July 04, 1963 Transcript of Meeting of the Political Bureau of the CC of Romanian Worker s Party

Similar documents
August 25, 1968 Stenographic Transcript of Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the Romanian Worker s Party

International History Declassified

International History Declassified

International History Declassified

August 21, 1961 Information on the Meeting with Comrade Zhou Enlai

April 03, 1963 Memorandum of Conversation between Yuri Andropov and the Central Committee of the Romanian Worker s Party

International History Declassified

Minutes of the Meeting between Nicolae Ceausescu, and Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Moscow, 4 December 1989

International History Declassified

January 20, 1956 Journal of Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK V. I. Ivanov for 20 January 1956

July 17, Minutes of Conversation between Deng Xiaoping and Head of the Korean Delegation Kim Gwanghyeop,

February 25, 1956 Record of a Conversation between Soviet Embassy Counsellor S. Filatov and Pak Yeong-bin

August 26, Record of Soviet-Somali Talks, Moscow (excerpts), with Somali aide-memoire, 10 August 1977

International History Declassified

February 02, Third African Department, Soviet Foreign Ministry, Information Report on Somali-Ethiopian Territorial. Disputes

[Tape deletion: 12 second segment on foreign affairs withdrawn for national security reasons]

February 04, 1977 Letter, Secretary Brezhnev to President Carter

June 25, 1971 Minutes of the Romanian Politburo Meeting Concerning Nicolae Ceauşescu's Visit to China, North Korea, Mongolia, and Vietnam

May 16, 1989 Meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Deng Xiaoping (Excerpts)

May 31, 1984 Memorandum of Conversation between Erich Honecker and Kim Il Sung

May 30, 1956 Report by N. T. Fedorenko on a Meeting with DPRK Ambassador to the USSR Ri Sang-jo

May 12, 1950 Telegram from Shtykov to Vyshinski regarding meeting with Kim Il Sung

January 19, 1950 Telegram Shtykov to Vyshinsky on a Luncheon at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK

It s a pain in the neck and I hate to [inaudible] with it

September 19, 1952 Minutes of Conversation between I.V. Stalin and Zhou Enlai

July 24, Minutes of Conversation between Deng Xiaoping and Head of the Korean Delegation Kim Gwanghyeop,

Adversarial decision making: The Ogaden war and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan

January 31, 1989 Minutes of the Meeting of the HSWP CC Political Committee

Essay Discuss Both Sides and Give your Opinion

Final Report: Religion and Radio Free Europe. I had a successful research trip to the OSA Archives. I spent five days in the archive

Document No. 3: Record of Conversation between Mikhail. Gorbachev and Margaret Thatcher. September 23, 1989

June 08, 1965 Record of Conversation between Vice Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua and North Korean Ambassador in China Pak Se-chang

What words or phrases did Stalin use that contributed to the inflammatory nature of his speech?

Again, I am not writing to change anyone s mind, merely to speak mine. Please know that I speak in love and respect for all.

June 29, 1962 Memorandum of Conversation, Albanian Labor Party Delegation with Mao Zedong

June 02, 1978 Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and US Secretary of State Vance, 31 May 1978 (Excerpts)

Mr. President, I just wanted to mention George Bush is in my office [inaudible].

June, 2007 The KGB vs. Vatican City. Folder 29. The Chekist Anthology.

Remarks by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to the UN Special Committee on Palestine (14 May 1947)

November 08, 1990 Record of a Conversation between M. S. Gorbachev and the US Secretary of State, J. Baker in Moscow

HISTORY PAPER 1 (SAMPLE PAPER)

1947 The Muslim Brotherhood

Document No. 12: Session of the CC CPSU Politburo. November 9, Gorbachev: I met before the holidays [of November 7,

Prentice Hall U.S. History Modern America 2013

April 05, 1956 From the Journal of Ambassador P. F. Yudin, Record of Conversation with Mao Zedong, 31 March 1956

1 Kissinger-Reagan Telephone Conversation Transcript (Telcon), February 28, 1972, 10:30 p.m., Kissinger

March 05, 1949 Meeting between Stalin and Kim Il Sung

conduct The affirmation of our Values, of our principles, put into action.

