JAGS AS Philosophy 2014-15 Philosophy of Religion: Part 1
Week 1: What are we doing here? What is Philosophy? Philosophy is a subject that defies easy definition; but broadly speaking it is the use of rational thought to try to make sense of: the way the world is; our relationships, and obligations, to other people. our relationship to the world and our place in it; As this list suggests, some parts of philosophy deal only with the way the world is, independently of human beings; some parts of philosophy (for example political philosophy) deal only with the interactions between human beings; and some parts of philosophy deal with the way human beings interact with the world. The Philosophy of Religion topic to some extent covers aspects of all three categories: the questions it engages with have consequences not only for our view of the world itself, but also for our relationship to that world in terms of our knowledge about it (for example, whether the use of pure rational thought enables us to prove or disprove that the world is the creation of a supremely perfect being), and about the nature of our obligations to other people (can these obligations be the result of divine command?) Doing philosophy involves taking a reflective and critical attitude to claims made by other philosophers and to your own beliefs: reflective because you will need to think more carefully, and for longer, about things which you do not often have time to consider in everyday life; and critical because you need to develop the ability to criticize other people s arguments, and develop arguments of your own. (NB: argument in philosophy means the same as it does in Critical Thinking: an organized set of reasons or premises attempting to persuade you to believe a conclusion.) Some Myths about Philosophy 1. Philosophy is all about the meaning of life. Not so: some philosophers have produced excellent work about the meaning of life, but that s not all there is to philosophy. Most philosophers today prefer to work on more specific questions, since it s easier to get a definite answer if you can formulate a definite question and what s the meaning of life? is about as imprecise and generalized a question as you can get. 2. Philosophy is all a matter of opinion. This is really a kind of relativism: the view that there are only competing opinions, with no underlying truth or fact of the matter to make one opinion true and another opinion false. Strangely, although a lot of non-philosophers believe this about philosophy, very few practising philosophers believe it. The sheer ferocity of arguments between philosophers should leave you in no doubt that both sides in any given philosophical debate 1
are convinced that there is a single right answer to be found. (I have heard of one Oxford philosophy tutorial that ended in a fist-fight in a stairwell, and a philosophy conference where one enraged philosopher threw another into a swimming pool.) In any case, someone who believes that it s all a matter of opinion is hoist by her own petard: if it s all a matter of opinion, then presumably it s a matter of opinion whether it s all a matter of opinion, and my opinion is that it isn t all a matter of opinion. So I don t need to listen to her. 3. Philosophy makes no difference to everyday life. One reason this seems initially plausible is that people are not very good at recognizing philosophy when they encounter it; in fact philosophical ideas form the basis of science, politics, medical ethics, and even some modern art, even if many of the people specializing in these fields may be only dimly aware of the philosophical foundations of their subject. (Example: the ban on smoking in public places in the UK which came into force in 2007 was justified by politicians at the time by reference to ideas about harm to others which originated with the 19 th -century philosopher John Stuart Mill. The politicians had misunderstood Mill s point, but that s another story ) And even if it were true that philosophy makes no difference to everyday life, that is no reason to avoid studying it. It s a strange kind of arrogance which makes people believe that it is only worth doing that which helps them get what they want, or enhances their standing in the eyes of other people; moreover, most people have some natural philosophical curiosity, even if they do not always have the time to indulge it systematically. Here s a helpful comment from the 19 th century Oxford philosopher, cat-hater and firearms enthusiast F.H. Bradley 1 which neatly sums up that point: Is it possible to abstain from thought about the universe?... I mean that, by various causes, even the average man is compelled to wonder and reflect. To him the world, and his share in it, is a natural object of thought, and seems likely to remain one... For the question (as things are now) is not whether we are to reflect and ponder on ultimate truth for perhaps most of us do that, and are not likely to cease. The question is merely as to the way in which this should be done. And the claim of metaphysics 2 is surely not unreasonable... it merely asserts that, if the attempt is to be made, it should be done as thoroughly as our nature permits. 1 Bradley (so the story goes) not only had a firing range constructed above his rooms in Merton College, but also used his gun collection to go cat hunting in the college grounds late at night. 2 Metaphysics is the branch of philosophy which deals with the way the world is independently of humans. 2
Alternatively, if Bradley s defence seems too verbose, we could appeal to one of the founders of the subject, the ancient Greek philosopher Socrates, for an uncompromising defence of philosophy: The unexamined life is not worth living. Exercise: listen to the Philosophy Bites podcast, What is Philosophy, which you ll find at http://www.tinyurl.com/whatisphilosophy. Make a note of any definitions you think are particularly important; then discuss. 3
