The Divine Nature from Summa Theologiae (Part I, Questions 3-11) by Thomas Aquinas (~1265 AD) translated by Brian J. Shanley (2006) Question 3. Divine Simplicity Once it is grasped that something exists, it remains to be investigated how it exists, in order that what it is may be known. But because it is not possible for us to know what God is, but rather what God is not, we cannot consider how God exists, but rather how God does not exist. Therefore, the first topic to be considered is how God does not exist [Questions 3 11]; second, how God is known by us [Q. 12]; third, how God is named by us [Q. 13]. Now it can be shown how God does not exist by denying of God all those things that do not befit God, such as composition, motion, and other things of this kind. Thus the first thing to be considered is God s simplicity, whereby we deny of God any composition. And because among corporeal beings what is simple is imperfect and a part of something, the second thing to be considered is God s perfection [Q s. 4 6]; the third is God s infinity [Q. 7]; the fourth, God s immutability [Q. 9]; the fifth, God s unity [Q. 11]. Article 1. Is God a body? Reply. God is not a body in any way. This can be shown in three ways. First, because no body moves another without itself being moved, as is evident through induction from individual cases. But it was shown above [I.2.3] that God is the unmovable first mover. Therefore, it is obvious that God is not a body. Second, it is necessary that whatever is the first being must be in act without being in potentiality in any way. For although in one and the same thing that passes from potentiality to actuality, the potentiality precedes the actuality temporally, nevertheless the actuality precedes the potentiality absolutely speaking, because what is in potentiality becomes actual only through some being in actuality. But it was shown above [I.2.3] that God is the first being. It is therefore impossible that there be any kind of potentiality in God. But every body has potentiality, because whatever is continuous, considered as such, is infinitely divisible. It is therefore impossible that God be a body. 1
Third, because God is the noblest of beings, as is obvious from what was said earlier [I.2.3 reply]. But it is impossible that any body be the noblest of beings. For a body is either living or nonliving. Now a living body is clearly more noble than a nonliving body. But a living body does not live insofar as it is a body, since then every body would live; it therefore must live through something else, just as our body lives through the soul. But that whereby the body lives is more noble than the body. Therefore, it is impossible that God be a body. Article 4. Is there composition of essence and existence in God? It seems that essence and existence are not identical in God: 1. If they were identical, then nothing is added to divine existence. But the existence to which nothing is added is the common existence that is predicated of everything; it would therefore follow that God is the common being that is predicated of all things. Yet this is false, according to Wisdom 14:21: They gave the incommunicable name to wood and stone. Thus the existence of God is not God s essence. 2. We can know that God exists, as shown above [I.2.3]. But we cannot know what God is. Thus the existence of God is not identical with what it is to be God God s quiddity or nature. On the contrary. Hilary says in On the Trinity VII: Existence is not an accident in God, but rather the subsisting truth. Thus what subsists in God is God s existence. Reply. God is not only his essence, as shown above [art. 3], but also his existence. This can be shown in many ways. First, whatever is in something that is other than its essence must be caused either by the principles of the essence, as in the case of proper accidents following from the species (as the ability to laugh follows from being human and is caused by the essential principles of the species); or by something external (as heat is caused in water by fire). Accordingly, if the very existence of a thing were other than its essence, then it would be necessary for its existence to be caused either by something external or by its own essential principles. But it is impossible for existence to be caused solely by the essential principles of a thing, because no thing suffices as the cause of its own being if its existence is 2
caused. It therefore follows that anything whose existence is other than its essence must be caused to exist by something else. This cannot be said of God, however, since we call God the first efficient cause. It is therefore impossible in God that existence be other than essence. Second, existence is what makes every form or nature actual, for neither goodness nor humanity is signified in actuality except inasmuch as we signify that it exists. Accordingly, it follows that existence itself is related to an essence that is distinct from it as actuality is related to potentiality. So since there is no potentiality in God, as shown above [art. 1], it follow that in God essence is not other than existence. Thus God s essence is God s existence. Third, just as that which has fire but is not itself fire is on fire through participation, so too that which has existence but is not itself existence is a being through participation. But God is his essence, as shown above [art. 3]. Thus if God were not identical with his existence, God would be a being through participation rather than essentially. This would mean that God is not the first being, which is absurd to say. Accordingly God is his existence and not only his essence. Article 7. Is there composition of any kind in God, or is God absolutely simple? It seems that God is not absolutely simple: 1. The things that come from God imitate God: thus every being derives from the first being and every good thing derives from the first good. But among the things that come from God, there is nothing absolutely simple. Therefore, God is not absolutely simple. 