German Social-Democrats were in the sixties, or the French Socialists in the seventies-we ourselves would try to convene a labour congress with the object of squeezing a Social-Democratic Party out of it. But the whole point of the matter is that we already have a party, a real proletarian party, which enjoys tremendous influence among the masses; and in order to convene a labour congress and create some fantastic 'non-partisan party', we should inevitably have first to' get rid of' the existing party, to destroy it. That is why the work of convening a labour congress is bound in practice to mean working for the disruption of the Party. And whether we should ever succeed in forming a 'broad non-partisan [ 32 ]

35 party' in its place, and whether such a party is needed at all, is an open question. That is why the enemies of our Party-all the Cadets and Octobrists-praise the Mensheviks so heartily for agitating for a labour congress. And that is why the Bolsheviks think that the work of convening a labour congress would be dangerous and pernicious; for it would discredit the Party in the eyes of the masses and bring the latter under the sway of the bourgeois democrats. That, roughly, is what Comrade Lindov said. For a labour congress and against the Social-Democratic Party, or for the Party and against a labour congress? That was ho\v the issue stood at the Congress. The Bolshevik working-class delegates at once realized what the issue \vas and vigorously rose up 'in defence of the Party'. 'We are patriots of the Party,' they said; 'we love our Party, and we will not allow tired-out intellectuals to discredit it.' It is interesting to note that Comrade Rosa Luxemburg, the representative of the German Social-Democratic Party, was in complete agreement with the Bolsheviks. '\Ve German Social-Democrats,' she said, ' cannot understand the absurd bewilderment of our Menshevik comrades, who are seeking gropingly for the masses when the masses themselves are seeking for the Party and are being drawn to it irresistibly.'... It was clear from the debate that the vast majority of the speakers supported the Bolsheviks. On the conclusion of the debate, two motions-one by the Bolsheviks and the other by the Mensheviks-were put to the vote. The Bolshevik motion was adopted as a basis. Practically all the amendments affecting principles were rejected. Only one more or less important amendment was adopted, one discountenancing restrictions on the right to discuss the question of a labour congress. The resolution as finally adopted declared that the 'idea of a labour congress tends to disrupt the Party', and to 'bring the broad mass of the workers under the sway of the bourgeois democrats ', and as such was harmful to the proletariat. Furthermore, the resolution drew a strict distinction between a labour [ 33 ]

36 congress and the Soviets of Workers' Deputies, or their congresses, which far from disrupting the Party or competing with it only tend to strengthen it by following its lead and helping it to solve practical problems when the revolution is on the upgrade. In the end, the resolution as amended was adopted by 165 votes to 94, the rest abstaining. Thus the Congress rejected the idea of a labour congress as harmful and anti-party. The voting on this question disclosed the following important fact. It appeared that of the I 14 working-class delegates who took part in the voting, only 25 voted for a labour congress, the rest voting against. If we take the percentages, we find that 22 per cent of the working-class delegates voted for a labour congress, and 78 per cent against. And what is particularly important is that among the 94 delegates who voted for a labour congress, only 26 per cent were workers; 7 4 per cent were intellectuals. Yet the Mensheviks had all along been crying that the idea of a labour congress was a workers' idea, that only the Bolshevik 'intellectuals' were opposed to the calling of such a congress, and so forth. To judge by the voting, it should rather be said that, on the contrary, the idea of a labour congress is the idea of harebrained intellectuals.... For it is evident that even the Menshevik working-class delegates did not vote for a labour congress: out o( 39 (30 Mensheviks, plus 9 Bundists ), only 24 voted. Baku, [ 34 ]

