CONFUCIANIST ETHICS H. Gene Blocker IN THIS READING, H. Gene Blocker interprets the writings of the sixth-century BCE Chinese philosopher Kongzi (Kung Tzi, Confucius) and his followers as a variation on what Western philosophers call self-realization, or naturalist ethics. This theory states that it is right to develop and perfect our innate human nature if that nature is good and to educate people to stifle their nature if it is evil. The Confucianists said that there was a human nature common to all people, although they disagreed among themselves as to precisely what that human nature was. Moreover, some Confucianists argued that human nature is good, while others pronounced it evil. Still others stated that it contains elements of both. As you read this selection, think about your own beliefs about human nature. Also, think about the possible problems that might arise from interpreting a non-western thought system with a Western standard. Why do we call Chinese thought philosophy? By using this Western European term to classify a large segment of Chinese writing, are we inappropriately comparing their culture to ours? (The same question could be asked about words like ethics and human nature.) In what ways might we evaluate these Chinese thinkers ideas according to their own standards? B efore we look at Confucianist ethics as part of Chinese philosophy, we should first ask whether there is any Chinese philosophy in the same sense in which we speak of Western philosophy. One way to compare cultures is to evaluate their religions, art forms, educational systems, family practices, and governmental institutions. But what about philosophy? Does every culture have a philosophy, however different it may be from other cultures philosophies? It all depends on what we mean by the term philosophy. In ordinary English, there is an everyday sense of the word. For example, we might say
that every person has his or her own philosophy of life. We could say the same about whole societies. Each society or culture has its own idea of itself, its own conception of what is important in life, and its own notions of what the world is like. In this sense, each society has its own philosophy, or worldview. Sociologists and anthropologists study such worldviews when they examine different cultures. But the word philosophy is also used in a more technical sense to indicate a particular methodology a specialized way of investigating and organizing ideas. In this sense, the discipline of philosophy is critical, logical, analytical, and systematic. It is this kind of philosophy that we are referring to when we say that someone is majoring in philosophy, or reading a new book on philosophy. When we think of philosophy in these terms, then not everyone is a philosopher, nor does every culture necessarily have philosophy. European philosophy, for example, first emerged in Greece around 600 BCE. Before that, the Greeks did not have philosophy in this more technical sense. To determine whether a society has philosophy, or has had it sometime in its past, we must look carefully at that society at its written works, its educational institutions, and so on. By studying various cultures philosophy, we not only can gain insights into the different cultures, but we might also begin to detect a more comprehensive world philosophy. Let s take a closer look at what we mean by philosophy in its more technical sense. At its core, it is a critical reflection on some very basic questions: (what is the best way to live? what is the best form of government? is beauty objective or subjective?), with the aim of providing logically defensible and systematic answers. It also includes the accumulated history of previous efforts to explore such questions. Of course, we are Westerners, and this definition of philosophy is inextricably linked with the West s own philosophy or worldview. When we compare our philosophy to that of other cultures, we need to take care not to judge those cultures by our own definition of philosophy. The very word philosophy is value-laden. For example, for a Westerner to say that another culture did not develop a philosophy can sound belittling or demeaning. In fact, whenever one group attempts to describe another group, there is always the possibility of cultural bias, or ethnocentrism. At first, the solution to this dilemma might seem fairly obvious. Because it is unfair to describe other cultures thought systems in our terms, why not describe their thought systems in their terms, and from their own perspective? Unfortunately, a little reflection will reveal that this is quite impossible.
