Forthcoming in the Journal of the History of Philosophy. Spinoza s Model of Human Nature Andrew Youpa Abstract Commentators are divided over the cognitive status of Spinoza s model of human nature: the free man. In this paper I defend an interpretation on which the idea of the free man is an inadequate idea from one perspective and an adequate idea from another. Regarded as the idea of a perfectly free finite thing, the idea of the free man is incoherent and, as a result, inadequate. However, regarded as the idea of the perfection of our nature and power, the idea of the free man is a way of conceiving God and, as a result, an adequate idea. Introduction Commentators are divided over the status of Spinoza s model of human nature. Interpretations run the gamut. At one end there is Jonathan Bennett s view that Spinoza s reference to a model of human nature in the Preface to Part 4 of the Ethics is a relic of an outlook he had abandoned but never got around to amend fully in the text. 1 On this reading, Spinoza s mature view does not contain a model of human nature and the reference in 4Preface is the last we hear of it. Other commentators hold that the figure who surfaces in propositions 67-72 of Part 4 the free man is the model referred to in 4Preface, but that the idea of the free man, it turns out, is an inadequate idea. 2 The idea is picturesque and, as a result, potentially edifying, 1
but that it is picturesque betrays its pedigree from the ranks of the imagination. A third set of commentators agree that the idea of the free man is the model, but they hold that in Spinoza s view the model is, or is based on, an adequate idea of human nature. 3 Surely Spinoza cannot believe (so the argument goes) that his model has no stronger foundation and no greater claim to our allegiance than any other model. The free man must therefore possess credentials that set him apart from, say, Aristotle s great-souled man, the Stoic sage, and Descartes generous human being, to name a few. In this paper I propose and defend an interpretation that does not fit into one of these three categories. On the reading I defend, there is a sense in which it is correct to think, as those in the second group hold, that the idea of the free man is an inadequate idea, and yet there is an important sense in which the idea is adequate, as the third group of commentators hold. Regarded as the idea of a particular finite thing, it is an inadequate idea. However, there is an alternative, adequate idea of the free man. This alternative idea, I argue, is a way of conceiving God. Before arguing for this interpretation, I give a sketch of the Preface to Part 4 and consider questions it naturally raises about Spinoza s aim(s) in that segment of the text. Then in section 2 I examine three considerations that appear to support the view that the idea of the free man is an inadequate idea. On the basis of this examination I conclude that, regarded as the idea of a perfectly free finite thing, the idea is inadequate. Nonetheless, the idea of the free man need not be understood as the idea of a perfectly free finite thing. Spinoza holds that the idea can be conceived if God is the object of our attention. In the third and final section I defend the view that Spinoza s model of human nature is an adequate idea. 2
1. The Puzzle In the Preface to Part 4 of the Ethics Spinoza critiques the evaluative concepts of perfection and imperfection, and of good and evil. He begins with the former pair and argues that, because God, or Nature, does not act for the sake of an end, general ideas derived from sensory experience do not reveal the nature of things. As a consequence, a judgment concerning the extent to which a natural thing is as it should be (i.e., a judgment about its perfection or imperfection) is unable to get any purchase on reality. Perfection and imperfection, Spinoza concludes, are only modes of thinking, i.e., notions we are accustomed to feign because we compare individuals of the same species or genus to one another (4Preface). 4 Our concepts of perfection and imperfection are, it seems, anthropocentric fictions unwittingly projected onto the natural world. Nature itself is pokerfaced; there is no perfection and imperfection in reality apart from our appraisals. In the Preface the same result is reached about the concepts of good and evil: As far as good and evil are concerned, they also indicate nothing positive in things, considered in themselves, nor are they anything other than modes of thinking, or notions we form because we compare things to one another (4Preface). Our ideas of good and evil can be as misleading as our ideas of perfection and imperfection. Apart from the varied and inconstant preferences of human beings, things themselves are neither good nor evil. Note that this had already been established in the Appendix to Part 1: The other notions [i.e., good, evil, sound, rotten] are also nothing but modes of imagining, by which the imagination is variously affected; and yet the ignorant consider them the chief attributes of things, because, as we have already said, they believe all things have been made for their sake, and call the nature of a thing good or evil, sound or rotten and corrupt, as they are affected by it. 3
Because people commonly but mistakenly believe that natural things have been created for the sake of themselves, they hold that one thing is better than another insofar as they are more attracted to it. Something is thought to be worse than another insofar as they are more averse to it. But it is an anthropocentric prejudice to think that things were made for the sake of human beings. Nature does not act with an end in view. A fortiori nature does not act with the end of human happiness in view. Thus, things are not more or less perfect because they please or offend men s senses, or because they are of use to, or are incompatible with, human nature (1Appendix). Contrary to ordinary ways of thinking, our preferences, like our sensory experience (1p16, 1p16c2), do not reveal the unvarnished nature and value of natural things. The Preface to Part 4 builds on this discussion of evaluative concepts. The concepts of good and evil, like those of perfection and imperfection, are, at least as they are employed in ordinary thinking, anthropocentric fictions unwittingly projected onto the natural world. On the basis of this critique, it might seem that Spinoza is committed to the view that there is no solid ground for any set of evaluative concepts. 