2. Whatever is best must be attributed to God. But our experience is that composite things are better than simple things, as mixed bodies are better than their elements, and animals to their parts. Therefore, it should not be said that God is absolutely simple. On the contrary. Augustine says in On the Trinity VI that God is truly simple to the highest degree. 3
Reply. That God is absolutely simple can be shown in many ways. First, from what has already been said in this question. For there is no composition in God: no composition of quantitative parts, since God is not a body [art. 1]; no composition of form and matter [art. 2]; no distinction between nature and subsisting subject [art. 3]; no distinction of essence and existence [art. 4]; no composition of genus and difference [art. 5]; no composition of subject and accident [art. 6]. It is thus clear that God is in no way composite, but is instead absolutely simple. Second, every composite thing comes after its components and depends on them. But God is the first being, as we have already shown [I.2.3]. Third, every composite thing has a cause, since things that are distinct considered in themselves do not come together to constitute some one thing unless there is some cause uniting them. But God has no cause, as was shown above [I.2.3], since God is the first efficient cause. Fourth, in every composite thing there must be potentiality and actuality, which is not the case with God. For either one part is actuality with respect to the other or else all the parts are in potentiality with respect to the whole. Fifth, no composite applies to any of its parts. This is clearly the case in wholes composed of dissimilar parts; for no part of a human being is a human being and no part of a foot is a foot. In wholes composed of similar parts, although something that is said of the whole can be said of a part as a part of air is air and a part of water is water nonetheless something is said of the whole that does not apply to any of its parts, for it is not the case that if the whole of the water measures two cubits then a part of it measures two cubits. Accordingly, in every composite there is something that is not the whole itself. Now even if this could be said of things having a form namely that they have something that is not the whole itself, as when something that is white has something that does not pertain to the nature of white nevertheless in the form itself there is nothing else. Thus, since God is form itself or rather existence itself, God cannot be composed in any way. Response to 1. Whatever comes from God imitates God as having been caused by the first cause. But it is part of the nature of being caused to be in some way composite, because at the very least its existence is different from what it is, as will be clear below [I.50.2]. 4
Response to 2. In our experience composite things are better than simple things, because the perfection of a creature s goodness is found not in one simple thing, but rather in a multitude. But the perfection of divine goodness is found in one simple thing, as will be shown below [I.4.2 R.1]. Question 4. Divine Perfection Having considered divine simplicity, we must now consider the perfection of God. And insofar as something is perfect it is also said to be good Article 1. Is God perfect? It is said in Matthew 5:48: You must be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect. Reply. God is said to be the first principle not in the manner of a material cause, but rather as an efficient cause, and so must be most perfect. For just as matter as such is in potentiality, so an agent, as such, is in actuality. Hence the first active principle must be in actuality in the highest degree, and consequently be perfect in the highest degree, since something is said to be perfect insofar as it is in actuality. For a thing is called perfect when it lacks nothing with respect to the manner of its perfection. [Response to 3.] Existence itself is the most perfect of all things, for it is related to everything as their actuality. This is because nothing has actuality except insofar as it exists; thus existence itself is the actuality of all things, including their very forms. Hence existence is not related to anything else as receiver to received, but rather as what is received to what receives it. For when I speak of the existence of a human being, or a horse, or anything else, that existence is taken as something formal and received, rather than as that to which existence belongs. Article 2. Is God perfect in every way, possessing in himself the perfections of all things? It seems that the perfections of all things are not in God: 1. God is simple, as was shown above. But the perfections of things are multiple and diverse. Thus not all the perfections of things are in God. 5