We can only think and talk and write from within our own cultural framework. A cross-cultural comparison is unavoidable whenever we try to describe another culture; the concepts (e.g., philosophy ) must be ours, while the beliefs are theirs. The best we can do is to try to ensure that the concepts by which we describe others beliefs and the concepts by which they describe the same beliefs are similar in meaning. So, let s take a closer look at what we Westerners mean by philosophy. The history of the term is a good place to start. Philosophy is an English word whose meaning was defined by Western European thought. The word has slightly different spellings in other European languages: Philosophie, or filosofia, for example, comes from a sixth-century-bce Greek word coined from philos, meaning love (as in philanthropy ) and sophy, meaning wisdom or learning (as in sophisticated or sophomore ). In the West, then, philosophy originally meant love of wisdom and learning. Because of Western Europe s colonial domination of the world since the seventeenth century, it has been Europeans who have initiated the discussion of and investigation into other cultures philosophy. Therefore, it is through the lens of Western European concepts that non-western thought systems have been viewed. This cross-cultural study has created several difficulties, among them problems with linguistic translation. The first reference to any Chinese writing as philosophy came in 1687, in a book written in Latin by Roman Catholic Jesuit missionaries who wanted to convert the Chinese to Christianity. Kongzi (Kung Tzu), latinized for the first time in this book as Confucius, was said to be a philosopher (as that word appears in Latin). Shortly thereafter, Mengzi (Meng Tzu; fourth century BCE), latinized as Mencius, was similarly designated by the Jesuits as a philosopher. But what is the Chinese word that these Jesuits translated as philosopher? In Chinese, as we ve seen, Confucius s and Mencius s names are pronounced Kongzi (or Kung Tzu) and Mengzi, or Meng Tzu. Of course, these are phonetic spellings in our own alphabet, not in the characters of the Chinese alphabet. The Chinese word zi (or tzu) means something like master, so that Kongzi (Kung Tzu) is Master Kong and Mengzi (Meng Tzu) is Master Meng. By the first century CE, the Chinese also used the word jia (chia), which literally means house, to refer to different schools of thought. Thus there was the ru jia, or ju chia (the Confucianists), the Mo jia (Mo chia) (the Moists, followers of Mo Ti, or Mozi [Mo Tzu]), the dao jia (tao chia) (the Daoist, or Taoist, thinkers), the ming jia (ming chia) (literally the school of names, often referred to in English as the Logicians), and so on. English-
speaking scholars who can read the texts of these scholars say that, although they are not exactly like anything in the West, they most closely resemble what we call philosophy. How have the Chinese translated the Western term philosophy? You might think that they would translate the word as jia (chia), and translate philosopher as zi (tzu). But it isn t as simple as that. At first, the Chinese did not recognize any similarity between European philosophy and their own ancient thought systems. But eventually, as East-West relations grew more complex, the Chinese began to identify words in their language that seemed to capture somewhat corresponding concepts in the English language. It all started in the 1850s, when Europeans, mainly the British and French, began to exert colonial pressure on China. At about the same time, the American commodore Matthew Perry forced Japan (by threat of military superiority) to open its doors to Western trade and influence. Worried about being colonized as India had been and as China seemed on the verge of becoming, the Japanese responded by learning as much as they could about Western science and technology. They set up Western-style universities, at first hiring American and European professors but gradually training their own Japanese professors. During this period, they had to find a way to translate the names of all the Western sciences physics, chemistry, engineering, philosophy, zoology, etc. into their own language. Because the Japanese script uses about 2,000 Chinese characters (kanji), the Japanese employed these characters to translate the European words for these Western sciences or disciplines. Accordingly, they selected a pair of Chinese characters to mean philosophy. Although the Chinese and Japanese pronounced these same words very differently, the Chinese adopted the Japanese convention for translating philosophy. Around 1900, both the Japanese and Chinese used the same written words to translate philosophy. The Japanese, though, pronounced the word tetsugaku ; the Chinese, zhushway. A few decades later, the Chinese decided that some of their own traditional writing, as well as some Indian texts, should also be called zhushway. By 1923 the Chinese had identified three major philosophical traditions Chinese, Indian, and Western. To some extent, the Chinese were influenced in this regard by two Western philosophers the Englishman Bertrand Russell and the American John Dewey who visited China just after the First World War. Russell and Dewey told Chinese scholars that philosophy was not actually a Western science, because it was speculative (rather than empirical) and normative, or evaluative (rather than factual and
