PHIL 155: The Scientific Method, Part 1: Naïve Inductivism. January 14, 2013

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Transcription:

PHIL 155: The Scientific Method, Part 1: Naïve Inductivism January 14, 2013

Outline 1 Science in Action: An Example 2 Naïve Inductivism 3 Hempel s Model of Scientific Investigation

Semmelweis Investigations into Childbed Fever Semmelweis wanted to know why the rate of childbed fever was higher in the First Division than in the Second Division.

Semmelweis Investigations into Childbed Fever He considers several hypotheses: H 1 Overcrowding causes childbed fever. H 2 Harsh treatment by the medical students causes childbed fever. H 3 The presence of a priest delivering last rights in the first ward caused distress which causes childbed fever. H 4 Giving birth on one s back, as opposed to one s side, causes childbed fever. He dismisses hypothesis H 1 because the Second Division is more crowded than the First. He dismisses hypothesis H 2 because the rate of childbed fever remained high even after the number of examinations were cut. In response to H 3, Semmelweis decides to have the priest take a different route, so that the women cannot see him. However, the rate of childbed fever remains constant. So, he rejects H 3.

Semmelweis Investigations into the Childbed Fever He considers several hypotheses: H 1 H 2 H 3 H 4 Overcrowding causes childbed fever. Harsh treatment by the medical students causes childbed fever. The presence of a priest delivering last rights in the first ward caused distress which causes childbed fever. Giving birth on one s back, as opposed to one s side, causes childbed fever. In response to H 4, Semmelweis decides to have the women in the First Division lie on their sides. However, the rate of childbed fever remains constant. So, he rejects H 4.

Semmelweis Investigations into the Causes of Childbed Fever Then, Semmelweis observes a colleague get cut during an autopsy and fall prey to the same symptoms of childbed fever. He hypothesizes (H 5 ) that he and his medical students have been carrying infectious material from cadaveric meterial into the First Division s ward, and that this has been causing the higher rates of childbed fever. Semmelweis orders his medical students to cleanse their hands before their examinations, and the rate of childbed fever drops. Semmelweis concludes that the hypothesis H 5 is correct.

Some Terminology: A Priori and A Posteriori A proposition is the kind of thing that can be true or false, that can be believed or disbelieved, doubted, feared, etc. That John is an Anabaptist, That Dmitri is 28 years old, and That Chloë is Canadian are all propositions. (Not those sentences, but the thing expressed by those sentences.) A proposition is a priori if it can be known independent of sense experience. A proposition is a posteriori if it can only be known through sense experience.

More Terminology: Deductive and Inductive A piece of reasoning is deductive if it is necessarily truth-preserving; if the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. One leg of an isosceles right triangle is of length a. The hypotenuse of that triangle is of length 2a 2 A piece of reasoning is inductive if the conclusion doesn t necessarily follow from the premises, but rather extrapolates from the premises to some more general claim. Every observed swan has been white Every swan is white (I ll use the double line to indicate that the reasoning is intended to be inductive.)

Aristotelianism Prior to the scientific revolution, the dominant approach to understanding nature came from the theories of Aristotle, interpreted by the scholastics. On the scholastics understanding, Aristotle s method involved coming to know the essence of things a priori, and then deductively working out the behavior of those things. E.g., the scholastics thought that we could work out a priori that all things seek their natural resting place, and that the natural resting place of fire was in the heavens, and conclude (deductively) that fire would rise. During the scientific revolution, this kind of philosophy came under attack by empiricists. Empiricism is the view that we can only attain knowledge through the senses. Rationalism is the view that we can attain knowledge through reason alone, independent of the senses.

Bacon s Novum Organum Fracis Bacon s new tool was a method for proceeding inductively from evidence to theory. The rough guide to Bacon s form of inductivism (what we can call naïve inductionism ): 1. Observe and record facts 2. Analyze and classify these facts 3. Inductively derive generalizations from these facts 4. Submit these generalizations to test

Naïve Inductivism, Steps 1 and 2 Step 1: Observe and record Facts Step 2: Analyze and classify these facts On Bacon s view, this stage of the inductive process is not to be tainted by any preconceived ideas about what facts are relevant or important; or how they are to be classified. We re not meant to start out with some hypothesis that we think is true and then go out into the world looking for evidence to establish that hypothesis. Similarly, we re not mean to classify these facts in such a way as to support an inductive generalization that we antecedently had in mind. Bacon appears to believe that approaching this part of the inductive method with a preconceived hypotheses in mind would call into question the objectivity of the scientific enterprise.

