VYTAUTAS MAGNUS UNIVERSITY FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND DIPLOMACY DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL CRITIQUE Vytautas Šliuburys AT THE MARGINS OF PRODUCTIVITY: PHILOSOPHY OF USELESSNESS (TIES PRODUKTYVUMO RIBOMIS: NENAUDINGUMO FILOSOFIJA) Final Master thesis Practical philosophy study programme, state code 621V53001 Philosophy study field Supervisor doc. dr. Jay Daniel Mininger (Moksl. laipsnis vardas, pavardė) (Parašas) (Data) Defended prof. dr. Šarūnas Liekis (Fakulteto/studijų instituto dekanas/direktorius) (Parašas) (Data) Kaunas, 2017
Contents Summary... 3 Santrauka... 4 Introduction... 5 1. The Useful Life... 8 1.1. The Judgement of Usefulness... 8 1.2. Obsession with Being Useful... 13 1.3. The Burden of Living the Useful Life... 20 2. The Useless Life... 33 2.1. Bataille and the Divinity of Uselesness... 33 2.2. Diogenes of Sinope: Master Without a Slave... 42 2.3. Emil Cioran and the Laboring Futility... 48 Conclusion... 52 BIBLIOGRAPHY... 54 2
Summary With usefulness expanding and consuming more and more areas of our lives, the useless philosophy and the humanities in general are fighting a losing battle and gradually becoming extinct. In order to defend them I attempt to give uselessness a positive meaning. Trying to redefine the concept of usefulness in order to make it work for the useless is a bad strategy because it endues usefulness with qualities that are considered alien to it in the modern world. For something to be useful it has to be so in an obvious way and if it is not it s labeled useless. In our times usefulness reigns unstoppably universities are turning into companies, students into clients, teachers into bureaucrats and knowledge into a product whose value is equal to the profit it brings. Anything that is perceived in terms of its usefulness or end-use is consequently subjugated to that end-use and therefore has no independent existence. In our consumer society of late capitalism this brings a great burden on individuals because by commercializing themselves they also internalize usefulness as it functions in commerce. The consequence of this is unfreedom, unhappiness and inability to connect with each other on a deeper level. In order to escape the dreadful world of usefulness individuals as suggested by George Bataille must try to re-connect with their violent and atemporal past that would help him to transgress boundaries laid down by reason and experience a sovereign moment. On a similar note Diogenes of Sinope suggest a sovereign and useless life of a beggar and philosopher. Emil Cioran contends that we should only serve eternity in idleness. Keywords: usefulness, uselessness, Bataille, Diogenes, Cioran 3
Santrauka Besiplečiant naudingumui ir jam apimant vis daugiau mūsų gyvenimo sričių, nenaudingieji filosofija ir humanitariniai mokslai palaipsniui nyksta. Kad juos apginčiau šitame darbe bandau suteikti nenaudingumui pozityvią reikšmę. Bandymai pakeisti naudingumo sąvoką tam, kad pritaikytume ją nenaudingųjų poreikiams yra bloga strategija, nes jie suteikia nenaudingumui tokių savybių, kurios mūsų visuomenėje yra traktuojamos kaip jam svetimos. Kad kažkas būtų laikomas naudingu, jis turi būti toks akivaizdžiu būdu, o jei taip nėra jam priskiriama nenaudingumo etiketė. Mūsų laikais nenaudingumas nesustabdomai viešpatauja universitetai virsta kompanijomis, studentai klientais, mokytojai biurokratais, o žinios tampa preke, kurios vertė lygi jos atneštam pelnui. Viskas, kas suvokiama per naudingumą ir per panaudojimą yra pajungiama tam panaudojimui, ir todėl neturi nepriklausomos buvimo. Mūsų vartotojiškoje vėlyvojo kapitalizmo visuomenėje tai užkrauna didelę naštą individui, nes sukomercindami save jie taip pat internalizuoja naudingumą taip, kaip jis funkcionuoja komercijoje. Šito pasekmė yra nelaisvė, nepasitenkinimas ir negebėjimas užmegzti gilių tarpasmeninių ryšių. Tam, kad ištrūktų iš baisaus naudingumo pasaulio, individai kaip siūlo George Bataille turi atkurti ryšį su smurtine ir nelaikine praeitimi, kuri jiems padėtų peržengti proto nustatytas ribas ir išgyvento suverenų momentą. Panašiai Diogenas iš Sinopės siūlo pasirinkti suverenų ir nenaudingą elgetos ir filosofo gyvenimą. O Emilis Cioranas teigia, kad tarnauti turėtume tik amžinybei dykinėjime. Raktiniai žodžiai: naudingumas, nenaudingumas, Bataille, Diogenes, Cioran, 4
Introduction How could anything have been more important, for everyone, than the certainty, at one point, of attaining a useless splendor, of surpassing at that point the poverty of utility? 1 The Accursed Share Philosophy today is often considered to be a waste of time and resources. As it happens, this composition works on behalf of this criticism as I strongly consider this work to be a waste of (especially my own ) time and energy, an energy that could have been used for something that would have actually benefited me in a more material and lasting sense (like making money or improving certain skills for a possible financial gain in the future). But here it really works both ways this work benefits the critical remark about the usefulness (or lack thereof) of philosophy and equally the latter benefits the former. It does so in a rather predictable twist while possessing all the necessary qualifiers for being labeled as useless this is also a work about the value and meaning of waste or about that which in essence is unproductive. Waste and wastefulness are of course one the great problems of our time and a great deal of energy has been put into getting rid of waste (in the sense of garbage ) or making it useful and in some parts of the world even managing wastefulness on a habitual level by employing penalties for it. But if we move on from something as obviously wasteful as simple leftovers to something that is much less so activities (such as engaging in classical studies, doing philosophy, worshiping a deity or drinking vine) experiences (any experience that has no other end but itself), and ideas (like the ones discussed in this work) we find something both similar and different at play. Similar in the sense that by calling an activity like philosophy wasteful, useless or unproductive one might mean to say, in a rather demeaning manner, that it is as valuable as trash, that is, not valuable at all and meant to be disposed, - an attitude not entirely uncommon in this time 2. Or, in other words, that it does not fulfil the requirements for what is considered to be useful; or, simply put, that it does not produce anything 3. And very different in the sense that unlike in the case of actual waste to deem an activity, experience or idea 1 Bataille, G. The Accursed Share, Vols. 2 and 3: The History of Eroticism and Sovereignty. Zone Books: New York. 1991. P. 226 2 It s a concern that was already voiced by authors like Irish Murdoch, she writes that [m]any voices proclaim the end of philosophy and that [p]hilosophy departments are closing. Murdoch, I. Metaphysics as a Guide to Moral. Vintage Classics: London. 2003. P. 210. 3 Perone, U. The Possible Present. State University of New Your Press: Albany. 2011. P. 28 5
