Curriculum Vitae Melissa Fusco Department of Philosophy University of California, Berkeley 314 Moses Hall Berkeley, California 94720-2390 2139 Prince Street Berkeley, CA 94705 (650) 380-0011 msfusco@berkeley.edu http://www.melissafusco.com Education Ph.D. Philosophy (anticipated), University of California, Berkeley, 2015. B.A. Philosophy, with honors, Stanford University, 2006. B.A. Slavic Languages and Literatures, with distinction, Stanford University, 2006. Areas of Specialization Philosophy of Language, Philosophical Logic, Formal Semantics Areas of Competence Decision Theory, Metaphysics Dissertation: Deontic Disjunction I propose a unified solution to two puzzles: Ross s puzzle (the apparent failure of ought p to entail ought (p or q) ) and free choice permission (the apparent fact that may(p or q) entails both may p and may q ). I begin with a pair of cases from the decision theory literature illustrating the phenomenon of act dependence, where what an agent ought to do depends on what she does. The notion of permissibility distilled from these cases forms the basis for my analysis of may and ought. The framework is then combined with an independently motivated generalization of the classical semantics for disjunction, which dissolves the puzzles. Committee: John MacFarlane, Seth Yalcin (co-chairs); Line Mikkelsen (Linguistics) 1
Publications Free Choice Permission and the Counterfactuals of Pragmatics. Linguistics and Philosophy 37: 4 (2014). Factoring Disjunction out of Deontic Modal Puzzles. Proceedings of the 12th International Conference Deontic Logic and Normative Systems. Cariani, F., Grossi, D., Meheus, J., Parent, X. (Eds.) Springer Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence. Deontic Modality and the Semantics of Choice. Philosophers Imprint. Forthcoming, 2015. Presentations Deontic Disjunction Meaning Sciences Club, UC Berkeley, 09/30/2014. Magdalen College, Oxford University, 02/05/2015. UC Santa Cruz S-Circle, 02/21/2015. Society for Exact Philosophy, 05/20/2015. New York Philosophy of Language Workshop, 09/22/2015. Factoring Disjunction out of Deontic Modal Puzzles DEON 2014 (the 12th International Conference in Deontic Logic and Normative Systems) Ghent, Belgium, 07/15/2014. The Revenge of Causal Decision Theory Formal Epistemology Workshop (FEW), 05/2/2014. Berkeley-Stanford-Davis Philosophy Graduate Conference, 04/26/2014. Disjunction and which-sluicing California Universities Semantics and Pragmatics Conference (CUSP 6), 10/12/2013. Free Choice Permission as Decision-Dependent Permission UC Berkeley Dissertation Seminar, 09/26/2013. Nonfactuals and the Semantics of Whether-ascriptions First Annual Women in Metaphysics Conference, Rochester, Vermont, 05/26/2013. Berkeley-Stanford-Davis Philosophy Graduate Conference, 05/11/2013. Decision Dependence and Deontic Modality Richard Wollheim Society, UC Berkeley, 03/08/2013. Resolution Sensitivity and the Semantics of Deontic Modals Richard Wollheim Society, UC Berkeley, 01/25/2013. UC Berkeley Dissertation Seminar, 09/07/2012. Free Choice Permission and the Counterfactuals of Pragmatics. Harvard-MIT Graduate Student Conference, 03/18/2012. UC Berkeley Syntax and Semantics Circle, 10/3/2012. Two-Dimensionalism and Content Berkeley Undergraduate Forum, 04/06/2012. 2
Indiscriminability and Two Concepts of Color UC Berkeley PhilFemme, 04/30/2011. Epistemic Modal Draconianism. EMINEES, Harvard University, 10/17/2009. Rocky Mountain Philosophy Graduate Conference, Boulder, Colorado, 03/14/09. Asymmetric Dependence and Mimicry. Richard Wollheim Society, UC Berkeley, 11/09/07. Comments on Fabrizio Cariani, Logical Consequence for Actualists. Symposium on Philosophy of Language, American Philosophical Association Eastern Division Meeting, 01/07/16. Comments on Nathan Howard, The Anchor Puzzle for Deontic Necessity Modals. American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Meeting, 4/16/14. Comments on David Sackris, Invariant Content Theory for Epistemic