DISTINCTION Necessity and importance of considering distinction It is necessary to consider distinction because nothing can be understood without distinction. A synonym for understanding a thing is to grasp it. But one cannot grasp a thing without distinguishing it from everything else, just as the hand cannot grasp something without separating it from other things. Hence, the consideration of distinction is important for all understanding. Moreover, the beginning of our mistakes is not seeing or understanding a distinction or misunderstanding it. Hence, we say that someone is mixed-up or confused when they are mistaken or apt to be mistaken. Hence, we must consider distinction to avoid mistakes. Not only is the consideration of distinction important in general for understanding and avoiding mistakes, but it is of the utmost importance for the consideration of the greatest things. This can be seen both in the thinking of the philosopher and that of the Christian. The philosopher seeks to know the distinction between God and his effects which comes under the more general distinction between a cause and its effect. And nothing is better in the effects or caused things than their distinction and order: Optimum autem in rebus causatis est distinctio et ordo ipsarum 1 The reason for this and why it is before in the intention of the first mover or maker is as follows: Quanto enim aliquid est melius in effectibus, tanto est prius in intentione agentis. Optimum autem in rebus creatis est perfectio 1 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Liber II, Capitulum 42
universi, quae consistit in ordine distinctarum rerum: in omnibus enim perfectio totius praeminet perfectioni singularium partium. Igitur diversitas rerum ex principali intentione primi agentis provenit 2 Hence, to know the greatest things, the philosopher must have a good knowledge of distinction. Moreover, to know the first cause is pure act rather than matter, we must know the following distinction between act and ability which Thomas, quoting Aristotle, notes is often used by him: Deinde dicit: Qui vero secundum potentiam, tempore prior in uno est: omnino autem, neque in tempore. Qua quidem distinctione inter potentiam et actum in pluribus locis utitur: scilicet quod actus secundum naturam est prior potentia; tempore vero, in uno et eodem quod mutatur de potentia in actum, est prior potentia actu; simpliciter vero loquendo, non est potentia etiam tempore prior actu, quia potentia non reducitur in actum nisi per actum. 3 Christians believe there is a distinction in God between the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. This is a distinction in God, not a division in God. And so the Christian should know the distinction between a distinction and a division. And also the kind of distinction this is. But more important, he should know the kind of distinction there is between the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. Thus a Christian should know how important is the consideration of distinction for knowing the greatest things. What is distinction? Distinction involves a negation in its meaning: 2 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Liber II, Capitulum 44 3 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Liber II, Capitulum 78
Sed in ratione distinctionis est negatio: distincta enim sunt quorum unum non est aliud. Unde et prima, quae seipsis distinguuntur, mutuo sui negationem includunt: ratione cuius negativae propositiones in eis sunt immediatae, ut, nulla quantitas est substantia. 4 This negation adds a second negation in our understanding of the many or multitude since there is already a negation in the understanding of one and the many involves many ones: unum quod convertitur cum ente, ponit quidem ipsum ens, sed nihil superaddit nisi negationem divisionis. Multitudo autem ei correspondens addit supra res, quae dicuntur multae, quod unaquaeque earum sit una, et quod una earum non sit altera, in quo consistit ratio distinctionis. Et sic, cum unum addat supra ens unam negationem secundum quod aliquid est indivisum in se, - multitudo addit duas negationes, prout scilicet aliquid est in se indivisum, et prout est ab alio divisum. Quod quidem dividi est unum eorum non esse alterum. 5 Wherever there is a distinction, there must be the opposition of affirmation and negation: Ubicumque enim est aliqua distinctio, oportet inveniri negationis et affirmationis oppositionem. Quae enim secundum nullam affirmationem et negationem differunt, penitus indistincta sunt: oportet enim quod quantum ad omnia unum esset quod et alterum, et sic essent penitus idem, et nullo modo distincta. 6 4 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Liber I, Capitulum 71 5 Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia, Q. 9, Art 7, corpus 6 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Liber IV, Caput 14