wasteful also means to inextricably involve the one who wilfully engages in it. Thus we have here a particular kind of waste, a kind that is not passive and can offer some resistance. This conscious engagement in that which does not produce but only consumes (time, money and energy) or does not consume anything at all constitutes a life beyond what is useful and as Bataille puts it a domain of sovereignty 4. Whether we can rightfully say that philosophy or at least some philosophy (today) belongs to the same category as luxury, mourning, wars, cults, the construction of sumptuary monuments, games, spectacles, arts, perverse sexual activity 5 is perhaps unclear, but what is certain is that its rather peculiar situation in our times puts it at odds with what Bataille calls servile utility not only in the language of the bureaucratic machine, which calls it out as waste, but also in practise: philosophy doesn t producing anything and doesn t serve any (easily conceivable) purpose or function. This is not say that philosophy cannot be useful (it can in a proper context) but generally speaking it is useless. In this work I do not aim to disprove this statement. Quite the opposite, I take here the uselessness of philosophy as a given and attempt to give it a positive meaning. I do this because I think that philosophy should not aspire to be useful and because what interest me here is not how to be or become useful, but, rather, how not to; how to avoid utility or how not to be a (servile) thing or tool. Thus in this work I examine philosophically and, consequently, unproductively concepts that are linked one way or another to the idea of uselessness. In the first part of this work, I examine the concept and world of usefulness. In chapter one, I try to define the concept of usefulness, and discuss why applying it to activities like philosophy might not be a good idea or strategy for securing its value today. In chapter two, I historically contextualize usefulness and uselessness as rivals and try to accentuate the obsessive or all-consuming nature of usefulness. In the last chapter, I examine the difficulties and consequences that we, who life in the world dominated by usefulness, experience. In the second part of this work, I turn to the modalities of uselessness. In the first chapter, I interpret George Bataille s concept of sovereignty and examine how the world of sovereignty 4 Bataille, G. The Accursed Share, Vols. 2 and 3: The History of Eroticism and Sovereignty. Zone Books: New York. 1991. P. 198. 5 Bataille adds an important additional specification: at least in primitive circumstances, meaning that in our times the status, meaning and impact of those activities might not be the same as it was in primitive times. Bataille, G. The Notion of Expenditure. In Visions of Excess: selected writings, University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 1985, p. 118. 6
differs from the world of work. In chapters two and three, I turn to more specific instances of the useless philosophies of Diogenes of Sinope and Emil Cioran. 7
1. The Useful Life 1.1. The Judgement of Usefulness Every time the meaning of a discussion depends on the fundamental value of the word useful - in other words, every time the essential question touching on the life of human societies is raised, no matter who intervenes and what opinions are expressed - it is possible to affirm that the debate is necessarily warped and that the fundamental question is eluded. In fact, given the more or less divergent collection of present ideas, there is nothing that permits one to define what is useful to man. 6 It goes without saying to philosophers at least that the word useful is a bit ambiguous. Its meaning is relative and varies greatly depending on the context in which we're using it. And yet the rule of usefulness or utility is rarely seen as problematic because it is so widespread, so firmly entrenched, so taken-for-granted that it becomes almost imperceptible, invisible against the canvas of late modern society. 7 Usefulness is often used as a criterion to decide whether something is good, valuable and worth pursuing. In fact we value usefulness in our society so much that it even merges with the idea of happiness being useful becomes equated with being happy. Happiness is no longer the end-goal but a productivity booster, only a subordinate of utility. Experiences are also categorized into those that are useful and those that are not, and we are encouraged to discipline ourselves to choose only the former: The best choice of all [ ] is a truly useful, productive experience that not only costs you nothing, but strengthens you financially and as a person. [ ] Opportunities for useful experience are everywhere, at every moment. All you have to do is to recognize them, choose them, and get in the habit of choosing them. 8 This encouragement is not without its merit: indeed by avoiding useless experiences we are bound to become more productive and successful members of society. Useless experiences are a constant temptation that leads use to make bad decisions or investments that do not contribute to our productivity. The same mentality extends to interpersonal relations: 6 Bataille, G. The Notion of Expenditure. P. 116. 7 Pawlet, W. Bataille and Baudrillard. In Economy and Societ, February 1997, vol. 26, no. 1, p. 92-125. 8 Taisdeal, F. Living Much More through Buying Much Less An invitation to deeper values. Firinn Taisdeal, 2015. P. 64 8
