Rethinking the Republic

Transcription

1 Rethinking the Republic The stated purpose of Plato s Republic is to address the nature of justice. The conventional scholarly view is that Plato makes claims (via Socrates) about two instantiations of justice: justice of the ideal city and justice of the soul. In other words, Plato makes a political claim and ethical claim. The conventional view also asserts that the claim about justice in the city helps support the claim about justice in the soul. Thus, the political claim is made both for its own sake and in support of the ethical claim. In what follows I propose that the conventional view is correct on these overarching points but fails to adequately treat a certain aspect of the Republic: the (seemingly) dystopian elements that Socrates includes in his description of the ideal city. Drawing upon the treatment of these elements by a rival interpretation that espoused by Leo Strauss I conclude that the presence of these features in Socrates account of justice can actually bolster both the central intuitions of the conventional interpretation and the core argument that it attributes to Plato. I The purpose of the political elements of the Republic is typically held to be two-fold: Plato intends through the argumentation of Socrates to demonstrate both that the aristocratic city is the ideal city and that it is feasible. 1 This aristocratic city is the ideal city if and only if it is in every way just and in no way unjust. 2 It is feasible if there is a reasonable chance that it could come into being at the present time or some future time given the conditions of the phenomenal world. 3 Socrates commitment to the first goal is seen clearly at 368d-369a and his commitment to the second at 540d. 4 In the latter passage he poses the question, Do you agree that the things we have said about the city and its constitution are not altogether wishful thinking; that it is difficult for them to come about, but possible in a way? 5 Socrates proposed ideal city, the Kallipolis, would be ruled exclusively by a group of philosopher kings whose unique access to the Form of the Good gives them and them alone the requisite knowledge to rule in a maximally just fashion. Taken together, 473b and 473d suggest that Socrates holds the rule of philosopher kings to be both a necessary and sufficient condition for the ideal city. 6 It will only be the maximally just city if they rule, and their rule alone is enough to make it maximally just. Scholars tend to agree, however, that something is amiss in Socrates aristocratic city. At the least, several specific policies that he proposes for the city appear quite radical and have been identified as such by some of the foremost thinkers in the discourse. Karl Popper asserts that the Republic is nothing short of a carefully crafted blueprint for the imposition of a rigid class hierarchy through downright totalitarian means. 7 Julia Annas claims something similar when she 1 Morrison Ibid. 3 See Marshall Ibid. 5 Plato 540d. Herein I quote from Reeve s translation of the Republic. 6 Morrison Schofield 195.

