Some Ethical Theories

Some Ethical Theories Some Distinctions Ethical principles can be categorized according to whether they take judgments of value or judgments of obligation to be primary 1

I. Species of Moral Judgment I. Judgments of Obligation X is right You ought to do X You have a duty to do X Where X is normally the performance of some action. Judgments of obligation concern the Right II. Judgments of Value X is a good thing (or X is a bad thing ) X is valuable (or X is nugatory ) X, yum! (or Yuck, X! ) Judgments of value concern the Good Deontological Theories Deon < Greek duty, obligation Deontological ethical theories take judgments about obligations to be primary value considerations are not fundamental (and, according to a strictly deontological theory, simply irrelevant) to whether or not some action is right or wrong. E.g., Kantian ethics. Such theories are sometimes said to maintain the priority of the right to the good 2

Consequentialist Theories Consequentialist theories (e.g., utilitarianism) take judgments about what is right (i.e., our obligations) to be derivable from and dependent on judgments of value. So, e.g., if pleasure is good (i.e. valuable), then an action which helps to bring about more pleasure is, ceteris paribus, a permissible action. Such theories could be said to maintain the priority of the good to the right Consequentialist theories are thus a species of teleological theory telos < Greek goal Something to Notice If the moral rightness or wrongness of any act is dependent on the good (or bad) consequences that that act brings about, then it would seem that there can be no such thing as an inherently immoral act. Instead, the rightness or wrongness of any action will always depend on the goodness or badness of the consequences the action brings about. This may an acceptable implication, but, as we ll see, it seems to be in tension with some basic intuitions about what moral rightness is supposed to be like. 3

II. Monistic vs. Pluralistic Theories Ethical theories can be further sub-divided with respect to whether the theory takes one thing or a bunch of things to be primary Theories of Obligation Monistic E.g., Kantian ethics; There is only one fundamental duty (obligation) conform to the categorical imperative (In a nutshell: act so that the principle implied by your action could be willed without contradiction to be a rule for everybody else) Pluralistic E.g., Ross s Ethics of Duty; we have a number of duties (Ross thinks there are at least 7), all of which are equally fundamental, though any of them can be overridden by others. 4

Theories of Value Monistic According to hedonic U (as described by Bentham) there is only one thing that is intrinsically valuable, namely pleasure or, what amounts to the same thing, the absence of pain. G. E. Moore Pluralistic G.E. Moore s intuitionism (which we will not be studying in this course) there is an indefinitely large number of good things in the world, each of which possesses it goodness as a unique, non-natural property (I.e., according to Moore, the goodness of friendship and the goodness of listening to Mozart s Die Zauberflote, etc., etc. cannot be compared by any common measure) Conflicts Among Obligations If you hold a pluralistic theory of obligation, like Ross s, what should you do when two or more obligations seem to conflict? Example: Ross: We have both a fundamental duty to not to injure others (the duty of non-maleficence) and a fundamental duty to keep our promises (the duty of fidelity). Both duties are held to be equally fundamental; neither can be reduced to the other. But these duties might conflict: Your friend asks you to promise to never tell anyone what she is about to tell you. Her confession? A product she is responsible for marketing is defective and can become extremely dangerous even under conditions of normal use. Which duty do you act on? 5

Conflicts Among Values Similarly, if one holds a pluralistic theory of value. What do you do when two or more values conflict or cannot be pursued together? (A Somewhat Contrived) Example: Assume (plausibly) that both freedom from manipulation (as an aspect of the presumably desirable condition of autonomy) and pleasure are intrinsically good. Then what about advertising that is both entertaining and manipulative? If we were to ban such ads, on the grounds that they are manipulative, we would be denying ourselves some modest pleasures. If we allow them, on the grounds that they are modestly pleasurable, we forego the value for freedom from manipulation. Utilitarianism 6

Utilitarianism (U) In a nutshell, the view that an action is right (i.e., is morally permissible) if it brings about more utility (for everyone affected) than any other alternative action. Its familiar slogan: The greatest happiness of the greatest number Put a bit more precisely: Utilitarianism is a monistic, teleological theory of ethical obligation. It holds that there is it holds that there is ultimately only one fundamental obligation, namely maximize utility! Notes on the History of U For our purposes, utilitarianism can be said to have been founded by Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) The theory was greatly refined and developed by John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) Both Bentham and Mill were active social and political reformers, both wrote and campaigned in aid of legislation (Bentham, penal reform; Mill, women s suffrage, Irish land reform) 7

