In Defense of Culpable Ignorance

It is common in everyday situations and interactions to hold people responsible for things they didn t know but which they ought to have known. For example, if a friend were to jump off the roof of a house and break his leg many would feel that he is fully responsible for the consequences of his actions because he ought to have known the dangers of such risky behavior. This idea that one can and should be held responsible for things they didn t know (i.e. things they are ignorant of) is a topic of debate in the field of philosophy called Ethics of Belief. This idea gains even more significance when applied to extreme cases (e.g. even if Hitler did not know that it was wrong to exterminate a portion of the population he ought to have known, and we can hold him responsible for his action in an attempt to do so). Framed in the technical language of the field, the debate focuses on the question: Can a person be culpably ignorant? This is a question that has received increasing attention throughout the twentieth and into the twenty-first century. Recently, Michael J. Zimmerman and James Montmarquet have weighed in on opposite sides of this debate. The purpose of this paper is to examine their respective arguments and ultimately defend Montmarquet s position that a person can be culpably ignorant. In the first section of this paper I describe Zimmerman s position and his arguments against culpable ignorance. In the second section I describe Montmarquet s response to Zimmerman, and in the third section, Zimmerman s counter-response to Montmarquet. In the fourth and final section I argue against Zimmerman s position and offer a defense of culpable ignorance. Specifically, I argue that people are in direct (though incomplete) control of their beliefs and are thus responsible for their ignorance and actions done as a consequence of such ignorance. In certain contexts, people have fundamental epistemic obligations, such as carefully 1

considering how to apply one s beliefs, and these are based on one s fundamental moral obligations. I: Zimmerman on Moral Responsibility and Ignorance There are countless examples, both fictional and historical, of people acting out of ignorance. Sometimes these actions are ones which many people deem morally wrong. The question then arrises, is the person who acted in this morally wrong way, but who was ignorant of the moral implications prior to acting, morally responsible? Michael J. Zimmerman argues 1 that a person is only morally responsible, or morally culpable, if he or she is culpable for his or her ignorance. He acknowledges that most people agree that this is the case, however, he disagrees with the common sense view that the conditions for culpable ignorance are frequently met. He believes that, the conditions are pretty restrictive and that therefore culpable ignorance occurs less frequently, perhaps far less frequently, than is commonly supposed. 2 Zimmerman begins his article with a fictional story about a car crash. Doris has driven her car into a tree when Perry arrives at the scene. No one else is around to help and Doris is unconscious. Perry s mind is filled with visions of cars starting on fire and exploding in grand theatrical fashion. He rushes in and quickly drags Doris to a safe distance from the car. The car doesn t explode and within minutes the paramedics arrive to find that Perry has paralyzed Doris while he was attempting to save her. 3 The question that Zimmerman is interested in is: Is Perry morally responsible for paralyzing Doris? For the purposes of the article, Zimmerman takes as an assumption that freedom is required for moral responsibility and that Perry did in fact act freely. With this assumption, Zimmerman focuses on investigating the additional condition 1 Zimmerman, 1997. 2 Ibid. Pg. 411. 3 Ibid. Pg. 410. 2

or conditions required for moral culpability. This is where the notion of culpable ignorance takes center stage; if a person acts freely but does so out of ignorance, is he or she culpable for the action? Zimmerman argues that a person is culpable for the action only when he or she is culpable for their ignorance. Zimmerman explains that he understands ignorance to be constituted by failure of belief. 4 The ignorance that Zimmerman thinks is relevant in Perry s case is his ignorance of his doing something morally wrong (or, at least, of his running an undue risk of doing something morally wrong--and running such a risk is itself a form of wrongdoing). 5 So, how is it that Perry could be to blame for this sort of ignorance? Zimmerman ultimately rejects the easy and common answer : Perry is to blame if he ought to have known better. He rejects this answer because he understands the ought here to express an obligation. He assumes that this obligation ought implies can, but he is searching for an additional condition besides freedom that imputes culpability. He does not believe that this easy answer is enough. Zimmerman believes that a person, Perry in our story, can only be considered culpable for his ignorant action, if he was culpable for his ignorance. But, Zimmerman believes we can never be in direct control of our ignorance. In order to be culpable for ignorance we must find something that we are in direct control of and which ignorance is a consequence. Zimmerman considers the obvious answer that it is carelessness 6 that one is directly culpable for and which ignorance is a consequence. He rejects this answer however, because he believes the question still remains. 7 The upshot of Zimmerman s argument is that culpability for 4 Ibid. Pg. 412. 5 Ibid. Pg. 412. 6 Or inconsiderateness, inattentiveness, etc 7 Ibid. Pg. 416. 3