2. Opposites cannot coexist in the same thing. But the perfections of things are opposites, for any species is perfected by its specific difference, and the differences dividing the genus and constituting the species are opposites. Thus since opposites cannot be in the same thing at the same time, it seems that not all the perfections of things are in God. 3. What is alive is more perfect than what simply exists, and what is wise more perfect than what is simply living; thus living is more perfect than existing, and being wise more perfect than living. But the essence of God is existence itself. Thus it does not contain in itself the perfections of life and wisdom and others of this kind. On the contrary. Dionysius says in Chapter 5 of On Divine Names that God contains all together and antecedently all things that exist. Reply. The perfections of all things are found in God. Hence God is said to be perfect in every way, because God does not lack any nobility that is found in any genus, as the Commentator says in Metaphysics V. This can be seen in two ways. First, because whatever perfection there is in an effect must be found in the cause of that effect, either according to the same nature, if the agent is univocal (as when a human being generates another human), or in a more eminent way, if the cause is equivocal (as a likeness of all that is generated by the power of the sun is found in the sun itself). For it is obvious that an effect preexists in the power of the acting cause. But to preexist in the power of the acting cause is not to preexist in an imperfect mode but rather in a more perfect mode. In contrast, to preexist in the potentiality of the material cause is to preexist in a less perfect mode, because matter as such is imperfect. An acting cause, however, as such, is perfect. Thus since God is the first efficient cause of things, it follows that the perfections of all things preexist in God in a more eminent way. Second, it was shown above [I.3.4] that God is self-subsisting existence. It follows from this that God contains the complete perfection of existing in himself. For it is obvious that if something hot does not contain the full perfection of what is hot, this is so because it does not participate in heat in a perfect manner. If, in contrast, heat [itself] were self-subsisting, then it would not be possible for it to lack any of the power of heat. Thus since God is subsisting existence itself, nothing of the perfection of existing can be lacking in God. But the perfections of all things belong to the perfection of 6
existing, for things are perfect inasmuch as they have existence in some way. Thus it follows that God does not lack the perfection of any thing. Response to 1. In Chapter 5 of On Divine Names, Dionysius says that just as the sun while remaining one in being and illuminating uniformly, prepossesses simply in itself the many and diverse substances and qualities of the things we can sense, so much more is it necessary that all things preexist according to a unity of nature in the cause of all things. And thus those things that are diverse and opposite in themselves preexist in God as one, without any detriment to divine simplicity. Response to 2. Through this, the solution to the second objection is obvious. Response to 3. In the same chapter Dionysius says that although existence itself is more perfect than life, and life itself more perfect than wisdom, if they were to be considered insofar as they are conceptually distinguished, nevertheless what is living is more perfect than what is merely a being, because a living thing is also a being, and a wise person is both living and a being. Accordingly, although a being may not include in itself living and being wise, since not everything that participates in existence must do so according to every mode of existing, nevertheless the very existence of God includes in itself life and wisdom, since no perfection of existing can be lacking to what is subsisting existence itself. Question 7. Divine Infinity After considering divine perfection, the next topic that ought to be considered is God s infinity and God s existence in things, for it is said that God is everywhere and in all things insofar as God is unbounded and infinite. Article 1. Is God infinite? Reply. As is said in Physics III, All the ancient philosophers attributed infinity to the first principle, and they did this with good reason insofar as they observed things to flow from the first principle to infinity. Yet because some of them erred regarding the nature of the first principle, they consequently erred regarding its infinity. For because they postulated a material first principle, they accordingly attributed the infinity of matter to 7