5 But, as we know, his ethical theory utilizes what no doubt looks like evaluative language. Indeed, immediately following the conclusion that the concepts of good and evil are modes of thinking, Spinoza s very next move is an appeal to a model of human nature in terms of which he explains the meanings of good and evil. He says, But though this is so, still we must retain these words. For because we desire to form an idea of man, as a model [exemplar] of human nature which we may look to, it will be useful to us to retain these same words with the meaning I have indicated. In what follows, therefore, I shall understand by good what we know certainly is a means by which we may approach nearer and nearer to the model [exemplar] of human nature that we set before ourselves. By evil, what we certainly know prevents us from becoming like that model [exemplar]. Next, we shall say that men are more perfect or imperfect, insofar as they approach more or less near to this model [exemplar]. (4Preface) 4
This is, I believe, as baffling as transitions come. 6 Who does Spinoza intend to include in the we referred to in the opening lines? After having just completed his persuasive account of the confusion endemic to models, who does he believe continues to have a desire to form an idea of man to use as a model of human nature? What, if anything, makes Spinoza s own model any less wrongheaded than any other? To this last question, some have suggested that the correct answer is, in effect, nothing. According to this interpretation the idea of the free man is inadequate. In the following section I examine the strengths and weaknesses of this interpretation. My examination yields the conclusion that in Spinoza s view there are at least two ways of conceiving the free man, only one of which is inadequate by virtue of being inconceivable. 2. The Free Man: An Inadequate Idea? Three separate considerations might appear to support the charge that the idea of the free man is inadequate. First, given the critique in 4Preface, it might seem that any proposed model of something that is not man-made is unavoidably inadequate. Like any such model, then, the idea of the free man is inadequate. 7 This does not necessarily mean that the idea serves no purpose in the Ethics. Despite its inadequacy, a model may be more useful than another insofar as it serves the purpose of edification more effectively than another. So, despite its inadequacy Spinoza s model may nevertheless serve an important function. According to Don Garrett, [Spinoza s] discussion of the free man is concerned chiefly with maxims of action, and his expression of these maxims in terms of the actions of the free man is evidently calculated to appeal to, or exploit, the imagination. For unlike doctrines about virtue and reason, the description of the free man allows us to imagine, not merely faculties or states of power, but the behavior of a complete ideal human being, whom we may then seek to emulate. 8 5
The idea of the free man, on this reading, is not intended for the speculative purpose of disclosing something about the world, or about metaphysical reality. Nor is it meant to reveal what makes some ends rational for each person to pursue. Rather, it is intended as a tool for improving character. It exercises a powerful influence on the imagination and, as a result, strongly influences motivation. Nevertheless, as an image, the free man can be numbered among the imagination s inadequate ideas. A difficulty for this reading, however, is that Spinoza s critique in 4Preface is most plausibly understood as aimed at ordinary models of natural objects, not all models. The same applies to his critique of the concepts of perfection and imperfection, and of good and evil. He is not making a sweeping criticism of all evaluative language, but of ordinary evaluative language only. 9 Ordinary evaluative language presupposes the anthropocentric prejudice that all natural things were created for the sake of human beings as well as its corollary that sensory experience discloses the nature and value of things. Because Spinoza s own evaluative language does not presuppose these prejudices, it is immune to his criticisms. To see the strength of this reading, it is necessary to look briefly at the Appendix to Part 1. There, Spinoza makes no effort to conceal his low opinion of the unenlightened masses and their custodians. He says, Hence it happens that one who seeks the true causes of miracles, and is eager, like an educated man, to understand natural things, not to wonder at them, like a fool, is generally considered and denounced as an impious heretic by those whom the people [vulgus] honor as interpreters of nature and the Gods. For they know that if ignorance is taken away, then foolish wonder, the only means they have of arguing and defending their authority, is also taken away. (1Appendix) On one side, there are the educated who seek the true causes of natural things while, on the other, the people the vulgus whose ignorance makes them easy prey for those who pose as interpreters of nature and the Gods. Convinced that everything exists and happens for the sake 6
of human beings, ordinary people explain and evaluate things accordingly, judging that what is most important in each thing is what is most useful to them, and to rate as most excellent all those things by which they were most pleased (1Appendix). Spinoza concludes, We see, therefore, that all the notions by which ordinary people [vulgus] are accustomed to explain nature are only modes of imagining, and do not indicate the nature of anything, only the constitution of the imagination. (1Appendix) The unenlightened never get beneath the surface of appearances. Their opinions reveal more about themselves and their idiosyncratic psychological states than anything else. If there were no alternative to the vulgar s anthropocentric prejudice, a strong case could be made that Spinoza s critique of evaluative language is intended to apply universally. But there is an alternative. For the perfection of things, Spinoza tells us, is to be judged solely from their nature and power; things are not more or less perfect because they please [delectant] or offend [offendunt] men s senses, or because they are of use to [conducunt], or are incompatible [repugnant] with, human nature (1Appendix, emphasis added). This is saying that the nature and power of things is the foundation of their perfection. What makes one thing more perfect than another is its greater nature and power. Thus the correct idea of perfection is the idea of a thing s nature and power. The vulgar misconceive perfection. They think that something is more perfect than another if it is more pleasing to the senses, or if it is more compatible with their confused idea of human nature, or both. The educated, by contrast, possess the correct idea. This is because the educated have apprehended the true causes of natural things. So the vulgar s ideas of perfection are mere modes of thinking, but not the educated person s. Just as not all ideas of perfection are inadequate, not all ideas of goodness are inadequate. The non-anthropocentric foundation of perfection also serves as the non-anthropocentric 7