ignorant actions and ignorance itself can only ever be indirect and consequently, all culpability can be traced to culpability that involves lack of ignorance, that is, that involves a belief on the agent s part that he or she is doing something morally wrong. 8 In addition to freedom, a lack of ignorance is a necessary condition for direct responsibility/culpability. As this relates to the fictional story, Perry is not culpable for paralyzing Doris because it was done out of ignorance and one can never be directly culpable for ignorance. II: Montmarquet s Response James Montmarquet begins his response 9 by summarizing Zimmerman s arguments and conclusions. He explains that Zimmerman s conclusion is that a person (e.g. Perry) would only be culpable, if he had done something very odd--like act at some earlier time so as to cause himself to be ignorant now, aware at that earlier point that what he was doing was wrong. 10 Montmarquet s response to Zimmerman focuses on carelessness, which Zimmerman dismissed as inadequate, and a person s direct responsibility/control of it. Montmarquet asserts that if one s control/responsibility of his or her carefulness/carelessness is direct, then his or her control/responsibility for carelessly formed beliefs is also direct. Montmarquet offers an analogy to illustrate how he thinks direct control can transfer from action to consequence. He asks the reader to consider a case of carelessly doing an action (whistling) over which it can be assumed that one has direct control. In virtue of the fact that a person has direct control over a way of doing something (a modality), it is not implied that he or she only has indirect control over the action itself. He explains that, On the contrary, it would seem to imply direct--if by no means complete--control of the latter. 11 Montmarquet is explicit that even though direct control of a 8 Ibid. Pg. 418. 9 Montmarquet, 1999. 10 Ibid. Pg. 843. 11 Ibid. Pg. 844. 4

modality does imply direct control of the action, it does not imply a complete control of the action. This can be illustrated by considering whistling again. If one directly controls the care with which he or she whistles then they seem to be in direct control of that aspect of the action, but there may be other aspects, such as loudness, with which they are not directly controlling. This seems to be the case with believing: A person may not be able to directly control what they believe, but they can directly control how they believe. 12 As Montmarquet says, this would seem to imply a direct yet incomplete control. Montmarquet applies this to the Perry and Doris case to further illustrate and argue against Zimmerman s general conclusion. If Perry is, at least partially, directly responsible for his carelessly formed belief that he should move Doris because the car is going to explode, but he is not aware of the wrongness of believing as he does, he is still responsible for the action. However, Montmarquet recognizes the appeal of Zimmerman s intuitions, for if one is in a given mental state but is not aware of any wrongness attached to being in this state, how can one be expected to exert any efforts to get our of this state? (This seems to violate the familiar notion that ought implies can. 13 But, Montmarquet believes that this appeal misses the point. It is not one s inability to escape from ignorance that is blameworthy, it is the ignorance itself that is culpable. The individual, Perry in our example, is culpable for simply being in such a state of ignorance. He ought not have been ignorant in this way in the first place. III: Zimmerman s Counter-response Zimmerman responds with an attack on Montmarquet s whistling analogy and with an extended defense of his belief that no one is ever in direct control of being ignorant. He starts by explaining his theory of action which grounds his belief that one cannot have direct control over 12 I will elaborate on this in section IV. 13 Ibid. Pg. 845. 5

the care with which one forms beliefs or over the belief itself. On his view, a person can only ever directly be in control of his or her volitions. All consequences of the volition are merely indirectly controlled. One s control over any action is what Zimmerman calls hybrid : direct with respect to the volition but, as just noted, indirect with respect to the result. 14 Zimmerman provides an example to help illustrate this theory of action and direct control: if a person flips a switch by raising his or her hand, this complex event is composed of a volition (to raise one s hand), which causes the hand to rise, which in turn causes the switch to go up. This complex event can also include further consequences as well, for example, the switch going up can cause a light to go on, etc. However, on his theory of action, the only event that a person can be in direct control of is the volition, all other consequences can, at best, be indirectly controlled. Zimmerman next moves on to consider Montmarquet s whistling analogy. Under Zimmerman s theory of action he thinks it is clear that neither the whistling nor the care with which someone whistles can be under his or her direct control (only the volition to do these can be directly controlled). 15 Zimmerman explains that if the analogy between whistling and believing were a good one, the result would be that believing can only ever be, at best, indirectly controlled. But Zimmerman doesn t even think that the analogy is apt because he does not believe that belief is an action, it can at best be the result of an action. 16 A better analogy to the action of whistling would be the forming of a belief, but as Zimmerman emphasizes, this action will still only be indirectly controlled because it will have been a consequence of a directly controlled volition. 14 Ibid. Pg. 486. 15 Ibid. Pg. 486. 16 Ibid. Pg. 487. 6