their first principle, saying that some kind of infinite body was the first principle of things. It must be noted, therefore, that something is said to be infinite because it is not limited. Now in one way matter is limited by form, and in another way form by matter. Matter is limited by form insofar as matter, prior to receiving form, is in potentiality to many forms; once it receives a form, however, it becomes limited by that one form. Form is limited by matter insofar as form, considered in itself, is common to many; once it is received in matter, however, it becomes the determinate form of this thing. Now matter is perfected by the form that limits it; thus the kind of infinity attributed to matter implies imperfection because it is as matter lacking form. Form, on the other hand, is not made perfect by matter, but rather has its range restricted; thus the kind of infinity that form has apart from determination by matter implies perfection. Now, as was made clear above [I.4.1.R3], what is most formal of all is existence itself. Therefore, since the divine existence is not received in anything, but is itself its own subsisting existence, as proven above [I.3.4], it is clear that God is infinite and perfect. Question 8. God s Existence in Things Since it seems to belong to what is infinite to be everywhere and in all things, we must now inquire whether this belongs to God. It seems that God is not in all things: Article 1. Is God in all things? 1. What is above all things is not in all things. But God is above all things, as it says in Psalms [112:4]: Exalted above all nations is the Lord. Thus God is not in all things. 2. Whatever is in something is contained by it. Yet God is not contained by things; instead, God contains things. Thus God is not in things, but rather things are in God. Hence Augustine says in On 83 Questions [Q. 20]: It is rather that all things are in God than that God is somewhere. 3. The more powerful an agent is, the farther its action extends. But God is the most powerful agent. Thus God s action can reach to what is distant from God without requiring that God be in all things. 8
On the contrary. Wherever something acts, there it is. But God acts in all things according to Isaiah 26:12: All our works are done by you in us, Lord. Thus God is in all things. Reply. God is in all things not as though God were a part of their essence or an accident, but rather as an agent is present in that on which it acts. For it is necessary that every agent be conjoined to that on which it immediately acts and make contact with it by its power; from this principle it is proved in Physics VII that a mover must be together with what it moves. Now since God is existence itself through the divine essence, it is necessary that created existence is God s proper effect, in the same way that to inflame is the proper effect of fire. Yet God causes this effect in things not only when they first begin to be, but so long as they are conserved in existence, in the same way that light is caused in the air by the sun so long as the air remains illuminated. Accordingly, as long as a thing has existence, so long must God be present to it according to its own mode of existence. Existence, however, is what is most intimate in a thing and deeper than everything else about it, since it is formal relative to everything else in a thing, as is clear from what was said above [I.4.1.R3]. Therefore, it is necessary that God be in all things, and intimately so. Response to 1. God is above all things due to the excellence of his nature, and yet is in all things as the cause of their existence, as was said above. Response to 2. Although bodily things are said to be in something as in a container, spiritual beings contain the things they are in, as the soul contains the body. Hence God is in things as that which contains them. Nevertheless, by a kind of likeness with bodily things, all things are said to be in God as if contained by God. Response to 3. The action of no agent, no matter how powerful, reaches to something distant except insofar as it acts on that thing through some medium. But it pertains to the maximal power of God to act on all things immediately. Hence nothing is distant from God, in the sense of not having God within. Instead, something is said to be distant from God through some dissimilitude of nature or grace, just as God is said to be above all things through the excellence of his nature. 9
It seems that God is not everywhere: Article 2. Is God everywhere? 1. To be everywhere means to be in every place. But being in every place is not applicable to God, since being in any place is inapplicable to him; for, as Boethius says in On the Hebdomads, incorporeal beings are not in a place. Therefore, God is not everywhere. 2. As time is related to successive things, so place is related to permanent things. But one indivisible moment of action or motion cannot exist at diverse times. Hence neither can something indivisible in the genus of permanent things be in all places. But divine existence is not successive but rather permanent. Hence God is not in many places and so is not everywhere. 3. What is wholly in one place does not have something of itself outside that place. But God, if he is in some place, is wholly there, since God does not have parts. Therefore, nothing of God is outside that place and thus God is not everywhere. On the contrary. It is said in Jeremiah 23:24: I fill heaven and earth. Reply. Since place is a kind of thing, something can be understood to be in a place in two ways: either (1) by way of other things, as when something is said to be in other things in any way, as the accidents of a place are in a place; or (2) by the proper way of being in place, as things having place are in place. Now God is in some respect present in both ways in every place (which is to be everywhere). First, just as God is in all things as giving them their existence, their power, and their activity, so he is in every place as giving it existence and the capacity to be a place. Second, things in place are in place insofar as they fill that place. Now God fills every place, but not as a body does, since a body is said to fill a place inasmuch as no other body can be with it in that place. What it instead means for God to be in some place is not that other things are excluded from that place, but rather that God fills every place insofar as God gives existence to all the things located in place, thus filling every place. 10