foundation of goodness. A thing is more or less good insofar as it increases an individual s perfection (4Preface, 4p8d, 4AppV). The correct idea of goodness is about what makes an individual more perfect. It is about what enhances an individual s nature and power. As with the ideas of perfection and goodness, the same applies to models of human nature. Not all models are incorrect. Not all models presuppose an uncritical acceptance of appearances. The correct model is the idea of that which possesses the greatest amount of perfection. In the Preface to Part 4, then, Spinoza targets anthropocentric ideas of perfection, goodness, and human nature, not all ideas of perfection, goodness, and human nature. His own ideas of perfection, goodness, and human nature are not anthropocentric because they do not presuppose that the contents of sensory experience, including the sensory experiences of pleasantness and unpleasantness, straightforwardly reveal the nature and value of things. Spinoza, in other words, does not mistake the imagination for the intellect, as the vulgar do. It is therefore not the case that his model is inadequate by virtue of being a model of a natural object. Spinoza s critique of models in the Preface to Part 4 is, however, just the beginning of the free man s alleged inadequacy. The problem is not that it is a model of a natural object. The problem, it has been suggested, is that it is the idea of an unattainable goal, or ideal. 10 Only God, the infinite substance, is free (1p17c2). A man is a finite mode and, as such, cannot be free: It is impossible that a man should not be a part of Nature, and that he should be able to undergo no changes except those which can be understood through his own nature alone, and of which he is the adequate cause (4p4). A human being is inescapably subject to events that do not causally originate in his nature. To be free is to exist and act from one s nature alone (1D7). It 8
follows that a human being cannot be free. So Spinoza s model is an inadequate idea because it represents a state of perfect freedom, a state that no human being can actually achieve. A problem with this reading is that it rests on a notion of inadequacy that is external to Spinoza s philosophy. The notion in question is inadequacy in the sense of failure to comply with the maxim that ought implies can. The complaint is that because it is impossible to be free, freedom is not a legitimate ideal; it is not something that can be legitimately held up as something we ought to be. No one, after all, is answerable for doing something that it is not in his power to do. However, as prima facie compelling as these opinions are, there is no evidence they are Spinoza s. There is nothing in Spinoza s definition of adequate idea (2D4), for instance, that has to do with the ought-can maxim. By adequate idea, he says, I understand an idea which, insofar as it is considered in itself, without relation to an object, has all the properties, or intrinsic denominations of a true idea. Exp.: I say intrinsic to exclude what is extrinsic, namely, the agreement of the idea with its object (2D4). An adequate idea of an object, x, is one that makes possible a complete explanation of x. 11 A complete explanation of something includes all the causal and logical antecedents and consequences of the object. The adequate idea of a circle, for example, is one that contains the antecedent efficient causes, or defining features, such that all the properties of a circle are capable of being deduced from it (Letter 60). Likewise, the adequate idea of a particular finite thing is one that contains the antecedent efficient causes such that all the properties of the particular thing are capable of being deduced from it. Thus, deductive prolificacy is a requirement of adequacy, but there is no evidence that the ought-can maxim is a requirement of adequacy. 12 But even if Spinoza were to grant that satisfaction of the ought-can maxim is a condition of an idea s adequacy, it does not follow that his model is inadequate in virtue of being a 9
practical impossibility. From the supposition that no finite being can be perfectly free, it does not follow that no finite being can be free to some degree. And so long as a finite being can become progressively more and more free, a model of perfect freedom is not meaningless or useless. Consider an analogy. No living human being can be perfectly healthy, where perfect health includes invulnerability to disease and degeneration. Still, every living human being is healthy to some degree and can be healthier than they are. Under these circumstances a picture, or model, of perfect health provides practical guidance toward better health despite the fact that no one can actually be in perfect health. Therefore, in order for the idea of the free man to avoid being inadequate in the sense of being meaningless or useless as a practical guide, it is sufficient that those who look to it as a guide can make continual progress toward that ideal. So far I have examined two considerations that might appear to support the conclusion that the idea of the free man is an inadequate idea, but upon closer examination have found that they do not give us reason to accept that conclusion. The third consideration I turn to presently is the view that the idea of the free man is an inadequate idea because it is incoherent. 13 For Spinoza, a necessary condition of freedom is to exist from the necessity of one s nature alone (1D7). A mode is defined as that which is in another through which it is also conceived (1D5). Thus a mode is, by definition, causally and conceptually dependent on something other than itself. It follows that it is conceptually impossible for a mode to satisfy the first condition of freedom. The idea of a free man is therefore inadequate by virtue of being incoherent. The idea of a perfectly free finite thing is indeed incoherent and, as a result, inadequate. This is, I believe, indisputable. But it is not the case that, for Spinoza, the only available idea of 10