2 says, Plato has no real notion of rights. 8 Even C.D.C. Reeve, who defends Socrates proposal with considerable rigor, admits that the city appears at least prima facie to be authoritarian and repressive. 9 And it is hard to deny White s claim that the residents of Kallipolis would object to the institutions in force there. 10 Criticisms of the dystopian elements of the Socratic proposal are common, but one voice in particular moves from criticism to a decidedly deeper level of analysis. This voice is Leo Straus, who holds that the result of Plato s attempt to conceive of the just city is so radical and unappealing (especially for his time) that his efforts cannot possibly be serious. Rather, he has depicted a comic fantasy designed to lead us to the conclusion that any attempt to reconstruct the realm of the political on rationalist lines would generate a dystopia built on injustice, as one commentator has put it. 11 Strauss holds that Plato s true purpose is to purge the attentive reader of unrealistic utopian ideals by presenting the monstrous absurdity that such aspirations ultimately lead to. What, specifically, are these unsavory characteristics of Kallipolis? At the very least, they include the proposal for communal sexual and familial relations 12 and the pseudo-eugenic policies 13 proposed by Socrates and his interlocutors. The former notion has women and children held in common among the men of the guardian class, and the latter has persons with unfit bodies left to die and persons with unfit souls executed. The banishment of poetry 14 and Socrates proposed constraints on imitative art in general are also objected to by some readers. Additionally, there is the issue of female guardians. 15 In modern society such a thing is of course normal and accepted, but in Plato s day it would have been quite a radical proposal. There is some debate in contemporary scholarship with regard to this last point, but it is at least still a candidate for inclusion. (At any rate, the argument that the Republic contains significant dystopian elements does not hinge upon this last point.) Even if the presence of female guardians in the city would have been acceptable to Plato s contemporaries, the other elements present a great difficulty. They are extreme proposals, and Plato would have known this. The Straussian contention is that he can therefore not have made them seriously. This suggestion carries at least some initial plausibility and is further strengthened by the conventional interpretation s rather monolithic suggestion that Plato simply held the views in question. The conventional take on these questions is certainly not out of bounds as a possibility, but Strauss demand that we not be so hasty in the face of an intellect as formidable as Plato s is difficult to resist. The Straussian view is itself problematic as well, however, though this is not because it asserts that there are ironical claims in the Republic when it comes to certain facets of the city. On the contrary, Strauss has strong reasons for proceeding as he does. The difficulty with his view is rather that it moves too hastily from this recognition to a generalization about Plato s entire project. The identification of sexual communism, eugenics, censorship, and female guardianship as arguments from absurdity is would certainly seem tenable given Plato s 8 Annas 334. She here makes an assumption typical of modern interpretation of Plato, namely that the views espoused by Socrates are Plato s own. I follow suit in this essay, at least initially (for reasons that will become clear in what follows). 9 Reeve White Schofield Plato 5.457c-d. 13 Ibid a. 14 Annas Plato 5.451d-452a.

3 intelligence. 16 It is a mistake, though, to imply that intentional absurdity of this sort could serve only the function that Strauss ascribes to it: conveying the point that the political proposals in the Republic are wholly misguided. If we are to treat the absurdities as evidence for some claim one Plato s part, the question as to what that claim is remains an open one. Strauss rigidly allows for only one conclusion: that a city ruled by philosopher kings is unjust and unrealistic. It is well worth investigating, though, whether there is a different conclusion that the dystopian features might lead to. II It is important to first identify the general thrust of both the conventional and Straussian interpretations of the Republic and to establish which assumptions they have in common and where they part company with one other. The conventional interpretation takes Socrates at his word and equates his views in the narrative with Plato s, and so attributes to Plato the following aristocratic thesis: A city ruled by philosopher kings would be maximally just. The Straussian interpretation takes Socrates to be speaking ironically throughout the dialogue, and so attributes to Plato the following dystopian thesis: The city described by Socrates is not maximally just. Despite initial appearances, these two theses are in themselves perfectly compatible with one another. Both can be attributed to Plato without attributing to him a logical contradiction. A contradiction arises only when they are combined with an additional claim, namely, the following consequence thesis: The city described by Socrates would in fact result from the rule of philosopher kings. Together, of course, the three theses would entail a contradiction. Assuming that Plato would have been aware of this, he cannot be interpreted as having sincerely made all three claims. For the reasons mentioned above, Strauss denies that Plato genuinely holds the consequence thesis. The Straussian interpretation thus attributes both the dystopian and consequence theses to Plato. The conventional scholarship, by contrast, denies that Plato should be regarding as assenting to the dystopian thesis. It may be granted that some of the apparently dystopian aspects of the Republic are unsavory, but Plato either did not recognize this or did but held that they were justified because they attained some greater good, such as unity in the city. The conventional scholarship, then, attributes to him the aristocracy and consequence theses. Of course, in assessing the truth of the three views most scholars hold some combination of the aristocracy and consequence theses be false and the dystopian thesis to be true. 17 But the issue here is not the truth of the views, but whether or not they can be rightly attributed to Plato, and the possibility that he may have sincerely held both the aristocracy and dystopian theses seems to have been largely overlooked. The initial temptation is to identify the two as in tension 16 Only tenable, though: some greater intuitive similarity between Plato and contemporary thinkers would be necessary to close this loop. See Editor s Note after this essay for more. Ed. 17 Morrison 242.

