MORALIT Y IN REPUBLIC II W E D N E S D AY, M A R C H 9, 2 0 1 6
INTRODUCING MORAL PHILOSOPHY Ancient Greek philosophy begins with what are largely epistemic and practical scientific concerns about the world around them, and about the cosmos. But as philosophy develops, we saw a turn toward human lives in more and more specific ways. The Sophists, through rhetoric, were concerned with teaching people to be good citizens. Last week we saw that Plato and Aristotle developed theories of the soul. This allows them to investigate human nature in two ways: Seeking to situate human beings in relation to Nature as a whole. Developing accounts of the relations between individuals and groups. This latter way is what leads philosophers to investigate morality and politics.
REPUBLIC II: THE GOODNESS OF JUSTICE Socrates wants to truly convince Glaucon (and the others) that it is better in every way to be just than unjust. Because we have already read ahead in the Republic, we know that Socrates accepts an analogy between justice in the city and justice in the soul. What does it mean to say that justice is better than injustice? To say that A is better than B is to say that A has a greater amount of goodness than B. Two kinds of good: x is good because we welcome it for its own sake. x is good because we desire it for its own sake AND for the sake of what comes from it. What are some examples of goods of these two kinds?
A THIRD KIND OF GOOD Things of this kind are onerous but beneficial. and we wouldn't choose them for their own sakes, but for the sake of the rewards and other things that come from them. (537d) What are some examples of this kind of good? So we have three kinds of good: Good only for its own sake. Good for its own sake and its effects. Good not for its own sake, but only for its effects. Where does justice fit in? Socrates says it is among the finest goods, i.e., the second kind above. But Glaucon says that most people think justice is onerous, and only good for the rewards.
WHAT PEOPLE CALL JUSTICE Socrates produces a very interesting argument about what people ordinarily say about justice. The argument leads people to say that injustice is better than justice! This is the opposite of Socrates view! So Socrates needs to show that they are wrong. The argument begins: They say that to do injustice is naturally good and to suffer injustice bad, but that the badness of suffering it so far exceeds the goodness of doing it that those who have done and suffered injustice and tasted both, but who lack the power to do it and avoid suffering it, decide that it is profitable to come to an agreement with each other neither to do injustice nor to suffer it.
GYGES RING: A CHALLENGE FOR JUSTICE This myth is used by Glaucon to explore the nature of justice. Suppose there are two rings that make the wearer invisible. One is worn by a just person, and the other by an unjust person. The premise of the argument is that if one can do whatever one wants with no consequences, then it seems that the just and unjust person would become indistinguishable. Why? This, some would say, is a great proof that one is never just willingly but only when compelled to be. No one believes justice to be a good when it is kept private, since, wherever either person thinks he can do injustice with impunity, he does it. Indeed, every man believes that injustice is far more profitable to himself than justice. (360d) Is this true? Even if it is true, does it follow that injustice is better than justice? After further discussion, Glaucon concludes: That's what they say, Socrates, that gods and humans provide a better life for unjust people than for just ones. (362cd)
ADEIMANTUS S INTERVENTION The best argument Adeimantus can muster is to refer to the practice of absolution of injustice through ritual. He says of those who can quote Homer and Hesiod: they persuade not only individuals but whole cities that the unjust deeds of the living or the dead can be absolved or purified through ritual sacrifices and pleasant games, These initiations, as they call them, free people from punishment hereafter, while a terrible fate awaits those who have not performed the rituals. (365) The upshot of this view is that people are persuaded to try to maintain a just reputation while getting away with as much as possible, so long as they perform rituals which persuade the gods to forgive them. This might be very difficult to maintain, so people form secret societies and use rhetoric to defend themselves. Finally, he concludes: Why, then, should we still choose justice over the greatest injustice? Many eminent authorities agree that, if we practice such injustice with a false facade, we'll do well at the hands of gods and humans, living and dying as we've a mind to. So, given all that has been said, Socrates, how is it possible for anyone of any power-whether of mind, wealth, body, or birth-to be willing to honor justice and not laugh aloud when he hears it praised? (366c)
B A RT T H E G R E E K In this scene, Bart is talking to a preacher about his reasoning for his behaviour. He appears to endorse precisely the view defended by Glaucon and Adeimantus. But what Bart says is clearly a joke. Do you think the writers agree with Bart, or are they ironically pointing out the flaw in this way of thinking?
SOCRATES RESPONSE: ADOPT A CERTAIN METHOD Socrates remains unconvinced by Glaucon and Adeimantus s arguments. He even thinks that they themselves are not convinced by them. He suggests the following approach: The investigation we're undertaking is not an easy one but requires keen eyed sight. Therefore, since we aren't clever people, we should adopt the method of investigation that we'd use if, lacking keen eyesight, we were told to read small letters from a distance and then noticed that the same letters existed elsewhere in a larger size and on a larger surface. We'd consider it a godsend, I think, to be allowed to read the larger ones first and then to examine the smaller ones, to see whether they really are the same. That's certainly true, said Adeimantus, but how is this case similar to our investigation of justice? (368de)
SOCRATES METHOD: ADOPT A COARSE-GRAINED MODEL Socrates suggests that in order to determine what justice is, we need to look where the most justice should be. Why? And where should we look? Perhaps, then, there is more justice in the larger thing, and it will be easier to learn what it is. So, if you're willing, let's first find out what sort of thing justice is in a city and afterwards look for it in the individual, observing the ways in which the smaller is similar to the larger. (369) So the discussion of justice in the city is a means to discover what it is in the soul, and therefore what it is in general. Is this a good approach? Why / why not?
JUSTICE IN THE SOUL: MORALITY? The discussion in Republic II turns to the way in which the parts of a city should be organized. As we saw, Socrates is explicit that this is part of the method of determining what justice in the soul is like, and therefore what justice and injustice really are. Are we supposed to think that a truly just soul is one that makes a person behave morally? Or does it only make a person behave justly? Is there a difference? Is there a difference between the city model, and the soul of a person? What exactly is the analogy here?
BAN POETRY, INCREASE JUSTICE Why does Socrates suggest that in the city, poets should be banned? How might this relate to the soul, and to morality / justice? At the beginning of this book, we saw Socrates make an important claim about justice: Where do you put justice? --I myself put it among the finest goods, as something to be valued by anyone who is going to be blessed with happiness, both because of itself and because of what comes from it. That isn't most people's opinion." (Republic II, 358) This view appears to have continued on in philosophy. Consider: Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself; nor do we enjoy it because we restrain our lusts; on the contrary, because we enjoy it, we are able to restrain them. (Benedictus de Spinoza, Ethics, 5P42) Plato ends Book II without a clear picture of what justice and injustice are, but the discussion seems to lead us to suspect that it can t be onerous, or merely good in itself, but valuable in itself and for what leads us to.