the free man is this incoherent and inconceivable idea. There is an idea of the free man that can be conceived. In support of this, the geometric order of demonstration strongly favors, if not requires, a coherent idea. In conformity with the geometric order, the propositions that make explicit mention of the free man (i.e., 4p67, 4p68, 4p69, 4p70, 4p71, 4p72) are derived from prior propositions and corollaries of the Ethics. The Free Man propositions therefore have, or are intended by Spinoza to have, the same epistemic status as any other set of propositions in the Ethics. Thus the propositions contain, or at least are meant to contain, a coherent idea of the free man. In addition to the geometric order, concrete textual support for this reading is found in the scholium of 4p68: P68: If men were born free, they would form no concept of good and evil so long as they remained free. Schol.: [A] It is evident from P4 that the hypothesis of this proposition is false, and [B] cannot be conceived unless we attend only to human nature, or rather to God [seu potiùs ad Deum], [C] not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar only as he is the cause of man s existence. (brackets mine) There are two things I wish to highlight in this passage. 14 First, Spinoza does not say that 4p68 s antecedent cannot be conceived, period. He says it cannot be conceived if our attention is not focused on the appropriate item. Second, Spinoza says that the appropriate item is God. The free man is inconceivable unless we are conceiving God. Shortly I will turn to the cryptic clause at the end, (C): not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar only as he is the cause man s existence. At present, I want only to emphasize that this passage indicates that in order to form a conception of the free man, it is necessary to focus our attention on God. 11
In the scholium of 4p68, then, (B) says that the free man cannot be conceived unless God is the object of our attention. In the next section I shall argue that the idea of the free man is an adequate idea. My immediate concern is to show that, for Spinoza, there is a conceivable idea of the free man. And (B) supports this conclusion. It suggests that the idea is inconceivable so long as the appropriate item is not given attention, leaving open that it can be conceived. Moreover, the fact that God is the appropriate item lends further support to this reading. This is because Spinoza holds that his idea of God is an adequate idea and is therefore conceivable. Since it is necessary to attend to God in order to conceive the free man and since God is conceivable, there is reason to believe that in Spinoza s view there is a conceivable idea of the free man. What is inconceivable is the idea of a perfectly free finite mode, such as a particular man, say, Socrates. A perfectly free Socrates is as inconceivable as to borrow his examples the angles of a triangle not being equal two rights angles or that from a given cause the effect does not follow (1p17c2s). However, this inconceivable and inadequate idea is not the only way of conceiving the free man. None of the considerations examined in this section thus constitutes a reason to think that Spinoza s model of human nature is, without qualification, an inadequate idea. The model does not presuppose the teleological prejudice that natural things are made for the sake of human beings, and so it is not inadequate in the sense of being anthropocentric. Because Spinoza does not make the ought-can maxim a condition of an idea s adequacy, his model is not inadequate despite the fact that it cannot be fully realized. Finally, though there is a sense in which the idea of the free man is incoherent and therefore inadequate, there is also a conceivable idea of the free man. In addition to the geometric order of demonstration, the scholium of 4p68 strongly supports this reading. The question is whether this idea is adequate or inadequate. 12
3. The Free Man: An Adequate Idea Some commentators have suggested that the idea of the free man, unlike other models of human nature, is an adequate idea, but that Spinoza does not make an explicit argument for this position. 15 There clearly is no explicit argument for it in the Preface to Part 4 where the notion of a model is introduced. The only thing we get there is the unsupported and within the context puzzling claim that we desire to form an idea of man, as a model of human nature which we may look to, which, even if true, does not single out one model over any other. At most what follows is that the greedy have a reason to form an idea of an ideally greedy man, the ambitious have a reason to form an idea of an ideally ambitious man, the envious an idea of an ideally envious man, and so forth. What Spinoza does not provide in 4Preface is a reason to think there is anything more to be said in favor of his model than any other. One desideratum for an interpretation is that it fill this explanatory gap. An interpretation that makes clear what sets Spinoza s model apart from other models is, other things being equal, more plausible, or has a stronger claim to our adherence, than one that does not. 16 The analysis of the previous section discloses that there is an idea of the free man that is not the idea of a perfectly free particular human being and that conceiving this alternative idea depends on making God the object of our attention. Attending to God is necessary for conceiving the free man. But the most plausible reading, I believe, is that attending to God is to conceive the free man. The idea of the free man is, strictly speaking, identical to the idea of God, not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar only as he is cause of man s existence. 13