4 with one another. However, further examination reveals a simple explanation for why this is the case. It is only because both sides take the consequence thesis to be axiomatic that the tension appears. The conventional scholarship provides strong reasons for attributing the aristocracy to him, and Strauss provides strong reasons for attributing the dystopian thesis as well. But what grounds are there for attributing the consequence thesis to Plato? It seems that what basis there may be does not outweigh the strength of the reasons in favor of attributing the aristocracy and dystopian theses to him. So it would seem, prima facie, that of the three claims, the consequence thesis could easily be jettisoned to avoid contradiction. III Consider, first, Plato s method of locating justice in the city through Socrates. There will be justice within the individual, but also in the city as a whole. 18 Because the city is larger, the task will be easier if conducted there. Socrates plan is therefore to find justice first in the city, which will in turn allow him to locate it within the soul. 19 The political claim is thus intended to provide support for the ethical claim. 20 However, this does not entail that the ethical investigation will not likewise bear on its political counterpart. On the contrary, only once justice has been identified in both places through the overall investigative method will Socrates be certain that he found justice in either of them. The implication of this is crucial: comparing the two instances of justice will help us better understand not only justice itself, but also each instantiation. The next natural step is to examine the Platonic view of the soul, which has it consisting of three parts: the appetitive, the spirited, and the rational. In the same way that Kallipolis is maximally just only when each group performs its proper role, the tripartite soul is maximally just only when each part performs its proper function. The appetitive part deals with base desires like hunger and thirst, yearning to fulfill them. The spirited part deals with social desires and so yearns for such things as fame and honor. The rational part, though, concerns itself only with goodness. Each part thus has its own important domain, just as each class of the Kallipolis has its own important social role. But as in the Kallipolis, the soul must have a ruler, and this ruler must be concerned only with goodness itself. Thus reason is the proper ruler of the soul, and it follows that the just soul is ruled by reason. It will still have appetitive and spirited urges that need to be fulfilled, of course, but this fulfillment will come in a way consistent with the dictates of reason in the same way that the warriors and producers of the Kallipolis perform their functions in a way consistent with the rule and policies of the philosopher kings. IV In contrast to much of modern moral philosophy, Plato s theory is agent-centered. The call to a just life is purported to be an intelligible demand on human nature, something in accordance with our potentialities for living creative and fulfilling lives. 21 For Plato, virtuous actions are a natural product of well-developed character it matters, and matters morally, what kind of person you are. 22 This breaks radically with action-centered moral theories, which place an arbitrary set of external demands on human nature with little attention to that nature itself. 23 Action-centered theories focus on obligatory actions. Plato, by contrast, concerns himself with the character of the agent. Those with a just soul will act justly. There is little need for an 18 Plato 368e. 19 Ibid. 368e-369a. 20 Reeve Ibid. 22 Ibid Ibid 331.

