Puzzles for Divine Omnipotence & Divine Freedom 1. Defining Omnipotence: A First Pass: God is said to be omnipotent. In other words, God is all-powerful. But, what does this mean? Is the following definition correct? Omnipotence (a): The power to do anything. Square Circles: Can God make something that is both a square and a circle? If God can do ANYTHING, then it seems like the answer should be Yes. Yet, square circles seem to be impossible. How could something be both a square and a circle? It seems like EVEN GOD could not make something have both of those features at one and the same time. Aquinas, like most Medieval philosophers, admits that God lacks the power to do a lot of things. Most importantly, God cannot generate contradictions. He writes, God can do all things, is rightly understood to mean that God can do all things that are possible. (ST, I.25.3) He explains that something is possible if the predicate is not incompatible with the subject, as that Socrates sits; and absolutely impossible when the predicate is altogether incompatible with the subject, as, for instance, that a man is a donkey. (ibid.) Explicit contradictions: A violation of the law of non-contradiction is impossible, even for an omnipotent being. So, He cannot make one and the same thing to be and not to be (SCG, II.25). For instance, God cannot make you (or anything else) both exist and not exist at the same time. Incompatible properties: Some properties are not contradictory, but contrary (i.e., they cannot both be true though they CAN both be false). God cannot make contrary statements true either. For instance, He can t make something be both black all over and white all over at the same time Essential properties: For Aquinas, each thing also has essential properties (i.e., properties which it cannot possibly lack). Therefore, it is also true that God could not make, say, a horse that is not a mammal (Aquinas s example is that God could not make a man without a soul, or make a man that is also a donkey for him, these are contraries). Facts About the Past: Aquinas also thinks that God cannot change the past. The past has already HAPPENED. So, to alter some event, A, would make it such that A both happened and did NOT happen. This is a contradiction. (See ST, I.25.4) 1
God can of course erase the EFFECTS of some past event. For instance, He could make a scar disappear. But, this does not erase the FACT that the event HAPPENED. He writes, God can remove all corruption of the mind and body [but it is] impossible that the fact of having sinned or having lost charity thereby can be removed from the sinner. Conclusion: Aquinas is not admitting defeat. He is not saying that there is some power that God could have had, but lacks; rather it is merely that some things are simply IMPOSSIBLE such that NO possible being could do them. Hence it is better to say that such things cannot be done, than that God cannot do them. (ST, I.25.3) Aquinas is offering an amended definition of omnipotence. All-powerful does not mean The power to do anything but rather: Omnipotence (b): The power to do anything that does entail a contradiction. Since a square circle is a self-contradictory concept (something cannot be both a circle, and NOT a circle at one and the same time, or have 4 sides and NOT have 4 sides, etc.), God can still be omnipotent in this sense without being able to make a square circle. The same would go for the following: God cannot make a married bachelor, or make the number 2 be the number 3, or a triangle whose angles do not add up to 180 degrees, or make himself be both God and not God, etc. 2. Defining Omnipotence: A Second Pass: However, Aquinas wants to add a lot more to this list of things that God cannot do. For, he also adds that God cannot: Change, lack something good, forget something, suffer, or sin. Why can t God lack something good? Because He is maximally good. Why can t God sin? Because He is morally perfect. Thus, we might initially think that there IS something of a contradiction here, if God were to do these things. For, isn t the following statement internally inconsistent? A morally perfect being does something morally wrong. In short, we might suggest the following revision: Omnipotence (c): The power to do anything that does not entail a contradiction, whether that be because the action itself is internally inconsistent, or because the action is inconsistent with the nature of the actor. 2