37 CLASS AND PARTY THE PROLETARIAN CLASS AND THE PROLETARIAN PARTY (Concerning the first paragraph of our Party Rules) Those times when people boldly proclaimed 'Russia single and undivided' are gone. To-day even a child knows that there is no 'single and undivided' Russia in existence, that she has long since become divided into two antagonistic classes: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. To-day it is no secret to anyone that the struggle between these two classes has become the axis around which revolves contemporary life. Yes, to-day, this is no longer a secret to anyone. Nevertheless, it was difficult to notice all this until quite recently, the reason being that hitherto we saw but individual groups in the arena of the struggle, for it was only individual groups in individual towns and parts of the country that carried on the struggle, while the proletariat and the bourgeoisie as classes were not in evidence-it was difficult to see them. Now, however, towns and districts have united, various groups of the proletariat have joined hands, general strikes have broken out and demonstrations have been held-and before our eyes a magnificent spectacle has unfolded, the spectacle of the struggle between the two Russias -bourgeois Russia and proletarian Russia. Two big armies have entered the struggle-the army of the proletariat and the army of the bourgeoisie-and the struggle between these two armies is what fills the whole of contemporary history. Since armies cannot operate without leaders, and since every army must have a vanguard marching at its head and lighting up its way for it, it is obvious that, with the emergence of these armies there had to emerge corresponding groups of leaders as well-corresponding parties, as they are usually called. Thus the picture that presents itself to our view is as follows: on the one hand there is the army of the bourgeoisie, headed by the [ 35 ]

38 CLASS AND PARTY liberal party, and on the other the army of the proletariat, headed by the Social-Democratic Party; each army is led in the class struggle by its own party. 1 We have made the above remarks for the purpose of drawing a comparison between the proletarian party and the proletarian class, and thus explaining briefly the general character of the party. From what has been said it is sufficiently clear that the proletarian party, representing as it does a militant group of leaders, must, firstly, be considerably smaller than the proletarian class in respect of its membership; secondly, be above the proletarian class as regards its level of class-consciousness and its experience; and, thirdly, constitute a monolithic organization. In our opinion, there is no need to cite proof in support of the above, for it is obvious that, as long as there exists the capitalist system, which is inevitably attended by the poverty and backwardness of the masses of the people, the whole of the proletariat cannot rise to the desired level of class-consciousness, and, consequently, there must be a group of class-conscious leaders to enlighten the army of proletarians in the spirit of socialism, to unite and lead them in the struggle. It is also clear that a party which has set itself the aim of leading the proletariat in struggle must represent, not a chance congregation of individuals, but a monolithic, centralized organization, whose activities can be directed according to a single plan. Such, in brief, is the general character of our Party. 'Vith all this in mind, let us consider the main question: \Vhom can we call a member of the Party? The first paragraph of our Party Rules, which is the subject of the present article, refers to this very question, which we shall accordingly examine. Whom, then, can we call a member of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party-i.e. what are the duties of a Party member? Our Party is a Social-Democratic Party. This means that it has its own programme (the immediate and the ulfimate aims of the movement), its own tactics (methods of struggle), and its own 1 We do not mention the other parties existing in Russia, because there is no need to dwell on them in examining the questions under discussion.

39 CLASS AND PARTY principles of organization (form of combination). Unity of programme, tactics and organizational forms is the basis on which our Party is built. Only the unity of these views can unite the Party members into a single centralized party. If unity of views is wrecked, the Party will be wrecked, too. Consequently, only he can be called a member of the Party who fully accepts the Party's programme, tactics and organizational principles. Only one who is sufficiently versed in, and has fully accepted, our Party's programme, tactics and organizational views can have a place in the ranks of our Party and, thereby, in the ranks of the leaders of the proletarian army. But is it sufficient for a Party member merely to accept the Party's programme, tactics and organizational views? Can a person like that be regarded as a true leader of the proletarian army? Of course not! In the first place it is well known that there are plenty of windbags in the world who will readily 'accept' the Party's programme, tactics and organizational views, but who are incapable of anything but idle chatter. It would be a desecration of the Holy of Holies of the Party to call a windbag like that a member of the Party (i.e. a leader of the proletarian army)! Moreover, our Party is not a philosophers' school or a religious sect. Is not our Party a party of struggle? And if that is granted, does it not stand to reason that our Party will not be satisfied with a platonic acceptance of its programme, tactics and organizational views? That it is bound to demand of its members that they apply the views they have accepted? Consequently, whoever wants to be a member of our Party cannot confine himself to accepting the programme, tactics and organizational views of our Party, but must undertake to apply these views, to carry them out in practice. But what does it mean for a Party member to apply the views of the Party? How can he apply these views? Only when fighting, when marching with the whole Party at the head of the proletarian army. Can the struggle be waged by solitary scattered individuals? Certainly not! On the contrary-people unite, organize first, and only then do they go into battle. Without unity and organization every struggle is futile. It is thus clear that the Party members, too, will be able to carry on the struggle and, consequently, apply the [ 37 ]