Clearly a defense of this reading requires, among other things, an explanation of the fact that, by 4p68s, attending to God is merely necessary for conceiving the free man. To this end, let s return to the opening line of the scholium to 4p68: Schol.: [A] It is evident from P4 that the hypothesis of this proposition is false, and [B] cannot be conceived unless we attend [attendimus] only to human nature, or rather to God, [C] not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar only as he is the cause of man s existence. (brackets mine) (B) is about what cannot be conceived unless a certain condition obtains, and there is no reason to think that, for Spinoza, a condition required to conceive something is itself a constituent of the idea to be conceived. A necessary condition for conceiving God, on Spinoza s view, is being free of the anthropocentric prejudice that God acts for the sake of an end. But surely someone s being free of this particular prejudice does not constitute part of the idea of God, nor does the idea of someone being free of this prejudice. And there are perhaps countless other conditions necessary to conceive something, conditions that are not themselves constituents of the idea conceived, such as the cognitive power to conceive something, the absence of emotional turmoil, and the leisure to engage in contemplation. If one of these does not obtain, an idea cannot be conceived, regardless of the idea at stake. In 4p68s, then, attending to God in the specified way is said to be necessary but not sufficient to conceive the free man, not because attending to God is not at the same time conceiving the free man, but because, in addition to such attention, other factors are also necessary, such as being free of prejudices and not being subject to emotional turmoil. A person s prejudices and emotional turmoil are obstacles to conceiving anything at all. Yet, arriving at a conception of something is not a matter of attending to the absence of prejudices and emotional turmoil, with the exception of the idea of the absence of prejudices and emotional turmoil. That is to say, to conceive the absence of prejudice and emotional turmoil (supposing 14
that, for Spinoza, this can even be done), it is necessary to (1) be free of prejudices, (2) be free of emotional turmoil, and (3) attend to the absence of prejudices and emotional turmoil. Separately these (i.e., 1, 2, 3) are necessary while jointly they are sufficient. On this reading, Spinoza suggests that the free man cannot be conceived without attending to God because, out of all the conditions necessary for conceiving anything, it is the one condition that is unique to conceiving the free man. It is the one thing that makes a conception of the free man a conception of the free man and not a conception of, say, the Pythagorean theorem. For conceiving the free man requires everything that is required to conceive the Pythagorean theorem except that the former requires attention to God in the specified way. Conceiving the Pythagorean theorem, by contrast, requires attention to the geometric equation. At this point two questions are particularly pressing. First, is there any reason to think that what Spinoza means by attend (attendimus) in 4p68s is anything like my proposed reading supposes? Second, what does Spinoza mean by not insofar as he [God] is infinite, but insofar only as he is the cause of man s existence? I will address these questions in order. On my proposed reading, by attend in 4p68s Spinoza means, roughly, to make some object (x) the focus of intellectual perception. Attending to the nature of God, then, is a matter of making God the focus of intellectual perception; attending to the Pythagorean theorem is a matter of making the geometric equation the focus of intellectual perception, and so forth. That Spinoza has nothing more nor less than this built into his concept of attending is strongly supported by other occurrences of attend in the Ethics. For instance, consider scholium 2 of 1p8: I do not doubt that the demonstration of P7 will be difficult to conceive [concipere] for all who judge things confusedly, and have not been accustomed to know things through 15
their first causes because they do not distinguish between the modifications of substances and the substances themselves, nor do they know how things are produced. So it happens that they fictitiously ascribe to substances the beginning which they see that natural things have; for those who do not know the true causes of things confuse everything and without any conflict of mind feign that both trees and men speak, imagine that men are formed both from stones and from seed, and that any form whatever is changed into any other. So also, those who confuse the divine nature with the human easily ascribe human affects to God, particularly so long as they are also ignorant of how those affects are produced in the mind. But if men would attend [attenderent] to the nature of substance, they would have no doubt at all of the truth of P7. Indeed, this proposition would be an axiom for everyone, and would be numbered among the common notions. This is saying that there are a number of things that make the demonstration of 1p7 difficult to conceive, among which Spinoza includes judging things confusedly, not being accustomed to know things through their first causes, ignorance of how things are produced and a consequent susceptibility to believing anthropomorphic fictions, and, finally, failure to attend to the nature of substance. From this list, the last condition is the key to conceiving 1p7. If the nature of substance is the focus of intellectual perception, 1p7 is conceived. It is an axiom. But though attending to the nature of substance is the key to conceiving 1p7, other factors are also necessary. And these factors, along with attending to the nature of substance, are jointly sufficient for conceiving 1p7. The same use of attend is found in the scholium to 1p15 where Spinoza offers an explanation of our inclination to believe that corporeal substance is divisible. 17 This view of substance is a common mistake due to the common failure to make corporeal substance the focus of intellectual perception. It is rare that someone makes it the focus of perception because it is difficult to attend exclusively to the contents of the intellect. It is much easier to attend to the imagination, and in the imagination quantity is finite, divisible, and composed of parts (1p15s). Thus it is inattentiveness that accounts for the widespread but mistaken belief that corporeal substance is divisible. 16