This definition would solve a great number of other problems. For instance, it would also explain why God cannot do things like FORGET A FACT (an omniscient being not knowing something is a contradiction), or CEASE TO EXIST (a necessarily existent being not existing is a contradiction), or PERFORM AN EVIL DEED (a morally perfect being committing a morally wrong action is a contradiction). If omnipotence is restricted to actions that are compatible with God s nature, then God can lack these abilities while retaining his omnipotence. However, this would be a terrible idea. Aquinas writes, If, however, we were to say that God is omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible to His power, there would be a vicious circle in explaining the nature of His power. For this would be saying nothing else but that God is omnipotent, because He can do all that He is able to do. (ST, I.25.3) In short, the proposal above defines God s power in terms of His power. For instance, God is all-powerful even though He cannot forget something because it is not in the power of an omniscient being to forget; and so on. This is viciously circular. [To illustrate, consider this case, from contemporary philosopher Alvin Plantinga: Mr. McEar: Mr. McEar is a man who has the essential property of only having the power to scratch his ear. He is incapable of doing anything else. Mr. McEar does not seem to be omnipotent. But, he WOULD be omnipotent on the above definition. For instance, Mr. McEar is incapable of standing up; however, A being who has the essential property of only scratching his ear doing something besides scratching his ear (standing up in this case) entails a contradiction. Therefore, it is no detriment to Mr. McEar s omnipotence that he cannot stand up. In fact, even though Mr. McEar cannot do ANYTHING besides scratch his ear, this does not detract from his omnipotence on this definition. Because NONE of those (non-earscratching) actions are compatible with his nature (i.e., essential properties). (Note that it is the fact that McEar has this property of only being able to scratch his ear ESSENTIALLY that is doing the work. You and I would not be omnipotent on this definition. I cannot jump over a building, but presumably my lack of this ability is not a part of my NATURE; i.e., it is not ESSENTIAL to me. Things that are essential to me are probably more like being human, having a soul, and so on. One might worry that McEar s essential properties are really strange how can something even HAVE such a weird essential property? but the point is to illustrate that God would be omnipotent in only a trivial sense on the proposal above.)] 3
3. Defining Omnipotence: A Final Pass: The medieval solution to this problem is simple: Such things are not powers at all! Rather, they are weaknesses! Anselm writes, whoever can do these things can do them, not in virtue of his power, but in virtue of his weakness. So when we say that he can do these things, it is not because he has the power to do them, but because his weakness gives something else power over him. (Proslogion 7) And Aquinas writes, To sin is to fall short of a perfect action; hence to be able to sin is to be able to fall short in action, which is repugnant to omnipotence. Therefore it is that God cannot sin, because of His omnipotence. (ST, I.25.3) Consider our power to forget, or to sin. These are not really GOOD things. It would be BETTER if we did NOT forget things, or sin, and so on. Our ability to do them does not really seem to stem from a power in us, but rather a weakness. One does not sin because one has the POWER to do so. Rather, one sins because of some weakness in the face of temptation and it is this WEAKNESS that God lacks. Note that this point was clearer in Latin, where weakness (impotentia) literally meant lacking power (potentia). Conclusion: In short, all-powerful should really be understood as follows: Omnipotence (d): Maximally powerful; i.e., having the greatest amount of power that it is logically possible to have. (This includes the power to do anything that does not entail a contradiction, or result from weakness rather than power.) 4. Divine Freedom and the Best of All Possible Worlds: However, another problem arises. If God cannot sin because such an action would be done out of weakness rather than power, can God do less than the best? After all, God isn t just morally pretty good. God is supposed to be morally PERFECT. In that case, it seems like God necessarily does the BEST. Problem: But, then, this seems to entail that God lacks free will. Abelard: God is Not Free: Abelard bites the bullet, accepting that God is not free. As a morally perfect being, everything that God does must be good. So, everything He does is good to do; and everything He omits is good to omit. If there were something else that WOULD HAVE been good for God to do, then He would have done it! For, failing to do a good thing is bad, and so not befitting of a morally perfect being. Abelard writes, 4