Response to 1. Incorporeal beings are not in a place through the contact of dimensive quantity, as bodies are, but rather through the contact of power. Response to 2. There are two kinds of indivisibles. One is the terminus of a continuum, as a point in the case of permanent things and a moment in the case of successive things. In the case of permanent things, this sort of indivisible has a determinate location and therefore cannot be in many parts of a place or in multiple places. Similarly, an indivisible moment of action or motion, because it has a determinate order in the motion or action, cannot be in multiple parts of time. The other kind of indivisible is something outside the whole genus of the continuous, and in this sense immaterial substances such as God, angels, and souls are said to be indivisible. Accordingly such an indivisible does not fit into a continuum as belonging to it, but insofar as it makes contact with it by its power. Therefore, insofar as its power is capable of extending to a single place or many, to a small one or a large, so it is in one or many places, small or large. Response to 3. A whole is said with respect to its parts. But there are two kinds of parts: first, parts of an essence, as form and matter are said to be parts of a composite, and genus and difference are parts of a species; second, parts of quantity, those parts into which a quantity can be divided. Therefore, whatever whole is in some place by the whole of its quantity cannot be outside of that place, since the quantity of what is in a place is commensurate with the quantity of that place; hence it is not the whole of the quantity if it is not the whole of the place. But the whole of an essence is not commensurate with the whole of the place. Thus what is whole in virtue of its essence s being whole in something can be outside that thing. This is evident in the case of accidental forms which have their quantity by accident: for white is whole in each part of the surface if one means the whole of its essence, since it is found in each part of the surface according to the complete nature of its species; if, on the other hand, one means whole according to quantity, which is something it has by accident, then it is not whole in each part of the surface. In the case of immaterial substances, however, the only whole, either intrinsically or accidentally, concerns the complete nature of its essence. Therefore, just as the soul is whole in each part of the body, so God is whole in all things and in each thing. 11
Article 3. Is God everywhere by his essence, power, and presence? Reply. There are two ways in which God is said to be in anything: first, in the manner of an efficient cause, and thus God is in all things created by him; second, as the object of an activity is in the agent. This second way is proper to the activities of soul, whereby what is known is in the knower and what is desired is in the desirer. In this second way, then, God is in rational creatures in a special way insofar as they know and love God actually or habitually. And since rational creatures can do this only through grace (as will be proven later [I-II, Q. 109]), God is said to be in the saints in this way by grace. In order to see how God is in the other things created by him, we need to draw on the way human affairs work. For a king is said to be in his entire kingdom by his power, even though he is not present everywhere. Moreover, by its presence, something is said to be in all things that are in its range of view, as when all the things in a house are said to be present to someone in the house who is nevertheless not present by substance in every part of the house. In contrast, something is said to be present substantially or essentially in the place where it subsists. There were some, then, namely the Manicheans, who said that spiritual and incorporeal beings are subject to divine power, but that visible and corporeal beings are subject to the power of a contrary principle. Hence against these it must be maintained that God is in all things by his power. There were others who, although they believed that all things are subject to divine power, nonetheless they did not extend divine providence down to these lower bodies; speaking for such men it says in Job 22:14: God traverses the limits of heaven and does not consider our affairs. Against these it must be maintained that God is in all things by his presence. There were still others who, although they said that all things are subject to divine providence, nonetheless they maintained that not all things are immediately created by God; rather, God immediately created the first creatures and they created the others. Against these it must be maintained that God is in all things by his essence. Thus God is in all things by his power, insofar as all are subject to his power. God is in all things by his presence, insofar as everything is naked and open to his eyes. God is in all things by his essence, insofar as God stands to all things as the cause of their being, as noted above [I.8.1 reply]. 12