The following reading makes this same point even more explicit in that it states that every distinction, whether of things or only in reason, is founded in affirmation and negation: de eodem, secundum quod idem est, impossible est aliquid idem affirmare et negare; sed si in aliquo distinguantur, affirmationes et negationes pertinentes ad illam distinctionem de ipso verificari poterunt: quia omnis distinctio, sive rei sive rationis, fundatur in affirmatione et negatione. 7 Although the other kinds of opposition can be a basis for distinction, nevertheless the first cause of all opposition and therefore all distinction is the opposition of affirmation and negation: affirmatio et negatio dicuntur maxime opponi, quia in eis non importatur aliqua convenientia: in privative enim oppositis importatur convenientia quantum ad subjectum, quia nata sunt fieri circa idem: in contrariis autem et relativis etiam quantum ad genus, quia scilicet sunt in eodem genere. Unde in utraque oppositione utrumque extremorum significatur per modum entis et naturae cujusdam. Illud autem in quo invenitur aliquid non permixtum contrario, est maximum et primum in genere illo, et causa omnium aliorum; et ideo oppositio affirmationis et negationis, cui non admiscetur aliqua convenientia, est prima et maxima oppositio, et causa omnis oppositionis et distinctionis; et ideo oportet quod in qualibet alia oppositione includatur affirmatio et negatio, sicut primum in posteriori. 7 Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super Lib. I Sententiarum, Dist XXXIV, Q. I, Art. I, Ad 2
Unde plura requiruntur ad alias oppositiones quam ad oppositionem contradictionis, quia se habent ex additione ad ipsam. Unde non oportet quod, si contrarietas non inveniatur nisi in diversis realiter, quod affirmatio et negatio inveniatur in diversis realiter. [objection was: essentia non est generans, Pater est generans, ergo Pater non est essentia] immo sufficit etiam distinctio rationis ad affirmationem et negationem: et talis distinctio, scilicet rationis, est inter essentiam et personam. Sed opposita relative aliquando requirunt diversitatem vel distinctionem realem; et talia sunt quae divinas personas distinguunt: aliquando autem distinctionem rationis tantum; ut cum dicitur idem eidem idem. 8 Distinction and one The distinction of the most universals is difficult to understand. Thomas, following Avicenna, distinguishes six of them: sicut in demonstrabilibus oportet fieri reductionem in aliqua principia per se intellectui nota, ita investigando quid est unumquodque; alias utrobique in infinitum iretur, et sic periret omnino scientia et cognitio rerum. Illud autem quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum, et in quod conceptiones omnes resolvit, est ens, ut Avicenna dicit in principio suae Metaphysicae. Unde oportet quod omnes aliae conceptiones intellectus accipiantur ex additione ad ens. Sed enti non possunt addi aliqua quasi extranea per modum quo differentia additur generi, vel accidens subiecto, quia quaelibet 8 Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super Lib. I Sententiarum, Dist. V, Q. I, Art. I, Ad 1
natura est essentialiter ens; unde probat etiam Philosophus in III Metaphysicorum, quod ens non potest esse genus, sed secundum hoc aliqua dicuntur addere super ens, in quantum exprimunt modum ipsius entis qui nomine entis non exprimitur. Quod dupliciter contingit: uno modo ut modus expressus sit aliquis specialis modus entis. Sunt enim diversi gradus entitatis, secundum quos accipiuntur diversi modi essendi, et iuxta hos modos accipiuntur diversa rerum genera. Substantia enim non addit super ens aliquam differentiam, quae designet aliquam naturam superadditam enti, sed nomine substantiae exprimitur specialis quidam modus essendi, scilicet per se ens; et ita est in aliis generibus. Alio modo ita quod modus expressus sit modus generalis consequens omne ens; et hic modus dupliciter accipi potest: uno modo secundum quod consequitur unumquodque ens in se; alio modo secundum quod consequitur unum ens in ordine ad aliud. Si primo modo, hoc est dupliciter quia vel exprimitur in ente aliquid affirmative vel negative. Non autem invenitur aliquid affirmative dictum absolute quod possit accipi in omni ente, nisi essentia eius, secundum quam esse dicitur; et sic imponitur hoc nomen res, quod in hoc differt ab ente, secundum Avicennam in principio Metaphysicae, quod ens sumitur ab actu essendi, sed nomen rei exprimit quidditatem vel essentiam entis. Negatio autem consequens omne ens absolute, est indivisio; et hanc exprimit hoc nomen unum: nihil aliud enim est unum quam ens indivisum. Si autem modus entis accipiatur secundo modo, scilicet secundum ordinem unius ad alterum, hoc potest esse dupliciter. Uno modo secundum divisionem unius ab altero; et hoc exprimit hoc nomen aliquid: dicitur enim aliquid quasi aliud quid; unde sicut ens
