202 Book Reviews. RICK ELMORE Appalachian State University DOI: /drt

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1 202 Book Reviews control but which, nevertheless, it must struggle. In the case of the second year of The Beast and the Sovereign, Naas argues that the death of Maurice Blanchot and the beginning of the war in Iraq are events whose force and signification come, week by week, to overtake the seminar (150). Hence, beyond biography or historical contextualization, Naas convincingly shows that Walten names the internal disruption of the sovereignty of Derrida s final seminar and the thematization of this disruption, the notion of Walten making good on Naas s claim that Derrida s text performs its own critique of sovereignty. However, Naas will extend this logic of Walten to Derrida s corpus as a whole, using it to interpret the lasting importance of the publication of Derrida s seminars. If, as Naas convincingly argues, Derrida s seminars are, first and foremost, a critique of sovereign violence, then we see in this critique, in this theme of Walten, a microcosm of how the publication of Derrida s seminars will come to change everything we know about his thinking. For Naas, the publication of each new seminar will come to overtake Derrida s archive, forcing anew a detour through the body of his work, and this is what the seminars as seminars have to teach us about deconstruction: that deconstruction was always a learning to struggle with this kind of imposition, a learning to read for this kind of violent and unavoidable overtaking, week by week, book by book, and line by line, an overtaking which, although always unpredictable, Naas s The End of The World and Other Teachable Moments will have helped us to think in a truly original way. RICK ELMORE Appalachian State University DOI: /drt Christopher Watkin, Difficult Atheism: Post-Theological Thinking in Alain Badiou, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Quentin Meillassoux. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press (2011). 296pp. $ ISBN: Difficult Atheism, by Christopher Watkin, is a book of far-reaching scope and ambition, tackling not just one but three of the more difficult thinkers currently writing at the intersection of philosophy and religion: Alain Badiou, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Quentin Meillassoux. Watkin s thesis is bold and unapologetic, and shapes the path of his reading and thinking with intense focus. His main concern, bordering on a battle cry, is that the ground gained by atheism is being lost once more to a

2 Book Reviews 203 new colonisation by theism. He writes: This systematic occupation of residual atheism s territory by a returning post-religious or postsecular theology is demonstrated by Jean-Luc Marion and others (9). His carefully crafted introduction analyses various methods or types of atheism produced in the past 100 years or so, and demonstrates how each fails to protect its ground. The goal of this particular work or at least the goal of postmodern philosophy of religion is or should be a thinking without God that is truly so, which does not simply take religion s categories for its own. He recognizes, however, that atheism cannot ignore religion, like the bogeyman in the corner of the room that we pretend does not exist (11). Rather, atheism needs to occupy theism s territory, redeploying theism s notions in its own cause (12). Watkin worries that even as Badiou, Nancy, and Meillasoux are attempting to think without God, their work carries with it, almost against their will, residual (parasitic or ascetic) a/theisms such that it is tainted. He wants to: not oppose theism but to occupy it, not to expel theism but to ingest it, taking terms and patterns of thought previously associated with theism and re-inscribing them in a way that is not to be confused either with parasitism or with ascetism. (14) In short, Watkin is looking for what he calls post-theological integration, whereby God-as-Being is thoroughly eliminated from philosophical thought and religious territory is occupied instead by a rigorous, immanent philosophy capable of addressing all that religion addresses, but without God. Watkin proceeds systematically and with an admirable thoroughness, working his way through the death of God articulated in Badiou and Nancy before turning to the new kid on the block, Meillassoux, whose work seizes, empties, and repurposes religious language more boldly yet. He then raises the standard/specter of politics as a sort of litmus test for each thinker s success or failure in moving thoroughly into the post-theological. Not to ruin the ending, but each thinker, in Watkin s estimate, ultimately fails in moving truly into the post-theological, but each helps us toward that goal in different ways. The first chapter addresses the God of Metaphysics as it is engaged by both Badiou and Nancy. He demonstrates each thinker s strategy in the battlefield, with the resultant strengths and weaknesses of each approach outlined. Watkin then approaches the God of the Poets in the same manner. Having done with these gods, he turns to the fundamental operatives of each thinker s approaches: the axiom in the case of Badiou

