Statement of Research

Statement of Research Amanda Bryant My central topic of research is the epistemology and methodology of metaphysics, particularly the relationship between metaphysics and science. My research on that topic asks: What relationship should metaphysics stand in to current science? Must good metaphysics be responsive to current science, and if so, how? In response to those questions, I develop and defend a program for the naturalization of metaphysics. Those interests have also lead me to pursue work on metaontology, scientific realism, and Quine. Naturalizing Metaphysics In their (2007) book Every Thing Must Go, James Ladyman and Don Ross famously railed against what they call neo-scholastic metaphysics. Their polemic has inspired much renewed interest in the epistemic and methodological credentials of the discipline of metaphysics, as well as in the prospect of reform. While I am sympathetic to their self-described scientism, I argue that Ladyman and Ross fail to show that science in particular, physics should be assigned epistemic supremacy. Further, their program of naturalization fails to sufficiently reflect the complex and pluralistic state of the current sciences. So there is much work to be done to articulate and motivate a sophisticated program for the naturalization of metaphysics. My main research contributes to that work. In my view, current metaphysical practice falls into one of two camps: free range or scientifically responsible. Free range metaphysics is constrained only by logical, aesthetic, and psychological demands, such as demands for consistency, simplicity, intuitive plausibility, and explanatory power. In my view, free range metaphysics cannot claim to produce justified theories of reality, because the constraints on its content are too weak and fail to secure epistemic warrant. By contrast, scientifically responsible metaphysics is conscientiously engaged with the theories and practices of the current sciences. I claim that scientifically responsible metaphysics is better constrained and supported than free range metaphysics, and therefore can better claim to produce justified metaphysical theories. I have produced three papers directly on this topic. The first levels my criticisms of free range metaphysics, considers some of its collateral benefits, and makes a normative conclusion for the discipline of metaphysics. The second articulates and defends an epistemology for naturalized modal metaphysics that takes current science as an evidence-base for the justification of modal claims and as a model of good modal reasoning. My account of naturalized modal metaphysics does not rely on dubious modal intuitions, allows for greater resolution of disagreement relative to rationalist accounts, and can better account for modal error. The third paper examines the naturalistic credentials of the grounding literature. It collects examples of work in the grounding literature that I take to be scientifically responsible (Audi 2012; Schaffer 2003, 2010, 2015) and synthesizes a number of recommendations for how theorists of grounding can fruitfully engage with science. Bryant Research Statement 1 of 6

In future research on this topic, I plan to attend in greater detail to the place of scientific practice in a naturalized metaphysics. I d like to flesh out and give specific examples of modes of metaphysical engagement with scientific practice, such as such as attending to the categories and conceptual frameworks that are used fruitfully in science (see for instance Ereshefsky 1991, 1994, 2001). I also plan to do some first-order metaphysics on modality and grounding to demonstrate what my conception of scientifically responsible metaphysics looks like concretely. Furthermore, while I make my program of naturalization sensitive to the possibility of scientific pluralism, I intend to investigate more fully what the truth of scientific pluralism would mean for naturalized metaphysics. In particular, I d like to consider whether scientific pluralism implies some kind of metaphysical pluralism, and what its features would be. I also plan to produce a book on the topic that will 1) situate my program for naturalizing metaphysics in relation to other such programs, 2) outline a number of desiderata for programs of naturalization, 3) show how my program satisfies the desiderata more fully than others, 4) lay out and defend my negative and positive claims, 5) deal with metaphysical topics that prima facie resist naturalization, and 6) perform some first-order, scientifically responsible metaphysics. Metaontology In relation to my interesest in the epistemology and methodology of metaphysics, some of my research investigates the theoretical legitimacy of ontological views that are permissive in the sense that they make the conditions for existence so weak that many or most putative things exist (see Ecklund 2006, 2009; Lewis 1986; Schaffer 2009; Williamson 2002). Prima facie, these permissive views violate a number of theory-governing norms, including norms favoring simplicity, empiricism, nominalism, and logical consistency. However, I argue that none of those apparent norm violations are egregious. Over the course of this research, I was struck by certain biologically motivated criticisms of Ockham s Razor (Wimsatt 1994) and other epistemic norms (Ereshefsky and Reydon 2015). In future research, I will examine the tenability of Ockham s Razor and other theorygoverning norms in certain scientific domains, and consider what the results mean for scientifically responsible metaphysics. Scientific Realism In addition to my research on the relation between science and metaphysics, some of my research concerns science itself scientific realism, in particular. If the epistemic credentials of naturalized metaphysics hang on the epistemic credentials of science, we need to know what those latter credentials are. In particular, if scientific realism turns out to be false or untenable, then it will be harder to motivate naturalization. On the subject of scientific realism, I have been gripped by recent work on the base-rate fallacy an error in probabilistic reasoning that threatens to fatally undermine the no miracles argument and the pessimistic meta-induction. In essence, the error is to ignore the prior probability (probability not conditional on any particular evidence) of the relevant hypothesis. The base-rate fallacy is disastrous to probabilistic reasoning. My paper on this subject Bryant Research Statement 2 of 6