Question 9. The Immutability of God We must now consider divine immutability and eternity, since the latter is a consequence of the former. Article 1. Is God completely immutable? It seems that God is not completely immutable: 3. To draw near and to move away signify motion. But these sorts of things are said of God in Scripture: Draw near to God and God will draw near to you (James 4:8). Thus God is mutable. On the contrary. It is said in Malachi 3:6: I am God and I do not change. Reply. From what has already been established, it can be shown that God is completely immutable. First, it was established earlier that there exists a first being that we call God [I.2.3], and that a first being of this kind must be pure actuality without any tincture of potentiality, because potentiality is absolutely posterior to act [I.3.1]. Now whatever is changed in any way is in some way in potentiality. Hence it is clearly impossible that God be changed in any way. Second, everything that is moved remains the same in one respect while changing in another respect, just as that which is moved from white to black remains the same in substance. Thus in everything that is moved, it follows that there is some kind of composition. But it was shown above [I.3.7] that in God there is no composition but rather complete simplicity. Hence it is obvious that God cannot be moved. Third, whatever is moved acquires something by that motion and attains something it previously had not attained. But God, since his infinity comprehends in itself every plenitude of perfection of all of existence, cannot acquire something or extend himself toward something he had not previously attained. Thus in no way does motion apply to God. Response to 3. These sorts of things are said about God metaphorically in scripture. For just as the sun is said to enter or exit a house insofar as its rays reach the house, so God is said to draw near us or move away from us insofar as we experience the influx of his goodness or fall away from it. 13
Question 10. The Eternity of God We must now inquire about eternity Article 1. What is eternity? It seems that it is not appropriate to define eternity in the way that Boethius does in Consolation of Philosophy Book V, saying that eternity is the perfect possession altogether at once of illimitable life. 1. Illimitable is a negative term. But a negation is found in the definition only of something that is deficient, which is not the case with eternity. Therefore, in the definition of eternity the term illimitable is inappropriate. 4. Many days cannot exist at once, as neither can many times. But days and times are spoken of in the plural with respect to eternity, for it is said in Micah 5:2: His origin is from the beginning, from the days of eternity. And Romans 16:25 says: according to the revelation of the mystery hidden from eternal times. Therefore, eternity is not altogether at once. Reply. Just as we must come to grasp simple things through composites, so we must come to grasp eternity through time, which is nothing other than the number of motion with respect to before and after. [Aristotle, Physics, IV.11] For since in every motion there is succession, and one part is after another, it is through enumerating the before and after in motion that we apprehend time, which is nothing other than the number of the before and after in motion. But in something that lacks motion, existing always in the same fashion, there is no before and after to be found. Accordingly, just as the definition of time consists in the enumeration of before and after in motion, so does the definition of eternity consist in the apprehension of a uniformity that is completely divorced from motion. Moreover, those things are said to be measured by time which have a beginning and an end in time, as is said in Physics IV; this is because in everything that is moved, there is to be found some beginning and some end. Yet what is completely immutable cannot have a beginning or an end, just as it cannot have any succession. Therefore, two features characterize eternity. First, what is eternal is illimitable, meaning it lacks beginning or end, since either can be a limit. Second, eternity itself lacks succession, existing altogether at once. 14
Response to 1. Things that are simple have customarily been defined by negation, as a point is what does not have parts. Now this is not because negation is of their essence, but rather because our intellect, which first apprehends composites, can come to grasp simple things only by denying composition. Response to 4. Just as God, although he is incorporeal, is described metaphorically in Scripture by terms taken from bodily things, so too the eternity that exists altogether at once can be described by terms taken from what is temporal and successive. It seems that God is not eternal: Article 2. Is God eternal? 1. Nothing made can be said of God. But eternity is something made, for Boethius says that a flowing now makes time and an abiding now makes eternity, and Augustine says in On 83 Questions that God is the author of eternity. Therefore, God is not eternal. 2. What is before and after eternity is not measured by eternity. But God is before eternity as it says in The Book of Causes, and after eternity, for it says in Exodus 15:18: The Lord will reign unto eternity and beyond. Therefore, to be eternal is not suitable to God. 3. Eternity is a kind of measure. But it is not suitable for God to be measured. Therefore, it does not belong to God to be eternal. 4. In eternity there is neither present, past, nor future, since it is altogether at once, as noted earlier [I.10.1]. But God is described in Scripture using verbs of present, past, and future tenses. Therefore, God is not eternal. On the contrary. Athanasius says: Eternal Father, eternal Son, eternal Holy Spirit. Reply. The nature of eternity follows from immutability, just as the nature of time follows from motion, as was said above [I.10.1]. Thus, since God is supremely immutable, it belongs most particularly to God to be eternal. Further, not only is God eternal, but God is his eternity. For although no other thing is its duration because no other thing is its own existence, God 15