Modals. American Philosophical Association Eastern Division Meeting, 12/29/13. Comments on Jonny McIntosh, Does Relativism Rest on a Mistake? Berkeley-London Graduate Conference, London, 05/04/12. Comments on Robert Bassett, Epistemic might is right! Berkeley-London Graduate Conference, Berkeley, 05/06/2011. Comments on Justin Snedegar, Contrastive Reasons and Withholding, Berkeley-Stanford-Davis Philosophy Graduate Conference, 04/18/2011. Comments on Justin Snedegar, Contrastive Semantics for Deontic Modals, Berkeley-Stanford-Davis Philosophy Graduate Conference, 04/24/10. Academic Awards, Honors, and Fellowships Berkeley Connect Fellow, UC Berkeley (2014-2016) Invited Participant, Mentoring and Networking Workshop for Graduate Student Women in Philosophy, Princeton University (2014) Graduate Division Summer Grant, UC Berkeley (2013) Graduate Student Travel Grant, UC Berkeley (2009) Ralph W. Church Fellowship, UC Berkeley (2006-07) National Merit Scholar, Stanford University (2001-06) Teaching Experience As Instructor of Record (UC Berkeley) Philosophy 12A: Introduction to Logic Summer 2012 3
As Graduate Student Instructor (UC Berkeley) Philosophy 135: Theory of Meaning Spring 2014 John Campbell Philosophy 100: Philosophical Methods Spring 2012, 2011; Fall 2009 Seth Yalcin Fall 2012 Daniel Warren Philosophy 133: Philosophy of Language Fall 2011, Fall 2010 John Searle Philosophy 12A: Introduction to Logic Fall 2013 Seth Yalcin Philosophy 3: Philosophy of Mind Spring 2013 Alva Noë Fall 2007 John Campbell Philosophy 125: Metaphysics Spring 2010 Geoffrey Lee Philosophy 6: Existentialism Spring 2008 Hubert Dreyfus As Teaching Fellow (Harvard University) MR 56: Self, Freedom and Existence Fall 2008 Richard Moran Philosophy 175: Ethical Theories Spring 2009 Talbot Brewer 4
Professional Service Referee, Erkenntnis Organizer for CUSP 6 (the California Universities Semantics and Pragmatics Conference), UC Berkeley (2013) Facilitator for the New Crop Philosophy Undergraduate Prize, UC Berkeley (2011-12) Reviewer for the Berkeley-Stanford-Davis Graduate Student Conference (2010-11) Reviewer for the Berkeley-London Graduate Student Conference (2012) Organizer for the Working Group in Philosophy of Mind and Neuroscience, UC Berkeley (2007-08) Philosophy Department Colloquium Organizer, UC Berkeley (2007-08) Graduate Coursework (* = audit) At UC Berkeley Metaphysics and Metasemantics* Spring 2014 Seth Yalcin Modality, Partiality, and Perspective* Fall 2013 Wes Holliday Decision Theory: Paradoxes and Alternatives* Fall 2013 Lara Buchak Ling 220B: Syntax & Semantics Spring 2013 Line Mikkelsen Ling 220A: Syntax Fall 2012 Peter Jenks Probability in Epistemology* Spring 2012 Sherrilyn Roush Logic, Epistemology and Natural Language* Fall 2011 Seth Yalcin Expressivism and Relativism* Spring 2011 John MacFarlane Perspective in Language* Fall 2010 Seth Yalcin Content Without Structure* Spring 2010 John MacFarlane, Seth Yalcin Proof Theory* Fall 2010 Paolo Mancosu Plato s Meno Spring 2008 David Ebrey Descartes Spring 2008 Marleen Rozemond Appearance and Expression Fall 2007 M. G. F. Martin Early Wittgenstein/Tractatus Fall 2007 Paolo Mancosu, Hans Sluga Spatial Representation Spring 2007 John Campbell Recent Work in Moral Philosophy Spring 2007 R. Jay Wallace Meaning, Understanding, and Attribution Fall 2006 Barry Stroud McDowell & Merleau-Ponty Fall 2006 Hubert Dreyfus, Hannah Ginsbourg First Year Seminar Fall 2006 John Searle, John MacFarlane 5
At Massachusetts Institute of Technology Topics in Philosophical Logic Spring 2009 Vann McGee Political Philosophy Spring 2009 Sally Haslanger, Rae Langton Topics in Philosophy of Mind Fall 2008 Alex Byrne Languages French (advanced); Italian (advanced); Russian (some reading knowledge) 6