What is Philosophy A-level? Philosophy A-level is primarily an essay subject: there are no one-word or multiple-choice questions, no graphs or illustrations to draw, and no comprehension questions. There are three different kinds of question in the exam: 1) Short (2-5 mark) questions. These ask you to give a simple definition of an important technical term, or a brief explanation of an argument you have met in the course. These primarily test your knowledge of the central concepts and arguments in the syllabus. Sample question: Outline the problem of evil 2) Outline and Explain questions (9 marks). These test not only your knowledge of material but also your capacity to analyse how philosophical views and arguments work by breaking them down logically and showing how different elements work together. Sample question: Outline and explain the Paley s Argument from Design. 3) Essay questions (15 marks). These require you to reach an independent judgement about some particular issue within the course. As well as coming to an overall conclusion, you are also expected to be able to distinguish between particular arguments and reach a reasoned verdict on which arguments are successful or persuasive, and which are unsuccessful. Sample question: Is religious language meaningless? Recent feedback from the A-level examiners has shown that they are particularly keen on two things: First, they want students to be able to select the relevant material for each question, and write answers that are directed at the question asked, without waffle (or redundancy, as the mark schemes put it). Longer answers will not necessarily get you higher marks, especially in the 2,5 and 9-mark questions. Second, they think it is important for students to display an understanding of the logic underlying arguments, and to be able to explain the structure of arguments to show how they work. It s a good idea to get into the habit of setting arguments out using numbered premises wherever possible, and you will need to become confident using a number of technical terms from philosophical logic to help you be more precise in your assessment. We ll be covering many of those next week. 4
The Course Each week you will have to hand in a shorter question to one teacher, and a longer question to the other. These must all be handwritten. There are two reasons for this: one is that you need to get as much practice as possible at putting your thoughts down on paper in longhand so that this is not an unfamiliar experience in the exam; the other is that there are many more things that can go wrong with homework in electronic document format lost USB stick, broken printer, computer virus etc. and it s very much in your interest that all your homework is handed in on time. This text lays out the material you need for the Philosophy of Religion topic, arranged week by week. Although many philosophers from the last 1000 years are mentioned in it, you will not find much biographical detail in the text; this is a course about ideas and arguments, not about history! Exercise: watch the first two sections of the programme on Descartes, which you ll find at http://tinyurl.com/mageedescartes. Answer these questions as you watch: 1. What question did Descartes become fascinated by after his military service? 2. Descartes was convinced from the outset that certainty and truth are not the same thing. What then is the difference between certainty and truth? 3. What is the point where the doubt stopped for Descartes? 4. What, among the contents of Descartes consciousness, is able to lead outside himself and establish the existence of the external world? 5
Week 2: Key distinctions and important technical terms You need to learn and get comfortable using all of these! There will be a short test next week. 1) An argument is a premise or set of premises leading to a conclusion. (Philosophers use premise rather than reason as in Critical Thinking). 2) An argument is valid if the premises really do support the conclusion. 3) An argument is sound if it is valid and all its premises are true. 4) When we move from believing the premises of an argument to believing its conclusion we are described as making an inference from one thing to another. 5) A proposition is a statement which can be true or false. Sentences express propositions, but note that two different sentences can express the same proposition (e.g. the same thing said in different languages). 6) If the truth of one proposition A means that another proposition B is true, we say that A implies or entails B. (Strictly speaking, entailment is reserved for cases where it is logically impossible for A to be true unless B is true as well.) In formal logic implication is sometimes represented with arrows: A B means A implies B. 7) A deductive argument is an argument where the steps follow from one another with absolute logical certainty, so that it is impossible for the conclusion of the argument to be false, so long as the starting point(s) or premise(s) - are true. Arguments which have this feature that the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises are described as deductively valid. Here is an example of a deductively valid argument: All men are mortal Socrates is a man Therefore, Socrates is mortal. Notice that an argument can be deductively valid and yet fail to establish its conclusion: if a premise is false (if Socrates is not in fact a man, or if some men are immortal) then the argument fails even though the arguer has not made a logical mistake. 6
8) By contrast, inductive arguments are arguments where the premises make the conclusion more likely rather than establishing it conclusively. They are usually generalizations from specific observations to general conclusions; they are the kind of arguments sometimes used by scientists when they use experiments to try to find laws of nature. For example, you might reason like this: Every fish we have observed has gills Therefore all fish have gills However, this kind of argument has severe limitations. Consider this famously mistaken piece of inductive reasoning: Every swan we have observed is white Therefore all swans are white. European scientists used to believe that this was a reasonable conclusion until the discovery of Australia and its population of black swans. Recently it has been popular to talk about Black Swan events - events where a generalization which has been supported by all the evidence up to that point turns out to be false. Because inductive arguments move from a limited, finite number of observations to a general and universal conclusion, there is always the logical possibility that the conclusion will turn out to be false. For that reason we can never be certain of the conclusion of a piece of inductive reasoning, and some philosophers would say that for that reason we can never know anything on the basis of inductive argument. For example, the 18 th century philosopher David Hume famously argued that we cannot even know for certain that the sun will rise tomorrow: Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. That the sun will not rise to-morrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction than the affirmation, that it will rise. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind. 7