dicitur unum, in quantum est indivisum in se, ita dicitur aliquid, in quantum est ab aliis divisum. Alio modo secundum convenientiam unius entis ad aliud; et hoc quidem non potest esse nisi accipiatur aliquid quod natum sit convenire cum omni ente: hoc autem est anima, quae quodammodo est omnia, ut dicitur in III de Anima. In anima autem est vis cognitiva et appetitiva. Convenientiam ergo entis ad appetitum exprimit hoc nomen bonum, ut in principio Ethicorum dicitur quod bonum est quod omnia appetunt. Convenientiam vero entis ad intellectum exprimit hoc nomen verum. 9 In this reading, Thomas understands one to add to being nothing real, but only a being of reason, a negation of division in itself. But is this negation to be understood as a pure negation or as a privation? One must recall the senses of privation or lack in the Fifth Book of Wisdom or First Philosophy and then discuss this: sicut dicitur in V Metaphysicorum, privatio tribus modis dicitur: Uno modo proprie, quando removetur ab aliquo quod natum est habere, et in quo tempore natum et habere; sicut carere visu est privatio visus in homine. Alio modo communiter, quando removetur ab aliquo quod ipsum quidem non est natum habere, sed genus eius; sicut si non habere visum dicitur esse privatio visus in talpa. Tertio modo communissime, quando removetur ab aliquo id quod a quocumque alio natum est haberi, non tamen ab ipso nec ab alio sui generis: sicut si non habere visum, dicatur esse privatio visus in planta. Et haec privatio medium est inter privationem veram et simplicem negationem, habens commmune aliquid cum utroque; cum privatione quidem vera, in hoc quod est negatio in aliquo subiecto, 9 Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate, Q. 1 Art. 1, corpus
unde non competit simpliciter non enti; cum negatione vero simplici, in hoc quod non requirit aptitudinem in subiecto. Per hunc autem modum unum privative dicitur, et potest simili modo praedicari in divinis, sicut et alia quae simili modo praedicantur in divinis, ut invisibilis et immensus et huiusmodi. 10 But sometimes Thomas takes one as including, not only the negation of division in oneself, but also the negation of being distinct from others:...unumquodque enim, in quantum est unum, est in se indivisum, et ab aliis distinctum. 11 Sic enim aliquid est ens, sicut et unum; unum autem est quod est in se indivisum et ab aliis divisum: pars autem prout est in toto, non est divisa in actu, sed in potentia tantum: unde non est actu ens neque una, sed in potentia tantum. 12 Of course the negation that the one has in itself is before the negation it has in being distinct from others. Albert the Great also takes the one sometimes as including both of these negations and in that order:...unum est indivisum in se et ab aliis divisum: indivisum autem in se negatio est, ad quam consequitur divisum esse ab aliis 13 The identity of being and one (even including the distinction from others) can be seen in the cause of their being and oneness: Quaecumque habentia sui esse causam distinguuntur, habent causam suae distinctionis: unumquodque enim secundum hoc fit ens secundum quod fit unum in se indivisum et ab aliis distinctum. 14 10 Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia, Q. 9, Art 7, Ad 11 11 Thomas Aquinas, Quaestio Disputata de Anima, Art. 3, corpus 12 Thomas Aquinas, In VII Physicorum, Lectio IX, n. 960 13 Albert the Great, Commentaria in libris Elenchorum Sophisticorum Aristotelis, Liber I, Tractatus IV, Caput VII 14 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Liber II, Caput 40
The same is the cause of the being of something and of its distinction from others: idem autem est causa essendi alicui et distinctionis eius ab aliis 15 The division negated in the one in itself has also its first root in the opposition of affirmation and negation: Sed unum quod cum ente convertitur importat privationem divisionis formalis quae fit per opposita, cuius prima radix est oppositio affirmationis et negationis. Nam illa dividuntur adinvicem, quae ita se habent, quod hoc non est illud. 16 Although one is before the many in thought in that the many is a combination of many ones and therefore the negation in one (in se indivisum) is before the negation in the many (ab aliis distinctum) as Albert says, nevertheless the negation in distinction is before in thought the negation in one. A sign of this is that Thomas is more apt to call the one undivided being. Division, however, adds in meaning to distinction. In a man, the body and the soul are distinct. But they are not divided or separated. Otherwise, the man would be dead. If we divide a material substance into body and soul (or more generally, substantial form and matter), this is a division in the mind. Thomas will have to explain that when Aristotle says the many is before one in knowledge, he means the negation in the many is before the negation in the one. Distinction and understandable 15 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Liber II, Caput 41 16 Thomas Aquinas, In IV Metaphysicorum, Lectio III, n. 566
The one is before the true and understandable in that something must be one before it can be understood: verum autem praesupponit unum, cum veri ratio ex apprehensione intellectus perficiatur; unumquodque autem intelligibile est in quantum est unum; qui non intelligit unum, nihil intelligit, ut dicit Philosophus in IV Metaphysicorum. 17 But to grasp something, one must separate it or distinguish it from everything else. Hence, it seems to us that one as including both undivided in itself and divided (or distinct) from others is before understandable. Distinction and the beginning about contradiction The axiom about being and non-being (it is impossible to be and not be at the same time in the same way or one cannot affirm and deny the same of the same at the same time and in the same way) is tied with distinction. To deny that axiom would be to deny all distinction: Item prohibet ne mente aliquid possimus definire vel determinare. Prima enim ratio distinctionis consideratur in affirmatione et negatione. Unde qui affirmationem et negationem unum esse dicit, omnem determinationem sive distinctionem excludit. 18 Distinction, division, definition 17 Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate (et Bonitate), q. 21, Art. 4, corpus 18 Thomas Aquinas, In IV Metaphysicorum, Lectio IX, n. 660