others are also filtered through the same filter of usefulness and their value measured by how useful they are. Having in mind this undeniable importance of the word useful in our contemporary society it may be worthwhile to ask what it really stands for. With the aim of being as clear as possible, we might respond to the question by stating that usefulness just means that something can be put to use and nothing else. This simple definition is of course acceptable but it immediately raises the following question: what does it mean for something to be able to be put to use? If we answer by saying that it means to be useful or to have a use we end up with a circular definition and that does not get us very far away. To make this simple definition more comprehensible we need to add that to be useful means to be able to be put to use by someone for something. Nothing is useful in-itself but only for the one who is using it for some end. Some might add that to be useful also means to have a function, but I don t think this is necessary. Useful and useless things can both have a function, and a thing can be useful even if it s not used according to its function or even if it doesn t have any, for example, a hammer might be used as a doorstop; an artwork as a tablecloth or if it s realistic enough as deterrent from unwanted intruders left beside the window of an empty house. Furthermore it might be suggested that having value is also part of being useful or that anything that has value to us is useful. In this case we would end up with a very broad definition of usefulness: Usefulness is nothing other than the value (and disvalue), in all its variety and complexity, that engagement with the world [ ] is capable of giving rise to. 9 This would include both theoretical and practical engagements, and consequently even those that have no practical merit, like art, philosophy and humanities in general. According to Timothy Macklem, this view of usefulness is in accordance with the standard view of usefulness: the standard view of usefulness [is] rather more accommodating than is sometimes recognized sufficiently accommodating, for example, to embrace the realm of aesthetics. Aesthetic value is not a domain that one reaches only by departing from idea of usefulness in the ordinary sense: there is beauty to be found in well-executed pipework [ ], and part of that beauty stems from the niceties of practical execution, so that pipework [ ] [is] the more beautiful the more that all [its] many and detailed elements tend to the success of [its] practical function 10 9 Macklem, T. Law and Life in Common. Oxford University Press: New York. 2015. P. 10. 10 Ibid. 9
Although we might agree that the common usage of the word usefulness may be more flexible than it looks, Macklem s broader definition does not seem to stand up to scrutiny. Even if we put aside the possible argument that the more useful something is perceived to be, the less beautiful it is, beauty of a professionally done pipework is not what makes it useful, and in this instance it is more accidental than essential. It s not that a useful thing cannot be designed with the aspect of beauty in mind or swayed to be chosen by a consumer because of it it can, but, for example, a beautiful car by design would still be useless if you could not start it. All we can truly say here is that it s not a contradiction to think that something that can be put use is also beautiful but that doesn t therefore make it part of the practical word because there is no beauty in that which makes it so. At most we can say that this expands the definition of aesthetic judgment but not of usefulness. But even though the aforementioned broader definition (leaving aside the idea of a practicalized aesthetic judgment) would be successful in securing the title of useful for both sides (practical and theoretical or abstract), it would ignore the existing distinction between usefulness and uselessness, and we would really end up with no clear definition at all. Also, as Lars-Göran Johansson rightfully suggests, trying to bend the concept of usefulness to fit humanistic disciplines is not a good strategy if one wants to defend their reason d etre: Quite often the defenders of research in humanities say that they are useful in broader sense; the result may improve our quality of life. I don t think it is a good strategy using the word useful for defending research in humanities. The reason is that this defense glosser over the distinction between things that are useful means to an end and the things that are valuable in themselves, and the default meaning of useful is as a means to an end. If an historian argues that research in history is useful, a sceptic taxpayer could say: Useful for what? 11 Still another but a bit more refined variation of the broader definition of usefulness is offered by William James who wishes to couple the concept of usefulness with the concept of truth : You can say of it then either that 'it is useful because it is true' or that 'it is true because it is useful.' Both these phrases mean exactly the same thing, namely that here is an idea that gets fulfilled and can be verified. True is the name for whatever idea starts the verification-process, useful is the name for its completed function in experience. 12 For James an idea is useful if it can be verified, meaning that there is a reality or an object that it 11 Johansson, Lars-Göran. Philosophy of Science for Scientists. Springer International Publishing, 2016. P. 221. 12 James, W. Pragmatism. Harvard University Press: Cambridge. 1975. P. 98. 10