CONFUCIANIST ETHICS objective). Russell and Dewey explained that Western philosophy was more similar to the ancient Chinese thought systems of the Confucianists, Taoists, Moists, etc., than it was to Western sciences like physics and chemistry. But what exactly do we mean by speculative, rational, and so on? And which of these qualities must a thought system have to be considered a philosophy? Philosophers continue to debate these questions. Nonetheless, today many philosophers hold that there are three great original centers of philosophy in the world Greece, India, and China. All three places developed philosophy at approximately the same time (roughly 600 BCE), though, as far as we know, they did so quite independently of one another. Moreover, all three philosophies arose as critical reflections on these regions own cultural traditions. From these centers of origin, philosophy then spread to other cultures. Greek philosophy, for example, was adopted and modified first by the Romans and then by the Arabs, Europeans, North and South Americans, Australians, and so on. Chinese philosophy began to influence the Koreans, Japanese, and Vietnamese. And Indian philosophy was embraced by the Tibetans, Burmese, Cambodians, and Balinese. This brief sketch of the history of the consideration of non-western thought as philosophy applies to each branch of philosophy, the philosophy of art, the philosophy of law and, of course, ethics as a branch of philosophy. Turning now to the question of non-western ethics, and more specifically Chinese ethics, let us look at the Confucianists (who had the most to say about ethics) and their critics. The field of ethics centers on the question of whether there are universal, cross-cultural standards for good and bad, and right and wrong, and if so, what they are. In all branches of philosophy, there is debate, and ethics is no exception. Some Chinese thinkers have argued that there are no universal ethical standards that morality is culturally relative. And the philosophers who thought that there are universal standards disagreed among themselves about what those standards are. Some Chinese theorists judged the moral worth of an action by its results. For example, the Utilitarians, such as the fifth-century-bce philosopher Mozi, or Mo Ti (Mo Tzu), maintained that everyone should do that which will produce the greatest good for the greatest number of people. Other thinkers believed that an action must be judged by the intention of the person committing the action, regardless of the consequences. For example, when Kongzi was criticized for attempting to do something that everyone knew was doomed to failure namely, morally educate the country s rulers he
replied that one had a moral obligation to do what was right regardless of the likelihood of failure. The oldest moral theory, known as Self-realization or Naturalism, explores the subject of human nature. The theory states that we ought to develop our nature if it is basically good, and control it if it is bad. This theory is also part of a larger philosophical question about universals; specifically, do you and I share the same human essence, or nature? Is there in fact a universal human nature, and if so, what is it? Like Western philosophers, Eastern philosophers (especially Chinese) have taken an interest in these questions. Yet although Chinese, Western, and Indian thinkers have approached these questions from very different sets of cultural assumptions, their analyses show some surprising similarities. Chinese philosophy, for example, draws on a set of ancient assumptions about the dual contributions to human nature of Heaven (tian, or tien) and Earth (di, or ti) and the influence of opposite but interdependent forces (yang and yin). Western philosophers look at the issue through the Platonic lens of universals that are believed to influence the nature of all things. Of course, you and I are likely very different from one another, and together we re probably quite different from peoples living in other parts of the world. But philosophers wonder to what degree these differences are due to socialization, environment, and education, and to what degree, if any, we are born with them. Are there any respects in which all human beings are fundamentally alike at birth? How much of the way we are stems from genetic inheritance ( nature ) and how much from the influence of family, teachers, and society ( nurture )? In addition to organizing a culture s beliefs about reality, philosophy often calls into question a society s traditional ways of thinking and behaving. Every society has conventional forms of behavior customs, rituals, manners, morals, and so on. But these forms differ from society to society. Can one society assume that its way of doing things is better or more right than another s? How can we justify one set of conventions as opposed to others? Is there some objective reality or innate human essence such that we can truly justify some social conventions and condemn others? If so, what is that objective reality or innate essence? These questions have led philosophers in many parts of the world to distinguish what is natural (or innate) from what is conventional (or human-created). In addressing questions about human nature, theorists have particularly searched for a natural foundation for social conventions. In
CONFUCIANIST ETHICS their view, such a foundation would provide a way by which to judge the morality of conventions. Specifically, if a convention is in conformity with, or is an expression, fulfillment, or development of this innate human nature, then it is good. If not, it is bad, or at least morally neutral. In sixth-century-bce China, these questions about human nature particularly captivated philosophers such as Kongzi. He claimed that all people shared the same essence in order to provide a philosophical justification for reviving and popularizing the traditional aristocratic virtues of his own society of the time: ren, or jen ( human heartedness ); li (propriety); yi, or i (righteousness); and zhi, or chih (knowledge). Critics of the Confucianists pointed out that they were merely defending existing customs and prescribing for everyone the virtues traditionally appropriate only to one particular class: the elite, ruling families of China. The Taoists, in particular, favored what they considered the natural ; that is, everything that was not created by human beings. They lambasted the Confucianists for their emphasis on the human-made (and therefore artificial ) civilized culture of art and literature, ritual, and custom