this practical focus is not accidental. Bentham s major work is entitled Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789). As his title implies, for Bentham the determinations of moral philosophy will be and ought to be of use in setting a practical political agenda. Mill, for his part, wrote numerous pamphlets on social and political questions and served as an MP. Of particular note, his The Subjection of Women (with Harriet Taylor Mill, 1869) is one of the major documents of modern liberal feminism. Objectivity For a moral theory to function as a practical guide to social and political questions, Bentham and Mill reckon, that theory must be as objective as possible. Utility is understood to be the sort of thing that we ought to be able determine, at least in principle, by observation, measurement, and inductive reasoning. Libertarian Complication: Mill famously held that each sane adult is the best judge of what is in her interests. Yet, utilitarianism is easily compatible with paternalism: It may be that the best objective account of utility is given by experts. 8

Utility Broadly speaking, the term utility stands for whatever is understood to be intrinsically valuable on a utilitarian theory of value. Intrinsically valuable: Valuable for its own sake. Instrumentally valuable: Valuable as a means to obtain something else (e.g., money, possessions) Candidates for intrinsic value have included: pleasure (hedonic U, Bentham), happiness (eudaimonistic U, Mill), welfare, preference satisfaction (some contemporary utilitarians) So, for Mill: Actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness (Utilitarianism, 1863, ch. 2) We might object: Other things are intrinsically valuable things besides happiness, such as, power, love or respect. Mill responds: everything we desire becomes part of happiness. I.e.: Happiness isn t just the feeling of being happy, it is eudaimonia ( thrivingness ): A complex phenomenon composed of many parts, including virtue, respect and power. 9

Act vs. Rule Actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness Note that Mill s formula is ambiguous. Is it the case that (i) an action is right if this sort of action tends to promote happiness or (ii) an action is right if this particular action will promote happiness? Rule Utilitarianism (RU): Adopt the rule, the general type of action, that will maximize utility in the long run Act Utilitarianism (AU): Choose the action that will maximize utility in each individual case Equality & Impartiality For classical U we are to maximize utility (minimize disutility) for everyone affected in aggregate. Bentham: Each is to count for one, none to count for more than one. Mill: I must again repeat what the assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the justice to acknowledge, that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct is not the agent s own happiness, but that of all concerned. As between others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested benevolent spectator. This commitment to equality and impartiality is a rather attractive feature of utilitarianism. It is also one of the main grounds for the popularity of utilitarian theory as a basis for social and political policy. 10

Who Is Everyone? In the world of business, one way of identifying everyone affected is to speak of stakeholders (supposedly a deliberate corruption of shareholders ) i.e., everyone who has a direct or indirect stake in the outcome of the decision. Peter Singer For contemporary utilitarians (e.g., Peter Singer), everyone affected may be extended to include every sort of being that can feel pain (i.e., not just human beings, but non-human animals as well) Alternative A Alternative B Stakeholder #1 Stakeholder #2 Stakeholder #3 Stakeholder #4 Stakeholder #5 Net Outcomes: [(5 x ) (2 x )] [(5 x ) (4 x )] Note that the distribution of benefits among stakeholders can vary greatly. Maximizing aggregate benefits does not necessarily maximize benefits for any particular stakeholder 11

Some Problems with Utilitarianism 1. Utility Comparisons and Commensurability A basic assumption for any U theory is that utility can be measured, both to allow for aggregation and to make different utilities commensurable. In practice, however, this has proves to be quite difficult to accomplish in any full satisfactory way. Cost/Benefit Analysis Cost/Benefit analysis (and, when dealing with probabilities, Risk/Benefit analysis), an historical offspring of U, addresses this problem by measuring utility in monetary terms (i.e., dollars). Some objections: Can everything assigned a monetary value? (Including rights, the environment, due process?) What about cases where monetary compensation can t be given to the right parties? (E.g., wrongful death, past generations.) To some people, even to begin to speak in purely monetary terms seems morally repugnant. 12

2. Special Duties and Relationships To many people it seems wrong to be (merely) impartial (or disinterested ) toward those with whom you enjoy some sort of special relationship (e.g., family, friends) and perfect strangers. E.g. Peter Singer RU may accept that special duties and relationships can count to some extent in the utilitarian calculus, just like everything else. But they have no special probative value of their own. 3. Punishing the Innocent / Ignoring Persons Perhaps most damning to the cause: U is apparently prepared to accept cases of (what we would otherwise call) injustice provided that the utilitarian calculus is satisfied. E.g., McCloskey s example: preventing a riot by falsely accusing an innocent man. John Rawls: U does not take seriously the distinction between persons 13