Dissertation Abstract: Deontic Modals and the Semantics of Choice Melissa Fusco Formal developments of normative theories typically claim that the guidance they give is universal: for any agent, and any way the world could be, there is a way she ought (according to that theory) to act. Yet when we consider an agent facing an open, indeterminate future, cases are possible in which what she ought to do depends on what she actually does. These situations follow the letter of the law while seeming to violate its spirit. A famous example, discussed by Gibbard and Harper (1978), comes from Somerset Maugham: while in Damascus, you learn that Death is coming to collect your soul. Your one option is to flee to Aleppo. But you are confident that Death never misses her quarry: if you flee to Aleppo, Death will be there. But if you stay in Damascus, Death will be there too. If Death is going to Damascus, you should go to Aleppo, and if Death is going to Aleppo, you should go to Damascus. So for any way the world could be, there is a way you should act. Yet there is a clear sense in which there is nothing you can do: since Death s destination depends on yours, no act is such that you ought to have done it, given that you do it. The norms of rationality in cases of this structure and cases with the opposite structure, where available acts deontically validate themselves are the subject of much recent work in ethics, decision theory, and the metaphysics of persons. I show how a model theory for the natural language modals ought and may can incorporate these notions of deontic validation and self-defeat. Because may tracks the concept of permissibility brought out by act-dependent cases, its inferential properties reflect the language-independent intuitions we have about choiceworthiness, in cases like Death in Damascus. This theorizing makes contact with natural language in the form of my solutions to two infamous puzzles about deontic modal language, free choice permission (Kamp 1973) and Ross s puzzle (Ross 1941). Free choice permission is the apparent validity of the classically invalid inference from may(ϕ or ψ) to both may ϕ and may ψ, and Ross s paradox is the apparent invalidity of the classically valid inference from ought ϕ to ought(ϕ or ψ). The first step to a unified solution to these puzzles is precisely to leverage the notion of permissibility corresponding to deontic self-validation. The second component is a generalization of classical logic. On my account, the interpretation of a disjunction depends on which of its atomic disjuncts are true at the actual state where the actual state can be keyed to the future-actual state an agent chooses when she acts. While classical consequence is preserved for sentences without modals, this analysis sets up a match between the act one brings about and the contents of statements describing that act s deontic status. This allows the stronger-than-classical conclusions of free choice permission to follow, and blocks the inference in Ross s puzzle. It also predicts the positive entailment properties of disjunction under ought, while preserving the inviolability of the role classical disjunction plays in our reasoning. This intuitively appealing combination has, in previous work, proved difficult to achieve. 7
References John MacFarlane, Professor of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley send.fuscomacfarlane2014.b70ff67c14@interfolio.com Seth Yalcin, Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley send.fuscoyalcin2014.a63862b0d8@interfolio.com Lara Buchak, Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley send.fuscobuchak2014.fe6de997ec@interfolio.com Alva Noë, Professor of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley send.fusconoe2014.493897aef0@interfolio.com Peter Jenks, Assistant Professor of Linguistics, University of California, Berkeley send.fuscojenks2014.3ff71ba215@interfolio.com Line Mikkelsen, Professor of Linguistics, University of California, Berkeley send.fuscomikkelsen2014.5b42d939f8@interfolio.com Departmental Contact Mr. David Lynaugh, Graduate Assistant, Department of Philosophy, 314 Moses Hall, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720. Email: dlynaugh@berkeley.edu. 8