all those things that one is not born with but that one must learn through an elaborate process of socialization and acculturation. Another group of naturalists shared some of the Taoists beliefs, but they disagreed that human beings can be altruistic if left to their natural impulses. Known as hedonist egoists, these followers of the fourth century- BCE theorist Yang Zhu (Yang Chu) believed that in the absence of moral instruction, people would selfishly seek their own pleasures. These naturalists didn t condemn selfish behavior. On the contrary, they argued that egoistic hedonism was the proper course of conduct. As Yang Zhu said: One hundred years is the limit of a long life. Not one in a thousand ever attains it.... Yet infancy and feeble old age take almost half of this time. Rest during sleep at night and what is wasted during waking hours... take almost half of that. Pain and sickness, sorrow and suffering, death of relatives, and worry and fear take almost half of the rest. In the ten and some years that is left... there is not one moment in which we can be happily at ease without worry. This being the case, what is life for? What pleasure is there? For beauty and abundance, that is all. For music and sex. That is all.... But we busily strive for the empty praise of others which is only temporary, and seek extra glory that would come after death.... Thus we lose the great happiness of the present and cannot give ourselves free rein for a
single moment. What is the difference between that and being in chains or in prison?... Let us hasten to enjoy our present life. Why bother about what comes after death?... If everyone refrains from sacrificing even a single hair of their body and if everyone refrains from benefiting the world, the world will be in order. The Moists also questioned the conventional nature of Confucianist ethics, but for very different reasons. They felt that Confucianist ethics was too conservative, especially with its emphasis on the ancient Chinese value of filial piety the special moral duty and obligation that one owes members of one s own family, particularly one s parents and children. The Moists argued that we should love, respect, and help everyone equally, regardless of whether they are relatives or even friends. This belief represented a radical departure from China s traditional, feudal way of thinking. In a feudal society, there are no moral standards applicable to everyone. There are only customary standards of behavior prescribed for each social class. For example, people living in feudal times believed that farmers should be hardworking and obedient, warriors should be brave and strong, priests should be wise and holy, and so on. When the feudal system broke down in China in the centuries 700 500 BCE, due largely to the consolidation of many small states into the larger state we now call China, the Confucianists, who had formerly served as advisors to the ruling elite, sought a universal foundation for a set of standards (generally those of the nobility) and proposed extending those standards to everyone, as being more objective, and therefore more valid. Kongzi and his followers believed that the traditional virtues of the ruling, warrior-class nobility were equally relevant to and appropriate for all Chinese. Indeed, Kongzi s grandson, Zu Su (Tzu Ssu) and, later, Mengzi would claim that these virtues represented the natural expression and ethical development innate to all human beings. Of course, all human-nature theorists acknowledge that the way a person actually turns out as an adult depends on both genetics and social influence. Human nature, they remind us, may be only a tendency that can be either further developed or constrained by socialization. But as we will see, various Confucianist philosophers assigned different weight to nature and nurture. For example, Mengzi believed that human nature had a stronger influence on character than socialization did. Xunzi (Hsun Tzu) in the third century BCE and Dong Zhongshu (Tung Chung-shu) in the first century
CONFUCIANIST ETHICS BCE stressed the role of socialization. And Gaozi (Kao Tzu) fourth century BCE, thought that socialization alone shaped human character. Is there a nature common to all human beings? At first we might think that this question could be settled empirically we would only have to assess whether human beings from different countries, social backgrounds, and historical periods are all alike in some ways, and if so, in what ways. But this is not nearly as practical as it appears. In fact, individuals and societies are very dissimilar. However, it is hard to know whether they are different because there is no human nature, or because each society s ways of educating and socializing its members are masking a universal human nature. For example, the fourth-century-bce Greek philosopher Aristotle said that human beings were rational by nature. But clearly most people behave irrationally at times. Does this mean that Aristotle was wrong? Or does it simply mean that although human beings are born with the capacity to think and behave rationally, this disposition is frequently offset by other factors such as emotions, instincts, or lack of training and discipline? To answer these questions, we could examine the behavior of young children of two or three years of age. But even they have probably already been influenced in some ways by their culture. Indeed, some research indicates that very young boys and girls respond quite differently to identical situations. Specifically, boys tend to be more aggressive and girls more submissive. But do these research results prove that boys are more aggressive and girls are more submissive by nature? Or, have the children already been acculturated to behave thus? Let s look at another example. Freudian psychologists claim that human beings are selfish and aggressive by nature, but followers of the German-born psychoanalyst Erich Fromm believe that people are innately loving and social. There is clear evidence against each theory against Freud, for example, we find many examples of loving, social people; against Fromm, we see that there are numerous selfish, aggressive individuals. Although removing infants from the influence of their parents and society in order to conduct more scientific tests might provide some insight into these phenomena, this method would be morally unacceptable in our culture. Theories of human nature therefore cannot be based entirely on empirical research methods and evidence. When Aristotle said that human beings are rational by nature, he didn t mean in a scientifically provable sense. He meant that people are more truly human when they display their rationality and that they abandon their human nature when they behave irrationally. This claim implies not that human