Like the cases of conceiving 1p7 and corporeal substance, conceiving the free man is a matter of making a certain item the focus of intellectual perception. But this is easier said than done. To make something the focus of intellectual perception requires rigorous effort, whereas attending to the contents of the imagination comes all too easily. Now, in conceiving the free man, what is it that ought to be made the focus of intellectual perception? Spinoza s suggestion is human nature, or rather to God [seu potiùs ad Deum], [C] not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar only as he is the cause of man s existence (4p68s). As Curley notes, Spinoza generally uses sive or seu to mark an equivalence and uses aut or vel to mark an alternative. 18 So the fact that Spinoza uses seu in this context creates a presumption in favor of a reading on which human nature is being equated with God where God is understood in the sense spelled out in (C). On the face of it, (C) is paradoxical. The denial that it is God insofar as he is infinite points to natura naturata, and the claim that it is God insofar as he is a cause points to natura naturans (1p29s). Fortunately, in this case Spinoza provides some help, and that comes from his appeal to 4p4 at the outset of the scholium. Note, however, that in the Latin, (C) reads: non quatenus infinitus, sed quatenus tantummodò causa est, cur homo existat, patet ex 4. Propositione hujus Partis. Here, what Curley translates as It is evident from P4 and places at the beginning of the passage does not actually appear until the very end. Its occurrence at the end brings out more clearly that, for Spinoza, 4p4 not only makes evident the falsity of the hypothesis of 4p68, but also the fact that in order to conceive the hypothesis it is necessary to attend to God insofar as God is the cause of man s existence. Like 4p68s, proposition 4 of Part 4 contains two claims: (1) It is impossible that a man should not be a part of Nature, and (2) that it is impossible that he should be able to undergo 17
no changes except those which can be understood through his own nature alone, and of which he is the adequate cause. Corresponding to these two claims, the demonstration includes two separate demonstrations, an argument for claim (1) and a separate argument for (2). The argument for (1) comes first, and it is this argument that provides an important clue to understanding the scholium of 4p68. It reads: Dem.: [i] The power by which singular things (and consequently, [any] man) preserve their being is the power itself of God, or Nature (by IP24C), not insofar as it is infinite, but insofar as it can be explained through the man s actual essence (by IIIP7). The man s power, therefore, insofar as it is explained through his actual essence, is part of God or Nature s infinite power, that is (by IP34), of its essence. This was the first point. (underline mine) Because the scholium of 4p68 is said to follow from 4p4, this strongly suggests that the underlined clause above is at least extensionally equivalent to (C). Thus apprehending the meaning of (C) is a matter of apprehending this line from 4p4 s demonstration. For this purpose, the appearance of the conatus doctrine 3p7 is instructive: The striving by which each thing strives to persevere in its being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing (3p7). This is instructive because Spinoza appeals to it in support of the claim that man s power is the power of God, not insofar as it is infinite, but insofar as it can be explained through the man s actual essence. Thus the striving to persevere in being that constitutes the actual essence of each thing is the power in question. The conatus is the power of God insofar as God s power can be explained through man s actual essence. It follows that the conatus is that which, according to 4p68s, we need to make the focus of intellectual perception in order to conceive the free man. The conatus is human nature, or God. It is God as the cause of man s existence. 19 The idea of the free man, then, is the idea of the conatus. 20 It is the idea of God s power expressed in a singular thing. Being an expression of God s power is an essential property of all 18
singular things, however. So the idea of the free man is not an idea of human nature where this is a property exclusive to human beings. Rather, it is the idea of the nature of singular things. It is a representation of the nature of my desk as well as myself even if my desk and I do not express God s power to the same degree. Still, if the aforementioned equivalence between (C) and the not insofar as clause of 4p4d obtains, this analysis can be taken a step further. Under the attribute of thought, the idea of the free man is the model of an adequate idea, or of adequate cognition. This is evident, not from Spinoza s official definition of adequate idea (2D4), but from the account of it he gives in 2p11c: From this it follows that the human mind is a part of the infinite intellect of God. Therefore, when we say that the human mind perceives this or that, we are saying nothing but that God, not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is explained through the nature of the human mind, or insofar as he constitutes the essence of the human mind, has this or that idea. That he is speaking here about perceiving an adequate idea is clear from his later use of this corollary, such as in the demonstration of 2p40 where it is the sole premise marshaled in support of the claim, Whatever ideas follow in the mind from ideas which are adequate in the mind are also adequate (cf. 2p34d, 2p38d, 2p39d, 2p43d). 2p11c, on this reading, is an ancestor of Spinoza s remark in 4p68s that to conceive the free man it is necessary to attend to human nature, or rather to God, not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar only as he is cause of man s existence. This is supported by the fact that the latter is a descendent of 4p4, in the demonstration of which, as we have seen, Spinoza says that man s power is the power of God, or Nature (by 1P24C), not insofar as it is infinite, but insofar as it can be explained through the man s actual essence (IIIP7). This, it seems, is an attribute-neutral translation of the claim in 2p11c that when we say that the human mind perceives this or that, 19