corresponds to and can be verified by it. For example, it is useful to have an idea of a phone, because if I were to have a desire to call someone, it would be of the utmost importance to know what a phone is, what it looks like and how to use it all of which would be verified by the fulfilment of that desire. In this case my idea would obviously have a practical application and refer to a concrete reality. However for James this applies not only for concrete realities but also to abstract or theoretical ones. For example, pragmatism, which is a philosophical movement or tradition, is useful because, as James sees it, it agrees with existing truths. The ideas of pragmatisms (like its definition of truth or usefulness) for him copies the reality better than other philosophies (for instance, defines usefulness in such a way that it applies both to practical and theoretical realities) and is therefore useful. But the problem with this concept of truth and usefulness is that James constructs a kind of hybrid definition that doesn t really fit either of them. Not everything that can be useful can be called a true belief, for example, a propaganda might be useful for some end, but we wouldn t call it truth for that reason. And equally not everything that is considered to be truth is useful, for example, people used to believe that bloodletting could cure all sorts of diseases and illnesses a hardly useful belief and, as we know today, quite harmful. The real issue will all these attempts to define usefulness in a broader way in order to include those that are left out or feel the pressure to justify themselves in that way because under modern conditions every occupation had to prove its "usefulness" for society at large, 13 and this still holds true to some extent in our society today is that they try to claim the concept by redefining in it so as to make it work for them, and what they really end up with as an abstract and useless concept of usefulness. A better strategy here might be to ignore it altogether: But, looking more closely, the decision to identify certain practices with usefulness [ ] is not an objective one, but the result of a set of contingent factors and choices. Similarly, the criteria of usefulness [ ] are used as if they were objective facts, when in reality they themselves are contestable values. Is the criterion of usefulness really so important? Who legislates on what counts as useful, and for whom? By invoking usefulness in the abstract, the central questions of how the judgement of usefulness is made, and precisely how an object s relevance is measured, are both eluded. 14 13 Arendt, A. The Human Condition. The University of Chicago Press: Chicago and London. 1998. P. 93. 14 Beighton, C. Deleuze and Lifelong Learning: Creativity, Events and Ethics. Canterbury Christ Church University: UK. 2015. P. 46. 11
Aside from that that suggesting not to invoke usefulness in abstract and asking general questions about the principle is still invoking usefulness in abstract, concerns raised in the quoted paragraph still hold. Decisions about whether something is useful sometimes carries with itself the force of an objective fact (as if the decision would be about what is real or not) and can have real consequences. It s not a coincidence that Beighton in the quotation above uses the word judgement and not judgment because the requirement of usefulness is really used in some legal disputes and is part of the law regarding, for example, inventions and their protection: an invention has to be useful in order to get patent protection. 15 One case in particular regarding this law is worth mentioning because it ends with the court ruling against the plaintiff based on an in depth analysis of the concept of usefulness. In the mentioned case the plaintiff stated that his claimed invention, relating to five purified nucleic acid sequences (genes), also known as expressed sequence tags (ESTs), that encoded proteins and protein fragments in maize plants, had a specific and substantial utility and that his patent application made it possible for someone of ordinary skill in the art to use the invention. 16 Here s a brief summary based on the court s decision: To summarize, as per judicial interpretation, an invention should have specific and substantial utility in order to satisfy the utility requirement in USA. The utility should be directed to a particular disease or aspect and general utility will not be sufficient. Usefulness for research and experimental purposes will not be sufficient to satisfy the utility requirement. To reject utility asserted by an inventor, the USPTO [United States Patent and Trademark Office] has to be satisfied that a person with ordinary skill would doubt the utility of an invention. Genetic inventions with generic uses will not be considered to be useful. 17 So even though the invention was obviously useful for performing those particular tasks in that particular field of research, it was still deemed useless because of its insularity, that is, it had not use except in the field of gene research. But the most surprising thing about this is that it was also required of it to be useful in an obvious way so that anyone could comprehend its usefulness. It s surprising, but as far as the standard view of usefulness goes not odd at all 15 Kankanala, C. Kalyan. Genetic Patent Law and Strategy. Manupatra Information Solutions Pvt. Ltd. 2007. P. 29. 16 Casenotes. Patent Law Keyed to Adelman, Rader, & Thomas' Cases and Materials on Patent Law. Aspen Publishers: New York. 2010. P.17. 17 Kankanala, C. Kalyan. Genetic Patent Law and Strategy. P. 33. 12
because we do, generally speaking, expect of useful things to be so in an evident way for them to count as such. This of course is a flawed (but not unjustifiable) requirement because history is full examples of successful and irreplaceably useful inventions (like the light bulb or the paper shredder) that in the beginning were called useless by the public. I find myself in complete agreement with Abraham Flexner who in his article about the usefulness of useless knowledge states that [o]ut of this useless activity there come discoveries which may well prove of infinitely more importance to the human mind and to the human spirit than the accomplishment of the useful ends. 18 This just means that the judgement of usefulness discriminates against those that fail to prove their utility in a demonstrable way. In this respect the humanities of course fall short because to pass the test of usefulness they are substantially required to go through the same process as an invention pending for a patent permit. This is to say that the concept of usefulness exclusively belongs to the practical world of means and ends. And so it s a futile task for the other side to try to win it over, not only because it s alien to it but also because words don t pass judgements, people do, and it is they that need the convincing. 