Meeting between Saddam Hussein and Top Political Advisors to Discuss a Visit by Prime Minister Tariq Aziz to the United Nations

STATEMENT ON CHURCH POLITY, PROCEDURES, AND THE RESOLUTION OF DISAGREEMENTS IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT UNION ACTIONS ON MINISTERIAL ORDINATION

Thursday, 18th September 2003, 10.30am. Richard Hatfield, Personnel Director, Ministry of Defence Pam Teare, Director of News, Ministry of Defence

Hu Yaobang's Visit to Tibet, May 22-31, 1980 An Important Development in the Chinese Government's Tibet Policy Wang Yao

1. I fully share the positions that were presented by the General Secretary in his presentation.

Apologies: Julie Hedlund. ICANN Staff: Mary Wong Michelle DeSmyter

Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Collections 2015 Grade 8. Indiana Academic Standards English/Language Arts Grade 8

February 10, 1965 Record of the Fifth Contact between Premier Zhou and Vice Premier Chen Yi and Kosygin (1)

Prentice Hall United States History Survey Edition 2013

Dr. Anderson is author of The Education of Blacks in the South , published by the University of North Carolina Press in ED.

The Juche philosophy of North Korea Philosophical Content and Practical Failure

September 18, 1956 Conversation records between Chairman Mao Zedong and the Soviet Communist Party Delegation, 18 September 1956

October 22, 1956 Letter from DPRK Ambassador to the USSR Ri Sang-jo to Kim Il Sung

http / /politics. people. com. cn /n1 /2016 / 0423 /c html

The Vatican and the Jews

Cosmopolitan Theory and the Daily Pluralism of Life

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA (TRANSVAAL PROVINCIAL DIVISION). THE STATE versus NELSON MANDELA AND OTHERS.

University of Fribourg, 24 March 2014

How to Communicate Effectively

September, 1956 Minutes, Mao s Conversation with a Yugoslavian Communist Union Delegation, Beijing, [undated]

December 04, 1973 Memorandum of Conversation between Nicolae Ceausescu and President Nixon

A Presbytery Policy for Congregations Considering Leaving the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) Approved by Carlisle Presbytery February 24, 2015

April 28, 1969 Mao Zedong s Speech at the First Plenary Session of the CCP s Ninth Central Committee

GENERAL SYNOD WOMEN IN THE EPISCOPATE. House of Bishops Declaration on the Ministry of Bishops and Priests

An Alternate Possibility for the Compatibility of Divine. Foreknowledge and Free Will. Alex Cavender. Ringstad Paper Junior/Senior Division

THE LEADERS OF THE CPSU ARE BETRAYERS OF THE DECLARATION AND THE STATEMENT

April 07, 1952 Conversation between Joseph V. Stalin and SED leadership

KIM JONG IL ON HAVING A CORRECT VIEWPOINT AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE JUCHE PHILOSOPHY

Lutheran CORE Constitution Adopted February 23, 2015

RECONCILIATION BETWEEN BAPTISTS IN SOUTH AFRICA

Fourfold Communication as a Way to Cooperation

WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES International Inter-Orthodox Consultation on

ABSTRACT of the Habilitation Thesis

Our Statement of Purpose

MS-763, Box 72, Folder 4 Transcription. Friedman, Herbert A. United Jewish Appeal address to the Des

GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR THE USE OF

It is advisable to refer to the publisher s version if you intend to cite from the work.

DOCUMENT. Issued by the Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee of the CPC: No. (2004) 13

Tom Conway, Colorado State University, Department of English Spring 2015 Context: Assignment 2: Sustainable Spaceship Argument Overview sustainably

EVANGELIZATION STYLES SURVEY

JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1780)

Question and Answer session. with. LODI GYALTSEN GYARI Special Envoy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama

FIRST CONGREGATIONAL CHURCH, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, COLUMBUS, OHIO

Decree 23: The Jesuit Priestly Apostolate, General Congregation 31 (1966)

Healthy Churches. An assessment tool to help pastors and leaders evaluate the health of their church.

The Awesome Responsibility of Leadership (Romania)

A Contractualist Reply

Can You Hear God Now? Your most important leadership role: discerning and obeying God's voice. Together. by Ruth Haley Barton

Overview: Application: What to Avoid:

Romans 3:21-26 is known as the Heart of the Gospel. Key phrases have been highlighted:

To Provoke or to Encourage? - Combining Both within the Same Methodology

AP European History. Sample Student Responses and Scoring Commentary. Inside: Short Answer Question 4. Scoring Guideline.