9) A statement (or proposition ) is known as a priori if it can be known to be true through thinking and reasoning on its own, with no need to consult experience. For example, 2+2=4 is a priori because you do not need to use sense experience to check that it is true. (You might of course use some method like counting on your fingers to help you check it, but you don t have to.) The opposite of a priori is a posteriori. A proposition is a posteriori if it is not a priori i.e. if it cannot be known through thinking alone, but needs to be tested through experience. All mathematical and geometrical truths are usually considered to be a priori. If you think this is surprising you might want to spend some time thinking about why mathematical truths fit the definition of a priori. Notice that many philosophers have believed that only a priori propositions can be demonstrated with absolute certainty when a belief is based on experience as well as pure thought we cannot rule out the possibility that the experience is misleading or mistaken. You ll notice that the strongest form of argument is a valid a priori deductive argument: this is one where the premises are known a priori (and so there is no possibility of making a mistake through relying on experience), and the conclusion follows from those premises with absolute certainty. There are really only two ways to criticize such an argument: one is to attack one or more of the premises, arguing that it is something that it false or that we have no reason to believe it; the other, to claim that the argument is invalid (the arguer has made a mistake in reasoning and the conclusion does not really follow from the conclusion). 8
Week 3: the Concept of God: omnipotence What is a concept? The notion of a concept is very important in this course (you may already have met it in connection with the epistemology module. However, many of the philosophers you will study didn t actually use the word concept, talking about ideas instead. For our purposes, we can use the two words concept and idea interchangeably, since they are really two different ways of talking about the same thing. But what are ideas/concepts? Here is Hume s presentation of his theory of ideas (published in 1748): 13. Nothing, at first view, may seem more unbounded than the thought of man, which not only escapes all human power and authority, but is not even restrained within the limits of nature and reality. To form monsters, and join incongruous shapes and appearances, costs the imagination no more trouble than to conceive the most natural and familiar objects. And while the body is confined to one planet, along which it creeps with pain and difficulty; the thought can in an instant transport us into the most distant regions of the universe; or even beyond the universe, into the unbounded chaos, where nature is supposed to lie in total confusion. What never was seen, or heard of, may yet be conceived; nor is any thing beyond the power of thought, except what implies an absolute contradiction. But though our thought seems to possess this unbounded liberty, we shall find, upon a nearer examination, that it is really confined within very narrow limits, and that all this creative power of the mind amounts to no more than the faculty of compounding, transposing, augmenting, or diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses and experience. When we think of a golden mountain, we only join two consistent ideas, gold, and mountain, with which we were formerly acquainted. A virtuous horse we can conceive; because, from our own feeling, we can conceive virtue; and this we may unite to the figure and shape of a horse, which is an animal familiar to us. In short, all the materials of thinking are derived either from our outward or inward sentiment: the mixture and composition of these belongs alone to the mind and will. Or, to express myself in philosophical language, all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones. The idea of God, as meaning an infinitely intelligent, wise, and good Being, arises from reflecting on the operations of our own mind, and augmenting, without limit, those qualities of goodness and wisdom. We may prosecute this enquiry to what length we please; where we shall always find, that every idea which we examine is copied from a similar impression. Those who would assert that this position is not universally true nor without exception, have only one, and that an easy method of refuting it; by producing that idea, which, in their opinion, is not derived from this source. It will then be incumbent on us, if we would maintain our doctrine, to 9
produce the impression, or lively perception, which corresponds to it. Hume, An Enquiry into Human Understanding, II.13 You will notice that Hume thinks that the concept of God arises from experience of the operations of our own mind ; other philosophers (e.g.) Descartes claim that the concept of God must be innate, implanted in our mind from birth by God himself. Which view is correct will become important later on in the course, but we can safely ignore the issue for now. Here are some key facts about concepts: For philosophers, concepts/ideas are represented by single words or phrases, not by complete sentences or that- clauses so strictly speaking you can talk about the concept of God or the concept of a golden mountain, but not about the concept that God exists. (Philosophers tend to say that complete sentences express propositions rather than concepts). However, concepts are not the same as words, because speakers of different languages can share the same concepts: the word God represents the same concept that a French speaker would represent with