Zimmerman acknowledges that many people might find his theory of action controversial, but instead of providing an in depth defense of the theory he chooses to offer a second argument. He explains that, even if it is allowed that one can have direct control over the care that one takes regarding what to believe about something, still it must be accepted that one cannot have direct control over the belief itself. 17 Zimmerman argues that, any plausible account of control will deny that we are directly in control of our nonbasic actions. 18 These nonbasic actions would be things like raising one s hand and causing the switch to go up. One can never be in direct control of such things. Simply by having the switch glued down shows that one is not directly in control of making it go up even though they are directly in control of willing it to go up. With this necessary component for any plausible account of control, Zimmerman alleges that a person cannot be culpable for their ignorance because in order to become non-ignorant one must consciously see that they are ignorant, which is precisely what is impossible when one is ignorant. IV: In Defense of Culpable Ignorance In this section I will explore ways that Montmarquet s position (or one very similar) can be elaborated on in order to further support the thesis that culpable ignorance is coherent and not merely found in exceedingly rare cases. Zimmerman objects that Montmarquet s whistling/believing analogy is not apt. In response I humbly offer this new analogy: a person can directly, yet incompletely, control their breathing by directly controlling one aspect - the care with which they breath. Analogously, a person can directly, yet incompletely, control their believing by directly controlling one aspect - the care with which they believe. I believe that this is a more apt analogy because believing 17 Ibid. Pg. 487. 18 Ibid. Pg. 488. 7

seems to be more like breathing because it is a reflexive/automatic occurrence rather than a willed action (such a whistling). We may never be able to completely control our breathing (or believing), but to say that we can never directly control any aspect of it seems plainly false. I will admit, that this analogy isn t perfect either. What it doesn t illuminate is why one should be expected to believe carefully. With the case of breathing one may agree that a person can directly control the care with which they breath, but they may legitimately ask why it matters if one do so? One reply may be that one should breath carefully (or mindfully) for health reasons or something of the sort, but there seems to be no underlying fundamental reason for a person to do this. So while the analogy is not fitting in this respect, it does seem to accomplish Montmarquet s initial intention in offering it: simply because a person has direct control over one thing, it does not follow that they only have indirect control over all consequences. A person may not be able to directly control what they believe, because it is an automatic response to experiencing and receiving information, but they can directly control one aspect of how they believe. The question now becomes, what is this aspect of belief that we can control and why ought we control it in this way? The terminology that has been used to refer to the aspect of belief that we are able to directly control has ranged from carefulness to conscientiousness to open-mindedness. So what is the aspect that we actually control? In Montmarquet s initial response to Zimmerman, he settled on the quality of openness to truth as the one that people can and ought to control. Zimmerman then objected that a person cannot be expected (held responsible) for controlling this openness unless they already believe that they should be open. Montmarquet s response is that the expectation is fundamental and does not depend on the beliefs of the person at any 8

particular time. Montmarquet explains this fundamental obligation by giving an example of an exchange between two people. If you had been open (as you should have been), you would have seen X. Yes, but since I was not open, I did not see the need for being open, so I could not see these things and cannot rightly have been expected to see them. 19 This nicely highlights the difference between Zimmerman and Montmarquet s views. For Zimmerman, the second speaker s response (if sincere) excuses them of all culpability for not seeing X and for not being open. For Montmarquet, the second speaker could still be culpable if they had a fundamental obligation to be open. Once again I would like to see if I can re-describe Montmarquet s position to make it even more clear. Consider another exchange: Professor: If you had been listening/paying attention during last week s lecture (as you should have been), you would have known that there was an exam today. Student: Yes, but since I was not listening/paying attention, I did not see the need to listen or pay attention, so I could not have known there was an exam today and cannot rightly have been expected to know. It seems even more clear to me in this second exchange that the student is culpable for their ignorance and the only reason seems to be because they have a fundamental obligation to listen/ pay attention during a lecture. But now one may justifiably ask Montmarquet: what sort of fundamental obligation do people have to exhibiting openness to truth? Is it an epistemic obligation? Is it a moral obligation? Is it some other sort or combination of obligations? I am not completely sure how Montmarquet would respond to these questions but I would like to briefly offer one avenue that could be explored. I believe that it may be fruitful to further explore the possibility that one s fundamental obligations regarding controlling one s beliefs is parasitic on one s fundamental moral 19 Montmarquet, 1999, pg. 845. 9

obligations. The view, moral epistemic contextualism, which has been explored and developed recently may be a principled way of spelling out one s fundamental obligations regarding controlling belief. 20 Briefly, moral epistemic contextualism may be described as such: How much one is morally required to do from an epistemic point of view with regard to investigating some proposition p varies depending on the moral context--on what actions one s belief in p (or absence of belief in p) will license or be used to justify, morally, in some particular context. 21 This would not even necessarily have to affect purely epistemic considerations such as justification. The standards of justification could remain the same while one s fundamental obligation towards belief control can increase and decrease as the situation and context change one s moral obligations. The obligation one has to exercise care and openness in their beliefs would be dependent on how those beliefs would be manifested and applied in particular situations. 22 While this path needs to be explored much further, my hope has simply been to offer one suggestion that a Montmarquetian view may use to further explain fundamental obligations in controlling belief. Conclusion It is my belief, along Montmarquetian lines, that culpable ignorance is conceptually coherent and whose conditions are quite frequently realized. I hope that the fourth section of this paper was able to further defend this belief by synthesizing and re-describing Montmarquet s views as well as offer a suggestion for further investigation as this position is further developed. 20 For an in depth discussion of moral epistemic contextualism, see Guerrero, 2007. 21 Ibid. Pg. 69. 22 This may be exactly Montmarquet s line on thinking in his 1992 article, pg. 338. 10

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