1.2. Obsession with Being Useful With the exception of the Greek skeptics and the Roman emperors of the Decadence, all minds seem enslaved by a municipal vocation. Only these two groups are emancipated, the former by doubt, the latter by dementia, from the insipid obsession of being useful. 19 The rivalry between utility and inutility has a long history. It was already present in times of classical Greece and it came about by the tension between humanly irrelevant speculations on nature and a very natural feeling of responsibility for mankind. The natural philosopher still had a hard time because their theoretical efforts were viewed as being practically useless. 20 Even Plato, who was arguably more practically-minded, i.e., humanistically oriented, was attacked by Diogenes of Sinope for being a theoretician, that is, for being as useful as a natural philosopher interested in cosmology. This disdain for natural philosophers is sometimes viewed 18 Flexner, A., The Usefulness of Useless Knowledge, https://www.ias.edu/ideas/usefulness-useless-knowledge 19 Cioran, E. A Short History of Decay. Arcade Publishing: New York. 2012. P. 15. 20 Scheibe, H. The Divorce Between the Sciences and the Humanities. In Analyoman 1. Walter de Gruyter: New York, Berlin, 1994, p. 365. 13
by scholars as being complicit in halting the development and progress of (applied) science 21 (one of the modern symbols of utility) but it must be noted that in classical times it lacked the evidence of its usefulness for which we celebrate it today. 22 Nevertheless from today s perspective history can be viewed as the struggle of utility against inutility that dominated the world for centuries. This struggle was still very much present for the most of the nineteen century and is best exemplified in texts concerning the role utility in education: No sooner have I uttered the word useful than I imagine the hideous noise which will environ me, and amid the hubbub I faintly distinguish the words, vulgar, utilitarian, mechanical. Well, before this storm of customary and traditional clamour I bow my head, and when it is over, I meekly repeat that it would be more useful more rich in practical advantages, more directly available for heath, for happiness, for success in the great battle of life. I for one am tired of this worship of inutility. One would really think it was a crime to aim at the material happiness of the human race. 23 On the one hand, science was kept outside the education system because of the fear of it being anti-religious 24, on the other hand, it was defamed by association with vulgar industry, artisans, and commercial utility 25, which meant an uncomfortable closeness to working with one s hands, not to mention an all-too-direct earning of money. 26 This bias that existed against the useful was also upheld by the long existing division between the lower and the upper classes and their values. University for a long time was not an institution meant for those who wanted to learn something of practical merit but a place where you went to become part of the elite or a gentleman (as it was in Victorian England), whose values did not lie in inventing, producing, or selling, but in preserving, harmonizing, and moralizing 27 and who possessed skills such as 21 Ibid, p. 366. 22 This is not to say that if it was as useful as it is today it would have certainly prevailed over the humanistic world-view. 23 Farrar, W. F. Public School Education. In Fortnight Review 3, March 1868, p. 239-240. 24 Wiener, J. M. English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 2004. P. 18 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid, p. 6. 14
versatility in foreign languages, history and the arts. 28 But more importantly it was place where wealthier people of the lower class could send their children to uproot the stigma of utility 29 that was carried by businessmen and professions like law and medicine: The children of businessmen were admitted to full membership in the upper class, at the price of discarding the distinctive, production-oriented culture [ ] The adoption of a culture of enjoyment by new landowners and aspiring landowners meant the dissipation of a set of values that had projected their fathers as a class to the economic heights, and the nation to world predominance. In its place, they took up a new ideal - that of the gentleman. [ ]Through these mechanisms of social absorption, the zeal for work, inventiveness, material production, and money making gave way within the capitalist class to the more aristocratic interests of cultivated style, the pursuits of leisure, and political service. 30 So what really differentiated the upper class from the lower class was not so much wealth as their sovereign lifestyle and values that were accessible only through the higher education and renunciation of the more practical and narrowly oriented world of the lower class. On the one hand, this might be construed as an oppressive mechanism, whose one of the main purposes was too keep the lower class at bay; on the other hand, it must be admitted that it did provide a protection for that part of the higher education that today is attacked for its lack of utility. And even as the class division was diminishing and gradually more and more people of the lower but richer class prioritized vocational preparation over the classics, the former were still regarded with respect and kept the veneer of the higher culture: They [the great majority of professional men, especially the clergy, medical men, and lawyers; the poorer gentry] would, no doubt, in most instances be glad to secure something more than classics and mathematics. But they value these highly for their own sake, and perhaps even more for the value at present assigned to them in English society. They have nothing to look to but education to keep their sons on a high social level. And they would not wish to have 28 Terci, M. The Gentleman And The British Cultural Space. In International Journal of Cross-Cultural Studies and Environmental Communication, 2013, vol. 2, no, 1, p. 43-54. 29 Wiener, J. M. English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit. P. 19. 30 Ibid, p. 13. 15
