The Resurrection of Material Beings: Recomposition, Compaction and Miracles This paper will attempt to show that Peter van Inwagen s metaphysics of the human person as found in Material Beings; Dualism and Materialism (van Inwagen 1995) and The Possibility of the Resurrection (van Inwagen 2009) is, at present, incompatible with three possible descriptions of the resurrection on a materialist metaphysics of the human person. I argue for this conclusion as follows. First, in ( 1) I will outline van Inwagen s metaphysics. Second, in ( 2) I will consider three models of the resurrection that attempt to demonstrate that the resurrection is possible on van Inwagen s materialist metaphysics. These are (2.1) the recomposition model, (2.2) the compaction model and (2.3) the miraculous- event model. (2.1) has already been rejected by van Inwagen but it will be useful for the remainder of the paper to show why he rejects this model. (2.2) is taken by Anders 2011 to be van Inwagen s current solution to the problem of resurrection on a materialist metaphysics of the human person while (2.3) is a model that might be offered on behalf of van Inwagen. I will attempt to demonstrate, as I go, that each model is inconsistent with van Inwagen s metaphysics. 1. Preliminaries: Material beings For the purposes of this paper I shall outline three strands of van Inwagen s metaphysics. They are: (a) van Inwagen s metaphysics of composition (b) van Inwagen s criterion for persistence across time and (c) van Inwagen s definition of death. First, van Inwagen s metaphysics of composition. Van Inwagen s general metaphysical project as outlined in Material Beings is to answer the composition question. That is, when is it true that y the xs compose y? 1 (van Inwagen 1990, 30). Van Inwagen is unsatisfied with the extreme answers to this question: 1 Where the xs are material simples and y is a composite object. 1
Nihilism (put simply, the view that there are no composite objects) and Universalism (put simply, the view that for any plurality of objects, those objects compose something) (van Inwagen 1990, 72-74). As such he proposes what he takes to be a moderate answer to this question. Put simply, he holds that there is one way in which it can be true that y the xs compose y. This is when the activity of the xs constitute a life (van Inwagen 1990, 90). A life, according to van Inwagen, is a natural biological process that is responsible for the existence of human organisms. As such, ultimately, he thinks that it is the job of Biology to supply us with the relevant definition of a life. He does, however, go on to give what I take to be are three conditions for something s being a life. As such I define life as follows. Life =def. x is a life iff, x is (i) an event that is (i.i) well- individuated (i.ii) self- maintaining and (i.iii) jealous. Event, well- individuated, self- maintaining and jealous, as used by van Inwagen, are all technical terms. I shall say a little about each here. Van Inwagen refrains from offering an ontology of events but he does say that lives are, of course, events that are individuals or particulars and not events in the sense that can recur. It should also be said that van Inwagen takes lives to be a particular species of event, a process, since he refers to the event type - life - as a natural process. Well- individuated, put simply says that it is reasonably clear...whether a life [that] is observed at one time is the same life as a life that is observed at another time (or place) (van Inwagen 1990, 87). Self- maintaining, says that lives need no external support for their existence. A shoot of water from a fountain, for example, is not a self- maintaining event. It needs a pump to keep it going. A life, however, needs only the biological processes that 2
are inherent to it. Jealous, put simply, says it cannot be that the activities of the xs constitute at one and the same time two lives (van Inwagen 1990, 89). Second, since we are interested in the persistence of human organisms across death we will now want to know van Inwagen s criterion for persistence of human organisms. Van Inwagen clarifies his criterion for persistence as follows (van Inwagen calls this principle Life I will call it the principle of persistence to avoid confusion in my paper): Principle of persistence = if the activity of the xs at t1 constitutes a life, and the activity of the ys at t2 constitutes a life, then the organism that the xs compose at t1 is the organism that the ys compose at t2 if and only if the life constituted by the activity of the xs at t1 is the life constituted by the activity of the ys at t2 (van Inwagen 1990, 145). Third and finally we need to know what van Inwagen counts as death for a human organism. The first condition he gives that results in the end of a life is called disruption. Crucially, he does give other conditions for death. I will define all conditions for death as I go. The first one can be put as follows: (CD1) Disruption = O has died at t* if the simples that composed O have been dissociated from one another. For example, van Inwagen writes that this disassociation has occurred when the organism has been blown to bits by a bomb or died naturally and has been subject to the normal room- temperature processes of biological decay for, say, fifteen minutes (van Inwagen 1990, 147), at which point the activity of the xs cease to be caught up (to use van Inwagen s phrase) in a life. 2. Resurrection models 3