the word dieu. One popular approach is to think of concepts as a kind of representation of something in your mind, so the concept God is a mental representation of God. Some philosophers (for example Hume) took this further to suggest that this representation is just a copy of the sense-experiences you associate with a concept (could you have a concept of pain without knowing what pain feels like?) Hume makes a distinction between simple and complex concepts, suggesting that some concepts (e.g. the concept of a virtuous horse ) are formed by combining the simple concepts we have already. Concepts are the building blocks of knowledge and thought: some would argue that concepts are necessary for thought, as without concepts we could not form thoughts in the first place. God s attributes In mainstream Christian theology, often known as Classical Theism (Greek theos = God ), God is characterized as the supremely perfect being, and thus omniscient (all-knowing), omnipotent (all-powerful), and supremely good. He is also thought of by many within this tradition as timeless (outside time and eternal ), simple (i.e. not divisible into parts), transcendent (existing completely independently from the physical world) and immutable (not changeable and so unchanging). However, God in this tradition is also conceived of as willing things and acting (for example, acting to bring the world into existence or to keep it in existence), and thus God has a mind and so has some of the attributes of a person. This raises a number of philosophical problems about the coherence or compatibility of these attributes. Usually, we think that something with incompatible attributes simply cannot exist for example, it 10
is impossible for a round square to exist. So if we can prove rationally that the God of Classical Theism has incompatible attributes, then it seems we have proved that a God with this nature cannot exist. Absolute Omnipotence Omnipotence in the philosophy of religion is not simply being all-powerful in the sense of having power over all other beings, or being so powerful that God cannot be overpowered by anything else. (This different attribute, being almighty, is not so problematic, philosophically speaking, and is a feature even of deities in polytheistic religions, e.g. Zeus.) Instead, being omnipotent is often thought of as a kind of ability, namely the ability to do everything. But what do we mean by everything? Two answers have been popular: First, we might mean that God has the power to do everything describable. This is known as absolute omnipotence. As Peter Geach put it, writing in 1972, you mention it, and God can do it. Once consequence of this view is that it is possible for God to do even the logically impossible, such as bringing it about that 2+2 does not equal 4. A version of this view is often attributed to Descartes, who suggested that God has it in his power to alter even the laws of logic and mathematics: The mathematical truths which you call eternal have been laid down by God and depend on Him entirely no less than the rest of his creatures. Indeed to say that these truths are independent of God is to talk of Him as if He were Jupiter or Saturn and to subject Him to the Styx and the Fates. Please do not hesitate to assert and proclaim everywhere that it is God who has laid down these laws in nature just as a king lays down laws in his kingdom. There is no single one that we cannot understand if our mind turns to consider it. They are all inborn in our minds just as a king would imprint his laws on the hearts of all his subjects if he had enough power to do so.... It will be said that if God had estabished these truths He could change them as a king changes his laws. To this the answer is: Yes he can, if his will can change.' 'But I understand them to be eternal and unchangeable.' - I make the same judgement about God.' 'But His will is free.' - 'Yes, but his power is incomprehensible.' In general we can assert that God can do everything that we can comprehend but not that he cannot do what we cannot comprehend. It would be rash to think that our imagination reaches as far as His power. Descartes, Letter to Mersenne, 15 th April 1630 Descartes supports the idea of absolute omnipotence by appeal to God s status as ultimate originator and creator of everything: if there were laws of logic which restricted what God could do, then these laws would have to pre-exist God, rather than being freely created by him. But because everything is freely created by God, it follows that the laws of logic are freely created as well, and so God could have chosen them to be otherwise. 11
However, this approach faces serious problems. First, the standard definition of a necessary truth is one that could not have been otherwise. Maths and logic are often thought to consist of necessary truths of this kind. But if maths and logic are what they are because of God s free choice, then surely they could have been otherwise in which case they are not really necessary after all. Moreover, Descartes is committed to the claim that God could have brought it about that there were true contradictions. This has been attacked on the basis that the very definition of a contradiction is something that describes a logical impossibility, and logical impossibility is a matter of whether a particular situation or state of affairs could be brought about, so it is incoherent to say that there could have been true contradictions: if the contradiction could have been true, it is not actually logically impossible and so not really a contradiction. This criticism is raised by Harry Frankfurt: What is troublesome in this claim that God could have made contradictions true is, of course, understanding the "could." The assertion that some state of affairs can be brought about ordinarily entails that that state of affairs is logically possible. Descartes's statement that God could have made contradictions true seems to entail, accordingly, the logical possibility of the logically impossible. This appears to make very little sense Further, as Geach says, a God who is not subject to logical laws might simply be inconceivable for human beings: as we cannot say how a non-logical world would look, we cannot say how a supralogical God would act or how he could communicate anything to us by way of revelation. Finally, if God can do absolutely anything, then it seems God can do a number of things that are incompatible with his own nature as God, for example bring it about that he himself did not exist (or even bring it about that he both does and does not exist simultaneously, suspending the law of non-contradiction). Exercise: try to list as many impossible things as possible that according to Descartes God should be able to do. Relaxation: the Hitchhiker s Guide to the Galaxy on the Restaurant at the End of the Universe: http://tinyurl.com/restaurantattheend 12