Distinction is more general than division although they are often used convertibly and division is more general than definition. Division in the strict sense is the distinction of the parts of some whole (whether a composed whole or a universal whole). And the one who defines, divides the defined into its defining parts (as Aristotle speaks in the Proemium to the eight books of Natural Hearing). But not everyone who divides is defining. Thus distinction, division and definition are distinguished like beginning, cause and element. But sometimes we might keep the word division for those divisions that are not definitions and the word distinction for those distinctions that are not divisions. Distinction and order Distinction is presupposed to order: ordo in ratione sua includit tria, scilicet rationem prioris et posterioris; unde secundum omnes illos modos potest dici esse ordo aliquorum, secundum quos aliquis altero prius dicitur et secundum locum et secundum tempus et secundum omnia hujusmodi. Includit etiam distinctionem, quia non est ordo aliquorum nisi distinctorum. Sed hoc magis praesupponit nomen ordinis quam significet. Includit etiam tertio rationem ordinis, ex qua etiam ordo in speciem trahitur. Unde unus est ordo secundum locum, alius secundum dignitatem, alius secundum originem, et sic de aliis 19 19 Thomas Aquinas, Super I Sent., Dist. 20, Q. 1 Art. 3, Quaestiuncula 1, corpus
This is clear from the axiom of order: nothing is before or after itself. Hence, there must always be some distinction between what is before and what is after. But two things can be distinct without one being before or after the other. And we must see some distinction between two things before we can see that one is before or after the other. Distinction and the rule of two or three Reason for the most part should distinguish into two or three. Reason cannot understand, or understand well, a distinction into more than three, but tries to understand it either by a division into two or three and subdivision into two or three until all are arrived at or by criss-crossing a division into two or three by another division into two or three to get all. Thus, the distinction of the five predicables or the ten categories or the ten commandments or the seven parts of philosophy or the seven sacraments is understood in the first way and the distinction of the six forms of government or the distinction of four beings in the Categories in the second way. The distinction of distinction: kinds of distinction There seems to be, at least, two distinctions of all distinctions. One is between material distinction (or distinction by the division of quantity) and formal distinction (which is by the kinds of opposition): Omnis distinctio est aut secundum divisionem quantitatis, quae in solis corporibus est aut secundum divisionem formalem. Quae sine graduum diversitate esse non potest: cum talis divisio reducatur ad privationem et formam; et sic oportet quod altera formarum condivisarum sit melior et altera vilior. Unde, secundum
Philosophum, species rerum sunt sicut numeri, quorum unus alteri addit aut minuit. 20 in rebus enim, remota materiali distinctione, quae in divinis personis locum habere non potest, non inveniuntur aliqua distingui nisi per aliquam oppositionem. Quae enim nullam oppositionem habent ad invicem, simul esse possunt in eodem, unde per ea distinctio causari non potest: album enim et triangulare, licet diversa sunt, quia tamen non opponuntur, in eodem esse contingit. Oportet autem supponere, secundum fidei catholicae documenta, quod Spiritus Sanctus a Filio distinguatur: aliter enim non esset trinitas, sed dualitas in personis. Oportet igitur huiusmodi distinctionem per aliquam oppositionem fieri. Non autem oppositione affirmationis et negationis: quia sic distinguuntur entia a non entibus. Nec etiam oppositione privationis et habitus: quia sic distinguuntur perfecta ab imperfectis. Neque etiam oppositione contrarietatis. Quia sic distinguuntur quae sunt secundum formam diversa: nam contrarietas, ut philosophi docent, est differentia secundum formam... Relinquitur igitur unam personam divinam ab alia non distingui nisi oppositione relationis. 21 There seems to be a contradiction between those texts where Thomas sees all opposition as based on the opposition of affirmation and negation (or the opposition of being and non-being) and the rejection of that kind of opposition in the above discussion of the distinction of the divine persons. 20 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Liber II, Caput 44 21 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Liber IV, Caput 24