5 account of just action (indeed, the difficulties involved in formulating such an account are a major motivation for Plato s view); the focus is instead on how one becomes internally just. Once this is achieved, proper external conduct will follow. Plato is thus a character-utilitarian, to use C.D.C. Reeves term. 24 Where there are just souls, there is moral goodness. Where there are unjust souls, there is moral wrongness. In practice, this moral value will be manifested both internally and externally. The just soul is good both because it exists as a valuable entity and because it performs just actions. The soul and its outworking both have moral status; Plato s key move, though, is to make the status of the outworking largely dependent on that of the soul. In doing so, he escapes the need for an exhaustive account of just external action because in a sense, one has already been provided: put the soul in the right state, says Plato, and what follows will be just action. It will now be helpful to recall that each instantiation of justice allows us to better understand the other, and that this is an explicit claim of the text. Socrates does not merely offer the political claim in support of the ethical claim, but offers the ethical claim in such a way that it can shed additional light on its political counterpart. The relevant lesson of the ethical claim is this: internal justice of the soul leads to just external action, and internal justice is achieved through the rule of reason. The precise form that this just external action will actually take is not a primary concern. Indeed, one will not be in a position to know what that form will be until one possesses a just soul. In the same way, the justice of the city has its basis in the rule of the philosopher kings. It is this internal feature of the city alone that makes it just. V The methods by which the philosopher kings governs will be just by virtue of the fact that they are policies of philosopher kings in a properly organized city; the actions of a soul will be just if they stem from the dictates of reason in a properly organized soul. In other words, the policies of the philosopher kings are analogous to choices that a soul governed by reason will perform. The policies themselves are not a primary concern, however, because their precise nature cannot be reliably expounded until philosopher kings are actually in power to implement them. Indeed, this was the whole point of putting philosopher kings in power in the first place: they are far better equipped to rule than anyone else. The implications of this are far-reaching. This means that for the city as well as the soul, there are two sorts of claims: claims about how to organize the city justly (in other words, who to place in positions of power), and claims about how the city will be ruled once it is so organized. Socrates asserts that he is able to offer reliable claims of the first type. But it is difficult to see how he could make the second sort of claim with a similar degree of reliability. The ethical theory he advocates does not concern itself with claims of the second sort. Such reliability comes only when one s soul is properly organized. In the same way, his political theory cannot concern itself with the second sort of claims either. Socrates can plausibly be said to have reliable information about how to organize a city such that it will be maximally just: by putting philosophers in power. But he cannot make reliable claims regarding how the philosopher kings will rule, because, as he repeatedly insists, he does not know the Good, whereas philosopher kings would. 25 Indeed, the need for the philosopher kings is predicated upon their having knowledge of how to rule that all others lack. If Socrates either the 24 Reeve Morrison 240.

6 historical figure or the Platonic character were made tyrant, he would make a mess of things straightaway according to his very own assertions. 26 As one who is not a philosopher king, Socrates cannot (on his own view) claim to be a reliable guide to issues of this second sort. Yet he seemingly does just that. He advocates specific policies that he allegedly holds to be best for the city, namely, sexual communism, eugenics, censorship, and guardianship of women. But to a philosopher king, Socrates conception of the city would be of little use. 27 He lacks the privileged access to the Forms that philosopher kings are supposed to have, and so is not in a position to assert with reliability what policies they would put into effect. This follows so clearly from the central argument (as well as Socrates stated reasons for making the central argument in the first place) that it would be quite farfetched to hold that Plato is not aware of it. It seems equally strange, then, to attribute the consequence thesis to Plato. A satisfactory interpretation will need to chart a different path. VI Straussian readings can of course present this implication as another piece of support for their dystopian conclusion. But this causes them to fall quite short in accounting for the evidence that Plato s overarching goal of giving an account of justice is a sincere one. Thus they cannot attribute the aristocracy thesis to Plato even though it seems very hard to make sense of the narrative structure of the text without so doing. Conventional commentators deal with the dystopian features in a number of ways, ranging from the claim that Socrates conception is intended to motivate political action on the part of his interlocutors to the view that it is to serve as a rough outline to be improved upon by the philosopher kings who come to power. This, however, precludes attribution of the dystopian thesis to Plato. As the previous section has shown, this is nearly as problematic as the Straussian failure to leave room for attribution of the aristocracy thesis. As should be clear by this point, a view that synthesizes the conventional interpretation s attribution of the aristocracy thesis and the Straussian interpretation s attribution of the dystopian thesis is therefore in order. Jettisoning the consequence thesis makes such a position possible. VII The question, then, is this: how can one hold that Plato is genuine in his overall project of describing justice in the city but ironic in furnishing certain examples of that justice? The answer may be the general political claims about the composition of the just city are sincere and the specific political claims about what the policies of a city so composed would be are not sincere. The specific political claims are purposefully made radical and unappealing in order to illustrate the need for philosopher kings. They highlight the futility of even attempting to fully conceive of the ideal city without the noetic access (knowledge of the Good) that Socrates insists he lacks. Just as Plato s ethics are concerned almost exclusively with getting one s soul in the right sort of state, so Plato s political theory is concerned almost exclusively with getting the right sort of ruler in power. His primary political concern is not with the actions such a ruler will take in a precise set of circumstances in the same way that his primary ethical concern is not with the actions that a just soul will take in a precise set of circumstances. The specific political claims thus turn out to be arguments from absurdity after all: they illustrate the absurdity of playing philosopher king when one lacks the requisite knowledge of the Form of the Good. The results are preposterous and even dangerous. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid 244.