we are saying nothing but that God, not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is explained through the nature of the human mind... has this or that idea. When a man adequately perceives an object (x), this is identical to the idea of (x) that God has, not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as God s power is the power that the man expresses. Man s power is a share of God s power of adequate cognition. Therefore, if we attend only to a man s power of adequate cognition, we are thereby conceiving the free man, the free man conceived under the attribute of thought. Is the idea of the free man, on this interpretation, the idea of a finite or of an infinite being? 21 The idea of the free man, I have argued, is the idea of an essential property of singular things, namely, the property of being an expression of God s power. Some singular things express more of God s power than others and thereby realize (actualize) this essential property to a greater extent than others, but no singular thing has infinite power (4p4d). The latter, we saw earlier, is conceptually impossible. But from this it would be a mistake to conclude that the idea of the free man is the idea of a finite property. Being an expression of God s power is an essential property of singular things, or finite modes, as well as infinite modes. Every existent besides God is an expression of God s power and is so essentially (1p15, 1p36d). Thus the idea of the free man, as the idea of being an expression of God s power, does not discriminate between the finite and the infinite. It is simply the idea of being an expression of God s power and, as such, is the idea of the essence of all existents except God. Recall that one desideratum for any interpretation is that it explain what sets Spinoza s model apart from others. This is satisfied on my proposed reading. No doubt other models are imaginable. Philosophers have imagined other models. Non-philosophers have imagined still others. And it can seem as if all such models are on a par with the free man as if a person 20
whose strongest desire is a desire for wealth has as much reason to form an idea of the model of greed as Spinoza has reason to form the idea of a model of freedom. But this appearance is misleading and results from inattention. It arises from the failure to make our nature and power our nature as modes of God s attribute of thought and our power of adequate cognition the focus of intellectual perception. For the perfection of things, Spinoza says, is to be judged solely from their nature and power (1Appendix). So all of us have a desire to form an idea of man, as a model of human nature which we may look to, but not all of us have reason to form an idea of the person we most desire to be. This is because there is only one model that answers to our essence, and that is the model of reason itself. It is hard to imagine that a reader of the Ethics can have any doubt that there is an adequate idea of this model. 4. Conclusion Although it was not a popular doctrine among twentieth-century analytic philosophers and historians of philosophy, central to Spinoza s ethical theory is a model of human nature and, as for many thinkers before him, God serves as Spinoza s model. The question is not whether the idea of a model of human nature does any work for Spinoza in Part 4 of the Ethics, but, rather, whether the model he puts to work there is an inadequate or an adequate idea. On the interpretation I have defended, it is inadequate from one perspective and adequate from another. Regarded as the idea of a perfectly free finite thing, the idea of the free man is incoherent and, as a result, inadequate. However, regarded as the idea of the perfection of our nature and power, the idea of the free man is a way of conceiving God and, as a result, an adequate idea. This Janus-faced character of the free man is, it seems, deliberate. The free man s two faces mirror the two sides of human, or modal, existence: as subjects of external causal forces 21
(4p4), on the one hand, and as determinate expressions of God s power (1p25c, 3p6d), on the other. So to view the image of the free man, as Garrett suggests, as calculated to appeal to, or exploit, the imagination, 22 is correct as far as it goes. The inadequate but vivid face of the free man serves as a powerful motivational tool insofar as it captivates the imagination. Indeed, this use of a model appears to be an application of one of the therapeutic techniques Spinoza enumerates in Ethics Part 5 (e.g., 5p10s). 23 But Spinoza s model has value apart from its therapeutic value. That is to say, the adequate but unvarnished face of the free man is the metaphysical foundation of our physical, emotional, and intellectual lives. As we come to know and love that reality, we come to know and love ourselves, and vice versa. 24 The model is therefore a representation of our highest good and highest virtue (4p28). It is a way of conceiving our final end: participation in the nature of God. 25 22
1 Jonathan Bennett, A Study of Spinoza s Ethics [A Study] (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1984), 296. Cf. Edwin Curley, Behind the Geometrical Method: A Reading of Spinoza s Ethics [Behind the Method] (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), 123 and n44. 2 George Santayana, The Ethical Doctrine of Spinoza, The Harvard Monthly, March, 1886, to July, 1886, volume II, 148; Don Garrett, Spinoza s Ethical Theory, in The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza, ed. Don Garrett (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 288-289; J. B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 218; Charles Jarrett, Spinoza on the Relativity of Good and Evil, in Spinoza: Metaphysical Themes, eds. Olli Koistinen and John Biro (Oxford University Press, 2002), 164; Bernard Rousset, Recta Ratio, in Spinoza on Reason and the Free Man, eds. Yirmiyahu Yovel and Gideon Segal (New York: Little Room Press, 2004), 9-10; Dan Garber, Dr. Fischelson s Dilemma: Spinoza on Freedom and Necessity [ Dr. Fischelson s Dilemma ] in Spinoza on Reason and the Free Man, eds. Yirmiyahu Yovel and Gideon Segal (New York: Little Room Press, 2004), 202. 3 Henry Allison, Benedict de Spinoza: An Introduction [Benedict de Spinoza] revised edition (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1987), 142-143; Steven Nadler, Spinoza s Ethics: An Introduction [Spinoza s Ethics] (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 219. 4 I follow Edwin Curley s translations from his The Collected Works of Spinoza [Collected Works], Volume 1 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1985). For the Latin I consult Spinoza Opera, ed. Carl Gebhardt (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1925). In citations to the Ethics, I use the following abbreviations: a means axiom; p means proposition; d means demonstration; D means definition; c means corollary; s means scholium. For example, 4p68s means Ethics, Part 4, proposition 68, scholium. 23
