Yemen conflict may alter US-Saudi relations [Content preview Subscribe to IHS Jane s Intelligence Review for full article] The civil war in Yemen is generating a humanitarian crisis as regional powers continue to engage in a proxy battle. Michael Horton examines how Donald Trump's election to power in the US may alter the dynamics in the Middle East's most under-reported conflict The election of Donald Trump as president of the United States has brought uncertainty and unpredictability, challenging the continuity and slow, subtle shifts that foreign policy favours. As president-elect, Trump has threatened to upend the decades' old 'one-china policy' by speaking to Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen and through subsequent tweets that constitute his ongoing 'Twitter diplomacy'. Former CIA director James Woolsey, one of Trump's senior advisers, claimed on 18 December that he was baffled by the tweets and could not "keep up with them". Trump's tweets mirror his sometimes conflicting statements on foreign policy, for example questioning whether the US would invoke Article V of NATO while at the same time criticising the administration of US president Barack Obama for making the US an unreliable ally. However, he has maintained consistent views on the Iran nuclear deal, describing it as "the worst deal ever negotiated", and has vowed to "tear it up" and renegotiate it. His rhetoric about Iran and subsequent choice of numerous policy hardliners for his cabinet could be indications that Saudi Arabia - Iran's foremost regional rival - can expect continued support from the US for its increasingly assertive regional foreign policy. Nowhere is this support more necessary, or more replete with risks, than in Saudi Arabia's intervention in Yemen, which began in March 2015. Saudi Arabia has failed to defeat the Zaidi Shia insurgent group Ansar Allah (also known as the Houthis) and to reinstall Yemen's internationally recognised government-in-exile. Instead, Saudi Arabia has become mired in a war that has devastated much of Yemen and empowered Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Washington has supported Saudi Arabia's intervention in Yemen with the provision of advisers, mid-air refuelling of its aircraft, and continued arms sales. However, Saudi Arabia's bombing campaign and its naval blockade are drawing international criticism from human rights organisations, aid agencies, and some members of the US establishment, such as Representative Ted Lieu, and senators Rand Paul and Chris Murphy. There is also a growing recognition among members of the US government and US military that the beneficiaries of the war are AQAP and other militant Islamist organisations such as the Islamic State. Impasse in Yemen Much like Afghanistan, Yemen is a graveyard for invaders, with its rugged mountains and deserts combined with complex tribal politics. Egyptian intervention in Yemen during the 1962-67 civil war that pitted republicans against royalists resulted in at least 20,000 Egyptian fatalities, and Cairo's decision to back the republicans with 50,000 troops significantly weakened its army and Page 1 of 6
contributed to its defeat by Israel in the Six Day War in 1967. Saudi Arabia seems to not have heeded these historical lessons, as well as warnings from Egyptian president Abdel Fattah al-sisi, who has refused to send troops to support Saudi efforts in Yemen. Saudi Arabia's intervention in the civil war in Yemen was prompted by the gains made by the Houthi insurgents, a Zaidi Shia revivalist organisation that has deep roots in northwestern Yemen. Although technically Shia, Zaidism is doctrinally closer to Sunni Islam. The Houthis are a distinctly Yemeni group and are fiercely independent, but Saudi Arabia maintains that they are backed by and acting on behalf of Iran. Tribesmen loyal to Houthi insurgents hold their weapons as they chant slogans during a gathering in Sanaa, Yemen. Saudi Arabia has failed to defeat the Houthis and to reinstall Yemen's internationally recognised government-in-exile. (PA) 1685265 On 25 March 2015, Yemen's unpopular but internationally recognised president Abdurabu Mansour Hadi fled a Houthi offensive on the Yemeni port city of Aden for exile in Saudi Arabia. One day later, Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners launched an aerial and naval campaign called Operation Decisive Storm. The Houthis - allied with former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh - and some units of the Yemeni army are formidable fighters. After initial gains when the Houthis and their allies were pushed out of Aden - an area where they have no local support - the frontlines in the war have largely remained fixed. Saudi Arabia's war in Yemen is heavily reliant on airstrikes. To date, Riyadh has been reluctant to send its own troops into the country. Instead, it has relied on limited numbers of troops from its partners, namely Sudan and the United Arab Emirates, both of which have sent small numbers of soldiers and mercenaries to southern Yemen. Page 2 of 6
The limited commitment of ground troops means that Saudi Arabia and its primary partner in the war, the UAE, are arming and training local militias and reconstituted units from the Yemeni army. These anti-houthi and nominally pro-government-in-exile forces have had little success against the Houthis despite the millions of dollars of arms that Saudi Arabia and the UAE have provided, largely because of the tenacity of the Houthis and the Yemeni army units fighting them. However, the lack of progress has also been due to the unwillingness of many of these newly created militias to fight for the government-in-exile and the reunification of Yemen. A majority of the fighters who form these Saudi- and UAE-funded units are from southern Yemen and are more interested in independence for that part of the country. Empowering AQAP AQAP has benefited immensely from the civil war and Saudi-led campaign in Yemen. The Houthis are considered to be heretics by militant Islamist organisations such as AQAP, and are therefore natural enemies. Before the Saudi-led intervention, the Houthis were engaged in an intense clearing operation in the governorate of Al-Bayda, where AQAP had long maintained a presence. Houthis and elements of the Yemeni army were inflicting serious defeats on AQAP in Al-Bayda and in the neighbouring governorate of