Virtue Ethics What kind of person do you want to grow up to be? Virtue Ethics (VE): The Basic Idea Whereas most modern (i.e., post 17 th century) ethical theories stress rules and principles as the content of moral philosophy, a VE approach stresses character i.e., what sort of person one ought to become. Historically, VE is perhaps the oldest ethical tradition, going back at least to the ancient Greeks (and found, in somewhat different forms, in many cultures cf. the idea of ren in Confucianism) The Greek word ethos, you ll recall, means character 1
Aristotle In his Nicomachean Ethics (325 BCE), Aristotle describes the fundamental task of ethics as articulating the good for man (i.e., what s good for us as members of our species -- us featherless bipeds possessing reason). What that turns out to be: activity of the soul in conformity with virtue Virtue > Greek areté excellence, power, goodness. The same etymological root as aristos, as in aristocracy Virtue: The Aristotelian View A good ditch-digger (presumably) will have the virtue of physical strength; a good teacher (hopefully) will possess the virtues of knowledge, articulateness, patience, etc.. These virtues enable the practitioners of these arts to realize the purpose of their art (teleology, again). Similarly, sharpness is a virtue of a knife: A good knife is a sharp knife. But what, in general, makes someone a good person? 2
Aristotle mentions, inter alia: Moral Virtues: Courage, Temperance (moderation), Generosity (moderation in giving and taking wealth), Magnificence (correctly dealing with great wealth or power), Pride (claiming honor due to you), Gentleness (moderation with respect to anger), etc. Intellectual Virtues: Wisdom (sophia), Knowledge (epistēmē), Intuition (nous), Prudence (phronēsis), Art/Skill (technē) The Doctrine of the Mean Aristotle: Each of the moral virtues is a mean (an average mid-point) between extremes the mean by reference to two vices the one of excess and the other of deficiency So, courage (andreia), e.g., is the mean between the deficiency of cowardliness and the excess of foolhardiness. Generosity (liberality), one could say, is the mean between being a tightwad and being a chump. Pride (megalopsychia) is the mean between vanity and selling yourself short (Donald Trump vs. Richard Lewis) 3
The Point: Happiness Eudaimonia On the Aristotelian view, having a virtue isn t simply a matter of making a judgment or calculating from a principle it s not primarily a cognitive activity at all. Instead, virtues are instilled through training and experience they are habits of character (e.g., the person with phronēsis has developed the habit of making good judgments) How so good? According to Aristotle, developing the virtues is necessary in order to become a good person where good means simply flourishing (happy). Eudaimonia = living a successful human life Virtues of Virtue Ethics 1. Like care ethics, VE provides a fairly compelling account of moral motivation. Stocker s example: There may be something disappointing about a friend or relative (or, for that matter a professional, such as a doctor) claiming that they act purely from duty. By contrast, someone who says I m doing what a good friend ought to do (i.e., instantiating the human virtues required by friendship) seems less cold, more admirable. We d like to live in a community of such people. 4
2. VE seems to address some reservations we may have about impartiality as a moral requirement. As we saw in connection with EC (and elsewhere), there seems to be something cold, possibly even inhuman, about principle-based theories that require strict impartiality. VE: The exercise of some virtues is necessarily partial (e.g., friendship, loyalty); others (e.g., beneficence, gentleness) are at least in principle capable of being exercised impartially. Vices of Virtue Ethics A. The Problem of Incompleteness (Rachels) If VE is proposed as a complete moral theory i.e., as an alternative to rule/principle focused theories, then VE faces challenges when faced with particular questions about actions (i.e., about what we ought to do). Some purist VEs are willing to bite the bullet on this: Anscombe: In identifying bad acts It would be a great improvement if, instead of morally wrong, one always named a genus such as untruthful, unchaste, unjust 5
But that s really just avoiding the question and/or changing the subject. When considering whether or not to tell a lie, e.g., it is not especially helpful to be told that doing so is contrary to the virtue of honesty. What I ultimately want to know is why I ought refrain from lying, why (or whether) I ought to be honest. Rachels: we need an explanation of why it is better to have this trait than it opposite We need reasons. B. The Problem of Possible Arbitrariness (Yours Truly) It s not the case that VE purists cannot in principle provide good reasons for the character traits that they favour (Indeed, Aristotle provides a pretty elaborate reasoned justification for his list.) But notice just how culture-bound Aristotle s list seems from a contemporary perspective: manliness, being a big guy, being magnificent. Once a list of virtues becomes detached from its reasons, I d suggest, it can easily become hypostatized. Consider, e.g.: Chastity à la Anscombe 6
C. The Problem of Conflicting Virtues Recycling an example from the CI: Do these jeans make my ass look fat? Should I answer you in accord with the virtue of honesty or in accord with virtue of kindness? VE by itself doesn t necessarily offer much help. (Aristotle would say that you ought to choose as prudent [phronetic] person would. But how much help is that, really?) C. The Problem of Scope Is there a virtue that matches every morally good reason for doing something? Consider: You are a bureaucrat who faces a choice between funding AIDS research and cancer research. You can t fund both. You might choose on the basis of whichever will do the most good (the virtue of being a good U ). Is there guaranteed to be a virtue that we can draw on for every difficult moral decision you ll ever need to make?... 7
In a way, Aristotle thinks there is: Phronēsis is the general purpose virtue that, if you have it, will allow you to fit virtues to particular circumstances. You gain phronēsis (prudence, good judgment ) on the basis of experience; with maturity you learn to balance the other virtues with particular circumstances But notice: When we are faced with morally difficult choices in particular circumstances (especially novel circumstances in connection with, e.g., technology) choose as a phronetic person would choose is almost perfectly empty non-advice. We want to know what the phronetic person would choose, and, more importantly, why. Phronesis saves the purity of VE at the cost of emptying its content. 8
VE By Itself vs. VE as Supplement But in fact it is simply not the case that VE and rulesfocused theories are mutually exclusive. Most of the major modern moral philosophers (incl. Mill and Kant) have explicitly discussed virtue as a necessary supplement to, or outcome of, a rule-focused theory. Of course, in practice, we don t normally go around morally reasoning from first principles: We adopt (and encourage others to adopt) dispositions to behave in accordance with the rules. I.e., rules imply virtues. 9