5 Though a minority position in the secondary literature, some have maintained that in Spinoza s view there ultimately is no solid ground for evaluative language. For instance, in the introduction to their collection of essays, Koistinen and Biro suggest that Spinoza is a proponent of an error theory in ethics ( Introduction, in Spinoza: Metaphysical Themes, eds. Olli Koistinen and John Biro (Oxford University Press, 2002), 8). Also, in his introduction to Essays on Moral Realism, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord says, Early defenders of the error theory in ethics include Hume (on some plausible interpretations) and Spinoza, who argues that good and evil are nothing but modes in which the imagination is affected in different ways, and, nevertheless, they are regarded by the ignorant as being specially attributes of things ( Introduction: The Many Moral Realisms, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988), 10). Also see George Santayana, The Ethical Doctrine of Spinoza, The Harvard Monthly, March, 1886, to July, 1886, volume II. 6 Commenting on the quoted passage, Henry Allison says, Although this sudden reversal is perplexing and raises a number of questions regarding Spinoza s intentions, the most reasonable reading is that he is suggesting that the problem with traditional morality is not that it appeals to a model of human nature, but that it appeals to a bad model, one based on inadequate ideas (Benedict de Spinoza, 142-143). I agree with Allison that part of Spinoza s point is that traditional morality is based on bad models. My aim in this paper is to specify what it is that in Spinoza s view serves as the adequate idea of human nature. On the reading I defend, the adequate model of human nature is a way of conceiving God. 7 J. B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 218. 8 Garrett, Spinoza s Ethical Theory, 288-289. Garrett does not hold that Spinoza s critique of models in 4Preface entails that the idea of the free man is an inadequate idea of the imagination. 24
Garrett s view of the inadequacy of that idea is based on its incoherence, not the critique of models. The incoherence charge is the third of the three considerations I discuss in the present section of the paper. 9 C. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1930), 49; Edwin Curley, 1973, Spinoza s Moral Philosophy, in Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Marjorie Grene (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), 371; also see Curley, Behind the Method, 119-124; Bennett, A Study, 284, 290-293; Allison, Benedict de Spinoza, 142-143; Don Garrett, A Free Man Always Acts Honestly, Not Deceptively : Freedom and the Good in Spinoza s Ethics, in Spinoza: Issues and Directions, eds. Edwin Curley and Pierre- François Moreau (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990), 229; also see Garrett, Spinoza s Ethical Theory, 287; Jarrett, Spinoza on the Relativity of Good and Evil, 164-165; Nadler, Spinoza s Ethics, 209-210, 218-220. 10 Garber, Dr. Fischelson s Dilemma, 202. 11 Allison, Benedict de Spinoza, 41 and 103; Nadler, Spinoza s Ethics, 164. 12 It is evident that Spinoza is committed to the denial of one common way of understanding the ought-can maxim. For that maxim is often understood as entailing that some causal agents have moral responsibility that certain agents possess the extraordinary contra-causal power that underwrites the ability to do otherwise. However, on Spinoza s view, the possession and exercise of that ability would elevate such beings in the natural world to a dominion within a dominion and entail that man disturbs, rather than follows, the order of Nature, that he has absolute power over his actions, and that he is determined only by himself (3Preface). For Spinoza, not even God possesses this sort of power (1p32, 1p32c1, 1p33s2). 13 Garrett, Spinoza s Ethical Theory, 289; Garber, Dr. Fischelson s Dilemma, 203. 25
14 In Latin the opening passage of 4p68s reads: Hujus Propositionis hypothesin falsam esse, nec posse concipi, nisi quatenus ad solam naturam humanam, seu potiùs ad Deum attendimus, non quatenus infinitus, sed quatenus tantummodò causa est, cur homo existat, patet ex 4. Propositione hujus Partis (Spinoza Opera, ed. Carl Gebhardt (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1925), 261. 15 Nadler, Spinoza s Ethics, 219; Jarrett, Spinoza on the Relativity of Good and Evil, 164. 16 Regarding the status of Spinoza s model, Nadler writes, Naturally, this objectivization of good and evil will work only if Spinoza can provide some objectivity for what he will claim is the ideal human being what he will later in Part Four call the free man or the person who lives according to the dictate of reason. Why should this conception of a human being, Spinoza s model of human nature [naturae humanae exemplar], be privileged? Why should it have an advantage over any other model of a human being that we might conceive? Unless he can provide a satisfactory answer to this question, he cannot escape the subjectivism that seems to be inherent in his relativization of good and evil to modes of thinking. Spinoza, unfortunately, does not explicitly offer any response to this challenge (Spinoza s Ethics, 219). Nadler goes on to offer a way of meeting this challenge on Spinoza s behalf. He suggests that the advantage Spinoza s own model has over others is that it is the one that a rational individual, acting from knowledge, will necessarily desire (from his striving to increase his powr of acting) and endeavor to achieve (Spinoza s Ethics, 219-220). This is certainly an advantage Spinoza s model has over others, but the key advantage, I argue, is that the model is a way of conceiving God and is, as a result, an adequate idea of human nature. 17 For additional instances of this use of attend, see the last line of the scholium to 1p11 and the opening line of the demonstration to 1p16. 26