4. Free Riders There is a temporary local energy shortage. Your local government has asked that businesses voluntarily curtail production by 50% in order to conserve energy. Counting on compliance among your neighbors, you choose to cut production by only 25%. You justify your action on utilitarian grounds After all, the relatively small amount of extra energy that you use in production (beyond what rationing would allow), is unlikely by itself to have any appreciable negative effects. On the other hand, 25% more production than you would otherwise have will definitely have a favourable impact on your company s profits, your employees income, etc Making an exception of yourself in this way is often termed being a free rider. (Someone else has paid for the transportation, you ride for free) Free ridership is a general problem for any number of normative theories, but perhaps especially so for AU, since it seems to suggest that, in some cases, becoming a free rider may be morally permissible (possibly even a moral duty). Perhaps the main objection to free ridership is something like: What if everyone did that? This is a question of great probative force for many of us. It suggests that unless everyone could do what I propose to do without adversely affecting the aggregate utility, then it would be wrong for anyone to behave in the same manner. 14

Kantian Ethics What if everyone did that? Kantian Ethics (KE) As we have seen, a fundamental concern for utilitarians is the (empirical, scientific) objectivity of normative judgments. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), by contrast, is preeminently concerned with the moral authority of reason (i.e., reason alone, without reference to experience). In the Critique of Practical Reason (1788), Kant says that he aims to construct a pure moral philosophy, perfectly cleared of everything which is only empirical, and which belongs to anthropology. 15

Kant s approach to this task leads to type of ethical theory very different from utilitarianism (as we shall see); but these two types of ethical theory need not be seen as fundamentally opposed in any social or political sense. For Kant, reason is something possessed by every moral agent; so an ethical theory founded on reason is committed to ideals of equality and impartiality essentially similar to those of utilitarians. Indeed, Kant s philosophy and utilitarianism both feed into the standard liberal view of a society composed of free individuals. The Theory In contrast to utilitarianism, Kant s theory is strictly deontological. For Kant, the rightness or wrongness of an action has nothing to do with the consequences that the act brings about. Instead, we should evaluate an action with respect to what kind of action it is: An action done from duty has its moral worth, not in the purpose that is to be attained by it, but in the maxim according to which the action is determined. The moral worth depends, therefore, not on the realization of the object of the action, but merely on the principle of volition according to which, without regard to any objects of the faculty of desire, the action has been done. Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785, Ellington trans.) 16

Maxims By maxim Kant means the general principle or rule that describes what one takes oneself to be doing in an action. In effect, the maxim of an action is what you would specify if you (honestly) answered the question What rule is implied by my action? Example: You are in a financial jam and you lie on a loan application to obtain money that would otherwise not be available to you. The maxim of such an action might be something like If I can avoid financial trouble by lying, I shall do so. Or, more accurately, for Kant: It is morally OK to lie. Note that, in practice, the maxim of an action may be (and indeed typically is) merely implicit. The maxim of your action may become evident to you only upon reflection after the action is performed or, perhaps, never at all. Still, Kant suggests that my willingness to act on a specific maxim expresses my commitment to a general rule, i.e., a commitment that extends beyond this particular case to cover myself or anyone else in a situation that is similar in the relevant respects. This claim is not as strange as it might seem: At least in part, it follows from an everyday principle that Waluchow terms the generalizability of reasons 17

The Generalizability of Reasons Consider the following dialogue: Me: You: Me: You: The Audwagen Serpent is a really great car. It has plenty of power with its 300 horsepower V6. Yet, it gets better than 60 MPG on the highway. And it is safe: It has roll cage construction and side-panel airbags. So what do you think of the Volksdi Locust? It s a piece of crap. But the Locust has a V6 engine that gives better than 300 horsepower, it gets 62 MPG highway, and it has roll cage construction and side-panel airbags? Logical Consistency Anyone can recognize that my position in the dialogue is inconsistent (even if they don t have that word to describe it). If a certain level of power and fuel efficiency, together with certain safety features, are jointly sufficient to make one model of car a good car, then it follows that I must be willing to say that any model of car that has the same properties is a good car. Either that or I have to supply at least one additional criterion of what makes for a good car. Note that the principle at work above applies to anyone who offers up a (purportedly) sufficient reason for anything. It is a matter of logic, not anything specific to people or cars. 18