Transcription:

Digital Archive International History Declassified digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org July 04, 1963 Transcript of Meeting of the Political Bureau of the CC of Romanian Worker s Party Citation: Transcript of Meeting of the Political Bureau of the CC of Romanian Worker s Party, July 04, 1963, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Chancellery, Arhivele Nationale Istorice Centrale (ANIC), Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, file no.37/1964, ff.2-13. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112976 Summary: The conversation focuses on whether or not to publish declarations made by the Chinese Communist Party and those made by the CPSU. The Romanians are concerned how the people will react to tension between the two communist countries. Original Language: Romanian Contents: English Translation

TRANSCRIPT of the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers' Party 4 July 1963 Participants : comrades Emil Bodnaras, Petre Borila, Chivu Stoica, Alexandru Draghici, Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Alexandru Moghioros, Dumitru Coliu, Leonte Rautu, and Stefan Voitec. Comrade Leonte Rautu : Comrades, in a nutshell, the problem in question is the following: as you know, on 1 July a declaration of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party was issued in connection with the negotiations that are to take place, in which the composition of the PCC delegation, and the stand they had taken were announced. We have published the composition of the delegation, and a sentence in which the position of the Chinese was presented. Today the Pravda newspaper published a declaration of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; I propose to have it read now (the declaration is being read). What about the Chinese declaration of 1 July, to which this [Soviet] declaration refers? We can read that declaration, too, to refresh the memory of it (the declaration of 1 July is being read). These are the two materials. In connection with this declaration we have published the fact that the New China News Agency transmitted a declaration of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party announcing the composition of the PCC delegation, as well as a sentence showing that the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party nurtures the hope that the talks will be held with a unanimity of views. Let us do the same thing with [the declaration of 1 July ]. Tomorrow a brief note [about the declaration of July 1] should also be published. I thought that it would be better for us to consider all of the possibilities, and afterwards to make a decision. There are two possible alternatives: either to impart information about the composition of this delegation and the fact that it will strive to enable the two parties to reach a better understanding or to publish both declarations in their entirety. What is the problem with the first alternative and with the second one? The problem with the second alternative is that we [will be criticized for] offering the pages of our press for the publication of a polemic, and we must say that we will not be able to avoid this. The problem with the first alternative is that a hell of a dispute will be sparked off about this debate in the whole world press and that all of the broadcast stations will air the situation, and our readers will learn from Radio Free Europe what the Chinese and the Soviet said.

Cde. Petre Borila : We have already issued a short communiqué. At the time, it was the stance of a single party, but now we have the views of both parties. Has Pravda published the declaration of the New China Press Agency? No, not a word. Not even the composition of the delegation. No sovereign country published even an iota about this. The press in the other socialist countries published only the Soviet declarations and documents. The Plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU issued a declaration in connection with this topic, which we reproduced, where the delegation is assigned the task of defending the standpoints of the Congresses of the CPSU and those in the Moscow declarations. The letter of the Chinese CP was also published by all of the parties. We likewise reproduced it The first time we published only an abstract, but now as it is the view of both parties it is good to publish the whole thing because this cannot be covered up. The press will cry at the top of its voice about this issue for several days running. We would be making a mistake if we did not publish it. We hope that they will come to understand each other. This has a big disadvantage. If we choose to take this path, we will have to always publish everything said by one side or the other. Our position is in disagreement with both some of the Chinese viewpoints and some of the Soviet stances. We do not wholly agree with either of the sides. To reproduce only certain points of view means to leave the impression that we have no stance. It means publishing a volume of materials without the certainty that everybody will read them. I think that by publishing both declarations we are showing what the situation is when the negotiations start. Cde. Alexandru Moghioros : We can issue an internal communiqué showing what our stance is. But why do we not publish [our position] in the Scânteia newspaper? We do not agree with either side, with their exaggerations and the practices they resort to, and then by publishing this in an objective manner we reserve the right to make comments, too. Sandu [Alexandru Draghici] is right. Now a new craze will appear: that the Romanians, after they