is his own invariable existence. Hence, just as God is his essence, so God is his eternity. Response to 1. An abiding now is said to make eternity with respect to our understanding. For just as our apprehension of time is caused in us because we grasp the flow of the now, so the apprehension of eternity is caused in us insofar as we grasp an abiding now. And when Augustine says that God is the author of eternity, this should be understood to refer to participated eternity. For God shares his eternity with things in the same way he shares his immutability. Response to 2. The solution to the second objection is obvious from the previous response. For when it is said that God is before eternity, this refers to the participated eternity of immaterial substances. Response to 3. Eternity is nothing other than God himself. Hence God is not said to be eternal as if he were measured in some way, but rather the idea of measure arises only from our apprehension of eternity. Response to 4. Verbs of different tenses are said of God insofar as God s eternity includes all times, rather than because God varies though present, past, and future. Article 4. Does eternity differ from time? Eternity is altogether at once. But in time there is before and after. Thus time and eternity are not identical. Reply. It is obvious that time and eternity are not identical. Some claimed that the reason for this difference is that eternity lacks beginning and end, whereas time has a beginning and an end. But this difference is only accidental, not essential. For even if it were the case that time had always existed and will always remain (in accord with the position of those who think that the motion of the heavens is everlasting 1 ), nevertheless there would remain a difference between eternity and time, as Boethius says in the Consolation of Philosophy, because eternity is altogether at once. This is not consonant with time, because eternity is the measure of permanent existence, whereas time is the measure of motion. 1 This is what Aquinas takes to be Aristotle s opinion; see ST I.46.1. 16
Question 11. The Unity of God After what has been laid down, the unity of God must be considered. It seems that God is not one: Article 3. Is God one? 2. The one that is the principle of number cannot be predicated of God, since no quantity is predicated of God. The same goes for the one that is convertible with being, since it implies privation, and every privation is an imperfection, which does not belong to God. Hence it should not be said that God is one. On the contrary. In Deuteronomy 6:4 it says: Hear, O Israel, the Lord your God is one. Reply. That God is one can be demonstrated in three ways [the third is omitted here]. The first way is on the basis of divine simplicity. For it is obvious that whatever makes an individual be this individual is in no way communicable to many. For that by which Socrates is a human being can be communicated to many, but that which makes him this human being can be communicated to one alone. For if what were to make Socrates a human were also to make him this human, then just as there could not be many Socrates, so there could not be many humans. But this is the case with God, for God Himself is his nature, as was proven above [I.3.3]. Accordingly, what makes God to be God is identical to what makes God to be this God. Hence it is impossible that there be many gods. The second way is on the basis of the infinity of divine perfection. For it was shown above [I.4.2] that God contains in himself the complete perfection of being. So if there were many gods, it would be necessary that they differ. Thus something would be proper to one that would not be proper to another. Now if this were a privation, the one would not be absolutely perfect; if on the other hand it were a perfection, it would be lacking in the other. Thus it is impossible that there be many gods. Hence, as if compelled by the truth itself, the ancient philosophers who proposed an infinite first principle proposed only one such principle. 17
Response to 2. Insofar as it is the principle of number, one is not predicated of God, but only of those things that have existence in matter. For the one that is the principle of number belongs to the genus of mathematical objects, which have existence in matter but are abstracted conceptually from matter. But the one that is convertible with being is something metaphysical, which does not depend upon matter with respect to its existence. And although in God there is no privation, nevertheless according to our way of apprehending, God is grasped by us only by way of privation and negation. Therefore, nothing prevents some privative terms from being predicated of God, as when we say that God is incorporeal or infinite. The same is true when God is said to be one. 18