40 CLASS AND PARTY Party's views, only if they unite into a monolithic organization. It is also clear that the Party members will fight the better and, hence, will the more fully apply the programme, tactics and the organizational views of the Party, the more monolithic the organization in which they are united. It is not for nothing that our Party is described as an organization of leaders, and not as a congregation of individuals. And, since our Party is an organization of leaders, it is obvious that only those can be regarded as members of this Party, of this organization, who work in this organization, and who therefore consider it their duty to merge their wishes with those of the Party and to act at one with the Party. Hence, to be a member of the Party one must apply the programme, tactics and organizational views of the Party; to apply the views of the Party one must fight for them; and to fight for these views one must work in a Party organization, work in the ranks of the Party. It is thus obvious that in order to be a member of the Party one must join one of the Party organizations. 1 Only by joining one of the Party organizations and thus merging our personal interests with the interests of the Party can we become members of the Party and, consequently, real leaders of the proletarian army. All the above is quite obvious, if our Party is to be, not a collection of individual windbags, but an organization of leaders which, through its Central Committee, is worthily discharging its duty of leading the proletarian army forward. There is also the following to be noted. Hitherto our Party has resembled a hospitable patriarchal family, ready to take in all who sympathize. But now that our Party has become a centralized organization it has thrown off its patriarchal aspect and has become in all respects like a fortress, the 1 Just as every complex organism is made up of innumerable simple organisms, so our Party, representing as it does a complex and general organization, is made up of a large number of district and local bodies called Party organizations if they are endorsed by the Party Congress or the Central Committee. As you see, it is not only committees that are called Party organizations. There exists the Central Committee for the purpose of directing the activities of these organizations according to a single plan, and it is through the Central Committee that these local Party organizations constitute a single large centralized organization.

41 CLASS AND PARTY gates of which open only to those who are worthy. And this means a lot to us. At a time when the autocracy is trying to corrupt the class consciousness of the proletariat with 'trade unionism', nationalism, clericalism and the like, and when, on the other hand, the liberal intelligentsia is striving persistently to kill the political independence of the proletariat and impose its tutelage on the proletariat, we must be extremely vigilant and never forget that our Party is a fortress, the gates of which open only to those who are worthy. \Ve have established two essential conditions of membership in the Party (acceptance of the programme and work in a Party organization). If we add to these a third condition, namely, that a Party member is obliged to render the Party financial support, then we shall have all the conditions that give one a right to the title of member of the Party. Hence, one can be called a member of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party who accepts the programme of this Party, renders the Party financial support, and belongs to one of the Party organizations. Such is the formulation of the first paragraph of the Party Rules given by Comrade Lenin. 1 This formulation, as you see, is entirely in line with the view that our Party is a centralized organization, not a collection of isolated individuals. Therein lies the great merit of this formulation. There are some comrades, however, who reject Lenin's formulation as being 'narrow' and 'inconvenient', and \vho propose their own formulation, which, we take it, should be neither 'narrow' nor 'inconvenient'. We are referring to Martov's2 formulation, which we shall now analyse. According to Martov's formulation, 'anyone is considered a member of the R.S.D.L.P. who accepts its programme, supports the Party financially and renders it systematic personal assistance under the guidance of one of its organizations'. 1 Lenin is an outstanding theoretician and practical leader of Revolutionary Social-Democracy. 2.i\1artov is one of the Editors of the Iskra. [ 39 ]