Shabwa, but this changed in March 2015 with the commencement of Operation Decisive Storm. The Houthis and their allies were forced to move the bulk of their forces to frontline operations along the Saudi border and contested areas such as the city of Taiz. As a result of this and the further fracturing of the Yemeni army, AQAP was able to go on the offensive rapidly. By April, it was in control of Yemen's third-largest city, the port of Mukalla in the governorate of Hadramawt, where its fighters seized stores of weapons and materiel from stockpiles abandoned by Yemeni soldiers. Most importantly, AQAP seized USD100 million in cash from the Mukalla-based branch of the Yemeni Central Bank. This money was critical to AQAP, which had long struggled with financing its operations. AQAP held Mukalla and much of the southern half of Hadramawt for a year, but in April 2016, Saudi- and UAE-backed forces moved into Mukalla and claimed to have evicted the group. Page 3 of 6
Soldiers gather at the site of a suicide attack at a base in the southern city of Aden, Yemen, on 18 December 2016. In March 2015, Yemen's internationally recognised president Abdurabu Mansour Hadi fled to exile in Saudi Arabia. (PA) 1685267 However, AQAP claimed that its retreat from the city was a strategic withdrawal that allowed it to preserve its fighters and equipment. A resident of Mukalla and retired member of the government told IHS Jane's in October 2016, "They [AQAP] began moving men and equipment out three months before the Saudis claimed to have retaken the city. Their withdrawal was well-planned." AQAP's decision to withdraw from Mukalla was reflective of an organisation that has undergone a renaissance in the two years since Saudi Arabia began operations in Yemen. AQAP's leadership appears to have embraced a far more nuanced and pragmatic approach to expanding its influence in Yemen, adopting a more covert 'gradualist' strategy that its late leader Nasir al-wuhayshi advocated. This strategy is predicated on building lasting ties to local communities by slowly implementing AQAP's extremist interpretation of Islamic law. A further innovation was demonstrated in Mukalla: AQAP is increasingly interested in ruling through proxies. During its year-long occupation of the city, it delegated day-to-day governance to a council of local tribal elders and city leaders with Salafist sympathies. It employed a similar strategy across much of southern Yemen, particularly along the coast where tribal structures are weak and poverty is endemic. Not only is AQAP focused on engaging and building ties with local communities, it is also working to enmesh itself within some of the forces fighting the Houthis and their allies. It is intent on leveraging its often superior organisational and fighting skills to make itself indispensable to anti- Houthi forces. Page 4 of 6
AQAP has clearly paid close attention to the war in Syria, where the local Al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat Fath al-sham (formerly Jabhat al-nusra) has successfully tapped into, and in many cases coopted, opposition forces fighting the government of Syrian president Bashar al-assad. In Yemen, AQAP has focused on heavily contested frontline locations such as the city of Taiz and the governorates of Al-Bayda and Dhale, where its forces and access to arms and materiel are invaluable to the poorly equipped and trained forces confronting the Houthis. A member of a selfstyled people's militia in Taiz commented to IHS Jane's in November 2016, "We know they are with Al-Qaeda and no one is happy about that, but for right now we are fighting the same enemy." Cooling relations Saudi Arabia's intervention in Yemen has cost it support at a time when more US lawmakers are willing to re-examine Washington's relationship with the kingdom. This was demonstrated by the US Congress's overturning of Obama's veto - the first time this had happened during his two terms - of the Justice against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA). JASTA became law on 28 September 2016 and allows victims of terrorist acts to sue foreign states that are not designated as state sponsors of terrorism. JASTA does not specifically mention Saudi Arabia, but it will allow long-standing civil lawsuits against Saudi Arabia to proceed. In addition to the passage of JASTA, there has been considerable opposition in both houses of Congress to continued US arms sales to Saudi Arabia. Although the legislation that would have blocked arms sales was defeated, those who backed it - including senators Paul and Murphy - were vocal in their condemnation of Saudi Arabia's human rights record, its continued support for questionable opposition groups in Syria, and its intervention in Yemen. Page 5 of 6
Tribesmen loyal to Houthi insurgents gather in Sanaa, Yemen, on 24 November 2016. Most of the raids into Saudi Arabia by the Houthis and their allies have taken place in the provinces of Jizan and Najran, where the presence of religious minority groups provides cover for the militants. (PA) 1685262 Concerns about Saudi Arabia's involvement in the wars in Syria and Yemen, as well as its human rights record, will be balanced against the importance of its financial and oil resources and its regional rivalry with Iran. Trump has filled some key positions in his administration with appointees who are Iran policy hardliners; for example, retired Lieutenant General Michael Flynn as national security adviser and Mike Pompeo as CIA director. Some of these appointees view Iran as one of the primary threats to regional - and even US - security. This might bode well for Saudi Arabia. However, Trump also supports rapprochement with Russia, Iran's most important ally and the key backer of the Syrian government. For the full version and more content: IHS Jane's Military & Security Assessments Intelligence Centre This analysis is taken from IHS Jane s Military & Security Assessments Intelligence Centre, which delivers comprehensive and reliable country risk and military capabilities information, analysis and daily insight. IHS country risk and military capabilities news and analysis is also available within IHS Jane s Intelligence Review. To learn more and to subscribe to IHS Jane s Intelligence Review online, offline or print visit http://magazines.ihs.com/ For advertising solutions contact the IHS Jane s Advertising team Page 6 of 6