Philosophy 220. Truth Functional Properties Expressed in terms of Consistency

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Philosophy 220 Truth Functional Properties Expressed in terms of Consistency

The concepts of truth-functional logic: Truth-functional: Truth Falsity Indeterminacy Entailment Validity Equivalence Consistency

The concepts of truth-functional logic: The section of the text from 110-113 aims to demonstrate that all of the other concepts of truthfunctional logic can be explained in terms of truthfunctional consistency. As it happens, all of the concepts of truth-functional logic can be explained in terms of any of the other concepts of truth-functional logic listed previously.

Why Consistency? If all of the other concepts of truth-functional logic can be explained via truth functional consistency, then a system that determines consistency can determine all of the other concepts as well. We will be replacing truth-tables with a system based on consistency (but that is much easier to learn if you already are very familiar with truth-tables). This new system, called the semantic tree system will be our primary system for determining validity, entailment, equivalency, etc. for the remainder of the course.

Truth-Functional Consistency (Review) A set of sentences of SL is truth-functionally consistent if and only if there is at least one truth value assignment [of the constituents of the set of sentences] on which all the members of the set are true.

Truth-Functional Falsity Definition A sentence of SL is truthfunctionally false if and only if it is false on every possible truth-value assignment of its constituents. Explained via consistency A sentence is truthfunctionally false if and only if { } is truth-functionally inconsistent. Since inconsistent sets are sets that can never all be true at the same time, and since the unit set of has only one member, it must always be false to be inconsistent.

Truth-Functional Truth Definition A sentence of SL is truthfunctionally true if and only if it is true on every possible truthvalue assignment of its constituents. Explained via Consistency A sentence is truthfunctionally true if and only if {~ } is truth-functionally inconsistent. Since inconsistent sets are sets that can never be true at the same time, and since the unit set ~ has only one member and is a negation.

Truth-Functional Indeterminacy Definition A sentence of SL is truthfunctionally indeterminate if and only if it is neither truthfunctionally true nor truthfunctionally false. Explained via consistency A sentence is truthfunctionally indeterminate if and only if both {~ } and { } are truth-functionally consistent. Since is truth functionally true or false if one of the above sets is inconsistent

Truth-Functional Equivalence Definition Sentences and of SL are truth-functionally equivalent if and only if there is no truth value assignment [for the components of and ] on which and have different truth-values. Explained via consistency Sentences and of SL are truthfunctionally equivalent if and only if {~( )} is truth-functionally inconsistent Since only truth-functionally false sentences are inconsistent as sole members of a set, the negation of a sentence asserting that and have different truth-values being truth functionally false means that and must have the same truthvalue.

A new symbol: To define validity and entailment by means of consistency, it is useful to introduce a new symbol: is the union symbol. The union symbol is used to express the combination of two sets together or to express the combination of a set and a sentence. Example: {A, B, C} D is {A, B, C, D}

Truth-functional entailment Definition A set of sentences of SL truth-functionally entails a sentence if and only if there is no truth-value assignment on which every member of is true and is false. Explained via Consistency if and only if {~ } is truth-functionally inconsistent. Next slide contains more detailed rationale

if and only if {~ } is truthfunctionally inconsistent. If the set entails, then there is no truth-value assignment that makes the members of true while is false. That means that whenever the members of are all true, is also, so {~ } would be inconsistent. Side note: If is inconsistent to begin with, then {~ } is still inconsistent, and still entails, because inconsistent sets entail anyhting.

Truth-Functional Validity Since validity is simply a special case of entailment, the same procedure can demonstrate that validity can be described in terms of consistency. If an argument is valid, then the union of the set of its premises and the negation of its conclusion will form a truth-functionally inconsistent set.