An alternative to Absolute Omnipotence Descartes view has not been universally accepted: instead, many theists follow the approach laid out by St Thomas Aquinas in his summa theologica (written over nearly ten years starting in 1265, and left unfinished at the time of his death in 1274). Aquinas view is that omnipotence is not the power to do absolutely everything; rather, there does not fall under the scope of God's omnipotence anything that implies a contradiction (ST I.25.4) Whether God is omnipotent? Objection 1: It seems that God is not omnipotent. For movement and passiveness belong to everything. But this is impossible with God, for He is immovable, as was said above (Q[2], A[3]). Therefore He is not omnipotent. Objection 2: Further, sin is an act of some kind. But God cannot sin, nor "deny Himself" as it is said in 2 Tim. 2:13. Therefore He is not omnipotent. Objection 3: Further, it is said of God that He manifests His omnipotence "especially by sparing and having mercy" [*Collect, 10th Sunday after Pentecost]. Therefore the greatest act possible to the divine power is to spare and have mercy. There are things much greater, however, than sparing and having mercy; for example, to create another world, and the like. Therefore God is not omnipotent. Objection 4: Further, upon the text, "God hath made foolish the wisdom of this world" (1 Cor. 1:20), a gloss says: "God hath made the wisdom of this world foolish [*Vulg.: 'Hath not God', etc.] by showing those things to be possible which it judges to be impossible." Whence it would seem that nothing is to be judged possible or impossible in reference to inferior causes, as the wisdom of this world judges them; but in reference to the divine power. If God, then, were omnipotent, all things would be possible; nothing, therefore impossible. But if we take away the impossible, then we destroy also the necessary; for what necessarily exists is impossible not to exist. Therefore there would be nothing at all that is necessary in things if God were omnipotent. But this is an impossibility. Therefore God is not omnipotent. On the contrary, It is said: "No word shall be impossible with God" (Lk. 1:37). I answer that, All confess that God is omnipotent; but it seems difficult to explain in what His omnipotence precisely consists: for there may be doubt as to the precise meaning of the word 'all' when we say that God can do all things. If, however, we consider the matter aright, since power is said in reference to possible things, this phrase, "God can do all things," is rightly understood to mean that God can do all things that are possible; and for this reason He is said to be omnipotent. Now according to the Philosopher [Aristotle] (Metaph. v, 17), a thing is said to be possible in two ways. First in relation to some power, thus whatever is subject to human power is said to be possible to man. Secondly absolutely, on account of the relation in which the very terms stand to each other. Now God cannot be said to be omnipotent through being able to do all things that are possible to created nature; 13
for the divine power extends farther than that. If, however, we were to say that God is omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible to His power, there would be a vicious circle in explaining the nature of His power. For this would be saying nothing else but that God is omnipotent, because He can do all that He is able to do. It remains therefore, that God is called omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible absolutely; which is the second way of saying a thing is possible. For a thing is said to be possible or impossible absolutely, according to the relation in which the very terms stand to one another, possible if the predicate is not incompatible with the subject, as that Socrates sits; and absolutely impossible when the predicate is altogether incompatible with the subject, as, for instance, that a man is a donkey. It must, however, be remembered that since every agent produces an effect like itself, to each active power there corresponds a thing possible as its proper object according to the nature of that act on which its active power is founded; for instance, the power of giving warmth is related as to its proper object to the being capable of being warmed. The divine existence, however, upon which the nature of power in God is founded, is infinite, and is not limited to any genus of being; but possesses within itself the perfection of all being. Whence, whatsoever has or can have the nature of being, is numbered among the absolutely possible things, in respect of which God is called omnipotent. Now nothing is opposed to the idea of being except non-being. Therefore, that which implies being and non-being at the same time is repugnant to the idea of an absolutely possible thing, within the scope of the divine omnipotence. For such cannot come under the divine omnipotence, not because of any defect in the power of God, but because it has not the nature of a feasible or possible thing. Therefore, everything that does not imply a contradiction in terms, is numbered amongst those possible things, in respect of which God is called omnipotent: whereas whatever implies contradiction does not come within the scope of divine omnipotence, because it cannot have the aspect of possibility. Hence it is better to say that such things cannot be done, than that God cannot do them. Nor is this contrary to the word of the angel, saying: "No word shall be impossible with God." For whatever implies a contradiction cannot be a word, because no intellect can possibly conceive such a thing. Reply to Objection 1: God is said to be omnipotent in respect to His active power, not to passive power, as was shown above (A[1]). Whence the fact that He is immovable or impassible is not repugnant to His omnipotence. Reply to Objection 2: To sin is to fall short of a perfect action; hence to be able to sin is to be able to fall short in action, which is repugnant to omnipotence. Therefore it is that God cannot sin, because of His omnipotence. Nevertheless, the Philosopher 14