Perhaps we can distinguish between a distinction which is based only on being and non-being and a distinction which has a basis in something besides this. Thus, for example, the distinction between virtue and vice is not just between virtue and what is not virtue for even a triangle or nothing is not a triangle. Rather virtue and vice are contrary habits so that vice is not just the non-being of virtue. Yet one can truly say that virtue is not a vice and vice is not a virtue. The other universal distinction of distinctions is that between a distinction of things and a distinction in thought or reason only: omnis distinctio, sive rei sive rationis, fundatur in affirmatione et negatione. 22 Ad tertium dicendum quod potentia significat principium. Principium autem distinctionem importat ab eo cuius est principium. Consideratur autem duplex distinctio in his quae dicuntur de Deo, una secundum rem, alia secundum rationem tantum. Secundum rem quidem, Deus distinguitur per essentiam a rebus quarum est per creationem principium, sicut una persona distinguitur ab alia, cuius est principium, secundum actum notionalem. Sed actio ab agente non distinguitur in Deo nisi secundum rationem tantum, alioquin actio esset accidens in Deo. Et ideo respectu illarum actionum secundum quas aliquae res procedunt distinctae a Deo, vel essentialiter vel personaliter, potest Deo attribui potentia, secundum propriam rationem principii. Et ideo, sicut potentiam ponimus creandi in Deo, ita possumus ponere potentiam generandi vel spirandi. 22 Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super Lib. I Sententiarum, Dist XXXIV, Q. I, Art. I, Ad 2
Sed intelligere et velle non sunt tales actus qui designent processionem alicuius rei a Deo distinctae, vel essentialiter vel personaliter. Unde respectu horum actuum, non potest salvari ratio potentiae in Deo, nisi secundum modum intelligendi et significandi tantum; prout diversimode significatur in Deo intellectus et intelligere, cum tamen ipsum intelligere Dei sit eius essentia, non habens principium. 23 Distinction and mistake: confused and mixed up Reason is often mistaken. A sign of this is the disagreement in our thinking. The man who considers something from its beginning will get the best understanding of it. What is the beginning of the mistakes of reason? The beginning of the mistakes of reason is not understanding or misunderstanding some distinction. The words mistake and error are common synonyms for the same thing. But they are taken from somewhat different things and suggest different causes of mistake or error in reason. To see this better, we should consider what reason is. Anaxagoras teaches us that mind or reason distinguishes and orders. And when Shakespeare defines reason by its ability to look before and after, he is defining it by order since before and after are the meaning of order. But in the ability to see order is understood and included the ability to see some distinction for nothing is before or after itself. The word mistake seems to come from the defect of reason in regard to distinction. Hence, we often say that the mistaken person is confused or mixedup. But error comes from the Latin word for wandering which is a disordered movement of reason. Hence, error seems to be named from a defect of reason 23 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars, Q. 41, Art. 4, Ad 3
in regard to order. Confused also seems to be mean not only indistinct, but disordered or out of order. But since distinction is presupposed to order, mistake is named from the beginning of reason s defect or failing. Four kinds of distinction and four kinds of mistake Aristotle distinguishes thirteen kinds of mistake that the sophist can lead us into if we do not know how to avoid them. There are perhaps thirteen distinctions overlooked by those deceived into making these thirteen kinds of mistake. But perhaps the four kinds of distinction corresponding to the first two kinds of mistake in each group (those from words and those whose cause is outside words) should especially be considered because they are so common. The first two kinds of mistake from words are the mistake from mixing up the senses of a word and the mistake from mixing up the senses of a speech. The first of these is the most common mistake (says the father of logic). These correspond to the distinction of the senses of a word and the distinction of the senses of a speech. The first two kinds of mistake from outside words or from things are the mistake from mixing up the through itself or the as such 24 with the through happening or by happening and the mistake from mixing up what is so simply or without qualification and what is so not simply but with qualification. These correspond to the distinction between what is so through itself and what is so through happening and the distinction between what is so simply and what is so not simply, but in some imperfect qualified way. Understanding these four kinds of distinction help us to understand these four kinds of mistake. And knowing and seeing these four kinds of mistake help us to see the need of understanding these four kinds of distinction. 24 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Liber II, Caput 55: Esse autem per se consequitur ad formam: per se enim dicimus secundum quod ipsum; unumquodque autem habet esse secundum quod habet formam.
Duane H. Berquist