7 Only a fool would pretend to have knowledge that he or she does not when the stakes are as high as there are in the case of Kallipolis. By asserting that each instantiation of justice can be of assistance in understanding the other, Plato allows the attentive reader to use the epistemic limitations of the ethical theory to confirm his or her suspicions about similar limits on the political theory. Coupled with his statements about the unique position of philosopher kings with regard to ruling, this casts Socrates specific political claims as absurdities. The question of whether or not the character Socrates is himself aware of this remains open. Does Plato make Socrates look foolish for pedagogical reasons, or does Socrates knowingly make foolish claims for pedagogical reasons? Given that Socrates usually speaks for Plato but does not always do so 28, either answer is defensible. Neither is particularly problematic, as the conclusions that follow are nearly identical. Either way, the result is that the specific political claims of the Republic are not sincere, but dramatize the pressing need for rule by philosopher kings. VIII We might, however, object as follows: it may true that attributing both the aristocracy and consequence theses to Plato in their current forms is problematic, but there is a way of amending AT and CT such that the conventional interpretation avoids the problems outlined so far. 29 The amendments would look like this: (AT*) A city ruled by philosopher kings of all generations beyond the first would be maximally just. (CT*) The city described by Socrates would in fact result from the rule of the first generation of philosopher kings. This would make sense of the apparent tension between Socrates various statements by asserting that they have two distinct referents: the first group of philosopher kings that come to power, on the one hand, and all subsequent generations of philosopher kings, on the other hand. The first generation would not have the benefit of Socrates aristocratic education and would thus lack knowledge of the Good. Subsequent generations of philosopher kings would have the benefit of the education program, and so would possess knowledge of the Good. Socrates is therefore in a position to make reliable statements about the rule of a certain class of philosopher kings, namely, those who are initially granted power in the city. They are not in the privileged epistemic position that their successors will be, lacking as they do the rigorous education that allows one to obtain knowledge of the Good. It would therefore be plausible for Socrates to view himself as an epistemic peer of this first generation and so be justified in making statements about the policies that they would enact. We can then take his statements to refer exclusively to actions that would be taken by this initial class of rulers. I have three replies to this modified rival interpretation. The first difficulty is this: it seems strange to call the city s first generation of rulers philosopher kings at all given that they lack the privileged noetic access that make philosopher kings ideal rulers. It might be natural to refer to them as something like provisional philosopher kings, but even this seems forced, as they lack the one relevant criterion that makes philosopher kings effective rulers: their noetic access. This makes their status dubious at best. More straightforwardly, this distinction is 28 Kraut I am indebted to [omitted for blind review] for this point.