rejects several realist defences of the no miracles argument (Psillos 2006; Worrall 2007, 2011, unpublished) against accusations that it commits the base-rate fallacy (Howson 2000, Lipton 2004, and Magnus and Callender 2004). The no miracles argument does, I argue, commit the base-rate fallacy and should be abandoned. In future research, I plan to consider the special motivations for naturalization that might emerge from an anti-realist point of view. Some advocates of naturalized metaphysics (French and Ladyman 2003; French 2014; Ladyman 1998; Ladyman and Ross 2007) argue that physics motivates a particular variety of realism: Ontic Structural Realism (OSR), according to which science acquaints us with the ontologically fundamental underlying structure of the world. Since science makes OSR a live theoretical option, I am interested in OSR s tenability. One of my papers considers whether versions of OSR that posit objectless ontologies can accommodate causation. Some critics (Busch 2003, Chakravartty 2003, Psillos 2009) argue that objectless structures don t have the sorts of properties (first-order properties) required to enable causal relations. I argue that taking structures to be concrete and understanding objects, properties, and events in structural terms allows us to square causation with OSR. The upshot is that advocates of OSR can comfortably appeal to causal explanations. I plan to continue my work on OSR. In particular, I would like to grapple with a thorny challenge facing the full articulation of OSR: what to make of relations. Quine Lastly, in relation to my work on naturalizing metaphysics, I have an interest in Quine s system of thought, particularly his epistemology its naturalism and holism and his resultant philosophy of logic. One of my papers (Bryant forthcoming) grapples with the tension in Quine s work regarding the rational revisability of logic. On the one hand, Quine s commitment to the universal revisability of the web of belief clearly commits him to the rational revisability of logic. On the other hand, the translation argument and the change of logic, change of subject argument appear to rule out successful discussion of alternate logical principles and it s not clear how revision can proceed if rival logics aren t communicable (see also Priest 2006, 2014; Resnik 2004). My paper articulates a Neo-Quinean view that preserves and brings into alignment the universal revisability thesis, translation argument, and change of logic, change of subject argument. On that view, everything is revisable in some manner or other it s just that the logical principles that laypersons find (actually or potentially) obvious and tacitly use to govern their everyday inferences can t be revised quickly and all at once. Since, in Quine s view, what most people find obvious resists change, changes to laymen s logic must be gradual. In my exploration of Quine s broader system of thought, I have been compelled by his holism, on the one hand, but unwilling to accept the radical epistemological and methodological naturalism it implies, on the other. That is, while I advocate for the naturalization of metaphysics, I don t reject a priori knowledge and justification out of hand, nor do I wish to advocate for the naturalization of all forms of inquiry. In future work, I wish to develop a strategy to avoid the slippery slope from Bryant Research Statement 3 of 6