published the [Chinese] declaration with twenty-five points, did not publish the Soviet declaration as well. We are the only country in the whole socialist camp that reproduced the Chinese letter and up to now the whole press has been howling. Or, by publishing both declarations, we stand in the middle. But the question arises: what is our contribution to the education of our people if we publish such dirt because they swear at each other and call each other names. People trust that, actually, a reconciliation is intended or solutions are sought for. But by disapproving these [?] we do not agree and we tell the Chinese and the Soviets what we do not agree with. The party is not an information bureau, it is the political leader, and it provides the information, too, but [the information] must serve the purpose of politically orienting the people. All of these are valid in principle, and especially they are valid in the current situation, where whether we like it or not public opinion has not been kept fully informed. But people did not even set about working. Let them work first. At this moment, there are people in our country who know this. We cannot permit their being informed about these relations by Radio Free Europe. We do not help in any way with their education, but neither can we go on hiding this thing. We must keep everything that contributes to the improvement of relations, and not publish everything that causes them to drift apart or poisons them. We must imagine that things have only just started, that the discussions have only just begun, and we do not know when these discussions between them are going to finish. They agreed with the proposal that an end should be put to the polemic, and we backed this proposal ourselves. What is our party's contribution to the ending of the polemic if it has this material, where the polemic is continued, published? One must either retain what brings things [people] closer or publish everything in the press. Did anybody get ruffled because we did not publish the Chinese communiqué of 1 July? No, they did not. But wait and see what discussions this issue will spark off. More heated than the discussions on 20 April. The issue is that an analyis of both these things will show that either solution has only disadvantages. Surely, you have to weigh and see on which side there are less disadvantages because you cannot speak about any advantages here. Not to mention the fact that by publishing both of them the only thing you do is to create a certain atmosphere. People may say that you are informing public opinion. It is difficult to express a viewpoint since this would require so many explanations that it would become necessary to issue a theoretical journal dealing with this issue only The trouble is that if we choose to present both materials, we will create a precedent for the future. And these discussions will not stop here. It is very likely that the Chinese will issue a further declaration as a response to this declaration of TASS.

At any rate, there are a series of letters from both sides. We have insinuated ourselves into this affair by publishing from the letters of both sides only the parts we deemed worthy of publishing, for the purpose of both imparting certain information and not turning our press organs into a rostrum for this polemic. It is true that people may say that this way our people had to get information from a different source about the remainder. Yes, this is true. My most serious fear at present is that if we now publish the unabridged versions of the Chinese communiqué and of the Soviet one, tomorrow the Soviets or the Chinese will send a letter, which we will again have to publish in its complete form. Up to now, we have never published in its entirety any material from anybody. Maybe it is reasonable for us not to abandon this standpoint. It is true that many people in the West speculate about this. They said that we had published the Chinese letter. In actual fact, we did not publish it. They said that we had published the Soviet letter as well. This is only partially true since we did not publish the entire letter, but only an abstract. Let us not renounce this procedure so that we avoid being blamed for not publishing everything. The Chinese were very happy that we had not published everything. This communiqué does not contain any new elements. It refers to something that was also said before. The new aspects are that they want to turn the disagreement between the parties into a divergence between the states. My view on this is the same: we are to publish only the composition of the [Soviet] delegation, that is to say exactly what we have published regarding the Chinese [delegation]. Maybe we made a mistake when we reproduced only part of the Chinese letter. We have only mentioned the composition of the delegation, and a sentence, where it was said that they were going to try to bring [the points of view] closer together. This may give the wrong impression that everything is being ironed out for an understanding to be reached. We may choose to give only an account, in which we say that the communiqué tackles a number of issues, that is to say to show in a roundabout way that there is more [in the communiqué] than meets the eye. If we publish both communiqués, it will be very difficult for us in future to choose what we are not going to publish. Cde. Alexandru Moghioros : Up to now we have taken a consistent stand so that we should not do a favor to our enemies. I think that the most reasonable and most wise thing to do would be to maintain this attitude. As regards conveying the information to the party, I think we have other means at our disposal. We can publish material with explanations, we can show the party members what the stand taken by our party is since we have taken a stand before. The party organizations know the stance of our party. We do not want to contribute in any way to the worsening of relationships between the communist parties. The argument used last time is very good: if we, seven parties, gather together here and take a stand, the Chinese can any time gather together seven parties and take a stand as well. Then,