These three points ((i) life, (ii) the principle of persistence and (iii) disruption) sum up van Inwagen s materialist metaphysics of the human person sufficiently for us to progress. Since van Inwagen is a Christian and a materialist and since the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead is a necessary doctrine of Christianity it is, therefore, unacceptable for his metaphysics to rule out the resurrection of the dead. I will argue that there are three models of the resurrection namely, the recomposition model, the compaction model and the miraculous- event model are inconsistent with van Inwagen s metaphysics and, as such, not open to van Inwagen. 2.1 The recomposition model I start with a model that van Inwagen himself rejects. I do this because demonstrating van Inwagen s response to this model will elucidate some concepts that will be useful when I respond to what s taken to be his own model (2.2) and a model that might be offered on his behalf (2.3). First, what I call the recomposition model is usually considered the most intuitive explanation of the resurrection on a materialist account of the human person. To explain the recomposition model van Inwagen gives the following analogy based loosely on Aristotle s metaphysics. This story is supposed to illustrate the possibility of God s resurrecting human persons by recomposing them from the simples that composed them at the time of their death. Van Inwagen writes, Augustine s manuscript consisted of a certain parcel of matter upon which a certain form had been impressed. It ceased to exist when this parcel of matter was radically deformed. To recreate it, God needed only to collect the matter (in modern terms, the atoms) that once composed it and reimpress that form upon it (in modern terms cause these atoms to stand in the same spatial and chemical relationships they previously stood in) (van Inwagen 1978, 118). 4
Here God needed only to bring the simples that composed the manuscript back together again and arrange them in the correct spatial and chemical relationships that they previously stood in for that manuscript to exist again. Similarly, the recomposition model says that the same could, conceivably, be done with the simples that compose a human organism. There are several replies to this model. I will repeat a reply that van Inwagen himself gives against the recomposition model. Van Inwagen notes that he has a criterion of identity for men and it is, or seems to be, violated by the recomposition model (van Inwagen 1978, 118). That is, is due to the fact that he holds the principle of persistence (above) to be true that entails the falsity of the recomposition model. His reply can be stated as follows: (1a) A human organism exists if and only if the simples that compose him 2 are caught up in a particular natural process; a life L* (2a) When the simples that compose that man have been disrupted, that man s life L* ends and he ceases to exist. (3a) When God collects the simples that used to constitute that man and reassembles them, they will occupy positions relative to one another because of God s miracle and not because of the operation of the natural process that was the life L* of that man. (4a) From (1a) the man cannot be brought back into existence. (C1a) Therefore, any recomposition of the simples that composed the man at the time of his death will not result in that man s being brought back into existence. The most important premise in this argument is premise (4a). The man in question cannot be brought back into existence because at the time of death, time t2, there is an end to the man s life. That is, the activity of the xs at time t1 in virtue of which that man exists has ceased. Since (1a) for one man to be identical with another there needs to be a particular natural process that was the life of that man and since, according to the recomposition model, the activity of the ys at t3 are a result of God s action and not the result of a particular natural process, 2 I follow van Inwagen in using gender specific language. 5
L*, that was the life of that man, then the life brought into existence by God is, a new life and, as such, a new man. 3 Van Inwagen, then, must give a model of the resurrection such that the xs at time t1 and the ys at time t3 are a part of the same continuing natural process and not two different processes; one brought about by the natural course of things the other brought about by God. That is, as van Inwagen notes, there needs to be the relevant causal chain (van Inwagen 1978, 119) between the xs at t1 and the ys at t3 such that the xs and the ys are both a part of the same life. I will explicate one way in which van Inwagen might attempt to demonstrate this below (model (2.2)). I will then attempt to show that this model fairs no better than the recomposition model. I will also consider a final model that holds that a particular human organism at time t1 and t3, although differentiated by a break in a natural process, might still be considered to be the same human organism (model (2.3)). 2.2 The compaction model Van Inwagen s current inclination is to argue that it is possible to give a model of death and resurrection such that there is the relevant causal chain, between the life of organism O 1 at t1 and the life of organism O 2 at t3. He does this by arguing that while disruption is a sufficient condition for death it s not a necessary condition for death. Instead, at death, God will somehow preserve a remnant of each person, a gumnos kókkos (a naked kernel: 1 Cor 15:37) (van Inwagen 2009, 327) which will continue to exist throughout the interval between my death and my resurrection and will, at the general resurrection, be clothed in a festal garment of new flesh (van Inwagen 1995, 486), that is, constitute a resurrected human organism. 3 For a further defence of this sub- clause new life and, as such, a new man see section (2.3). 6