Carl Gustav Hempel Born in Germany, in 1905. Studied physics, philosophy, and mathematics. Moved to Brussels, and then the United States after the rise of Hitler in Germany Eventually become a U.S. citizen. Taught at the City University of New York, Yale, Princeton, and the University of Pittsburgh. Died in 1997

Naïve Inductivism, Step 1 Step 1: Observe and record Facts Hempel s objections to Step 1 of the Naïve Inductive method. There are an infinite number of facts. We must have some idea of where to start collecting facts, or of what facts are important or relevant. Which facts Semmelweis collected varied at each stage of his enquiry. Which facts were relevant depended upon which hypotheses he was considering.

Naïve Inductivism, Step 2 Step 2: Analyze and classify these facts Hempel s objections to Step 2 of the Naïve Inductive method. Empirical facts can be classified or analyzed in an infinite number of ways. We must have some idea of how to start classifying or analyzing these facts. Semmelweis could have classified the women in his ward by their age, the distance of their homes from Jerusalem, the length of their hair, their ethnicity, the number of letters in their last names, the number of letters in the first name, etc. etc. Semmelweis decided to classify them by whether they had been attended by a physician who had handled cadaveric material precisely because he had a hypothesis according to which this classificatory scheme was relevant. And he analyzed these data by checking to see whether there was a correlation between the handling of cadaveric material and childbed fever, not by checking whether there was a correlation between the handling of cadaveric material and the length of their fingernails, the number of syllables in their last name, etc.

Hempel s critique of Naïve Inductivism More generally, the naïve inductivist thinks that we can go, formulaically, from a body of evidence to a general hypothesis. Hempel denies that we can ever do this. His first argument: 1. Scientific hypotheses often contain terms (e.g., force and electron ) that don t appear in the data which support them. 2. There s no procedure which could invent these concepts on the basis of the empirical data alone. 3. So, there is no procedure which can take us from empirical data to scientific hypotheses.

Terminology: Observational versus Theoretical Vocabulary Many philosophers of science draw a distinction between observational and theoretical vocabulary. A bit of vocabulary is observational if it can be directly observed or measured. For instance, terms describing the presence of a bubble in a bubble chamber, the reading on an oscilloscope, the reading of a geiger counter, marks on a litmus paper, etc., are all observational. A bit of vocabulary is theoretical if it cannot be directly observed or measured, but must rather be inferred, via a bit of theory, from what can be directly observed. For instance, terms like electron, wave function, positron, etc., are all theoretical.

Hempel s Critique of Inductivism Objection: but can t we specify simple procedures for generating a hypothesis on the basis of a data set as in, for instance, curve-fitting (e.g., simple linear regression)? Hempel: even here, we must suppose that the independent variables are the only factors relevant to the dependent variable.

The Context of Discovery and the Context of Justification The context of discovery is the context within which a hypothesis is formulated. There is no formulaic procedure for arriving at a hypothesis. Formulating a hypothesis requires creativity and imagination. The context of justification is the context within which a hypothesis is confirmed by evidence. Hempel suggests that, even if the context of discovery is not objective in the sense that it is not guided by any specific methodology, this does not keep the context of justification from being objective, in the sense that there isn t a methodological procedure for subjecting a hypothesis to empirical test.

The Context of Discovery and the Context of Justification Hempel suggests that, even if the context of discovery is not objective in the sense that it is not guided by any specific methodology, this does not keep the context of justification from being objective, in the sense that there isn t a methodological procedure for subjecting a hypothesis to empirical test. In other words, we can retain steps 3 and 4 of the naïve inductivist s methodology: Step 3: Inductively derive generalizations from the facts. Step 4: Submit these generalizations to test. However, the inductive generalizations we derive will be informed by which hypotheses we antecedently take to be likely.

Induction and Deduction Note that this doesn t mean that we can t reason our way from data to hypotheses inductively. It just means that we have to have some hypothesis in mind in order to adduce evidence in its favor. Induction should be understood not as a method of discovery, but rather as a method of validation. It s proper place is in the context of justification, not the context of discovery. Hempel notes that, in this way, induction isn t any different than deduction. There s no algorithmic procedure for proving a mathematical theorem. It requires creativity and ingenuity. Similarly with inductively establishing a scientific hypothesis.

The Logic of Scientific Inference The logic of rejecting hypotheses: 1. If hypothesis h were true, then we would observe evidence e. 2. We don t observe evidence e. 3. Hypothesis h isn t true. The logic of accepting hypotheses: 1. If hypothesis h were true, then we would observe evidence e. 2. We do observe evidence e. 3. Hypothesis h is true.