apart from the fact that there are divergences, from the organizational standpoint we create a number of centers. Maybe a moment will come when we will have to take a stand within the framework of an article so that everybody can have a clear picture of this thing. Maybe the best thing for us to do would be to provide an account in this respect as well. Cde. Alexandru Moghioros : I can remember a moment in the history of our party, it was in 1931, when the representatives of the two factions came to Brasov to us and asked us whose side we were on. I was a worker at the time, and I asked each party what it was they wanted. And the representative of Luximin began to present the issue. We withdrew to the adjoining room, and when we came out we said that we were on the side of the ComIntern. In a month, things clarified. I told you all this in connection with the fact that if we commit ourselves to supporting one side or the other, without the shadow of a doubt it is we who will be in the wrong. If we have not published anything so far, we cannot start publishing now. We have means of informing the party. Cde. Dumitru Coliu : Surely, the problem is what stand we are to take, and the question arises what the Western press, and all of this army that cries at the top of their voices to the right and to the left in relation to our stance will say. However, we cannot disregard the fact that they say: after all, the Romanians are not on the side of the Chinese either, they have something of their own. I think it would be a dereliction or a retreat from the position of principle that we adopted, because we are for the ending of the polemic, for negotiations and understanding. I am also of the opinion that we must try and do everyting possible not to strain the relationships and stir up feelings in order not to contribute towards the aggravation of divergences. We do not agree with lots of things the Chinese say, but we do not agree with certain methods and stances of the Soviets, either. To date, we have never published a document in its entirety. We have published only what we believed could contribute to removing these divergences. What has happened now to make us want to publish the Soviet document in its entirety when two days ago we did not publish the Chinese communiqué? I think that we should go on in this direction, that is to say This is our point of view, and we have always the possibility to tell both sides that we have not agreed with their standpoint, that we took our own stand that we are putting forward now, and feel that in this way we will contribute to the two sides getting closer and not splitting up. Let us fiind a form of giving an account of the Soviet communiqué. As regards what the people will say, there are means and possibilities. Party members trust our party because they have always been informed correctly. Let us fiind a way of informing the party active and the party members. You see that the Soviets say that the Chinese reserve the right to publish. [the communiqué]. What are we going to do if we publish the communiqué? Especially as these [?] do not occur simultaneously. One comes first, and after a while the other does. Cde. Dumitru Coliu : Let us adopt the same position we have adopted before, and go to the end. We cannot but win

from this point of view. We have the advantage of being able to always justify this stance. If we are asked: why did not you publish, we will answer them that we only published what we thought would be useful. We summoned the Chinese ambassador and called his attention to the fact that we did not agree. We also told him why we did not agree. We are entitled to criticize both the Chinese and the Soviets for such procedures. Cde. Petre Borila : We have discussed these issues many times, and it took us long to discuss them because they are very big, very important issues outside the framework of relationships between two parties, consequently they are related to the interests of the whole international communist movement. Having adopted a certain line, namely to fight with all our strength to do away with the divergences by means of comradely discussions and to preserve unity, we stated this thing lots of times, and it was also reflected in our communiqués, in the declarations we made on various occasions in connection with the polemics between the CPSU and the CCP. We have to stick by this stance in the future, and people must understand what our opinion is. Actually, this fact is known by both our friends and our enemies. Those who want to speculate saying: You are on so-and-so's side, will keep speculating. We must not let ourselves be provoked by such speculation. The main thing is the unity of the international communist movement, of our camp. If we accept the integral publication of the two declarations, it is not our actual position that will be perceived, but a middle-of-the-road one. It might be understood that this is our position, but we do not want such a position to be looked upon as being our real position. We are for the unity of the international communist movement. If we publish the short communiqué, as it was proposed in one of the alternatives, our position will be readily apparent. The question arises: why should we publish integrally all of the communiqués in the form of communiqués full of divergences of a political or other nature? Why should we let ourselves be drawn into such polemics? We cannot fully agree either with one side or the other. You will have noticed that a memo exists showing that our Czechoslovak comrades drew up a statement to be discussed by the local party organizations in relation to the Chinese stance. You can imagine [the embarrassing situation that would appear] if our press were to publish everything the Czechoslovaks said. Cde. Petre Borila : The Chinese and the Soviets stated their points of view, and said they wanted to meet each other. This is something we should not publish. [The Chinese and the Soviets] must first meet and discuss. If they have already published [their respective communiqués], this will deepen the divergences between the two parties even more. The [Soviet] communiqué in question shows the composition of the CPSU delegation. We can publish a short report, as in the case of the [Chinese communiqué]. What is there in this communiqué? We must extract from it what is the main thing for us. In our view, the main part is not the second [part]. We are most interested in the meeting, where [the two sides] can discuss and understand each other. This is the main point of interest. This is what we must publish in [our] communiqué. Thus people will see what our position is. What is it that we want? We want