epistemic holism to radical naturalism a way of accepting holism about justification, while adopting moderate, domain-specific forms of naturalism. Works Cited Audi, Paul. 2012. A Clarification and Defense of the Notion of Grounding. In Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality, edited by Fabrice Correia and Benjamin Schnieder, 101 121. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. Bryant, Amanda. forthcoming. Resolving Quine s Conflict: A Neo-Quinean View of the Rational Revisability of Logic. In Australasian Journal of Logic (Special Issue: Frontiers of Non- Classicality: Logic, Mathematics, Philosophy), edited by Zach Weber, Maarten McKubre- Jordens, and Patrick Girard. Busch, Jacob. 2003. What Structures Could Not Be. International Studies in The Philosophy of Science 17: 211 225. Chakravartty, Anjan. 2003. The Structuralist Conception of Objects. Philosophy of Science 70: 867 878. Ecklund, Matti. 2009. Carnap and Ontological Pluralism. In Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, edited by David Chalmers, David Manley, and Ryan Wasserman, 130 157. Oxford: Oxford UP. -. 2006. Neo-Fregean Ontology. Philosophical Perspectives 20 (Metaphysics): 95 121. Ereshefsky, Marc. 2001. The Poverty of the Linnaean Hierarchy: A Philosophical Study of Biological Taxonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. -. 1994. Some Problems with the Linnaean Hierarchy. Philosophy of Science 61 (2): 186 205. -. 1991. Species, Higher Taxa, and the Units of Evolution. Philosophy of Science 58 (1): 84 101. -, and Thomas Reydon. 2015. Scientific Kinds. Philosophical Studies 172 (4): 969 986. French, Steven. 2014. The Structure of the World: Metaphysics and Representation. Oxford: Oxford UP. -, and James Ladyman. 2003. Remodelling Structural Realism: Quantum Physics and the Metaphysics of Structure: A Reply to Cao. Synthese 136: 31 56. Howson, Colin. 2000. Hume s Problem: Induction and the Justification of Belief. Oxford: Oxford UP. Ladyman, James. 1998. What Is Structural Realism? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 29: 409 424. - Don Ross, David Spurrett, and John Collier. 2007. Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized. Oxford: Oxford UP. Bryant Research Statement 4 of 6

Lewis, David. 1986. Modal Realism at Work: Properties. In On the Plurality of Worlds, 50 68. Oxford: Blackwell. Lipton, Peter. 2004. Inference to the Best Explanation. 2nd ed. London: Routledge. Magnus, P.D., and Craig Callender. 2004. Realist Ennui and the Base Rate Fallacy. Philosophy of Science 71: 320 338. Priest, Graham. 2014. Revising Logic. In The Metaphysics of Logic, edited by Penelope Rush, 211 223. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. -. 2006. Logic and Revisability. In Doubt Truth to Be a Liar, 155 175. Oxford: Oxford UP. Psillos, Stathis. 2009. Is Structural Realism Possible? In Knowing the Structure of Nature: Essays on Realism and Explanation, 125 135. Chippenham: Palgrave Macmillan. -. 2006. Thinking About the Ultimate Argument for Realism. In Rationality and Reality: Conversations with Alan Musgrave, edited by Colin Cheyne and John Worrall, 133 156. New York: Springer. Resnik, Michael. 2004. Revising Logic. In The Law of Non-Contradiction, edited by Graham Priest, J.C. Beall, and Bradley Armour-Garb, 178 194. Oxford: Oxford UP. Schaffer, Jonathan. 2015. Grounding in the Image of Causation. Philosophical Studies Online. www.jonathanschaffer.org/groundcause.pdf. -. 2010. Monism: The Priority of the Whole. Philosophical Review 119 (1): 31 76. -. 2009. On What Grounds What. In Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, edited by David Manley, David Chalmers, and Ryan Wasserman, 347 383. Oxford: Oxford UP. -. 2003. Is There a Fundamental Level. Noûs 37 (3): 498 517. Williamson, Timothy. 2002. Necessary Existents. In Logic, Thought and Language: Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 51, edited by Anthony O Hear, 269 287. Cambridge UP. Wimsatt, William. 1994. The Ontology of Complex Systems: Levels of Organization, Perspectives, and Causal Thickets. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 20 (sup 1): 207 274. Worrall, John. unpublished. Miracles, Pessimism, and Scientific Realism. PhilPapers. philpapers.org/ rec/wormpa -. 2011. The No Miracles Intuition and the No Miracles Argument. In Explanation, Prediction, and Confirmation: The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective, Vol. 2, edited by Dennis Dieks, Wenceslao Gonzalez, Stephan Hartmann, Thomas Uebel, and Marcel Weber, 11 21. New York: Springer. Bryant Research Statement 5 of 6

-. 2007. Miracles and Models: Why Reports of the Death of Structural Realism May Be Exaggerated. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82 (61): 125 154. Bryant Research Statement 6 of 6