what might be more readily converted into money, if in any degree it tended to let their children sink in the social scale. 31 Thus what in reality was keeping the lower class people from maybe abandoning the classical studies altogether was not the consciousness of its intrinsic value (of, for example, literature and philosophy) but the value at present assigned to them in English society 32 and not wanting to sink in the social scale. This of course is understandable because the reality of the working class (especially of the non-professional) was greatly different for those immersed in the world of literature and arts. It was (as it is today to a great extent) a world dominated by utility and efficiency, by things with direct practical use. It is therefore not surprising that a different perspective strengthened by the progress in science and the triumph of the cosmological worldview over the humanistic one on the value of usefulness eventually gained momentum and the useless felt the need to defend themselves: Now this is what some great men are very slow to allow; they insist that Education should be confined to some particular and narrow end, and should issue in some definite work, which can be weighed and measured. They argue as if every thing, as well as every person, had its price; and that where there has been a great outlay, they have a right to expect a return in kind. This they call making Education and Instruction "useful," and "Utility" becomes their watchword. With a fundamental principle of this nature, they very naturally go on to ask, what there is to show for the expense of a University; what is the real worth in the market of the article called a Liberal Education, on the supposition that is does not teach us definitely how to advance our manufactures, or to improve our lands, or to better our civil economy; or again, if it does not at once make this man a lawyer, that an engineer, and that a surgeon; or at least if it does not lead to discoveries in chemistry, astronomy, geology, magnetism, and science of every kind. 33 The quote is from Newman s book The Idea of a University, in which he tries to defend the classical liberal education from such an assault by referring to the importance of a healthy 31 The Tauton Report (1864), edited by Stuart Maclure. In Educational Documents: 1816 to the present day, 2006, vol 2, p. 93. 32 The English society in this regard was more conservative than Germany, Japan or the United States where the industrial spirit was treated with much more respect. Nevertheless I think that it offers a better case study for highlighting the differences and changes in mentality regarding the value of utility. 33 Henry, J. The Idea of a University. Notre Dame: Indiana. 1986. P. 115-116. 16
intellect and by protesting that that a cultivated intellect, because it is a good in itself, brings with it a power and a grace to every work and occupation which it undertakes, and enables us to be more useful, and to a greater number 34. What Newman does not take account of (not to mention the misuse of the word useful, which was already discussed in the previous chapter) is that his rhetoric as far as defending the classics goes doesn t make much sense for those who are against the useless because it is exactly that kind of language and mindset that they are opposed to: There is a delusive sort of splendor in a vast body of men pursuing one object, and thoroughly obtaining it; and yet, though it is very splendid, it is far from being useful. [ ] When the University has been doing useless things for a long time, it appears at first degrading to them to be useful. A set of lectures upon political economy would be discouraged on Oxford, probably despised, probably not permitted. [ ] In the same manner, the Parr, or the Bentley of this day, would be scandalized in an University to be put on a level with the discoverer of a neutral salt; and yet, what other measure is there of dignity in intellectual labour, but usefulness? 35 Take, for example, Newman s notion of the intellect. He presupposes that since the intellect is something immaterial and good in itself, i. e., not for something else, it therefore can only be nurtured with a help of something of a similar nature, like liberal education that is also good in itself. This makes the intellect into a useless concept because nurturing your intellects or taking care of its health is the same as using it, and if you can only do that by getting a liberal education then it follows that the only thing it is good for is liberal education. Newman also does not take account of the obsessive nature of the useful. This obsessiveness comes from the instrumentalized relationship with the world. In the word where everything is treaded as means to an end nothing has any intrinsic value. Tools have no value expect in relation to some end for which they are being used for. This kind of relative value is nothing because it ceases to mean anything as soon as the tool is no longer needed. The principle of usefulness does not end with tools, it has no limits (because there is nothing initself) and extends to nature, animals and even other people and to our understanding of knowledge and its value. This is why usefulness and uselessness (as forms of being) can coexist 34 Ibid, p. 126. 35 Inquiry into the Utility of Classical Learning. In Selections from the Edinburgh review, 1833, vol 2, p. 372. 17