discussions, understanding, and the elimination of divergences in our movement. Cde. Stefan Voitec : In my opinion, for us to be consistent with our position, we should publish a short version with the gist of the Soviet communiqué, just as we published a short version of the Chinese communiqué. As to the radio, few people listen into London Radio.. Besides, if we published both communiqués, it would mean that this was to the advantage of the Chinese since we have already published a short version of the Chinese communiqué. I agree with this; since we published a short version of the Chinese declaration, let us publish a short version of the Soviet declaration as well, with a sentence saying that we hope they reach an understanding because, at any rate, there will surely be a row over this issue. The Soviets will say, Ah, Romania censors the Soviet declaration. I promise this will be the consequence. If we publish the Soviet declaration, then naturally we will have to publish the Chinese declaration, too. If we choose this line of action, since we published this part of the Chinese declaration, let us also publish the composition of the Chinese delegation, and express the hope that the [two sides] will reach an understanding. I agree with this. If there are people who want to analyze the Soviet stance deeper, they must see what we published from the Chinese communiqué; they will find that from this communiqué we published only a part. They will also fiind that from the Soviet communiqué we published only a part as well. For these people, Romania's stance will be clearly apparent. Of course, there will be people who will try to blow things out of proportion. In the event of the Soviets asking us, we will tell them that we did not publish anything. We have only welcomed the meeting in our capacity as members of the great socialist community in the world, and we take an interest in the meetings between [them and the Chinese], not in the preparatory polemic. Cde. Dumitru Coliu : If it is not opportune for us to reaffirm in the press, after we publish this short text from the Soviet communiqué, that on the eve of the meeting between the two sides our party hoped that the differences will be eliminated, let us reaffirm this standpoint in the sense that in the interest of the sides getting closer and holding friendly discussions they should hold back from People will say: the Soviets published a communiqué, the Chinese issued a communiqué, and the Romanians issued a communiqué. After this exchange of ideas, I reached the conclusion that the only solution we had was to publish in relation to the Soviet declaration what we had published in respect of the Chinese declaration, in other words to issue a short note with the same title. [In the short note about the Chinese declaration] there was the title Delegation of the Chinese Communist Party and a sentence which stated that in the declaration it was said that the delegation would strive to achieve an understanding between their parties, in the interest of the international communist movement. I take the following view. We really are in a difficult situation: since we do not want to involve ourselves in the polemic, we feel it is too early for us to take a certain stance and, on that score,

we have a different point of view, namely the declaration of the position of the communist parties should be made in an appropriate framework. However, the fact that we are publishing both communiqués shows that we are purposely excluding everything that was of a polemical nature, and in this respect we will be able to give an answer to everybody and maybe it would not be a bad idea for all of our ambassadors to be briefed accordingly. They should declare that we published only the composition of the delegations, as well as the affirmation of our wish that an understanding be reached because we are against polemics and against any action that would bring about a worsening of the relationships. In respect of our party members, I would propose for us to take the following measure. After we publish this [?], we should inform the party active via the operative links with the party organs that a Chinese declaration and a Soviet one are going to be published; we have published, very succinctly, only the composition of the delegations, the reason being that both declarations contain polemics and we did not publish them since we feel that this would be detrimental to the understanding prior to the meeting. If our party members learn that these declarations also include other things, they will be able to understand why we did not publish them. We reserve the right to wait until we can express our opinion in a detailed manner. Cde. Dumitru Coliu : Actually, over dinner comrade Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej said that we cannot affirm that everything the Chinese stated was bad. Then let us publish only a short note. We can produce a text for our party members so that they know [what it is all about], and not create the impression that both parties come to this conference with an open heart and the wish that an understanding be reached. We have to disapprove of this attitude of theirs. Consequently, we all agree with the issue of a short communiqué. I think it necessary that comrade Chivu Stoica inform comrade Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej about our opinion on the matter.