How does this relate to ethics? Well Either the maxim of an action provides a sufficient reason for performing that action or it doesn t. If it doesn t, then you had no sufficient reason for acting the way you did, that is, your action was irrational (or non-rational). If you act on a maxim, then you are effectively committing yourself to a universal moral rule, since, if that maxim provides sufficient reason for you to act in that way, then logical consistency dictates that it ought to provide sufficient reason for anyone else in a relevantly similar situation. The Categorical Imperative (CI) According to Kant only one fundamental duty need be observed by any rational agent in order to guarantee that her action is moral namely, will that your actions conform to the categorical imperative. Kant offered at least three different formulations of the CI. Each formulation, however, is said by Kant to be strictly equivalent to each of the others. That is, each will pick out the same actions as morally wrong and each will allow the same actions as morally permissible. It can sometimes be a bit difficult to see how this strict equivalence is supposed to work. The idea of equivalent tests for the same property, however, seems clear enough. (Think: Lab equipment) 19

First Formulation I ought never to act except in such a way that I can at the same time will without contradiction that my maxim should become a universal law of nature. Although it might not look like it at first glance, the first formulation is, in effect, a test for logical consistency An Example (related to Kant s own, but in somewhat different terms): If, when I say I promise to pay you back, I know, according to the maxim of my action, that I mean I m not going to pay you back (I m just saying that I will), there is a clear contradiction: I promise = I don t promise (p = ~p) If whenever anyone says I promise they are entitled to mean, in effect, I don t promise, then clearly there can be no such thing as promise keeping. Making false promises cannot be willed to be a universal law of nature without creating a contradiction. 20

Second Formulation Act in such a way that I will always treat humanity, whether in my own person or in the person of another, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end. For Kant all (but only) rational beings are genuine participants in the realm of morality. And it is precisely our rationality and our autonomy (our ability to and our requirement that we give the law unto ourselves ) which makes us the sort of creatures that are worthy of respect. So why should we never other people merely as means? Because, as a rational being, you wouldn t accept as legitimate any reason that was offered up for some action that you couldn t accept for yourself. Therefore, it would be inconsistent for you to treat another rational being any differently than you would want to be treated. In short, rational beings, for Kant, are creatures that both give and require respect. 21

Third Formulation So act as if you were through your maxims a law-making member of a kingdom of ends. That is, treat others as autonomous agents, capable of self-directed, rational action. Treat yourself and every other rational being as jointly constituting a community of moral agents, each of who, as ends in themselves, can accept only those laws which they have given and accepted for themselves. Some Problems with the CI Test It is uncompromising and inflexible e.g. The Axwielding Murderer at the Door 22

It offers little help when duties conflict (Hegel: It is excessively abstract and thus lacks substantive content) e.g., Save lives when you can and Never lie in some situations (as in the case above) may both be legitimate duties, yet suggest different courses of action. By itself, the CI will be of little help in choosing. Kant s answer to such charges is, if not very helpful, at least consistent (as you would expect from Kant). It is, in effect: The perfect moral life is a regulative ideal, not something that we can actually expect to achieve So, think of the CI not so much as a practical rule generator, but as guide to or prefiguring of what an ideal moral life might look like. 23

W.D. Ross s Ethics of Duty Another sort of a deontological theory W. D. Ross William David Ross (1877-1940) was a persistent critic of utilitarian views. One of his main objections to the theory was that utilitarians fail to take proper account of the many different values at work in human life and that this lead to distorted account of moral relationships 24

Other people are not just possible benefactors of my actions, they may also stand to me in the relation of promisee to promiser, creditor to debtor, or wife to husband, of child to parent, of fellow countryman to fellow countryman, and the like (The Right and the Good, 1930, 3). Ross provides a list of fundamental prima facie duties that, he thinks, helps to clarify the various duties and moral relationships involved in everyday moral thinking Ross s List of Prima Facie Duties 1. Duties resting previous actions of our own. These include: (a) duties of fidelity arising from explicit or implicit promises; (b) duties of reparation, resting on previous wrongful acts of ours and requiring that we compensate, as best we can, the victims of our wrongful conduct. 2. Duties resting on the services of others; duties of gratitude that require that we return favour for favour. 3. Duties involving the fair distribution of goods; duties of justice that require fair sharing of goods to be distributed. 4. Duties to improve the condition of others; duties of beneficence 5. Duties to improve our own condition; duties of self-improvement. 6. Duties not to injure others; duties of non-maleficence 25

Why these seven duties? Ross does not claim that the list is exhaustive, but he does think that it is simply self-evident that all the duties included are, in fact, fundamental duties. And if someone disagrees (say, about the duty of selfimprovement)? Ross: I can only ask them to reflect again, in the hope that they will ultimately agree that they know. If you persist in your disagreement, you must be morally blind. 26