Anders 2011 offers a description of this naked kernel that he thinks is consistent with van Inwagen s metaphysics. It must be noted that I do not think that Anders description of this naked kernel is the only description (as Anders seems to suggest). For the time being, however, I will structure my argument around Anders description of a naked kernel. First, as discussed, van Inwagen must give a condition for death that allows for the relevant causal chain (van Inwagen 1978, 119) between the xs at t1 and the ys at t3 to persist. In addition to disruption van Inwagen argues that upon death one s life can get suspended (van Inwagen 1990, 147). We might state this condition as follows: (CD2) Suspension= O has died at t* if the life of O has ceased and the simples that were caught up in it at the moment it ceased retain owing to the mere absence of disruptive forces their individual properties and causal relations to one another (van Inwagen 1990, 147). Suspension might occur, for example, when the temperature of an organism has been reduced to very nearly absolute zero by some technique (not currently available, by the way) that does no irreversible organic damage) (van Inwagen 1990, 146). Second, according to Anders, upon suspension one s life also gets compacted. 4 A life has been compacted if the suspended life gets condensed into a small portion of the simples whose activity constituted that life at the time of death (Anders 2011, 34). Specifically, we can state compaction as follows: 4 I must note that I think Anders account of compaction is unclear and offer an alternative account elsewhere. 7
(CD3) Compaction = O has died at t* if O s life has been suspended and the organizational structure of O s life is compacted into a small portion of the simples whose activity constituted O s life the moment before O s death. One further point must be clarified before I offer an objection. Upon compaction one may wonder whether or not a life exists. I think that both van Inwagen and Anders would agree that the life has ceased (van Inwagen 1990, 147). There may be, however, a sense in which there is still a life there (van Inwagen 1990, 147) but this life is a life in suspended form and, as such, not a life in the strict sense established by van Inwagen s Life principle (Anders 2011, 35). This is why Anders refers to the organizational structure (Anders 2011, 34) of O s life getting compacted and not O s life. This small portion of simples is, according to Anders, the naked kernel that van Inwagen alludes to. Upon resurrection, then, God need only to encourage this kernel to develop into a life again resulting in a resurrected organism that has maintained a sufficient causal connection with the life that was going on before death. In response I think that compaction, at least as stated above, is not sufficient for the persistence human organisms across death. This is because the life L* that is responsible for the existence of organism O2 at time t3 does not count as the same life in virtue of which the organism O1 exists at time t1. This is for the following reason. The Life L* at time t3 has come about because of God s supplying the relevant energy to the kernel and, since the kernel is not itself, strictly speaking, a life, then God is starting a new life; a new natural process in virtue of which an organism exists. That is, the life of organism O2 at time t3 is not the continuation of a particular life, a particular natural process, but a new process encouraged to develop by God s action from a kernel. 8
I am happy to concede that a life that has merely been suspended, if such a thing is possible, could begin again 5 perhaps through thawing. But a life that has been suspended and compacted, as Anders describes, cannot begin again in this way. Rather, God must supply the relevant energy for the kernel to develop into a life resulting in a new organism. 2.3 The miraculous- event model The final response that might be put forward on behalf of van Inwagen is to argue that since van Inwagen s thesis entails that organism O* exists in virtue of event L* then God need not reassemble the simples that compose O*, nor need there be any causal chain between specific activities of simples at times. Rather, all God needs to do is miraculously restart the life, L*, in virtue of which organism O* exists. 6 This model, then, is consistent with CD1 (disruption) and it seems possible that God could perform such a feat. To be clear this suggestion doesn t violate condition (i.ii) of Life. One might respond by arguing that since (i.ii) says that lives must be self- maintaining i.e. certain living beings, for example, consume certain simples and excrete other simples through breathing and exhaling, eating and going to the lavatory, and since all of this activity happens within the self- maintaining natural process that results in the existence of human organisms, if God restarted a life then the life that was composed of xs at t1 and the life that was composed of the ys at t3 would not be a self- maintaining process but a process maintained by God. That is, the breathing and exhaling, eating and going to the lavatory would have to be restarted and, as such, maintained by God and not the life itself. This response, however, will not work. It seems possible that God could, at t3, restart the same self- maintaining life that existed at t1. This seems to amount to the claim that it s only after the life has started that the self- maintaining 5 see van Inwagen s frozen cat analogy (van Inwagen 1990, 146-148) 6 A model similar to the miraculous- event model described here was originally put forward by Richard Sturch at the Religious Studies at 50 conference, June 2014 and the Tyndale Fellowship Philosophy of Religion conference, July 2014 in his, yet unpublished, paper Games of Cricket and the General Resurrection. 9