42 CLASS AND PARTY As you see, this formulation leaves out the third essential condition of Party membership, according to which Party members are obliged to belong to one of the Party organizations. It appears that Martov considers this definite and indispensable condition superfluous, and has substituted for it in his formulation the nebulous and vague idea of 'personal assistance under the guidance of one of the Party organizations'. So it seems that one can be a member of the Party without belonging to any Party organization (and that's what they call a' party'!) and without deeming it one's duty to submit to the Party's will (and that's what they call 'party discipline'!) Well, and how is the Party expected to guide 'systematically' persons who do not belong to any of the Party organizations and, consequently, do not regard Party discipline as absolutely binding on them? That is the question that confounds Martov's formulation of the first paragraph of the Party Rules, but is solved in masterly fashion in Lenin's formulation, inasmuch as the latter definitely stipulates that a third and indispensable condition of membership in the Party is that one must belong to one of the Party organizations. We thus have to eliminate from Martov's formulation the nebulous and meaningless idea of 'personal assistance under the guidance of one of the Party organizations'. \Vith this condition eliminated, there remain only two conditions in Martov's formulation (acceptance of the programme and financial support) which by themselves are entirely valueless, since every windbag can 'accept' the Party programme and support the Party financially-which, of course, does not entitle anyone to membership in the Party. And that's what they call a 'convenient' formulation! \V e say that under no circumstances can real Party members confine themselves to acceptance of the Party programme, but that they are in duty bound to strive to apply the programme they have accepted. Martov replies: You are too strict, because it is not really essential for a Party member to apply the programme he has accepted, so long as he does not refuse to render the Party financial support and the like. Martov, it seems, sympathizes with some windbags who call themselves 'Social-Democrats' and does not want to close the Party's doors to them. [ 40 ]

43 CLASS AND PARTY We say, further, that inasmuch as the programme cannot be applied without struggle, and struggle cannot be waged without unity, it is the duty of every prospective Party member to join one of its organizations, merge his wishes with those of the Party and work with the Party in directing the militant proletarian army, i.e. that Party members must organize into serried detachments of a centralized party. Martov replies: 'It is not really necessary for Party members to form into serried detachments, or to unite in organizations; we can manage if each wages the struggle singlehanded.' What, then, is our Party, we should like to ask-a chance congregation of individuals or a monolithic organization of leaders? And if it is an organization of leaders, can we count among its members those who do not belong to it and, consequently, do not consider its discipline binding on them? Martov's answer is that the P2rty is not an organization, or, rather, that the Party is an unorganized organization (and that's what they call 'centralism'!) In Martov's opinion, as we see, our Party is not a centralized organization but a collection, an aggregation of local organizations and individual 'Social-Democrats' who have accepted our Party programme, etc. But if our Party is not a centralized organization it will not be like a fortress, the gates of which open only to those who are worthy. And, indeed, to Martov, as is evidenced by his formulation, the Party is not a fortress but... a banquet, which every sympathizer can freely attend. A few grains of knowledge, a similar amount of sympathy, a little financial support-that's all you need, and you have every right to be considered a member of the Party. Don't listen-1\tlartov tries to encourage frightened 'Party members', so-called-don't listen to certain individuals who maintain that a Party member must join one of the Party organizations and thus subordinate his wishes to the wishes of the Party. In the first place, it is hard for one to accept these conditionsit is no joke to subordinate one's wishes to those of the Party! And, secondly, as I have already pointed out in my explanation, the opinion of those certain individuals is erroneous. Therefore, step in, gentlemen, you are welcome to... the banquet! Martov seems to sympathize with some professors and high [ 41 ]