3 204 Book Reviews and dis-enclosure in the case of Nancy. Finally, he brings Meillassoux to bear upon the conversation, and it is here we find where Watkin pulls his battleground metaphor, for Meillasoux rejects the very terms of engagement that may be tacitly agreed upon by Nancy and Badiou. Rather than a dichotomous battle between theism and atheism, or a faith without faith, Meillassoux sees philosophy s task as the devouring of God, of God Godself as the battlefield, rather than being the object about which we fight. The God of Metaphysics chapter is the most complicated, but most helpful, in understanding Watkin s overall project (even as Watkin claims the God of the poets is more tenacious). Watkin argues that Badiou attempts to escape metaphysical superstition via an appeal to mathematics as ontology, which opens the possibility of an intensive, rather than extensive, infinite. Badiou s task is nothing more than saving philosophy from its own history, by recognizing and rescuing the role of mathematics (the matheme of Plato) as key to philosophical thought. By turning to the notion of the empty set, Badiou attempts to wrest philosophy from the God of metaphysics, refusing merely to banish this god and instead seeking to divest it of all possible existence as Being, as the One Infinite. Badiou s turn to inconsistent multiplicity is an attempt to outmaneuver the single Infinite Being: anything that exists mathematically emerges always as multiple; yet the multiple itself refuses definition (which would limit its infinitude). Thus, Badiou must resort to an axiomatic claim that inconsistent multiplicity must be assumed. But it seems that this turn to math does not solve the problem of the God of metaphysics after all. Badiou wishes to escape the historicism of post-theological philosophy by a return to mathematics, but his thought carries with it the problematic residual atheism by carrying forward the infinite, even if it is now that of the infinitely null set rather than than infinitely extravagant deity. Furthermore, Badiou attempts to ground his argument for equality in the inconsistent multiplicity. Watkin claims that this becomes Badiou s eo ipso Good and therefore introduces back into Badiou s work a parasitic atheism (240). In the end, Badiou must rely upon a) ignoring the absolute infinite Cantor sets up and b) axioms of Badiou s own making in order to hold firm the notion that this path frees us from the God of the philosophers. Watkin then turns to Nancy s attempt to wrest us from the God of metaphysics. Nancy rejects Badiou s anti-historicist approach, insisting that denying that metaphysics has a history is just another onto-theological move. Watkin devotes considerable time to Nancy s understanding and critique of Badiou before turning to Nancy s own

4 Book Reviews 205 work on the deconstruction of Christianity. Almost immediately Watkin sees Nancy s project as infected with a parasitic theism and a Christmas projection, which is also the concern Derrida expresses in On Touching. Watkin claims that in deconstructing Christianity Nancy imitates Christianity, or at least cannot conclusively be said not to imitate Christianity (39). He does note, however, that Nancy seems to head beyond or behind Christianity into a deconstruction of the a/theism binary per se (41), but that he ultimately fails to escape the shadow of the theological (111). Nancy repurposes of Christological and theological language in order to achieve, in an incomplete sense, a world without Other, without transcendence, a world that gives itself to itself from within itself, as openings, spacings. Thus, Nancy s faith that is nothing at all resists the dichotomizing tendencies in both Badiou and Meillassoux. Nevertheless, it may be that Nancy is still vulnerable to the charges of parasitic or even imitative atheism in his adoption of religious terminology. I found the chapter The God of the Poets to be more familiar territory, and thus easier to follow but perhaps less compelling. It is obviously true that post-modern philosophy, even as it rejects the onto-theological God, nevertheless appropriates religious language (the infinite, the Open, even incarnation) in its work, leaving it vulnerable to what Watkin calls a parasitic atheism. Badiou attacks this tendency via the poetry of the Idea to counteract Romantic poetry, and a subtractive theory of incarnation and the body to undermine the Romantic construction of the relation between art and the infinite. Badiou attempts to recast the notions of truth, infinity and immortality in a post-theological world, according to Watkin, but produces an atheism that is ascetic, that loses robustness and liveliness when it loses god. Nancy too goes after the Romantic notions of infinity and incarnation, but he does so not by relying upon the Idea, but rather by turning toward spacing, an immanent openness, rather than a transcendent one, an infinity in the finite. While I think Watkin occasionally overstates Nancy s aggression toward God and religion, if one wishes to be led through difficult Nancean concepts without feeling lost, this is an excellent chapter to turn to. Ultimately, this chapter compares Badiou and Nancy and acknowledges that, while they may echo each other in particular moves, their approaches to post-theological integration are radically different, and finding points of commonality here seems unlikely. I am the least familiar with Quentin Meillassoux s work, and thus found myself relying upon Watkin for guidance and trusting his

5 206 Book Reviews interpretation more that perhaps is fair. To his credit, in the chapter on Meillassoux, Watkin presents other thinkers critiques of his work, even if he mostly disagrees with them. In any case, Meillassoux is bolder even than Nancy in appropriating religious language for an explicitly, even passionate, post-theological account of the world. Refusing to cede linguistic ground to theism, Meillassoux is determined, in Watkin s reading, to separate the wheat from the chaff and incorporate everything one can from religious language. Ultimately, Meillassoux s task is to found an absolute understanding of the world a metaphysic of sorts upon reason alone, without appeal to transcendence or Being. He does so via conceptualizing contingency as necessity. Here Watkin breaks down this maneuver and unpacks its problems, and it s easily the most helpful, if dense, section of the book. Reading Meillassoux produces aha! moments, where he turns a philosophical concept on its head (as when he advocates for radical possibility, which must be if everything is necessarily contigent); Watkin does an admirable job of waking us up from our thrall and pointing out the deep problems with such seemingly magical moves. Meillassoux, in the end, cannot escape or avoid what plagues all three thinkers in Watkin s estimation: a latent appeal to something outside self-sufficient reason that opens the door to a/theism. Whether it be Badiou s axiomatic claims or Nancy s opening of signification to sense in faith or Meillassoux s claim to just believe reason, in each case there is an unaccounted for term, a question of fundamental philosophical orientation, that Watkin both identifies and rejects as blind spots. The final chapters of the book veer into the political, which almost felt like a separate volume of work given its abrupt shift in focus. Watkin s goal is to ground a universal justice without resorting to theological assumptions, and he now utilizes Badiou, Nancy, and Meillassoux to see how far they get in accomplishing this task. He rightly points out that ethics is a deep concern of all three thinkers, and therefore this turn allows him to acknowledge and utilize said work rather than bracketing it. He begins with Meilllassoux, whose work on the ethical suggests justice even for the dead, but without appeal to a theological axiom regarding resurrection or Heaven. Nevertheless, we ultimately have to take his word for it, as there is no discourse that can lead the reader... to accept his hope for universal justice (172). Assuming as he does that a world of justice to come is not only possible but inevitable is where Meillassoux loses Watkin, who once again points out his tendency to idolize human reason.