beings actually behave rationally, but that they ought to behave so that is, we should follow our human nature, or live up to our potential as human beings. This seems sensible, if our nature is essentially rational and loving. But what if it is essentially aggressive, selfish, and greedy? We certainly wouldn t want to advise a potentially violent person to live up to his potential! Some human-nature theorists therefore tend to attribute a more positive capacity to human nature, and so maintain the belief that people are inherently rational, loving, and so on. They also assume that this universal, innate quality is unique to human beings that is, no other species possess it. Other theorists stress not what is unique to human beings but what human beings share with other animal species (desire for food, comfort, sex, personal survival, etc.). Therefore, they argue, human nature is evil and should be controlled and modified by society. These theories are often used to support intrusive and repressive governmental measures. Both human-nature theories are talking about the capacity for good or wickedness in human beings, not what individuals actually do. Members of each school of thought agree that people are neither all good nor all bad. Those who say that human nature is primarily evil think that people are likely to become evil (if left to themselves) but that they can also become good (if properly socialized). Those who say that human nature is for the most part good also agree that people can become evil (if they are abused or mistreated) but that they can also become good (if allowed to follow their own inherent nature). Unfortunately, this emphasis on capacity as opposed to actual behavior makes both theories weak. In real life, people have enacted all manner of behaviors murder, altruism, hard work, laziness, creativity, conformity, and so on. If human potential is all these theorists are claiming, then their arguments imply that in fact there is no universal human nature. Indeed, Gaozi (Kao Tzu), the fourth-century-bce Chinese theorist, agreed with this and stated that human beings are capable of being molded into any form or shape their leaders choose. To be useful, arguments for the existence of an innate human nature must therefore assert more than a mere capacity or potential. For those theorists who believe that it is generally good to follow one s nature, social institutions that encourage and develop the expression of this nature are valuable. For those who think that it is generally bad to follow one s nature, institutions that curb our nature are needed.
CONFUCIANIST ETHICS Mengzi told a story that illustrates this point. In his story, there is a hill that has been cleared of trees. Originally, the hill was heavily forested, but one day a group of woodsmen came and cut down all the trees. At first, saplings grew back each spring, and for many years the farmers had to cut them back again and again. Only after many years did the trees finally die out completely and the hill become bare. Mengzi s point is that, even though the trees were cut down, their tendency was to keep growing. That is why it took so long for the men to permanently clear the hillsides of trees. In Mengzi s story, there is a force inside the trees that moves in only one direction: directing the trees to keep growing. There are also forces outside the trees. Some of these external forces support the force within (rainfall, sunlight, good soil, and so on). Others are diametrically opposed to the inner force of the trees; for example, woodcutters cutting down the trees to obtain firewood and building materials. But if the force within the trees is encouraged and allowed to act, then there can be only one outcome: the continued growth of the trees. The same principle applies in human-nature theories. These theories state that, in the absence of defeating conditions, people will tend to behave according to their innate nature whether that nature is rational, selfish, loving, or aggressive. But what are some of these defeating conditions? Perhaps emotions or base instincts overwhelm a fundamental rationality or capacity for altruism within us. If we are basically aggressive and selfish, perhaps these forces are curbed by socialization, education, and a system of rewards and punishments. Let s now take a focused look at some Confucianist theories of human nature, beginning with Kongzi. This great philosopher never developed a theory of human nature. He said only that at birth all people are close (jin) to one another but that through education they became far apart (yuan). This suggests that Kongzi thought there was a human nature, but he never said what it was. He believed that all people are born alike, but he did not explain how they were alike. Kongzi s followers Mengzi and Xunzi later speculated on what characterized human nature, but came up with opposite conclusions. Mengzi held that human nature was basically good, while Xunzi pronounced it essentially evil. Dong Zhongshu developed a more sophisticated theory that said that within each person raged a conflict between human nature and instinctual feelings his belief represented a compromise between Mengzi s and Xunzi s theories.