If, then, when it is good to do something it is not good to omit it, and God can do or omit only what it is good for him to do or omit, clearly it seems that he can only do or omit what he does do or does omit. [For] if he omits what it is good for him to do and draws back from some things which should be done, who would not infer that he is sort of envious or hostile? Two conclusions follow: (a) God can only do (or omit) what He DOES do (or omit). (b) This is the best of all possible worlds. Since this world exists, and God exists, THIS world must be the best possible world that an all-powerful being could create. For, if it is NOT the best, then there is something better (i.e., MORE GOOD) that God could have done, but failed to do but this falls short of what a morally perfect being would do. So, this is the best world, and God cannot do anything other than what he does. Some worries: If Abelard is correct, we might worry that, (i) God is like a slave to His nature, compelled to do what He does. Reply: Abelard thinks we are speaking improperly here. Someone is COMPELLED only if they are forced to do something WHETHER OR NOT THEY WANT TO. But, God s actions are always aligned with His will. He ALWAYS does what he WANTS to do. This is not compulsion. (ii) God is not worthy of our gratitude, since He really had no choice but to create us. Reply: Imagine that someone is SUCH a good person that they can t help themselves from saving us, helping us, or doing something good for us, etc. You d still be grateful to them. Wouldn t you? Isn t this person s goodness even BETTER than that of someone who only occasionally does good things? [Interesting question: Would you be MORE or LESS thankful to someone who struggled against their vices to do something unexpectedly good for us? (compared to a do-gooder who always, predictably does good all the time, such that doing good came naturally and easily for them? Also, isn t Abelard being inconsistent here? In his Ethics (22), he seemed to suggest that those who do good despite STRUGGLING with evil desires and inclinations are MORE praiseworthy who do good with no struggle at all!] 5
(iii) We re better than God, since we have a power that He does not (i.e., free will). Reply: Here, Abelard appeals to the Anselmian view: The ability to do something other than the best is not really a power, but a weakness, writing, we would be totally better if we could do only those things which we ought to do and nothing shameful could be done by us. (iv) If God cannot do otherwise, He cannot even FORESEE otherwise; i.e., whatever future for US that God sees is set in stone, and could not have been otherwise. In short, we too exist necessarily, and we lack free will. Reply: Abelard points out that the necessity is only on the part of God s nature. God necessarily did what He did. But, one of the things He did was create FREE creatures (whose freedom included the ability to create or not create others). So, WE can be free, contingent beings even if God is not. He clarifies, In the former case, as we qualified it, possible made reference to God s nature; in the latter case, to the natures of creatures. Thus, although God necessarily has from his own nature either providence of things or a good will in relation to them, because this is especially fitting for God, still it is not necessary that the nature of things things which are completely able not to be require that they be. Compatibilist Solution: Abelard notes that some (e.g., Augustine) attempted to avoid this conclusion by claiming that there is a sense in which God IS still free. Namely, even if everything Abelard has said is correct, it remains the case that, IF God had wanted to do otherwise, He WOULD have done otherwise (for, nothing can prevent an all-powerful being from carrying out its will). Reply: Abelard offers two criticisms of this account: (a) First, on this account, God could sin. For, <IF God wanted to sin, then He WOULD sin> is true. (b) Furthermore, the antecedent is impossible. God CAN T want to sin. So, it doesn t really make sense to say that He has the power to sin. For, where his will is lacking his power is lacking too. Aquinas: God is Free, but Constrained: For Aquinas, God is only required to preserve The Good. But, it follows from this not only that God is not obligated to create the BEST. God is not obligated to create AT ALL! Aquinas says that God would only be morally REQUIRED to create something whose non-existence causes the nature of the good entirely to be lost. But there is no such good apart from God. (SCG, I.81) Since God IS The Good, even if He created NOTHING, the whole of reality would still contain perfect Goodness. So, God is not morally required to create anything at all. 6
No Best World?: Aquinas thinks it is clear that God is not obligated to create the best. The reason is simple: We ve proven that God exists, but clearly this isn t the best world! Consider: The BEST world would seem to require an INFINITE number of beings. For any good world, that world would have even MORE good in it if God created one more happy creature. We can repeat this inference without end. However, look around you. We know that there are NOT an infinite number of creatures. (But do we really?) Therefore, it must not be the case that God is morally required to create the best. (We might even think the very notion of a best world is incoherent!) He writes, But, since the divine goodness is infinite, it can be participated in infinite ways, and in ways other than it is participated in by the creatures that now exist. If, then, as a result of willing His