6 Book Reviews 207 Nancy works to undo ethics from ontology, but does so via an appeal to the call, which opens up his philosophy to the outside and to a withdrawal, which can imply avoidance or quietism (as Bruno Bosteels suggests). Watkin spends quite a bit of time presenting Simon Critchley s and Martin Crowley s engagement with Nancy s work here, rather than focusing on Nancy himself, which creates a bit of an interruption in reading the text. Finally, turning to Badiou, Watkin follows his engagement with and critique of Emmanuel Levinas and Immanuel Kant: whereas the former relies upon the theological explicitly to articulate the ethical, the latter relies upon the notion of a general human subject, which presents its own Oneness that should be resisted. Charges of quietism or incrementalism are levelled at Badiou from several angles, and Watkin agrees, with some qualifications. This section provides much food for thought, but also seems more a review of literature rather than a robust account. Watkin does well to articulate the limits of post-theological integration of, say, the decision in Badiou with the demand in Nancy, but it would have been enjoyable to have a little less summation and a little more experimentation regarding the subject of ethics and the political in a post-theological account. The second chapter of this section focuses more intently upon justice itself as a case study to see if a weaving together of these three approaches to the post-theological is possible. Can we possibly arrive at a robust notion of universal justice without falling back upon a parasitic or ascetic atheism? Beginning once again with Meillassoux s truly strange accounting of how universal justice is possible (based again upon the necessity of contingency), Watkin makes the uncomfortable suggestion that a change of definition with regard to what the just is evaporates the injustice of a prior act (in his example, rape). Unfortunately, Watkin does not really follow through with this example, but moves on to even weirder territory whereby Meillassoux veers into rationally unsubstantiated claims regarding the Child of Man, claims that are only possible by a reworking of what reason could be, a problem Watkin already revealed in prior chapters. Meillassoux, just as he sought a principle of necessity that did not lead inevitably to either the existence of God or relativism, now seeks a common trait that ethically unites all people, which he finds in the jolts of intuition of the possibility of, and a desire for, immortality (what Watkin later labels the ontological and ethical jolts). Watkin rightly questions both Meillassoux s reliance upon human reason to ground such universal desire, and the desire itself. The section on Nancy in The Politics of the Post-Theological II: Justice is where Watkin again engages Nancy s work directly, rather

7 208 Book Reviews than via other commentators; and it is a coherent and cogent account of Nancean terminology that can benefit any reader curious (and perhaps intimidated) by Nancy s work. The reader is then taken quickly through Badiou s work on capitalism and communism. The conclusion to this chapter is probably the most helpful for the neophyte reader: Watkin ably sums up and compares the various notions of justice provided, quickly identifying weak points. His final questions point out that all thinkers ultimately make claims regarding what is good that are unjustified, and perhaps permanently so. In each case, universal justice may come to occupy the territory of God, but in a problematic way, imitating the unquestioned assumption of God by having unquestioned assumptions about Justice. As such, Watkin accuses, gently, each of a kind of idolatry. I admit that I am not a fan of the rhetorical flourishes with which this work began. Utilizing the language of battlefields and territory seems to me to be unnecessarily defensive; while I understand Watkin s desire (if I interpret it correctly) for a philosophy that is robust, universal, and without even the possibility of onto-theology sneaking in, I do not share his passion. As such, while the book itself was extraordinarily helpful in its exploration of three challenging thinkers, I found myself occasionally uncomfortable with its purpose and thrust. Additionally, I found myself frustrated in places, as the density of the prose seemed to obscure more than it clarified, and I really do prefer to have quotations in the language of the book itself, with the original in endnotes, rather than vice versa. All these points notwithstanding, however, Watkin accomplishes a daunting task in this book, managing to summarize and explain some of the most complicated, complicating works we have from these thinkers while at the same time issuing forth his own provocative thesis, thus finding points of commonality in unlikely places. He has raised the bar on post-theological philosophy, demanding more than a mere emptying of God s place, more than a weak imitation of religion, but rather a full-throated and unapologetic philosophy that provides us with all God used to, without the cost. I remain unconvinced that this is possible, or that it is completely necessary, but I look forward to seeing what comes next. CHRISTINA SMERICK Greenville College DOI: /drt