[Aristotle] says (Topic. iv, 3) that God can deliberately do what is evil. But this must be understood either on a condition, the antecedent of which is impossible---as, for instance, if we were to say that God can do evil things if He will. For there is no reason why a conditional proposition should not be true, though both the antecedent and consequent are impossible: as if one were to say: "If man is a donkey, he has four feet." Or he may be understood to mean that God can do some things which now seem to be evil: which, however, if He did them, would then be good. Or he is, perhaps, speaking after the common manner of the heathen, who thought that men became gods, like Jupiter or Mercury. Reply to Objection 3: God's omnipotence is particularly shown in sparing and having mercy, because in this is it made manifest that God has supreme power, that He freely forgives sins. For it is not for one who is bound by laws of a superior to forgive sins of his own free will. Or, because by sparing and having mercy upon men, He leads them on to the participation of an infinite good; which is the ultimate effect of the divine power. Or because, as was said above (Q[21], A[4]), the effect of the divine mercy is the foundation of all the divine works. For nothing is due to anyone, except on account of something already given him gratuitously by God. In this way the divine omnipotence is particularly made manifest, because to it pertains the first foundation of all good things. Reply to Objection 4: The absolute possible is not so called in reference either to higher causes, or to inferior causes, but in reference to itself. But the possible in reference to some power is named possible in reference to its proximate cause. Hence those things which it belongs to God alone to do immediately---as, for example, to create, to justify, and the like---are said to be possible in reference to a higher cause. Those things, however, which are of such kind as to be done by inferior causes are said to be possible in reference to those inferior causes. For it is according to the condition of the proximate cause that the effect has contingency or necessity, as was shown above (Q[14], A[1], ad 2). Thus is it that the wisdom of the world is deemed foolish, because what is impossible to nature, it judges to be impossible to God. So it is clear that the omnipotence of God does not take away from things their impossibility and necessity. Aquinas, summa theologica, Part 1, Question 25, Article 3 Study questions: 1) How should we rightly understand the claim that God can do all things? 2) What is the difference between the two ways in which something may be possible? 3) There is a risk of a vicious circle in explaining his *God s+ power. Why? 4) How does Aquinas explain what he means by an absolutely possible action? (Last paragraph before the start of the replies ) 15
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An Ojection to Aquinas Objections to Aquinas conception of God s omnipotence usually proceed by trying to describe situations which are both logically possible and yet impossible for God to do because of some aspect of his nature. One version of this challenge is already considered by Aquinas in the extract you have read, when he considers whether God can do evil. There is apparently a dilemma here: either God (because he is supremely good) cannot do evil and so is not omnipotent, or God (because omnipotent) can do evil, in which case he is not supremely good. Aquinas answer is complex: that in fact it follows from God s omnipotence that God cannot sin, because to sin would be to fall short of a perfect action, and that would imply a limitation on God s power, since it would imply situations in which God would act less than perfectly. Nevertheless, Aquinas claims, even though it is impossible for God to choose to do evil, it is still true to say that God can do evil things, if he will, since a conditional sentence like this can still be true even if its antecedent (if-clause) describes an impossibility (i.e. God willing an evil action). The Paradox of the Stone If God is omnipotent, on Aquinas definition of omnipotence, then God can do everything that is logically possible. But creating a stone that you cannot lift sounds like a description of a logically possible act of creation. So an omnipotent God should have it in his power to create a stone that he himself could not lift; in which case he would have created something he could not have lifted, in which case he would not be omnipotent after all! This straightforward-sounding argument has resulted in some challenging philosophical discussion. Read the two articles by Mavrodes and Wade Savage, and answer the study questions for each. Mavrodes Some Puzzles concerning God s Omnipotence (1963) 1) Mavrodes describes his argument as a dilemma. What are the two options, and why do both of them lead to the same conclusion? 2) Why does the dilemma fail? 3) Why does the phrase a stone too heavy for God to lift become selfcontradictory? 4) (Hard): What is Mavrodes somewhat different way of showing that the problem is specious? Wade Savage The Paradox of the Stone (1967) (nb: don t be put off by the logical notation in this article: you can understand the main point perfectly well without following it) 1) if God is by definition omnipotent, then, obviously, creating a stone which God (an omnipotent being who can lift any stone) cannot lift is a task whose description is self-contradictory. (p.75) Explain this statement! 17
2) Argument B (p. 76) is the version that Ward Savage thinks is immune to Mavrodes objection. Rewrite this in the form of a tree diagram showing how the premises lead to the conclusion. 3) (Hard) The paradox does have a correct solution (pp.76-79): try to explain in plain English what this solution is (hint: it is best explained in the last three paragraphs of the article). Further reading (both in shared area): Geach, Omnipotence La Croix, Descartes on God s Ability to Do the Logically Impossible Homework: Outline and explain the Paradox of the Stone (9 marks; no more than one side of A4 handwritten) 18