44 CLASS AND PARTY school students who are loath to subordinate their wishes to the wishes of the Party, to Party discipline, and is forcing a breach in the fortress of our Party, which will enable these honourable gentlemen to insinuate themselves into our Party by stealth. He opens the door wide to opportunism-and that at a time when thousands of enemies are besetting the class consciousness of the proletariat! But that is not all. The point is that l\1artov's dubious formulation makes it possible for opportunism to arise in our Party from a different side as well. Martov's formulation, as we know, refers only to the acceptance of the programme; but not a word is mentioned about tactics and organization. Yet the unity of the Party requires the unity of the organizational and tactical views of its members no less than the unity of their programmatical views. \Ve may be told that this point is not mentioned in Comrade Lenin's formulation either. Right! But the point is that there is no need to mention it in Comrade Lenin's formulation. Is it not self-evident that one who belongs to one of the Party organizations and, consequently, fights in the ranks of the Party and submits to Party discipline, cannot follow any other tactical and organizational principles but those of the Party? But what would you say of a 'Party member' who has accepted the Party programme, but does not belong to any Party organization? \Vhat guarantee have we that such a 'member' will follow the Party's tactics and organizational Yiews, and not some other tactics and organizational views? This Martov's formulation fails to explain! And, as a result of Martov's formulation, we are to have a singular sort of 'Party', whose ' members' have the same programme (that, too, is open to doubt!), but different views on tactics and organization! What an ideal variety that will be! But in what way will our Party, in that case, differ from a banquet? There is just one question we should like to ask: What are we to do with the ideological and practical centralism that has been enjoined upon us by the Second Party Congress and which is radically contradicted by Martov's formulation? Throw it overboard? It is beyond any doubt that, if it comes to a choice, it \vill be more correct to throw Martov's formulation overboard. [ 42 ]

45 CLASS AND PARTY Such, as we see, is the absurd formulation which Martov presents to us, as against Comrade Lenin's formulation! In our opinion, the Second Party Congress was ill-advised in accepting Martov's formulation, and we hope that the Third Party Congress will not fail to correct the mistake committed by the Second Congress and will adopt Comrade Lenin's formulation. To sum up briefly: The proletarian army has entered the struggle. Since every army must have its vanguard detachment, this army, too, could not but feel the need of such a detachment. That is why there has appeared a group of proletarian leaders-the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party. As the vanguard detach-. ment of a definite army, this Party must, firstly, be armed with its own programme, tactics and organizational principles, and, secondly, constitute a monolithic organization. To the questionwho can be called a member of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party?-this Party can have only one answer: one '\Vho accepts the Party programme, supports it financially and works in one of the Party organizations. It is this obvious truth that Comrade Lenin has expressed tn his remarkable formulation. January 1 ( 14), [ 43 ]

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48 MARXIST-LENINIST CLASSIC~ THE MARXIST-LENINIST LIBRARY I. ANTI-DUHRING - Frederick Engels 364 pp. 5/- 2. LuD\VIG FEUERBACH - Frederick Engels 101 pp. 2/6 3 LETTERS TO KuGELMANN - Karl Marx 148 pp. 2/6 4 CLASS STRUGGLES IN FRANCE Karl Marx r6o pp. 2/6 5 CIVIL \VARIN FRANCE Karl Marx 92 pp. 2/6 REvoLuTIoN Frederick Engels 7 THE HousiNG QuESTION Frederick Engels IO. MARX, ENGELS, MARXISM II. THE OcTOBER REVOLUTION rs6 pp. 103 pp. 2/6 z/6 6. GERMANY: REVOLUTION AND COUNTER- 8. THE PovERTY OF PHILOSOPHY Karl 1\llarx 9 CORRESPONDENCE OF MARX AND ENGELS 214 pp. sso pp. z/6 sf- V. 1. Lenin 226 pp. 2/6 J. Stalin r68 pp. 2/6 12. l\llarxism AND THE NATIONAL AND CoLONIAL QuESTION J. Stalin 304 pp. 2/6 13. MARX AND THE TRADE UNIONS A. Lozovsky 188 p p. 2/6 14. FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF MARXISM G. Plekhanov I46 pp. 2/6 15. CRITIQUE OF THE GOTHA PROGRAMME Karl 1\llarx I ro pp. z/6 r6. ON 'CAPITAL'. EssAYS AND REVIEws Frederick Engels 148 pp. 2/6 17. THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY Karl il1arx and Frederick Engels 216 pp. 3/6 All prices subject to alteration without notice. LAWRENCE & WISHART LTD., 2 PARTON ST., LONDON, \V.C.I