8 nowhere indicated in the text. Given how much weight it carries on this proposed account, its absence is conspicuous. My second reply is, I think, more decisive. There is a point in the text where Socrates makes a statement that simply cannot be reconciled with this modified conventional position. Speaking of the philosopher kings, he says: If good education makes them moderate men, they will easily discover all this for themselves and everything else that we are now omitting, such as the possession of women, marriages, and the procreation of children, and how all these must be governed as far as possible by the old proverb that friends share everything in common. (423e-424a) The importance of this passage is that it has Socrates referring to 1) the philosopher kings, 2) their aristocratic education, and 3) his seemingly dystopian proposals all in one place. Aristocratic education is here set in a direct causal relationship with Socrates specific political claims, the success of the former leading to an embrace of the latter. Socrates therefore cannot be speaking of the first generation of philosopher kings, for they will not receive his aristocratic education. He can only be referring to subsequent generations of philosopher kings, and in doing so makes explicit the claim that they will put the relevant policies into effect. There is no getting around it; Socrates is claiming to have reliable knowledge of the way in which philosopher kings would rule, and yet elsewhere disavows such knowledge. The modified conventional interpretation, therefore, cannot stand. Additional support can be found in the dialectical structure of the text. Socrates repeatedly implies that he has finished defending his account of justice only to have his interlocutors express dissatisfaction and demand a more detailed treatment of various issues that they take to be unsettled. Socrates reaction is consistent in each instance, invoking a disavowal of certainty and then proceeding anyway. At 450d-e, for example, he states the following: If I were confident that I was speaking with knowledge, your encouragement would be all very well. When one is among knowledgeable and beloved friends, and one is speaking what one knows to be the truth about the most important and most beloved things, one can feel both secure and confident. But to produce arguments when one is uncertain and searching, as I am doing, is a frightening thing and makes one feel insecure. This casts significant doubt on Socrates subsequent statements, and it turns out that those statements regard precisely what is at issue: the seemingly dystopian elements of his account. We see the same situation again at 506c, where Socrates again suggests that continuing down the dialectical path proposed by his interlocutors will leave their conclusions on shaky (or even nonexistent) epistemic foundations: What? Do you think it is right to speak about things you do not know as if you do know them? Haven t you noticed that beliefs without knowledge are all shameful and ugly things, since the best of them are blind? Do you think that those who have a true belief without understanding are any different from blind people who happen to travel the right road? Socrates would seem to be here implying a kind of futility in continuing further on the proposed course, but his interlocutors encourage him to continue anyway. By Zeus, Socrates, do not stop

9 now, with the end in sight, so to speak! We will be satisfied if you discuss the good the way you discussed justice, temperance, and the rest, Adeimantus replies (506d). There are the makings of a pattern here: Socrates expresses misgivings about proceeding further, is seemingly goaded into doing so by his interlocutors anyway, and makes various radical statements. This state of affairs brings with it strong suspicions of sarcasm on Socrates part, and the proximity of his dystopian statements to his professions of ignorance at 450d-e are particularly forceful. It would be a great coincidence for the narrative structure to simply happen to take this course in exactly the way we would expect it were Socrates simply speaking sarcastically. IX This treatment allows us to account for the dystopian elements of the Republic without giving up any of the crucial contributions of the conventional interpretation. It also makes room for recognition of Strauss contribution without giving quarter to the problematic and overreaching conclusions that he draws from it. The overarching intuitions of the conventional interpretation are vindicated, one of the most significant barriers to their acceptance having been diffused. This renders Plato s presumed view far less objectionable (both for his contemporaries and modern readers) while allowing it to remain a significant contribution to political theory. In some ways, it becomes even more significant. His call becomes not one to eugenics or sexual communism but to humility. It takes a wise thinker to craft complex political policies, but it takes an even wiser one to admit that such policies are good but not good enough, or at the very least that he or she cannot be sure that they are. True political wisdom will thus rest in training (or locating) and then deferring to the only truly qualified candidate who can serve as the philosopher king.

10 Works Cited Annas, Julia. An Introduction to Plato s Republic. New York: Oxford UP, Kraut, Richard. "Introduction to the Study of Plato." The Cambridge Companion to Plato. Ed. Richard Kraut. New York: Cambridge UP, Marshall, Mason. "The Possibility Requirement in Plato's Republic." Ancient Philosophy no. 1 (2008): Morrison, Donald R. "The Utopian Character of Plato's Ideal City." The Cambridge Companion to Plato's Republic. Ed. G.R.F. Ferrari. New York: Cambridge UP, Plato. Republic. Trans. C.D.C. Reeve. Indianapolis: Hackett, Reeve, C.D.C. Philosopher-Kings: The Argument of Plato's Republic. Princeton: Princeton UP, Schofield, Malcolm. Plato. New York: Oxford UP, White, Nicholas P. A Companion to Plato s Republic. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1979.