Notes on Mavrodes and Wade Savage. Both Mavrodes and Wade Savage agree that the paradox of the stone does not show that God cannot be omnipotent; they disagree about how the argument works, and about what the correct solution is. Mavrodes claims that the paradox of the stone succeeds only if it shows that the assumption of the omnipotence of God leads to a reductio (n.b. a reductio ad absurdum or just reductio is a form of argument in which the initial premise or premises are shown to entail a contradiction, meaning that the initial premise must be abandoned.) But from the premise that God is omnipotent it follows that God is able to create a stone that he himself cannot lift, from which it follows that there is something that God cannot do (namely, lift that stone), from which it follows that God is not omnipotent a contradiction of the first premise and so a clear reductio. Mavrodes has two answers to this. The first is to point out that the inability to perform tasks with self-contradictory descriptions is not a limit on omnipotence. So, while it is true that God cannot create a stone too heavy for him himself to lift, that task should really be described as creating a stone which cannot be lifted by Him whose power is sufficient for lifting anything in which case the task has a self-contradictory description and so the inability to perform it is not a limit on God s omnipotence. The second answer also takes the line of supposing that God cannot create the stone in question, but asks whether this actually constitutes any real restriction on God s omnipotence: nothing in the argument limits God s infinite power to create or lift stones, since if God s power to lift is infinite, then his power to create may run to infinity also without outstripping the first power. Mavrodes concludes that the supposed limitation is no limitation at all. Wade Savage thinks that Mavrodes is wrong to say that the task is self-contradictory, since the task doesn t have to be described using the word God, and in any case it is a mistake to start out by assuming that God is by definition omnipotent, since what is at stake is whether it is possible for any being to be omnipotent: What the paradox of the stone really seeks to prove is that the notion of an omnipotent being is logically inconsistent that is, that the existence of an omnipotent being, God or any other, is logically impossible. To show this, Wade Savage rewrites the argument using the schematic letter x like a mathematical variable, to stand for any being. He points out that any being, x, must either be able to create a stone which x cannot lift, or be unable to create a stone which x cannot lift and whichever option you choose, it follows that there is at least one task which x cannot perform (either creating or lifting). With the further premise that If x is an omnipotent being, x can perform any task, it follows that x is not omnipotent. Since x here could stand for any being, it follows logically that no being is omnipotent. 19
The solution to this, according to Wade Savage, is very similar to Mavrodes second suggestion: Wade Savage argues that God cannot create a stone which he cannot lift, but this inability does not entail a limitation on his power. His reason is that, when logically analysed, x cannot create a stone which x cannot lift does not logically imply There is a task which x cannot perform. If God s power in lifting were limited rather than infinite (say he couldn t lift rocks heavier than seventy-pounds) then an inability to create a rock he couldn t lift would be an inability to do something specific, namely to create a rock heavier than seventy pounds. But if God has an infinite power of creating, and an infinite power of lifting, then his inability to create here is not an inability to create any specific rock, and so not an ability to perform a real task: God s inability to create a stone which He cannot lift is a limitation on His power only if (i) He is unable to create stones of any poundage, or (ii) he is unable to lift stones of any poundage that is, only if He is limited in his power of stonecreating or His power of stone-lifting. In fact, God s inability to create a stone he cannot lift is not a limitation on his omnipotence, but a necessary consequence of it, since an omnipotent God can create stones of any weight and lift stones of any weight. 20
Week 4: the concept of God: Supreme Goodness One of the issues with the claim that God is supremely good is known as the Problem of Evil: the question of whether the existence of a supremely good God is compatible with so much suffering in the world. We ll come back to that later in the course. But there is another issue with the goodness of God: if God, by definition, is supremely Good, is that consistent with the claim that God is omnipotent and free? Surely for God to be truly free, it must be possible for God to do evil as well as good. All this raises the question of what makes good actions good in the first place: are they good simply because God approves of them, or does God approve of them because they are good? This question is known as the Euthyphro dilemma because it was first raised in Plato s dialogue Euthypro, written some time around 380BC and featuring Plato s former teacher Socrates as the lead character. In this, Socrates meets Euthyphro at the court house where Euthyphro has gone to prosecute his own father for the murder of a slave; Socrates challenges him about how he knows he is doing the right thing. The Euthyphro is written in dialogue form; although it is worth reading in full, you ll find a slightly condensed version below. Plato, Euthyphro Euthyphro. Why have you left the Lyceum, Socrates? and what are you doing in the Porch of the King Archon? Surely you cannot be concerned in a suit before the King, like myself? Socrates. Not in a suit, Euthyphro; impeachment is the word which the Athenians use. Euth. What! I suppose that someone has been prosecuting you, for I cannot believe that you are the prosecutor of another. Soc. Certainly not. Euth. Then someone else has been prosecuting