condition really matters. That is, if the principle of persistence is true and it s possible that God could restart a life then the token event that is O* s life L* - could be restarted by God, resulting in O* s continued existence. As such, it seems that one could keep much of van Inwagen s metaphysics and refuse to concede that some sort of immanent causal chain between the activity of the xs at time t1 and the activity of the ys at time t3 is required. I am inclined to think that the miraculous- event model may be a possible solution for some form of Christian materialism; but it cannot be a solution for van Inwagen. This is due to the fact that van Inwagen, to accept this solution, would have to abandon his understanding of the relationship between life and organism. I will explain this in two steps. First, it must be noted, as van Inwagen writes, that [i]f a life has been disrupted, it can never begin again; any life that is going on after its disruption is not that life (van Inwagen 1990, 147-148). As such, if van Inwagen were to allow it to be the case that human organisms can be gappy (that is, human organism O* can exist at t1, cease to exist at t2, and then exist again at t3), then van Inwagen would be allowing it to be the case that the same human organism could exist in virtue of a new event since any life after disruption would not be, as he says, that life (van Inwagen 1990, 148). Second, for van Inwagen any new life, necessarily, results in the existence of a new organism. To see why a new life cannot result in the existence of a previous organism one needs to understand the relationship between life and organism. On van Inwagen s theory for any human organism O* there exists a token life L* in virtue of which that particular human organism O* exists such that the life L* is ontologically prior to the human organism O*. That is, we might say that van Inwagen sees particular human organisms and particular lives together. As van Inwagen writes, a life is like an engine which supports and maintains the form of a living organism [as] an inherent part of its characteristic structure the mechanisms responsible for the maintenance of a life are virtually indistinguishable from the structures they support (van Inwagen 1990, 93). 10
Since a particular life maintains the form of a particular living organism as an inherent part of that organism s structure, any new life will, therefore, necessarily result in a new organism. To say that the same organism can exist in virtue of a new life, then, would be to accept the claim that the identity of a human organism were not determined by the life in virtue of which it actually exists. This is inconsistent with van Inwagen s view of lives. Conclusion In sum, the recomposition model, the compaction model and the miraculous- event model as currently stated all seem to be inconsistent with van Inwagen s broader materialist metaphysics of the human person. The recomposition model, perhaps the most intuitive model, rules out resurrection due to the fact that the life of the organism before death has ceased and, as such, God brings a new organism into existence. Likewise, while the compaction model attempts to maintain some material and casual connection between lives at times, it seems that this material and causal connection is not sufficient for persistence of a particular human organism if it is God who brings about a life from a kernel. Finally, the miraculous- event model is inconsistent with van Inwagen s metaphysics due to the fact that lives are ontologically prior to organisms and since any life after disruption will be a new life then there can only exist, necessarily, a new organism. It should be noted that all van Inwagen needs to do is give a model to show that the resurrection is logically possible. He does not need to give the actual mechanism by which material beings are resurrected. I have not shown that the resurrection on a van Inwagen s account is logically impossible. All I hope to have shown is that two apparently logically possible models (the compaction model and the miraculous- event model) are incompatible with van Inwagen s materialist metaphysics. References Anders, Paul C. 2011. Mind, Mortality and Material Being: Van Inwagen and the Dilemma of Material Survival of Death. Sophia 50, no. 1 11
Van Inwagen, Peter. 1978. The Possibility of the Resurrection. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9, no. 2, pp. 114 121. - - -. 1990. Material Beings. Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press - - -. 1995. Dualism and Materialism. Faith and Philosophy 12(4), 475-488. - - -. 2009. The Possibility of Resurrection in Oxford Readings in Philosophical Theology Volume II. Oxford: New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 321-327 12