provided that later has more authority than the former because the useful have no need of the useless, they devours them automatically. 36 This worldview brought forth by the useful is in stark contradiction with what universities were all about before modernization and commercialization: The operation of these institutions was based on the presupposition that integrated human knowledge was accessible, a structure which can be taught and researched either in its disciplinary details or in its systemic character, and their latent presupposition was the possibility of acquiring absolute knowledge of reality. 37 Of course this idea of absolute knowledge of reality is philosophical in nature and philosophy was viewed as the basis for achieving such knowledge. It was belief entangled in metaphysics in an unchanging and immobile truth or reality that was at the core of liberal education. Today of course we live in a very different reality. We live in a technological and commercial society, where Hellenistic notion of unified science 38 has no place, and where the humanities are becoming increasingly isolated from the types of higher learning that are considered useful, that is, from those that are closely connected to the changing set of social, political, economic, and scientific factors. 39 On the one hand this can be construed as a victory for the working class, for those that for a long time were considered to be at the bottom of society because of their too close relationship with utility. 40 On the other hand, with the humanities losing its role in the process of education, with the disappearance of values and ideals (the in-itselves) that once were the backbone of education and with no uppers class of the Victorian era to suppress those below them, there is no one left to protect or defend the value of the useless, and even more importantly there is no one to protect the useful from themselves. As result of this in our time commerce reigns unstoppably universities are turning into companies, students into clients, teachers into bureaucrats and knowledge into a product whose value is equal to the profit it brings. 36 This is not to say that the useful are evil, on the contrary, in society the useless the ones that don t produce but only consume are usually the oppressors. 37 Mezei, M. B. Religion and Inovation after Auschwitz. Bloomsbury: London and New York. 2013. P. 252. 38 Ibid, p. 258. 39 Ibid, p. 250. 40 This of course is only partially true because it is very unlikely that those at the bottom were in anyway satisfied with their working class reality. I m very sure that even today a builder with a hernia in his back and a heavy bag of cement on his shoulders would rather be a philosopher if he could and if it would pay enough. 18
It is no accident that in the last few decades the humanities have come to be considered useless, and that they are marginalized not only in scholastic programs, but above all in state budgets and the resources of private bodies and foundations. Why put money into an area that will produce no profit? Why earmark funds for areas of knowledge that do not bring in a fast, tangible economic return? [ ] Universities, unfortunately, sell diplomas and degrees. And they sell them by placing heavy stress on professionalization, offering young people various courses and specializations with the promise of obtaining well-paid jobs immediately. [ ] Institutes of higher education have been transformed into companies. Nothing wrong with that, if company logic were limited to cutting out waste and pointing the finger at the cavalier management of public money. But, underlying this new vision, the ideal task of principals and rectors would seem to be that of churning out licentiates and graduates to feed the job market. Stripped of their customary role as teacher and forced to take on that of manager, they are obliged to balance the books in an attempt to ensure that the enterprises they run are competitive. [ ] 41 We see here usefulness transformed into a machine of commercial efficiency. Usefulness does not function here only as criteria for the type of education being offered (not to mention that the promise of well-paid jobs immediately is of course deceptive), but also as slogan that itself has commercial or competitive value clients invest into those companies that create the impression of obvious and immediate usefulness better. (Thus once again we find here similar criteria as those that are used to determine whether someone deserves a patent permit, which was discussed earlier.) Universities that call themselves liberal for making lecture attendance optional for students are more like shopping malls, where everyone can come and leave as they please if nothing on offer interests them. This kind of commercialization of education, as Nuccio Ordina tells us, is a grave mistake because Schools and universities cannot be run like companies. [ ] [S]tudy is first and foremost the acquisition of knowledge that, free of all utilitarian constraints, makes us grow and become more independent. The experience of what is apparently useless and the acquisition of not immediately quantifiable assets eventually reveal themselves to be investments whose profits will emerge in the long run. 42 41 Ordine, N. The Usefulness of the Useless. Paul Dry Books: Philadelphia. 2017. P. 40. 42 Ibid. 19
Unfortunately in the long run is treated as a bad and unwelcome bargain, where efficiency and immediacy are the defining criteria for inclusion. But the question of independency is an interesting one because the promise of a well-paid job is also viewed in our society as a promise of independency. So does it really make sense to say that the the acquisition of knowledge [ ], free of all utilitarian constraints, makes us grow and become more independent? What kind of independency is it and more importantly from what? The answer is of course from being useful but why should we care? 1.3. The Burden of Living the Useful Life Through work, man has moved from subject to object; in other words, he has become a deficient animal who has betrayed his origins. Instead of living for himself not selfishly but growing spiritually man has become the wretched, impotent slave of external reality. 43 From a cashier mindlessly scanning items in a checkout line all day to a consultant reiterating the same selling points for the hundredth time to a bus driver driving in circles all day to a factory worker endlessly repeating the same hand movements at the pace of a machine many today are engaged in repetitive and non-autonomous work. It s true, of course, that this repetition, as boring as it may be for the great majority of workers, is not for nothing because we work as many would say for ourselves. The reasons for working may obviously differ: some work to eat or to survive, some for money, independency, for respect and status or to avoid the shame of a freeloader; others do it for self-realization, for a need of purpose or out the desire to belong to a certain social group; and finally, some do it simply out of boredom or just because of the need to work, to be and feel useful. But it s also true that for many workers their desires are left unfulfilled or only partially so and that misery is a word that a lot of them would use to describe there working reality. Thus it would seem that a sense of necessity and urgency or not knowing better may be even more important here than the desires we identify with. Sean Sayers defines work as a need to exercise our power to shape and form objective world towards useful ends. 44 It would follow from that we work not because we have to but 43 Cioran, E. On the Heights of Despair. The University of Chicago Press: Chicago & London. 1992. P. 104. 44 Sayers, S. The Need to Work. In Marxism and Human Nature. Routledge: London and New York. 2010. P. 41. 20