you? Soc. Yes. Euth. And who is he? Soc. A young man who is little known, Euthyphro; and I hardly know him: his name is Meletus, and he is of the deme of Pitthis. Perhaps you may remember his appearance; he has a beak, and long straight hair, and a beard which is ill grown. Euth. No, I do not remember him, Socrates. But what is the charge which he brings against you? Soc. What is the charge? Well, a very serious charge, which shows a good deal of character in the young man, and for which he is certainly not to be despised. He says he knows how the youth are corrupted and who are their corruptors. I fancy that he must be a wise man, and seeing that I am the reverse of a wise man, he has found me out, and is going to accuse me of corrupting his young friends. And of this our mother the state is to be the judge. Of all our political men he is the only one who seems to me to begin in the right way, with the cultivation of virtue in youth; like a good husbandman, he makes the young shoots his first care, and clears away us who are the destroyers of them. This is only the first step; he will 21
afterwards attend to the elder branches; and if he goes on as he has begun, he will be a very great public benefactor. Euth. I hope that he may; but I rather fear, Socrates, that the opposite will turn out to be the truth. My opinion is that in attacking you he is simply aiming a blow at the foundation of the state. But in what way does he say that you corrupt the young? Soc. He brings a wonderful accusation against me, which at first hearing excites surprise: he says that I am a poet or maker of gods, and that I invent new gods and deny the existence of old ones; this is the ground of his indictment. Euth. I understand, Socrates; he means to attack you about the familiar sign which occasionally, as you say, comes to you. He thinks that you are a neologian, and he is going to have you up before the court for this. He knows that such a charge is readily received by the world, as I myself know too well; for when I speak in the assembly about divine things, and foretell the future to them, they laugh at me and think me a madman. Yet every word that I say is true. But they are jealous of us all; and we must be brave and go at them. Soc. Their laughter, friend Euthyphro, is not a matter of much consequence. For a man may be thought wise; but the Athenians, I suspect, do not much trouble themselves about him until he begins to impart his wisdom to others, and then for some reason or other, perhaps, as you say, from jealousy, they are angry. Euth. I am never likely to try their temper in this way. Soc. I dare say not, for you are reserved in your behaviour, and seldom impart your wisdom. But I have a benevolent habit of pouring out myself to everybody, and would even pay for a listener, and I am afraid that the Athenians may think me too talkative. Now if, as I was saying, they would only laugh at me, as you say that they laugh at you, the time might pass gaily enough in the court; but perhaps they may be in earnest, and then what the end will be you soothsayers only can predict. Euth. I dare say that the affair will end in nothing, Socrates, and that you will win your cause; and I think that I shall win my own. Soc. And what is your suit, Euthyphro? are you the pursuer or the defendant? Euth. I am the pursuer. Soc. Of whom? Euth. You will think me mad when I tell you. Soc. Why, has the fugitive wings? Euth. Nay, he is not very volatile at his time of life. Soc. Who is he? Euth. My father. Soc. Your father! my good man? Euth. Yes. 22
Soc. And of what is he accused? Euth. Of murder, Socrates. Soc. By the powers, Euthyphro! how little does the common herd know of the nature of right and truth. A man must be an extraordinary man, and have made great strides in wisdom, before he could have seen his way to bring such an action. Euth. The best of Euthyphro, and that which distinguishes him, Socrates, from other men, is his exact knowledge of all such matters. What should I be good for without it? Soc. Rare friend! I think that I cannot do better than be your disciple. Then before the trial with Meletus comes on I shall challenge him, and say that I have always had a great interest in religious questions, and now, as he charges me with rash imaginations and innovations in religion, I have become your disciple. You, Meletus, as I shall say to him, acknowledge Euthyphro to be a great theologian, and sound in his opinions; and if you approve of him you ought to approve of me, and not have me into court; but if you disapprove, you should begin by indicting him who is my teacher, and who will be the ruin, not of the young, but of the old; that is to say, of myself whom he instructs, and of his old father whom he admonishes and chastises. And if Meletus refuses to listen to me, but will go on, and will not shift the indictment from me to you, I cannot do better than repeat this challenge in the court. Euth. Yes, indeed, Socrates; and if he attempts to indict me I am mistaken if I do not find a flaw in him; the court shall have a great deal more to say to him than to me. Soc. And I, my dear friend, knowing this, am desirous of becoming your disciple. For I observe that no one appears to notice you- not even this Meletus; but his sharp eyes have found me out at once, and he has indicted me for impiety. And therefore, I adjure you to tell me the nature of piety and impiety, which you said that you knew so well, and of murder, and of other offences against the gods. What are they? Is not piety in every action always the same? and impiety, again- is it not always the opposite of piety, and also the same with itself, having, as impiety, one notion which includes whatever is impious? Euth. To be sure, Socrates. Soc. And what is piety, and what is impiety? Euth. Piety is doing as I am doing; that is to say, prosecuting anyone who is guilty of murder, sacrilege, or of any similar crime-whether he be your father or mother, or whoever he may be-that makes no difference; and not to prosecute them is impiety. Soc. But just at present I would rather hear from you a more precise answer, which you have not as yet given, my friend, to the question, What is "piety"? When asked, you only replied, Doing as you do, charging your father with murder. Euth. And what I said was true, Socrates. 23