own goodness, God necessarily willed the things that participate in it, it would follow that He would will the existence of an infinity of creatures participating in His goodness in an infinity of ways. This is patently false, because, if He willed them, they would be. (SCG, I.81) God, the Satisficer?: A maximizing moral theory says that one is always obligated to the BEST. Aquinas s moral theory seems to be a satisficing one: God is only obligated to do what good enough. And Aquinas seems to think that God has done good enough so long as whatever world He creates is perfect in its own way. (see below) Could God Have Made a Better World? Yes and no. God could not have made THIS world better for then it would no longer be this world, but some other, even as He cannot make the number four greater than it is; because if it were greater it would no longer be four, but another number. (ST, I.25.6) Aquinas believes that any world God creates must have a sort of perfect harmony, so to speak such that if anything were changed, it would destroy that harmony because God establishes a perfect order or balance in His creation. He gives the metaphor of a perfectly tuned harp: Change the tuning of any single string and the harmony of the whole harp is disrupted. Yet, He could have made some OTHER world that was better than this one. Only, THAT world would have had some OTHER order or balance in it, by God s design. He writes, if any one thing were bettered, the proportion of order would be destroyed; as if one string were stretched more than it ought to be, the melody of the harp would be destroyed. Yet God could make other things, or add something to the present creation; and then there would be another and a better universe. 7
[Wait, Aquinas says that everything eternal is necessary. (SCG, I.83) And (since God does not change) God eternally wills the creation of the universe. So, isn t God s act of creating NECESSARY? And if so, doesn t it follow that God is not free? Answer: No. Medieval philosophers believed that, if something was true at all times, then it was NECESSARILY true but only in a weaker sense. Aquinas distinguishes between two types of necessity: Necessity by supposition: Supposing that it is true at all times that God willed X, then <God willed creatures> is necessary by supposition. However, Absolute necessity: Something is absolutely necessary if its denial entails a contradiction. And since <God did not will creatures> is not self-contradictory, this is not necessary in the absolute sense; i.e., it is possible. (Contrast this with <God does not make a square circle> which IS necessary in the absolute sense.) God s act of creation is only necessary in the first way, but not in the second and Aquinas thinks that this is compatible with God s freedom.] Scotus: God s Freedom is Not Constrained: Scotus accepts the standard view that God cannot do what is contradictory. However, his God is far more free than Aquinas s. For a human being, if we want to do what is right, or best, there is only one course of action available to us: We must do what is best according to the law of morality. If we do otherwise, we fall short of that law. But, that is only true of us because we are under the law, so to speak we are subject to it, and unable to change it. However, recall that, for Scotus, God DECIDES morality. God can do whatever is not contradictory. But, that leaves open pretty much any moral code, because in those laws there is not found any necessity coming from the terms (for example, that every sinner will be damned), but only from the divine will that accepts it. (Ordinatio, I.44) He writes, when that right law is not in the power of the agent, then in that case the action not in conformity with right law is neither right nor regulated, because such an agent is held to act in accord with the rule that it comes under. But when the law and the rightness of the law is in the power of the agent in such a way that it is right only if it has been established, then in virtue of its freedom the agent can regulate things differently than that right law dictates. Consequently, just as He can do otherwise, so He can set up another right law, and if this were set up by God it would be right, because no law is right except to the extent that it is set up by the divine will that accepts it. (ibid.) 8
In short, God can make pretty much whatever world He wants (barring worlds with contradictions, or contradictory moral laws). And that world would be the best world NO MATTER WHAT! For, whatever world He creates, He can just say, This is the BEST possible world and declare morality to be whatever which way makes this true. In short, this IS the best of all possible worlds. But, so would ANY world God created have been. [So God could have even made a world where we all suffer forever, where torture, rape, and murder are all good, and so on, and this would have been the best possible world? First, is that really what Scotus is committed to? Second, if so, is this plausible?] 9