because we have a need to do it, and that work is about exercising our powers usefully. Obviously in reality a lot workers are unable to exercise these powers in any satisfying manner. Sayers is aware of this and therefore he adds a distinction between a fulfilling work and the one that is not so or a job as he calls it which is something we do only because we have to, in order to earn a living 45. But even though a job is not something we de out of passion, Sayers thinks that it still satisfies our fundamental need to work: For most people [ ] the experience of being without a job is a profoundly demoralizing and unfulfilling one. This is particularly so if joblessness takes the form of unemployment in its usual sense [ ] 46 Hence the reason why so many people would rather work, even if they find it unsatisfying in all sorts of ways, even if its dull, repetitive [and] meaningless, - because not having a job is more demoralizing and unfulfilling than a demoralizing and unfulfilling job. Sadly, the last statement is very much true 47 but I would argue not because of some fundamental need to work but because when one loses a job and becomes unemployed, one does not therefore stop living the useful life. On the contrary, the newly unemployed passing from living in an undisturbed and agonizingly monotonous reality of labor to the reality on the other side now finds himself living in the regime of the useful where society and the closest to him turn on him in order to reflect his shameful lack; where he is immediately sucked right back in so that he could try to fill any existing void of inutility, he s forced to reduce himself to an item on offer, to become a job hunter, a laborer for the very regime. To anecdotally back this up I refer to an article in The Atlantic called Voices of the Jobless, here are some quotes of interest from the article from jobless people in the United States: 1. Unemployment dehumanizes the real person. They lose the essence of their identity and value. To become a number, a label, a resume, a failure, a defect, unproductive, desperate, wishful, delusional, depressed, poor and separated from respectful society. Being unemployed is to be silently disrespected. On a par with being homeless, mentally ill or addicted. 2. [W]hen I become depressed from my job search, I'm told to cheer up or else give a bad vibe to prospective employers. [ ] [W]hen I confide to friends and family that I have "given up" to pursue more fruitful interests, it elicits a crushing look of disbelief, disappointment, and 45 Ibid, p. 44. 46 Ibid, p. 47. 47 Rose, J. R., The Mental Health Consequences of Unemployment, https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/06/the-mental-health-consequences-ofunemployment/372449/ 21
disgust. [ ] If looking for a job is a full-time job, then are you "fired" when you never (after many resumes, networking events, and workshops) find a job? [ ] 3. I'm not asking for much. I would just like to make $30,000 a year. At least that way I could afford to sleep on a bed again. 4. Every day, I spent hours looking for jobs and painstakingly tailoring my cover letters and resumes to jobs. After the first month passed, I was embarrassed that I could not find a job and that I looked like a mooch. 5. The worst thing though is the impact on my kids. [ ] I am afraid for the social impact on them. They are so upbeat, so enthusiastic. They don't know we're in a ditch. It would break my heart if they figured that out. 48 The jobless are also marked by the stigma of inutility, of failing to be useful, and generally the longer they stay unemployed the more undesirable they become for potential employers. This makes the job hunter to try even harder. But even if he fails to find a job his failure still contributes to the regime of the useful he s turned into an example for other workers. This is why, I think, the most ironic thing about the modern human is not even that he still has to work to survive, that things like food or a roof above his head can still be hard to acquire, but that even work itself can be denied for him. Carrying the burden of being useful is a very modern problem: cavemen had only one real burden survival, for us this is only secondary, we re not entitled to be useful, first we have to prove that we even deserve to try and if we do carry it on our heads as if our lives depended on it. A seemingly more emphatic look at the worker is offered by William Morris in his surprisingly not outdated book called Useful Work versus Useless Toil: It is assumed by most people nowadays that all work is useful, and by most well-to-do people that all work is desirable. Most people, well-to-do or not, believe that, even when a man is doing work which appears to be useless, he is earning his livelihood by it - he is "employed," as the phrase goes; and most of those who are well-to-do cheer on the happy worker with congratulations and praises, if he is only "industrious" enough and deprives himself of all pleasure and holidays in the sacred cause of labour. In short, it has become an article of the creed of modern morality that all labour is good in itself - a convenient belief to those who live on the labour of others. [ ] [W]orthy work carries with it the hope of pleasure in rest, the hope of pleasure in our using what it makes, and the hope of pleasure in our 48 Thompson, D., What You Don't Get About the Job Search: Voices of the Jobless, https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/08/what-you-dont-get-about-the-job-search-voices-of-thejobless/243942/ 22