B. C. Johnson God and the Problem of Evil 1 General Problem How can an all-good, all-loving God allow evil to exist? Case: A six-month old baby painfully burns to death Can we consider anyone as good who had the power to save this infant from painful death and did not? 2
But, the Baby s Going to Heaven The baby s potential to go to heaven is irrelevant to whether it was necessary for the baby to suffer If it was not necessary for the baby to suffer, then it was wrong to allow the baby to suffer. If it was necessary for the baby to suffer, then the baby s going to heaven does not explain why it had to suffer There is no reason given for why God failed to act to prevent the suffering 3 But, the Baby s Suffering Will Have Good Results in the End I If we knew that God would not have permitted the baby s suffering if there were not good results, then we know that every successfully performed action must be for some good in the end and the right thing to do, or else God would not have permitted it to happen. But this reasoning justifies all sorts of harmful acts and even makes these actions one s duty: setting houses ablaze, killing innocent people, etc. A defense of God s goodness which takes as its foundation duties known only after the fact would result in a morality unworthy of the name. 4
But, the Baby s Suffering Will Have Good Results in the End II In addition, this argument fails to explain why God allowed this evil to happen The claim that there is some reason for evil rests on the assumption that God is good is true. But, the assumption that God is good conflicts with the evidence at hand Example of the lawyer: no jury would accept a defense in which the lawyer argued his client is innocent, the evidence is misleading, and the truth will be known at some indefinite time in the future 5 But, Humans Have Free Will and There is No One to Blame But the Human But, if it is in one s power to save one from unnecessary evil, then not helping is grounds for thinking that person is not good If we think a human of this sort is not good, then on what basis can we claim that God is all good or all loving? 6
But, Humans are Better Off Facing Disasters On Their Own This rebuttal assumes that humans are better off because they learn to be independent and not depend on outside powers for assistance But, if humans should not depend on outside powers, should they shun medical care, fire departments, or any other sort of outside assistance? Theist might respond that these are cases of humans helping each other Johnson s response is that these cases are instances of a small group of people helping others and one can become dependent on them just like one can become dependent on God The real issue is whether the dependence on outside powers is wrong or right? 7 Is One s Dependence on Outside Powers Wrong or Right? If right to depend on outside powers, then God has an obligation to assist those in areas of the world without these helpful human institutions In fact, such help has not been available and the evidence is that humans are on their own If wrong to depend on outside powers, then humans should get rid of medical care, fire departments and any other forms of human aid and assistance But, we do not think we should do this 8
But, if God Interferes in Disasters, Then There Would Be No Moral Urgency to Make Things Right If moral urgency is best, then humans should get rid of medical care, fire departments and any other forms of human aid and assistance same implications as last argument Helping others undermines the need for moral urgency 9 If God Tolerates Disasters, Then God Appears to Approve of Evil to Encourage Moral Urgency God not only appears to approve of evil in order to encourage moral urgency, it appears God would require that evil occur in order to guarantee moral urgency If moral urgency is important, then whenever maximum moral urgency is not maintained it would become necessary for God to create some disasters Johnson thinks it absurd to think that we should maximize moral urgency--hence the claim that there d be no moral urgency to make things right is false 10
But, Without Suffering There Would be No Motivation to Produce Virtuous Characters Without suffering and disasters, there would be no events to help us become better people Johnson is not demanding a world without suffering, simply a world without excessive suffering One can build virtuous characters in a world without excessive suffering In fact, we value a world without suffering and thus without opportunities for building virtuous characters Should we attempt to end our efforts to wipe out wars, disease, famine, and other suffering? If yes, then we admit that virtue-building is not a reason for God to allow evil If no, then we should all start wars and encourage evil 11 But, God Allows the Innocent to Suffer to Deflate Human Egos This excuse has the same problems as the moral urgency and building virtues arguments 12
But, Evil is a Necessary Result of the Laws of Nature Since evil follows from laws of nature, it is irrational for God to interfere every time disaster strikes If God did interfere, then the whole causal order would be altered But, it would be easy for God to prevent an evil and no one would know Hitler could have been given a heart attack and lots of evil diverted God should interfere to prevent particularly nasty events 13 But, Without Evil There Would be No Good A conceptual argument that one has to know evil as part of knowing good But, one does not need Hitler or burning babies to see evil Relatively minor pains will be enough to teach one about a life without suffering and evil 14
But, God Has a Higher Morality God s actions are judged based on this higher morality and humans simply cannot comprehend this higher morality If this is true, then this higher morality is meaningless to us What humans call evil is really good, and the good is really evil God s higher morality cannot be a basis for humans deciding that God is good 15 Analysis Conception of God The solutions to the problem of evil may be plausible in the abstract, but not when applied to particular cases When applied to particular cases, God either must be seen as making excuses for its inaction or very limited and not as powerful as humans Johnson thinks that such a limited, excuse-making God strains the very meaning of God 16
Analysis Faith in God Theist appeals to faith in God s goodness to maintain one s claim that God exists, or at least that God s existence has not been disproved What s meant by faith? confidence in God s innocence or goodness? What evidence does one have that God is innocent or good and has never committed evil? Johnson argues that history is filled with examples of God allowing evil to occur and there s no justification for one s faith in God s goodness 17 Analysis Evil God Every excuse making the actual world consistent with a good God also applies to an evil God An evil God allows free will so we can freely do evil and we act against God when we do good An evil God allows natural disasters to make us more bitter and selfish 18
God s Moral Character Given facts about the actual world, what might we believe? a) God is more likely to be all evil than all good b) God is less likely to be all evil than all good c) God is equally likely to be all evil as all good Given the arguments and evidence, it is not likely that God is all good (support for (a)) Given the arguments and evidence, (b) is false since God being evil can be justified just as well as God being good If (c) is true, then we have no reason to think a good God permits evil. If (c) were true, then facts of the actual world would make it as likely that God is all good as all evil. But, this is just to admit that actualworld facts do not support the evidence for thinking a good God permits evil. So, the excuses are no more likely to be true as false. 19 Conclusion Johnson thinks (a) (c) are the only options. (b) is false (a) makes it unlikely that God is all good since (c) makes the excuses that God is all good no more likely to be true as false, then (c) makes it unlikely that God is all good Johnson concludes that, there is no escape from the conclusion that it is unlikely that God is all good. Thus the problem of evil triumphs over traditional theism. 20